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Plato describes a way of reasoning that comprises two complementary operations, 
collection and division. Collection unifies many into one while division divides one into 
many. In other words, while collection brings together many parts into a whole, division 
divides a whole into many parts. While Plato goes into some detail in his observations on 
collection and division, several questions remain unanswered. More specifically, the 
means by which collection and division operate, their product, and their relation to 
deductive and non-deductive reasoning are uncertain. The purpose of this study is to shed 
light on collection and division by defending the following thesis: collection and division 
define logical frameworks that underlie both deductive and non-deductive reasoning.   
Chapter 1 will introduce collection and division by reviewing recent literature, 
defining key terms, and discussing illustrations of collection and division in the dialogues. 
Chapter 2 will explain how collection and division define logical frameworks through 
three operations: seeing, naming, and placing. These operations will be discussed in 
terms of their relations to reasoning about wholes and parts. Chapter 3 will present four 
models for interpreting the logical structures that are produced by collection and division. 
It will present the argument that collection and division define non-hierarchical structures 
of overlapping parts. Chapter 4 will present the argument that collection and division 
define whole-part relations that underlie deductive reasoning on the one hand, and the 
formulation of definitions in dialogues such as the Sophist and the Statesman on the other. 
Chapter 5 will explore the relation between collection and division and non-deductive 
reasoning. It will present the argument that Meno’s definition of virtue and Euthyphro’s 
definition of piety are formulated using collection and division. Chapter 6 will provide a 
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summary of key points from the preceding chapters and discuss unanswered questions 
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In his dialogues Plato illustrates a form of reasoning that comprises two 
complementary ways of thinking, collection and division. Collection and division are 
wide in scope: they give us the ability to speak and to think (Phaedrus 266b) and provide 
a means by which all the discoveries of the arts are made (Philebus 16c). They are 
illustrated extensively in the definitions of the Sophist and the Statesman and they are 
described as an ancient method of discovery in the Philebus. But the means by which 
they operate, their results, and their relation to other forms of reasoning are open to 
question. For example, do collection and division comprise a deductive method, or are 
they completely removed from such forms of reasoning as the syllogistic? What is their 
relation to non-deductive reasoning? This study will present the argument that collection 
and division define structures that serve as the basis for syllogistic inference as well as 
other forms of reasoning. In short, the purpose of this study is to shed light on collection 
and division by defending the following thesis: collection and division define logical 
frameworks that underlie both deductive and non-deductive reasoning.  
The dialogues in which collection and division are most extensively discussed are 
the Phaedrus, Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus. In the Philebus, Socrates states that the 
method of collection and division is the way through which all the discoveries of the arts 
are made (“πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόμενα ἀνηυρέθη πώποτε διὰ ταύτης φανερὰ γέγονε” 
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1; 16c). More importantly, he also states that collection and division give us the ability “to 
speak and to think” (“λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν”; Phaedrus 266b), and in the Sophist it is 
stated that the method aims at “acquiring intelligence” (“κτήσασθαι γὰρ ἕνεκα νοῦν”; 
227b). These statements indicate that collection and division, like logic and reasoning in 
general, are very wide in scope, and it will be argued below that these dialogues show 
that collection and division are not confined to a particular domain such as psychology, 
mathematics or linguistics; rather, collection and division underlie and shape thinking in 
general.   
This raises the question as to the relation between collection and division and 
logic. I will argue that the logical frameworks defined by collection and division are 
necessary for deductive reasoning. In other words, without whole-part relations defined 
by collection and division, deduction is not possible. In this sense, the mereological 
structures produced by collection and division provide a basis for deductive inference. 
However, while collection and division are necessary for deductive reasoning in the sense 
that they lay the groundwork upon which such reasoning moves, in and of themselves 
they are not sufficient for deductive reasoning. They facilitate the formulation of sound 
arguments but they do not provide all of the necessary components for valid deductive 
inference. This is also the case for non-deductive arguments: while the whole-part 
relations necessary to formulate a non-deductive argument are defined through collection 
and division, the argument itself is constructed through another way of reasoning such as, 
for example, the method of elenchus. Thus, by ‘logical framework’ is meant a structure 
of whole-part relations through which deductive and non-deductive argumentation 
                                                 
1 Quotations of Plato in Greek are from J. Burnet, Platonis opera, vols. 1-4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press) via 
Thesaurus Linguae Graecae and print sources.  
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operates. In other words, a logical framework defined by collection and division is a 
mereo-logical framework, i.e., a set of interrelated parts that provides the basis for other 
forms of reasoning.2  
When collection and division are referred to as a “method,” the term ‘method’ is 
being used in the ancient sense of ‘μεθ-όδος’ – i.e., a figurative route or road. Thus, in the 
context of collection and division, a method is a way by which reasoning makes its way 
to an endpoint such as a definition. In this sense, collection and division do not constitute 
a logical method in the modern sense of the term, i.e., as a rule-based procedure for 
constructing valid arguments. Rather, as will be argued below, collection and division 
constitute a way of reasoning that enables the reasoner to discern, articulate and order the 
parts of a whole.  
To illustrate the ways in which collection and division operate, this work will 
focus on dialogues in which collection and division are explicitly described and 
illustrated: the Phaedrus, the Sophist, the Statesman, and the Philebus.3 While some of 
the themes of the earlier dialogues overlap with the above dialogues, it is beyond the 
scope of this work to discuss them in detail. More specifically, topics such as the theory 
of Forms as described in the Republic, the method of hypothesis in the Phaedo, and 
arguments concerning teleology will not be discussed in detail. Rather, this work will 
focus on defending the claim that collection and division define frameworks that underlie 
deductive and non-deductive reasoning. Therefore, instead of discussing themes that play 
                                                 
2 While a framework provides the necessary conditions under which a deductive argument can be 
constructed, in fact the reasoner may reason incorrectly and reach the wrong conclusion even in cases 
where a framework makes a valid deductive inference possible. This is discussed further in Section 1.3.4. 
 
3 However, as will be explained below, Chapter 5 is exceptional for the reason that its purpose is to show 
that collection and division, as a way of reasoning based on wholes and parts, are not limited to the 




prominent roles in the earlier dialogues, I will discuss passages in the aforementioned 
dialogues that shed light on how these frameworks are constructed and their relationship 
to other forms of reasoning. 
Dialectic is another topic that will not be discussed in detail.4 In contradistinction 
to dialectic as described in the Republic, I will argue that collection and division in their 
elementary form constitute a way of reasoning that is more akin to the term ‘διαλέγεσθαι’ 
as it is employed in the definition of thinking (“διανοεῖσθαι”) at 189e-190a in the 
Theaetetus. In this passage, the term is employed to define thinking as a conversation of 
the soul with itself.5 As a common form of reasoning, διαλέγεσθαι in this sense agrees 
with the claim made by Socrates that collection and division allow us “to speak and to 
think” (“λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν”; Phaedrus 266b).  
The intimate connection between collection and division on the one hand, and 
everyday thought and speech on the other, is one of the key aspects of collection and 
division that is explored in this work. Evidence of collection and division in the earlier 
dialogues complements their portrayal in the Sophist and the Statesman as a deliberately-
applied procedure. The Meno and the Euthyphro were chosen in this regard for two 
reasons. First, as earlier dialogues in the Platonic corpus, they show that the driving force 
behind collection and division – the discernment, naming, and ordering of parts within a 
whole – is at work even in everyday reasoning. Clearly, neither Meno nor Euthyphro are 
practicing any particular procedure or “method” in the modern sense of the word when 
they initially formulate their definitions of virtue and piety, respectively, nor are they 
                                                 
4 By ‘dialectic’ is meant the procedure for investigating Forms as described in Book VII of the Republic. In 
Section 1.4.2 below I argue along with commentators such as Ackrill that while the method of collection 
and division is closely associated with dialectic, it is not identical to it.  
 
5 Theaetetus 189e-190a is discussed further in Section 1.5.3 below. 
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philosophers who are trained in a particular way of reasoning. It is for these reasons that 
they make interesting test cases to determine if collection and division operate behind the 
scenes to allow them “to speak and to think” about virtue and piety in the midst of a 
conversation. In Chapter 5 I will argue that this is indeed the case; i.e., a specific way of 
reasoning – reasoning in terms of wholes and parts for the purpose of arriving at a 
definition – is at work even as Meno and Euthyphro formulate their definitions in 
response to Socrates’ questioning. Second, I chose these two dialogues because while 
they both parallel the method as it is illustrated in the Phaedrus, they also exhibit features 
of collection and division that are not apparent in other dialogues. In the case of the Meno, 
I will argue that Meno’s definition of virtue fails precisely because it is an incomplete 
application of collection and division. For this reason it is useful as a negative case that 
points out what is needed to fully develop a coherent definition using collection and 
division. In this sense, Meno’s description of virtue is not unlike the “scattered many” of 
the Phaedrus (265d; see Section 2.2.1.2) upon which collection and division operate, 
only in Meno’s case the process of bringing the nameless many into a coherent whole 
remains unfinished. The Euthyphro, on the other hand, is especially interesting because it 
shows that collection and division do not always focus on universals; i.e., they also 
operate on collections of individuals. For example, a human lineage can be seen as a 
whole in which the parts are members of a family. In fact, as I will argue in Section 5.4.2, 
the reasoning behind Euthyphro’s definition of piety parallels the division of love and 
madness in the Phaedrus in this respect. In short, the Meno and the Euthyphro are 
discussed because they resemble in key respects the illustrations of collection and 
division in other dialogues such as the Phaedrus, and because they illustrate how whole-
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part reasoning underlies the formulation of definitions even in cases where a procedure is 
not being deliberately employed.  
As stated above, the result of collection and division can be understood as a 
logical framework that underlies other forms of reasoning. This claim raises the question 
as to what is meant by the term ‘logic.’ In Section 1.5.3 (pg. 74) a working definition of 
logic will be presented: ‘logic’ is to be understood as a way of reasoning that is oriented 
toward a goal or endpoint. Given this definition, I will argue that collection and division  
constitute a basic form of logic. However, even if this is the case, the question remains as 
to whether there is any value in studying them aside from whatever light they may shed 
on Plato’s way of thinking. In the preface to Truth, etc.: Six Lectures on Ancient Logic, 
Jonathan Barnes states the following:   
 
Most contemporary logicians have little interest in the history—or at least in the 
ancient history—of their subject. No doubt they suppose that their long-dead 
colleagues have little or nothing to teach them, and perhaps they prefer the present 
and the future to the past. If that is so, then it must be confessed that their supposition 
is quite true: no logician has anything to learn from a study of Aristotle; and the pages 
of this book make no contribution to logic or to philosophy (vi). 
 
 
If Barnes’ claim that most contemporary logicians have little interest in the ancient 
history of logic is true, it simply raises the question as to whether contemporary logicians 
have anything to gain from the study of ancient logic. As for Barnes’ stronger claim that 
contemporary logicians have “nothing to learn” from “their long-dead colleagues,” 
logicians such as Graham Priest disagree. Far from dismissing logicians of the past as 
irrelevant, Priest emphasizes that significant discoveries have been forgotten over the 
centuries. At the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy Conference in 2012, he 
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stated that “things come and things go in the history of the logic that we teach.” (Priest, 
“Revising Logic”). Priest emphasized that “stuff gets forgotten … with the rise of 
humanism in the 15th-16th century, the great advances in Medieval logic were all 
forgotten” (“Revising Logic”). He states that this was not a rational change; rather, 
scholasticism fell out of favor to be replaced by a kind of “bowdlerized form of 
traditional logic” that we see in Kant’s logic, for example (Priest, “Revising Logic”). 
Priest is not claiming that all changes are for sociological reasons, and real progress is 
made in some cases.6 However, Priest is correct when he claims that important 
discoveries in logic are forgotten. A commonly-cited example is the logic of the Stoics, 
which had been largely forgotten over the centuries and then resurrected in the 20th 
century as propositional logic; scholars such as Josiah Gould state that in the Stoics’ 
theory of deduction “one finds an astonishing number of anticipations of work in modern 
logical theory” (166). Similarly, John Corcoran states that one “crucial” possibility is the 
following:    
 
…the ancients had insights, perhaps even fairly well developed theories, which are 
substantially better than our own views on the same topics … I think that we have a 
responsibility to make it impossible for future generations to say of us that, for 
example, had we understood the Categories, we would have been able to develop 
theories of semantics far superior to those that we are now developing. In other words, 
I think that we must look at the ancients with the hope of finding in them doctrines 
and ideas which would be substantial contributions to modern linguistics and logic 
(186-187).  
 
Corcoran also states that “Attempts to understand ancient theories seem to force us to 
reconsider the fundamental and enduring questions concerning logic and language. As we 
all sadly know, successful technical advances have a tendency to engender trains of 
                                                 
6 The advances made in mathematical logic in the 19th century serve as an example. 
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imitative variations which cloud fundamental issues” (187). These observations are a far 
cry from Barnes’ claim that contemporary logicians have little or nothing to learn from 
ancient logic. In my view, Priest, Gould, and Corcoran are correct; in general, the study 
of ancient logic is invaluable for recovering ideas and methods that have been forgotten 
or overlooked. 
Ancient thought plays a prominent role in contemporary mathematics as well as 
logic, and some of the basic concepts that underlie collection and division are evident in 
both modern logic and mathematics. Cantor, the co-founder of set theory, drew his 
inspiration for the notion of a set from the idea of collection as described in the Philebus. 
Hauser states that there is a “substantive connection between Plato’s mature theory of 
ideas” and Cantor’s theory of sets (784). Cantor’s Grundlagen einer allgemeinen 
Mannichfaltigkeitslehr, published in 1883, employs concepts from the Philebus – ἄπειρον 
(unlimited), πέρας (limited), and μεικτόν (mixed) – to explain sets as collections, the 
latter of which are compared to the Platonic εἶδος (Hauser 785). Menzel argues similarly. 
In fact, the concept of μεικτόν was employed by Cantor to overcome a long-standing 
impediment to the study of infinity. Menzel states,  
 
…in likening sets to the meikta of the Philebus Cantor was challenging an 
ancient, well-entrenched philosophical position which had associated, even 
identified, the infinite with the indeterminate. To the contrary … Cantor showed 
that infinite sets are no less open to mathematical determination than finite sets, 
and are thus no less legitimate (97). 
 
This is a good example of how ancient ideas can influence contemporary mathematics, 
and it is worth noting that the use of sets is widespread in mathematical logic. For 
example, the alphabet and logical connectives of a system of logic such as propositional 
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logic or first-order logic are typically defined as sets. While it is beyond the scope of this 
study to explore in-depth the relations between set theory, logic and Plato’s writings, that 
there are such relations underscores the relevance of collection and division to modern 
thought. 
In short, the importance of investigating the method of collection and division is 
three-fold. First, it will shed light on a good portion of Plato’s later dialogues. Collection 
and division occupy center stage in the Statesman and the Sophist, and they play a 
prominent role in the Philebus and the Phaedrus. For Plato, collection and division are a 
means to attain clarity and truth in all areas of inquiry; as such, they constitute the means 
by which deep philosophical questions are explored in the later dialogues. Second, by 
formulating a definition of logic and determining the relation between logic and 
collection and division, we can gain a better understanding of the development of systems 
of deductive logic such as the syllogistic. This will be discussed primarily in Chapter 4, 
where it will be argued that the basis of a syllogism is a logical framework produced by 
collection and division. Third, as explained above, collection and division have shaped 
and informed important developments in modern mathematics. Collection and division 
have been, and are, important in both ancient and modern thought. 
However, precisely what collection and division are and how they operate is open 
to debate, and recent commentators have remarked on the difficulty of defining the nature 
and purpose of collection and division. James Philip observes that we have “the evidence 
of the dialogues for the theory and practice of division ... But though we cannot doubt the 
importance it assumed, its nature and purpose is nowhere clearly defined ... And even if 
the dialogues provided us with clear answers to problems of form, there remain problems 
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concerning the nature of the method” (337). Similarly, Griswold states that in the 
Phaedrus, “The discussion of the art of division and collection is itself an effort to reach 
a definition ... Although great emphasis is placed on the exactitude of the method, the 
method itself does not receive an exact formulation. The descriptions vary from one 
another in nontrivial ways, and no one of them mentions all the important points” (188-
189).  
Nonetheless, important points can be gleaned from the dialogues to sketch a 
picture of what collection and division are, how they operate, and what they produce.  
In Section 1.2 below, four dialogues will be discussed to give an outline of collection and 
division. In Section 1.3, a more focused discussion of three passages will be presented for 
the purpose of introducing three operations, seeing, naming, and placing, through which 
collection and division construct logical frameworks. Section 1.4 will introduce some of 
the debates and unanswered questions about collection and division by reviewing recent 
literature, while Section 1.5 will discuss key terms that are especially relevant in the 
following chapters. Section 1.6 will discuss the origin and purpose of collection and 
division and present the argument that collection and division are wide in scope: they are 
not restricted to only one domain of inquiry. 
 
1.2 Four illustrations of collection and division 
 
The scope of collection and division in the Platonic corpus is debated – some 
claim that collection and division, or at least suggestions of them, appear in dialogues 
such as the Republic and Gorgias, and M.L. Gill claims that collection occurs in the 
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Meno (“The Divine Method” 36). However, the Phaedrus, the Sophist, the Statesman, 
and the Philebus are commonly held to be representative of collection and division. The 
Phaedrus presents the first extended discussion of collection and division as a unified 
way of reasoning. In this dialogue, collection and division are used to delineate different 
kinds of madness (μανία) and to clarify the nature of love (ἔρως). In the Sophist, the 
definition of the angler serves as a paradigmatic example of collection and division as a 
step-by-step procedure. In this case, as with the Statesman, the method aims to arrive at a 
definition or characterization of a representative individual. Unlike the Phaedrus, the 
Sophist and the Statesman present a picture of a procedure in which step-by-step details 
reveal some of the inner workings of the method of collection and division. In addition, 
taken as a whole, the Sophist and the Statesman reveal that the results of collection and 
division are defeasible; e.g., the definition of the sophist is revised six times before the 
conclusion is reached. The last dialogue to be discussed below is the Philebus, where the 
method is employed to discover the parts of a continuum, φωνή (sound). Despite the 
different presentations of collection and division in the four dialogues, collection and 
division as a way of reasoning (λόγος) is a common thread that runs through these 
dialogues. As an introduction to collection and division, these four dialogues will be 
discussed in more detail below in Sections 1.2.1-1.2.4.  
 
1.2.1 Collection and division in the Phaedrus 
 
In the Phaedrus, collection and division are referred to as two εἴδη, each of which 
plays a complementary role in a unified pair of operations. Collection is used to bring 
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together into one idea what Socrates calls “ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας” (Phaedrus 265e) – this is 
translated as “irrationality” (Hackforth, Phaedrus 133) or “mental derangements” (A. 
Nehamas and P. Woodruff in Plato 542). Elsewhere in the Phaedrus the same idea is 
referred to as “μανίας” (265a) and “παρανοίας” (266a) – i.e., “madness” (Goold 535; 
Hackforth, Phaedrus 133). In any case, all of these expressions refer to a single “εἶδος”  
or “kind.” Division “cuts” (διατέμνειν) this unified idea into two parts, human and divine 
(265a). The former is described as being the “left-hand” (σκαιόν) part of madness, the 
latter as the “right-hand” (δεξιᾷ) part. In turn, the single εἶδος of divine madness is 
divided into four parts: using Griswold’s translation, these are the prophetic (μαντικός), 
mystic (τελεστικήν), poetic (ποιητικήν), and erotic (ἐρωτικὴν) sub-kinds of divine 
madness (265b; Griswold 179). Figure 1, reproduced from Griswold’s Self-Knowledge in 
Plato’s Phaedrus, illustrates the relations between the parts of madness described by 
Socrates. 
 
Fig. 1. The parts of madness. Charles Griswold, Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus 
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986) 179. Print. 
 
At Phaedrus 265d, collection begins with the disparate and unnamed “πολλαχῇ 
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διεσπαρμένα” (“scattered in many ways”). Griswold points out that “whether the 
dispersed things are particular objects, forms, [or] sense perceptions is not specified” 
(179). Thus, the intended referent of “πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα” is unclear and a spectrum 
of possible interpretations is left open. Perhaps “πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα” are not specified 
because doing so would imply that collection operates within a specific domain. As will 
be argued in Section 1.6.3 (pg. 88), collection is all-inclusive: it can be applied to both 
the intelligible and the sensible.  
The second key term in this passage is ‘ἄγειν,’ which means “lead,” “guide” or 
“bring” (Liddell and Scott 17-18), and translations of  “ἄγειν” in this passage include 
“bring” or “bringing into” (Hackforth Phaedrus 132, Rowe 103), “bringing together” 
(Goold 533) and “seeing together” (Plato 542). The image that this passage brings to 
mind is that of disparate things being brought together or led into a unity. The concept of 
leading is especially informative because it supplements the image of the method as a 
way or road (the metaphor of the road will be discussed further in Section 1.5.2 below). 
The entry for ‘ἄγω’ in Ast’s Lexicon Platonicum shows that there are a number of 
passages in Plato’s dialogues which make use of this term in an intellectual sense – i.e., 
to refer to a way of reasoning in which thought is “led” in a particular direction to reach a 
goal or endpoint. For example, in the Republic, the method of dialectic is illustrated by 
the image of ways or roads (“ὁδοί”) that lead (“ἄγουσαι”) to the end of journeying (532e). 
In the Theaetetus, Plato describes a line of reasoning as “τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι” (“leading to 
wisdom”; 172b). The term is used in this sense in Aristotle as well. For example, in Prior 
Analytics I, Aristotle expresses the result of a reductio ad absurdum as “εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον 
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ἄγοντας”7 – a leading into the impossible (27a14-15). Here, a movement of thought leads 
to a judgment or conclusion. This is important because if we understand λόγος – 
reasoning – as a step-by-step process that reaches an endpoint (Section 1.5.3, pg. 74), 
then it makes sense to say that a figurative road or way (or network thereof) can guide us 
and lead us to an endpoint.  
Phaedrus 265e1-266b1 describes the second εἶδος that operates with and 
complements collection, division. At 265d, Socrates describes this εἶδος as “τὸ πάλιν κατ' 
εἴδη δύνασθαι διατέμνειν κατ' ἄρθρα ᾗ πέφυκεν …” (“That of dividing things again by 
kinds, where the natural joints are …”8; 265e). The word used for “dividing” is 
‘διατέμνειν,’ and the expression “δύνασθαι διατέμνειν” is also translated as “to be able to 
cut up” (A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff in Plato 542) as well as “enabled to divide” 
(Hackforth, Phaedrus 133). Division is the reverse of collection – while collection brings 
together that which is similar into one idea or kind, division, when performed correctly, 
cuts up or divides a single εἶδος into two or more parts along the “ἄρθρα” – i.e., the 
natural joints. The concept is illustrated by the image of an animal that should be cut up 
skillfully along its joints (265e). A clumsy butcher who fails to follow the natural 
articulations of an animal is analogous to one who fails to divide an εἶδος into real, as 
opposed to contrived or illusory, parts. Thus, this passage establishes that there are 
objective relations among εἴδη that determine how a division should proceed; in other 
words, one should not simply divide haphazardly or arbitrarily, instead one must follow 
along the “joints” of a set of interrelated parts of a whole. That this point is made 
                                                 
7 Quotations of Aristotle in Greek are from W.D. Ross, Analytica Priora et Posteriora and Metaphysics  
(Oxford: Clarendon Press) and from the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.  
 
8 Translated by H.N. Fowler, with modifications. 
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indicates that all too often division is applied incorrectly.  
However, some commentators argue that there may be more than one objective 
articulation of the same thing. Commenting on the metaphor of cutting along the natural 
joints of an animal, Griswold suggests that different perspectives yield different 
divisions:  
 
Are there not joints that would come to light from the perspective of, say, a 
veterinarian but not that of a butcher, and vice versa? The veterinarian might see that 
while there is a joining of two bones at the elbow, there are arteries and nerves that do not 
divide there … There would seem to be many natural joints; on the basis of our desires 
and goals we select some as the place for cutting. Indeed, one might take an axe and 
butcher that pitiable animal; why can we not say that where the axe falls is a natural joint, 
given that we wish to deform or kill the beast? (184)  
 
That there can be more than one set of objective dividing lines in the same thing will be 
discussed further in Chapter 3, where it will be argued that Griswold’s interpretation is 
correct: in other words, the same whole may be divided differently (Section 3.2.2, pg. 
162). However, these are not purely subjective divisions – i.e., divisions made solely by 
the choices of the divider, without any objective basis – rather, they are divisions that 
reflect different perspectives on the same object. Thus, objectively, an animal will be 
divided at different points in terms of its arteries compared with points of bones. This can 
be seen as multiple structures that articulate the same object. Even in Griswold’s example, 
there are particular points at which the axe must fall in order to kill the animal – one 
should aim for the jugular, for example, not the toe – these ‘joints’ are not determined by 
the divider, but by the biological (i.e. objective) structure of the animal. 
Furthermore, a purely subjective basis for division would preclude the possibility 
of error, of making a mistake and dividing incorrectly. If divisions were solely up to the 
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divider, then there is no objective basis for determining if a division is correct or not. Yet 
Plato warns against dividing incorrectly – i.e., not dividing according to real parts. For 
example, in the Statesman, the division of Man into Barbarian and Greek is incorrect 
because it is not based on real kinds (Appendix A 25). Now it may be very useful for 
Athens, for example, to divide this way, but political value does not supersede objectivity. 
Divisions that are relative and subjective may be erroneous. Reality and truthfulness, not 
usefulness and efficacy, are the standards by which collection and division are judged.9  
 
1.2.2 Collection and division in the Sophist 
 
In the Sophist, the method of collection and division is depicted as a procedure for 
seeking out a definition or characterization. One begins by naming that which is sought – 
i.e., something to be defined – and employs the method with the aim of arriving at a 
definition. For example, how do we define the sophist as opposed to the philosopher or 
statesman? A question initiates a search that, if successful, will end with an accurate 
definition of the sophist – i.e., a definition that will correctly distinguish the sophist from 
those who may appear to be similar. Thus, instead of wandering between conflicting 
opinions, the method of collection and division provides a route to a characterization that 
can serve as the basis for further thought and discussion.   
In the Sophist, Plato presents the paradigmatic example of the method in which a 
definition of the angler is sought and found using collection and division. This sets the 
stage for a much more elaborate and contentious series of divisions in which the sophist 
                                                 
9 The ways in which collection and division can produce erroneous results are discussed further in Section 
1.3.4 (pg. 47). 
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is defined and re-defined several times over until the seventh and final definition is 
reached at the end of the dialogue.10 As a more detailed illustration of collection and 
division, the example of the angler indicates the inner workings of collection and division 
as they are employed during a step-by-step procedure.  
The first step in defining the angler begins with a question posed by the Eleatic 
Stranger: “Tell me, shall we say that he is a man with an art, or one without an art, but 
having some other power?”11 (“καί μοι λέγε · πότερον ὡς τεχνίτην αὐτὸν ἤ τινα ἄτεχνον, 
ἄλλην δὲ δύναμιν ἔχοντα θήσομεν;”; 219a). The first word of this question is ‘πότερον.’ 
The word ‘πότερος’ (“which of two?” or “either of the two”; Liddell and Scott 1454) is 
often used to indicate that a choice must be made – only one of two possibilities is correct. 
Other passages where this word is used include the Sophist 219a, the Philebus 20e, and 
the Statesman 261c. By restricting the target to be defined – in this case, the angler – to 
one of two possible kinds, the search is narrowed. It will be argued in Section 2.2.3 that 
placing the target to be defined within a specific kind is an elementary operation of 
collection and division.  
It is important to note that the number of divisions is often more than two, and in 
many cases a more elaborate structure is mapped out when both the “length” and “width” 
of a kind are cut. This occurs at 266a in the Sophist. Here, a symmetric structure is 
articulated when production is divided into the divine and human, each of which is 
divided into original production and copy-making (266a-b; see Section 2.2.3.1, pg. 125). 
Thus, the divine and human kinds are both divided into the same parts. This shows that 
                                                 
10 These definitions, as well as definitions formulated in the Phaedrus and the Statesman, are listed in 
Appendix B. 
 
11 Translated by H.N. Fowler (Henderson, Sophist 273) 
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the method is not restricted to dichotomous division and it indicates that symmetry can be 
an important feature of the logical structures that are produced by the method.12  
In the first division of the angler, art (τέχνη) is divided into the productive and the 
acquisitive kinds. The question then becomes one of where to place the angler: “Then 
since acquisitive and productive art comprise all the arts, in which, Theaetetus, shall we 
place the art of angling?”13 (“κτητικῆς δὴ καὶ ποιητικῆς συμπασῶν οὐσῶν τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν 
ποτέρᾳ τὴν ἀσπαλιευτικήν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τιθῶμεν;”; 219d). The role of the term ‘τίθημι’ 
(to put or place) from which ‘τιθῶμεν’ derives, and the function of placement in 
collection and division will be discussed further in Section 2.2.3 (pg. 122). In short, 
placing defines the relationship between the parts of a whole, and it is crucial for 
understanding how a structure is constructed, understood, and communicated. For now, 
suffice it to say that placement in one of two or more sub-kinds serves to locate the 
angler in a conceptual space that is successively narrowed down, thus marking the angler 
off from others.  
In the next step, the angler is placed under the acquisitive form of τέχνη. This 
procedure is repeated: the acquisitive kind of art is divided into two parts of its own, by 
exchange and by force, and one part is selected as the kind which applies to the angler. 
Ultimately, the selected parts yield a combination of characteristics that forms a λόγος 
“of the thing itself”14 (“τὸν λόγον περὶ αὐτὸ τοὖργον εἰλήφαμεν ἱκανῶς”; 221b). Here, 
λόγος is a definition, and in this sense, it is the goal of collection and division (the 
                                                 
12 The importance of symmetry is also emphasized in the Phaedrus at 266a, where the image of left and  
right hand parts is used to describe division.  
 
13 Translated by H.N. Fowler (Henderson, Sophist 275) 
 
14 Translated by H.N. Fowler (Henderson, Sophist 281) 
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meaning of the word ‘λόγος’ will be discussed in detail in Section 1.5.1 (pg. 66). In other 
words, the series of characteristics under which the angler is placed, when collected 
together into a statement along with the highest kind, τέχνη, yields a definition or 
characterization of the angler. This final result is expressed by the Eleatic Stranger as 
shown in Appendix B 2. The object of the search has been found and the name 
‘ἀσπαλιευτής’ (angler) now has an account (τὸν λόγον). In this passage, “τὸν λόγον” is 
often translated as a “definition,” but as discussed in Section 1.5.1 and in Chapter 3, it is 
debatable whether the λόγος is a definition in the usual sense of the word, and 
“characterization” is also a suitable translation. It will be argued in Section 3.2.2 (pg. 
162) that a λόγος is not meant to serve as a singular definition (i.e., a definition that, if 
true, rules out other definitions), but one of possibly multiple characterizations that serve 
to distinguish the object that is studied.  
One interpretation of the process described above is that it is a procedure based on 
disjunction elimination. Under this reading, each division yields mutually exclusive sub-
kinds, where each sub-kind serves as a disjunct. At each step a single disjunct is selected, 
thereby ruling out the other disjuncts. Thus, with the first step, one infers that the angler 
practices an acquisitive kind of τέχνη, thereby eliminating the possibility that the angler 
falls under the remaining disjunct, the productive kind. This process is repeated, and 
when the final division is made, the conclusion is the collection of kinds and sub-kinds 
that have not been eliminated. However, under some interpretations of the method, this 
model does not hold in all cases. In some cases, division does not yield mutually 
exclusive sub-kinds; rather, parts of a whole can overlap and form more complex 
relations. The latter are seen in the Fabric and Lens models, which will be discussed in 
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detail in Chapter 3. 
Two other points may be gleaned from the example of the angler. First, it is 
unclear whether the divisions concern a kind or a representative individual. In the first 
step, attention is placed on an imaginary figure referred to as “him” (“αὐτὸν”; 219a), and 
it is noteworthy that in general, the divisions are often worded as though they refer to an 
individual, not to a kind. Under one interpretation, the individual can be seen as a stand-
in or symbol for a kind, a literary device for simplifying and shortening the introductory 
illustration of the method, and for gaining the interlocutor’s interest. Arguably, 
personification was used for the angler only to make the lesson simpler. But 
personification is used outside of the introductory lesson of the angler – e.g., the sophist 
is referred to as an individual throughout the dialogue.  
Under a different though not incompatible reading Plato had other reasons for 
personifying the angler. Personification allows us to easily visualize a representative 
individual such as the angler side-by-side in our imagination with other individuals, such 
as a farmer or the sophist. Because the angler is seen as an individual, his activities and 
other characteristics can be visualized clearly in the imagination. In addition, we can 
narrow in on an individual through successive divisions, “trapping” him as the sophist is 
trapped. More specifically, the use of a figurative individual such as the angler or sophist 
reinforces the idea of placement: when we use the method to produce a definition, we are 
not only placing kinds within one another, but also individuals within kinds, much as a 
piece on a chessboard is placed and moved to various locations on the board. Thus, by 
placing the angler under acquisition instead of production, the former becomes part of his 
definition; i.e., the angler is an acquisitive, not a productive, artisan. In short, there are 
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two kinds of placement: in one case, placing establishes the relations between parts of a 
whole to each other (i.e., the parts of a concept are “mapped out,” as in figure 1); in the 
other, such as the one just described, placing a representative individual under a kind or 
class specifies the concepts that together comprise the definition of the individual. These 
two kinds of placement will be discussed further in Section 2.2.3 (pg. 122). 
The second point to be gleaned from the lesson of the angler is that it provides an 
opportunity to develop one’s ability to think and to imagine. Many of the divisions of the 
dialogues postulate relations between concepts that are surprising, if not counter-intuitive. 
For example, in the Phaedrus, madness has a divine as well as a human aspect. While the 
example of the angler is introduced as being “well known and small” (“εὔγνωστον μὲν 
καὶ σμικρόν”; 218e), the examples used to justify and illustrate the divisions are not at all 
obvious or easily grasped. For example, the Stranger illustrates the idea of production as 
follows: 
 
     Ξένος: Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν γε τεχνῶν πασῶν σχεδὸν εἴδη δύο.  
     Θεαίτητος: Πῶς;  
     Ξένος: Γεωργία μὲν καὶ ὅση περὶ τὸ θνητὸν πᾶν σῶμα (10) 
θεραπεία, τό τε αὖ περὶ τὸ σύνθετον καὶ πλαστόν, ὃ δὴ  
(b) σκεῦος ὠνομάκαμεν, ἥ τε μιμητική, σύμπαντα ταῦτα δικαιότατ’ 
ἂν ἑνὶ προσαγορεύοιτ’ ἂν ὀνόματι. 
     Θεαίτητος:  Πῶς καὶ τίνι; 
     Ξένος: Πᾶν ὅπερ ἂν μὴ πρότερόν τις ὂν ὕστερον εἰς οὐσίαν 
ἄγῃ, τὸν μὲν ἄγοντα ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀγόμενον ποιεῖσθαί πού (5) 
φαμεν (219a8-b6).  
  
     Stranger: But the arts as a whole, generally speaking, fall into two types. 
     Theaetetus: How? 
     Stranger: There’s farming, or any sort of caring for any mortal body; and there’s 
also caring for things that are put together or fabricated, which we call equipment; and 
there’s imitation. The right thing would be to call all those things by a single name. 
     Theaetetus: How? What name? 
     Stranger: When you bring anything into being that wasn’t in being before, we say 
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you’re a producer and that the thing you’ve brought into being is produced.15 
 
Thus, the concept of production is illustrated with the following examples: 
 
Farming (‘Γεωργία’) 
Caring for any mortal body (‘τὸ θνητὸν πᾶν σῶμα θεραπεία’) 
Equipment (‘τό τε αὖ περὶ τὸ σύνθετον καὶ πλαστόν’) 
Imitation (‘μιμητική’) 
 








It is not evident what learning has to do with combat and money-making, and at first 
glance the differences seem to outweigh the similarities. There are at least two 
explanations for the puzzling nature of these examples. First, the examples indicate that 
the method is not restricted to one domain of inquiry. For example, in the first case, the 
use of obvious examples of production such as cobbling, carpentry, and weaving would 
suggest that the method is restricted to empirical observations: one has observed shoe-
                                                 
15 Translated after Nicholas P. White (Plato 39), with modifications. 
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makers, carpenters, and weavers in action, and based on these observations, concludes 
that they all have a common characteristic. This would resemble an inductive procedure 
in which various animal species are classified under genera, for example. But, as will be 
explained in Chapter 3, genus-species divisions are only one aspect of the method. The 
use of eclectic examples illustrates that the method is not restricted to one domain of 
inquiry even within a single division. This tells us how broad the method of collection 
and division is: it is not a means by which a classification within a narrow domain is 
established. This passage from the angler tells us that very surprising discoveries can be 
made – discoveries that cross the boundaries between established domains of inquiry. 
Reflection on the examples used to illustrate the concept of production in the angler 
motivates us to question what the concept comprises – i.e., reflection brings to light a 
different perspective on production and it widens its scope. In other words, there are 
aspects of the concept that are hidden from us, and these aspects (or “parts” of the 
concept) come to light when we consider the possibility that imitation, among many other 
things, is a part of production. 
 
1.2.3 Collection and division in the Statesman 
 
The Statesman is similar to The Sophist in that there is an attempt made by the 
Eleatic Stranger and his interlocutors to define a kind of individual. However, in the 
Statesman the Stranger is more confident in his approach – unlike the sophist, the 
statesman does not require the revision of six definitions before the conclusion is reached. 
Nonetheless, the first definition produced at 267a-c (Appendix B 10) is recognized as 
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flawed; just after the Stranger presents his definition of the statesman to his interlocutor, 
Young Socrates, he states his doubts: 
 
    ΞΕ. Ἆρά γ’, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῶς ἡμῖν τοῦτο καθάπερ (5) 
σὺ νῦν εἴρηκας οὕτως ἐστὶ καὶ πεπραγμένον; 
    ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δή; 
    ΞΕ. Τὸ παντάπασιν ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι τὸ προτεθέν; ἢ 
τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ καὶ μάλιστα ἡ ζήτησις ἐλλείπει, τὸ τὸν λόγον 
(d) εἰρῆσθαι μέν πως, οὐ μὴν παντάπασί γε τελέως ἀπειργάσθαι; (267c5-d1) 
 
    Stranger: Is it really the case, Socrates, that we have actually done this,  
as you have just said? 
    Young Socrates: Done what? 
    Stranger: Given a completely adequate response to the matter we raised.  
Or is our search lacking especially in just this respect, that our account of  
the matter has been stated in a certain way, but has not been finished off  
to complete perfection?16    
 
The definition is inadequate because the statesman has not been sufficiently 
marked off from those who are similar to him. More specifically, by placing the 
statesman in the class of the herdsman of the human, the Stranger failed to mark him off 
from others who fall within the same kind, such as merchants, farmers, millers and bakers 
(267e). The problem is that he is placed in a kind that is too broad to serve adequately in 
a definition: 
 
     ΞΕ. Πῶς οὖν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὀρθὸς φανεῖται καὶ ἀκέραιος 
(c) ὁ περὶ τοῦ βασιλέως, ὅταν αὐτὸν νομέα καὶ τροφὸν ἀγέλης 
ἀνθρωπίνης θῶμεν μόνον ἐκκρίνοντες μυρίων ἄλλων ἀμφισ- 
βητούντων; 
     ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς. 
     ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν ἐφοβήθημεν ὑπο- (5) 
πτεύσαντες μὴ λέγοντες μέν τι τυγχάνοιμεν σχῆμα βασιλικόν, 
οὐ μὴν ἀπειργασμένοι γε εἶμέν πω δι’ ἀκριβείας τὸν πολι- 
τικόν, ἕως ἂν τοὺς περικεχυμένους αὐτῷ καὶ τῆς συννομῆς 
                                                 
16 Translated by C.J. Rowe (Plato 308) 
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αὐτῷ ἀντιποιουμένους περιελόντες καὶ χωρίσαντες ἀπ’ ἐκείνων 
καθαρὸν μόνον αὐτὸν ἀποφήνωμεν;  (268b8-268c10) (10)  
 
    Stranger: So how will our account of the king appear to us right and  
complete, when we posit him as sole herdsman and rearer of the human 
herd, singling him out on his own from among tens of thousands of others  
who dispute the title with him? 
    Young Socrates: There’s no way in which it can. 
    Stranger: Then our fears a little earlier were right, when we suspected  
that we should prove in fact to be describing some kingly figure, but not  
yet accurately to have finished the statesman off, until we remove those  
who crowd round him, pretending to share his herding function with  
him, and having separated him from them, we reveal him on his own,  
uncontaminated with anyone else?17  
 
Here, the Stranger “posits” (“θῶμεν”) the statesman in the same kind as countless others 
– i.e., the statesman is placed within a kind, human herding, that is too broad because it 
includes others from which the statesman should be distinguished. The statesman needs 
to be separated from the others so that he can be singled out and “revealed” (ἀποφαίνω). 
Thus, the object of the search and the goal is to hone in on the statesman so that he is not 
confused with something else. In other words, while a “kingly figure” (σχῆμα βασιλικόν) 
has been found, it is incomplete; like a sketch or outline, it is only a partial picture.  
However, before the definition is revised through collection and division, a myth 
is introduced and elaborated (268e -274e). The Myth of Cronus explores the possibility of 
divine as well as human herdsmanship and presses home the point that unlike the divine 
herdsman, the statesman needs to be distinguished from those others – e.g., merchants 
and farmers – who also care for the human herd (275b). After the myth concludes, a 
second set of divisions is performed, yielding a new kind under which the statesman falls, 
the kind of herdsman that cares for the entire human community as a whole (276b). But it 
                                                 
17 Translated by C.J. Rowe (Plato 309), with slight modifications. 
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is soon pointed out that this too does not sufficiently define the statesman, because 
tyrants also fall within this kind: 
 
(e)     ΞΕ. Καὶ ταύτῃ που τὸ πρότερον ἁμαρτάνοντες εὐηθέστερα 
τοῦ δέοντος εἰς ταὐτὸν βασιλέα καὶ τύραννον συνέθεμεν, 
ἀνομοιοτάτους ὄντας αὐτούς τε καὶ τὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἑκατέρου 
τρόπον (276e1-4). 
 
     Stranger: I think we made a mistake before in this way too, by behaving 
more simple-mindedly than we should have. We put king and tyrant into  
the same category, when both they themselves and the manner of their  
rule are very unlike one another.18 
 
Thus, since the statesman and the tyrant are “placed together” (‘συνέθεμεν’) into the 
same kind, this division too is mistaken. Once again, the statesman is confused with 
others with whom he should be distinguished. For this reason, the method has failed to 
produce an adequate definition. Again, the Stranger states that the definition is 
incomplete:  
 
 …ἀλλ’ ἀτεχνῶς ὁ 
(c) λόγος ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ζῷον τὴν ἔξωθεν μὲν περιγραφὴν ἔοικεν 
ἱκανῶς ἔχειν, τὴν δὲ οἷον τοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τῇ συγκράσει 
τῶν χρωμάτων ἐνάργειαν οὐκ ἀπειληφέναι πω. (277b7-c3)  
     
…and our account, just like a  
portrait, seems adequate in its superficial outline, but not yet to have  
received its proper clarity, as it were with paints and the mixing together  
of colors.19  
 
Using weaving as a model (279b), a new series of divisions ends with the result that the 
                                                 
18 Translated by C.J. Rowe (Plato 318). 
 
19 Translated by C.J. Rowe (Plato 319). 
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statesman is a special kind of weaver: he weaves human beings together into a coherent 
society (310e-311a). The final definition at 311b7-311c6 (Appendix B 11) is described 
by Socrates as follows: “Another most excellent portrait, Stranger, this one that you have 
completed for us, of the man who possesses the art of kingship: the statesman.”20 
(“Κάλλιστα αὖ τὸν βασιλικὸν ἀπετέλεσας ἄνδρα ἡμῖν, ὦ ξένε, καὶ τὸν πολιτικόν.”; 
311c7-8).   
The end result is an account of the statesman that is considered to be complete: it 
tells us who the statesman is by distinguishing him from those who appear to be similar, 
but in reality differ in fundamental ways. 
In conclusion, like the Sophist, the Statesman shows that definitions produced 
through collection and division are defeasible. In other words, a definition is formulated 
and questioned, and if errors are discovered, then a new series of divisions are performed 
in which the parts – i.e. kinds or aspects – into which the statesman falls are refined. In 
some cases, the error is that the target to be defined – in this case, the statesman – is 
placed into a kind which fails to distinguish him from others who appear to be similar. 
Thus, the parts in which the target is placed must separate the target from that with which 
it is similar. The Statesman is interesting also because a myth is used to guide a division. 
This is to be distinguished from cases in which other forms of reasoning are used to guide 
or evaluate a division; e.g., in the Sophist, dialectical argument21 is used to settle a 
question of placement (see Section 1.3.3, pg. 45). This shows that various ways of 
reasoning are used to revise an incorrect division. Thus, while dialectical argument may 
be one way of reflecting on the results of collection and division, it is not the only way. 
                                                 
20 Translated by C.J. Rowe (Plato 358), with modifications. 
 
21 The arguments are dialectical in the sense that they concern the investigation of the five highest Forms. 
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This will be discussed further in Section 2.2.4 (pg. 129), where three ways of reasoning 
about a definition will be described. 
 
1.2.4 Collection and division in the Philebus 
 
The Philebus represents an important development of the method of collection 
and division, but the dialogue is notoriously difficult to interpret, however, and it has 
become the subject of a great deal of debate among scholars. J.C.B. Gosling’s translation 
and commentary, published in 1975, has established a reference point for interpreters of 
the Philebus. It serves as an overview of the dialogue and its points of contention, and 
Gosling discusses passages which have received a great deal of scholarly attention, some 
or all of which may shed light on collection and division. These passages are named by 
Gosling as follows: “The One and the Many” (Philebus 14-16), “The Heavenly 
Tradition” (Philebus 16-19) and “The Determinant and Indeterminate” (Philebus 23-28).  
“The Heavenly Tradition” is the center-point but has “proved extremely 
recalcitrant to interpretation” (Gosling 154). In Gosling’s view, among recent 
commentators it has spawned two opposing lines of interpretation. Differences in 
agreement hinge on whether 16c-17a is interpreted as “things from time to time said to 
be” or “the things said always to be” (Gosling 155). Under the former interpretation, the 
method is applicable to all things – e.g. Forms, numbers, and physical things. The latter is 
the more common interpretation, according to Gosling. In this case, the method is 
understood to apply to genus-species divisions of Forms or universals (Gosling 160). 
Here, the concept of the unlimited is seen not as a part of collection and division, but 
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rather as an ancillary device brought into play to address some of the problems that are 
unique to the Philebus (Gosling 161). 
One of the main difficulties in interpreting the Philebus as a coherent dialogue is 
the concept of the unlimited (ἄπειρον). Depending on the interpretation, ‘ἄπειρον’ can 
refer to the variable characteristics of particulars, to an unlimited number of individuals, 
or to an undifferentiated continuum, the latter of which may be a kind (e.g., pleasure) that 
can be divided into sub-kinds, or a unified phenomenon, such as φωνή (“sound”) 
(Gosling 62). In Chapter 4, it will be argued that Plato’s description of the unlimited and 
the limited shed light on the relation between collection and division and deductive 
reasoning. More specifically, using Aristotle’s syllogistic as a representative example of a 
deductive system, I will present the argument that limits between the parts of a 
continuum that are discovered through collection and division correspond to the terms of 
a syllogism. 
In the Philebus, collection and division are used to divide speech (φωνή) into 
three kinds, vowels, consonants, and mutes (18b5-18d2; see Appendix A 49). This 
passage shows that while collection and division may resemble inductive reasoning, there 
is a key difference. Here, Theuth is not studying objects that are already defined or even 
recognizable at first. This is not typically the case with scientific inductive reasoning. For 
example, when studying an animal species, a biologist may first locate a population of 
animals in their native habitat and compare them, looking for similarities or differences 
between members of the species. But this kind of induction presupposes that one already 
knows how to identify and locate the members of the species. In other words, the “parts” 
of the species – the particular organisms that belong to the species – are already 
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identifiable; i.e., they are recognized as such and while knowledge of their characteristics 
is incomplete, they are at least seen as members of the species. Otherwise, the biologist 
would not know where to begin. To use another example, one more closely related to 
collection and division in the Philebus, a present-day linguist may observe and collect 
data on variation of pronunciation of vowels among native speakers of English. But this 
presupposes that not only can vowels be recognized as such, but that there is such a thing 
as a vowel, that each vowel is an instance of the same kind or genus, and that this kind or 
genus is a “part” of sound. But one practicing collection and division would, at least in 
some cases, have to start with a unified phenomenon such as human speech without 
preconceptions about its parts – i.e., neither knowledge nor presuppositions about the 
kinds of sound (vowels, consonants, mutes) nor the elements of  speech are necessarily 
present when the investigation begins. In other words, neither the kinds nor the letters are 
discerned (i.e. “seen”) as parts of sound. Instead, sound is perceived as something of an 
opaque whole – its internal structure (if any) is hidden from view.  
In his discussion on Theuth’s discovery of sound in the Philebus, Menn states the 
following: 
 
Theuth originally recognizes φωνή simply by hearing spoken language: since no 
written language yet exists, and since Theuth has not performed the analysis of 
language that will lead him to the concept of στοιχεῖον, what he initially recognizes is 
not a set of units of sound, but simply continuous speech. He recognizes φωνή as 
ἄπειρόν, not because there are several kinds of indivisible φωναί, but because there 
are an unlimited variety of φωναί of all lengths. In fact Plato avoids the plural φωναί, 
preferring to speak of φωνή in the singular as something that is both one and 
infinitely many; so perhaps it would be better to speak of many sections of φωνή or 




Thus, neither the elements nor the kinds of an indeterminate whole are necessarily known 
before collection and division are applied. To use an analogy, while native speakers of a 
language may know how to use the language and its elements, without a definition of the 
alphabet and an enumeration of the kinds of speech, they wouldn’t know how to 
distinguish and name the parts of the language and trace out their relations. 
In conclusion, there is no established interpretation of the indeterminate; 
‘ἄπειρον’ can refer to the variable characteristics of particulars, to an unlimited number 
of individuals, or to an undifferentiated continuum, the latter of which may be a kind or a 
unified phenomenon, such as φωνή (“sound”). In Section 2.5 (pg. 152), it will be argued 
that collection and division define the structure of a continuum by means of discerning, 
naming, and ordering its parts. In addition, the method of collection and division is not 
always inductive in the conventional sense of the word – it is also the discovery of new 
kinds as well as the discovery of similarities and differences between kinds that are 
already recognized. In short, the method of collection and division is not to be confused 




In conclusion, the four dialogues discussed above yield different impressions of 
collection and division. In the Phaedrus, collection and division are not defined as a 
single procedure to be carried out methodically, but instead as two εἴδη that are described 
by Socrates in general terms. The Sophist and the Statesman, on the other hand, present a 
picture of a procedure in which step-by-step details reveal some of the inner workings of 
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the method. In addition, taken as a whole, the Sophist and the Statesman reveal the 
tentative nature of the method: definitions are revised before a conclusion is reached. 
Moreover, while the Phaedrus yields a structure in which two kinds of madness and four 
sub-kinds of divine madness are mapped out, ultimately yielding a definition of love, 
collection and division in the Sophist and the Statesman result in the definition of a 
representative individual.  The descriptions of collection and division in the Philebus 
resemble those of the Phaedrus in this sense: rather than defining a representative 
individual, the parts of a concept such as sound (φωνή) are mapped out.  
Despite these differences, the method of collection and division as a way of 
reasoning is a thread that binds the descriptions of the method in the four dialogues. In 
other words, collection and division lead to a definition or logical framework by way of 
reasoning – i.e., by way of λόγος. On the other hand, the definition or logical framework 
– i.e., the endpoint of the reasoning process – is itself described as a ‘λόγος.’ In short, 
‘λόγος’ means reasoning in one context, definition or account in another. It is a process 
or activity in the former case, and the object of a search in the latter. 
 
1.3 Three operations of collection and division: seeing, naming,  
      and placing  
 
Three passages from Appendix A, (1) Statesman 285a4-285b6, (2) Statesman 
260d11-261a9, and (3) Sophist 235c8-235d5 will be discussed below for the purpose of 
giving a more focused introduction to collection and division. In the following sections, 
three operations by which collection and division produce a logical framework, seeing, 
Pasqualoni 43 
 
naming, and placing, will be introduced. This section will set the stage for a more 
detailed discussion of each operation in Chapter 2. 
 
1.3.1 Statesman 285a4-285b6 (Appendix A 44) 
 
In the Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger divides the concept μέτρησις (measurement) 
after criticizing “many of the sophisticated people” (“πολλοὶ τῶν κομψῶν”; 285a1) who 
fail to see that the art of measurement has two kinds or “parts” (μέρος): (1) the 
measurement of number, lengths, etc. on the one hand, and (2) the measurement of what 
is fitting, i.e. “what is as it ought to be” on the other (284e2-8; Appendix A 43). So-called 
sophisticated people fail to make this distinction.  
In this passage, the importance of being able to see (εἶδον) or perceive 
(αἰσθάνομαι) similarities and differences is highlighted. Here, even seemingly 
sophisticated people can treat a concept as a whole while failing to see that it has parts. In 
other words, while the concept of measurement is recognized as a whole, the relevant and 
irrelevant parts of the conceptual whole are not discerned. Moreover, the perception of 
similarities as well as differences should be discerned – in other words, a “community” 
(“κοινωνίαν”) of the members of a group is to be discerned (285b1). In short, both 
differences and similarities are to be discovered; differences correspond to the parts of a 
whole, while similarities correspond to that which unifies the parts into a whole. The 
discernment of similarities and differences is the operation of seeing; this will be 




1.3.2 Statesman 260d11-261a9 (Appendix A 21) 
 
In this passage, the Stranger is dividing directive expertise (ἐπιτακτική τέχνη; 
260c6) into two kinds. On the one hand is the kind that includes interpreters, seers, 
heralds, and many others (260d11-260e1), while on the other are the “self-directors” 
(“τῶν αὐτεπιτακτῶν”). The purpose of the division is to narrow down the particular kind 
of directive expertise that applies to the statesman, being careful not to confuse him with 
others who only appear to be similar. In other words, in order to provide a definition of 
the statesman, he must be grouped with the self-directors, otherwise he cannot be 
distinguished from those who are not of the same kind, such as heralds and the like. This 
is a kind of “narrowing down” or “honing in” to a definition. To use an analogy, one 
could arrive at a definition of the number two by first locating it within the prime 
numbers, and then marking it off from the other numbers by locating it within the set of 
even numbers. Similarly, with the statesman, he is first located within the kind of 
directive experts, and then distinguished from others by locating him in the kind of self-
directors, lest he be confused with heralds, seers, and those of similar ilk. 
The importance of naming is emphasized in this passage. While the part of 
directive expertise that comprises heralds, seers, etc. remains nameless because the 
statesman does not fall within this kind, the name ‘self-directors’ is coined for the 
purpose of articulating differences, that is for marking off the statesman from those who 
appear to be similar (260e). Since heralds, seers, etc. are directors of a sort but not self-
directors, the name serves as a device for distinguishing the statesman from those who 
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appear to be similar. In addition, the name ‘self-directors’ is fabricated in such a way as 
to indicate the meaning or content of the kind to which the statesman belongs. These 
functions of naming will be discussed further in Section 2.2.2 (pg. 114).  
 
1.3.3 Sophist 235c8-235d5 (Appendix A 13) 
 
In the Sophist, the Stranger divides the imitative (μῑμητικός) into two kinds 
(Appendix A 13). At 236c6-7 the two kinds are named “likeness-making” 
(“εἰδωλοποιικῆς”) and “appearance-making” (“φανταστικὴν”). But at this stage, it is not 
clear to which kind the sophist belongs; i.e., the Stranger does not know where to place 
the sophist: “But still I can’t see clearly the thing I was in doubt about then, namely, 
which type we should put the sophist in…”22 (“Ὃ δέ γε καὶ τότ’ ἠμφεγνόουν, <ἐν> 
ποτέρᾳ τὸν σοφιστὴν θετέον, οὐδὲ νῦν πω δύναμαι θεάσασθαι σαφῶς…”; 236c9-10). 
After a series of dialectical arguments, the sophist is placed under appearance-making, 
and that in turn is to be divided (“cut”) into two:  
 
    ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γ’ ἦν ὁ σοφιστὴς τούτων πότερον, 
διωμολογημένον ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἦν. 
    ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. 
    ΞΕ. Πάλιν τοίνυν ἐπιχειρῶμεν, σχίζοντες διχῇ τὸ (10) 
(e) προτεθὲν γένος, πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τοὐπὶ δεξιὰ ἀεὶ μέρος τοῦ 
τμηθέντος, ἐχόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σοφιστοῦ κοινωνίας, ἕως ἂν 
αὐτοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πάντα περιελόντες …(264d7-264e3)  
 
    Stranger: And we agreed before that the sophist does fall under one of  
the two types [i.e., appearance-making] we just mentioned. 
    Theaetetus: Yes. 
    Stranger: Then let’s try again to take the kind we’ve posited and cut it  
in two. Let’s go ahead and always follow the righthand part of what we’ve  
                                                 




cut, and hold onto things that the sophist is associated with until we strip  
away everything that he has in common with other things.23 
 
To summarize, there is a movement from seeing the parts of a conceptual whole (in this 
case, imitation; 235c8-d1), to naming them (236c6-7), to eventually positing the part in 
which the target to be defined, the sophist, falls (264d7-11). In other words, two parts of 
imitation are discerned, they are named, there is confusion about which part the sophist 
falls under, and eventually the matter is settled: the sophist should be placed in the 
appearance-making kind. This process drives the inference forward, and the name of the 
kind in which the sophist is placed then becomes part of the definition of the sophist 
(268c8-268d4; see Appendix B 9). Thus, placing the sophist in a named part is a kind of 
resolution, a kind of decision-making that moves one step forward to the definition. 
Note too that the Stranger gives the instruction to follow “the righthand part” 
(“δεξιὰ …μέρος”); in other words, the sophist is imagined to escape into certain “kinds” 
that are placed relative to each other: the kind on the “left” is to be avoided, while the 
kind on the “right” is to be incorporated in the final definition. Both kinds are parts of 
another concept – i.e., likeness-making and appearance-making are both parts of 
imitation – but the sophist is placed in only one. In turn, this one kind is then divided into 
two using the concepts through tools and through one’s self  (267a), and the process is 
repeated. In each step, the kind on the “left” is “stripped away,” thereby distinguishing 
the sophist from others who appear to be similar. The sophist is located in the remaining 
kind, and the process is repeated until a definition is reached. This process is described in 
more detail in the discussion of the angler, where again certain parts of a concept are 
removed and considered irrelevant to the definition sought, while other parts are included 
                                                 
23 Translated by Nicholas P. White (Plato 289), with slight modifications. 
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in the final definition (see Section 1.2.2, pg. 26). 
 
1.3.4 Conclusion  
 
Roughly, in terms of division, seeing is the discernment of the parts of a whole, 
naming articulates and establishes the differences between the parts, and placing defines 
the relevant parts of the definition and the relations between the parts of a whole. The end 
result of a series of seeing, naming, and placing operations is a definition, as shown in 
Appendix B. Each of the three operations will be discussed further in Sections 2.2.1-2.2.3 
(pp. 98-127) and this analysis as a whole will be compared with interpretations of 
collection and division presented by Moravcsik and Cohen (Section 2.2, pg. 98).  
In general, a definition produced through collection and division can be 
understood as a logical framework that serves as the basis for deductive and non-
deductive forms of reasoning. The upshot is that despite Aristotle’s claim to the contrary, 
division is not a weak form of syllogistic reasoning (see Section 4.3.2, pg. 192). Rather, it 
will be argued in Chapter 4 that collection and division yield logical structures that make 
syllogistic reasoning possible. Without a logical framework produced by collection and 
division, the interrelations between terms remain undefined – it is only when terms are 
woven into whole-part relations that a deduction becomes possible. Moreover, if parts are 
not arranged in a strict hierarchy but overlap, then the interrelated parts do not form the 
basis of syllogisms such as Barbara and other moods in the syllogistic. Even a simple 
definition produced by collection and division such as love is a kind of madness or piety 
is a kind of prosecution constitutes a logical framework. These are minimal frameworks 
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in the sense that only two concepts are interrelated. Therefore, they cannot serve as the 
basis for syllogistic reasoning, which requires three terms. However, these minimal 
frameworks are useful for other forms of reasoning, i.e. reasoning that is not based on 
strict hierarchies of kinds.  
While frameworks defined through the three operations described above underlie 
deductive and non-deductive reasoning, collection and division do not guarantee that a 
framework is truthful, nor do they guarantee that an argument based on a framework is 
sound. By means of the three operations, collection and division are typically employed 
with the intention of defining a framework that is truthful – i.e., one that accurately 
describes the target being defined. Thus, the definition of the sophist is revised six times 
to remove deficiencies in the framework that is being formulated and to arrive at a result 
that is presumably correct. However, because the three operations described above are 
prone to error, the question arises as to what is meant by “presumably correct.” The fact 
that a framework has survived the test of refutation is an indication that it is a correct 
definition. Thus, since the final definition of the sophist is the product of a lengthy series 
of arguments that were employed to pinpoint and remove flaws in the provisional 
frameworks, there is evidence that the final definition is truthful. However, there is only 
evidence – i.e., there is an indication that seeing, naming, and placing have ultimately 
defined a framework that is free of error. Thus, even when a framework has survived the 
method of elenchus or a similar form of argument, there is no guarantee that the 
framework is correct. This is explored in detail in Section 2.2.1.3, where it is argued that 
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Plato does not specify how one actually sees the parts of a conceptual whole, and this 
limitation applies to naming and placing as well.24  
Thus, the method of collection and division does not constitute a proof procedure; 
i.e., it does not prescribe specific rules for formulating a valid argument, nor does it 
guarantee that a definition is correct. Instead, the three operations of collection and 
division facilitate the construction of sound arguments and provide the necessary 
groundwork for deductive and non-deductive inference. In short, the method in and of 
itself does not provide a means for evaluating the correctness of its results. 
Moreover, collection and division are susceptible to deliberate misuse. Section 3.3 
discusses cases in which errors may be intentionally introduced by the divider. For 
example, it may be advantageous for Greeks to classify all non-Greeks as natural slaves. 
While this is clearly an egregious misuse of the method and its operations, the resulting  
framework could become an ideology if it is sufficiently beneficial to the dividers. This 
form of erroneous reasoning should be distinguished from the misapplication of 
collection and division described just above, in which the divider is aiming for a truthful 
definition, but misses the mark despite his or her best intentions. 
 
1.4 Literature Review 
 
Secondary literature on collection and division has accumulated over centuries. 
This review will discuss publications primarily from the modern period and will focus on 
                                                 
24 In Sections 6.3-6.4, it is suggested that recollection of the Forms may allow one to determine whether a 
framework matches reality. However, in my view the process of recollection is above and beyond the three 
operations that underlie collection and division, and the method in and of itself does not tell us whether its 




seminal works from the 20th century in addition to more recent publications. The purpose 
of this review is to provide an overview of some of the debates on, and varying 
interpretations of, collection and division in recent literature, thereby setting the stage for 
the topics and arguments that are presented in detail in the remaining chapters. More 
specifically, this review will discuss different perspectives on the scope and purpose of 
the method of collection and division, its relations to other forms of reasoning, the nature 
of the structures produced by collection and division and criticisms of the method old and 
new.  
 
1.4.1 Scope and purpose of collection and division 
 
A seminal work in the recent literature that provides an overview of the method is 
John Ackrill’s essay, “In Defense of Platonic Division.” Ackrill discusses two primary 
uses of the method: it can be used to define a term or to analyze a general concept (103). 
Both of these functions are important to collection and division and to the method of 
dialectic, and each will be discussed below. 
Ackrill states that although using the method for the purpose of definition 
involves neither deduction nor a priori reasoning, it plays a crucial role in philosophy 
(104). After discussing the role of the method in the Phaedrus, Sophist, Statesman, and 
Philebus, he states the following: 
 
Interest in the ‘What is it?’ question and the search for definition are of course as 
characteristic of earlier Socratic dialogues as of these later dialogues…What is clear 
(and relevant) is that Plato sees the definition of terms as one of the aims of division, 
and that from Socrates to Aristotle such definition – elucidating the meaning of 




This evaluation is echoed by J.R. Trevaskis. He states that, in dialogues such as the  
Sophist and the Phaedrus, the method of division is used to provide definitions for 
disputed terms, a task that is “of extreme importance” (Trevaskis, “Division and its 
Relation to Dialectic” 128). For example, in the Phaedrus, terms central to philosophy 
and to common discourse such as ‘good’ and ‘love’ are disputed – they mean different 
things to different people – and for this reason it is important to remove ambiguity and to 
formulate definitions; this is one of the primary uses of division (Trevaskis, “Division 
and its Relation to Dialectic” 128). Thus, according to Trevaskis, division plays a crucial 
role in both philosophy and everyday discourse.  
The second purpose of collection and division described by Ackrill is the analysis 
of general concepts. This involves the articulation of a genus into species, or a kind into 
sub-kinds (Ackrill 104). Examples of this use of the method include defining the various 
kinds of pleasure – a very involved and nuanced discussion in the Philebus – and 
investigating the forms of madness as described in the Phaedrus (Ackrill 105). For 
example, in the latter case, madness is divided into “kinds” such as human and divine 
(Phaedrus 265a).  
In addition to the two functions discussed by Ackrill, Trevaskis describes another 
feature of the method which is “clearly supereminent … It is referred to in essence at 
Phaedrus 266b where Socrates justifies his enthusiasm for the method of Division by its 
conferring on him the ability ‘to speak and to think’” (Trevaskis, “Division and its 
Relation to Dialectic” 129). This feature of the method is also mentioned at Statesman 
285d, where it is explained that the central purpose of the discussion is not to define the 
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statesman but to make the discussants better dialecticians. In Trevaskis’ words, the 
method in this case is viewed as a means to improve “general powers of philosophical 
discussion” (“Division and its Relation to Dialectic” 129). To practice the method is to 
train oneself to apprehend the Forms, these being the ultimate aim of everything that is 
said (Statesman 286a). In short, the method is “a practice routine in philosophy” 
(Trevaskis, “Division and its Relation to Dialectic” 129). 
Trevaskis is right to point out the claim made in the Phaedrus that division 
confers the ability “to think and to speak” – this remark shows that collection and 
division are fundamental to reasoning. However, in my view collection and division are 
not just “a practice routine in philosophy,” but routine in human thought. Does it really 
take a philosopher, for example, to formulate a tentative definition of love? Dialectic may 
be required to determine the interrelations between Forms (see Section 1.4.2 below), but 
formulating a definition in and of itself does not require a philosopher. In Chapter 5, it 
will be argued that when Meno and Euthyphro formulate definitions of virtue and piety, 
they are doing so by means of collection and division.  
 
1.4.2 Relation between collection and division and dialectic 
 
The relation between collection and division and dialectic25 is open to debate. The  
secondary literature identifies dialectic with collection and division in some cases, but 
contrasts them in others. Dorothea Frede, for example, states that while dialectic as 
described in the Republic is useful for arriving at definitions, the method of collection 
                                                 
25 Here using Ackrill’s definition of ‘dialectic’ as “the study of the interrelations of forms” (109; cf. Section 
1.1 above).  
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and division, although purported to be a “prerequisite for dialectic proper,” is less 
informative (207). Philosophical investigations such as the inquiry into the nature of 
justice require experience and insight, these being elements of dialectic or, at least, an 
activity that complements dialectic. Collection and division, however, do not fare well in 
Frede’s view. While “orderly and methodical,” their productions are too “machinelike” 
and “cut-and-dried” in comparison with the results of dialectic proper and its kindred 
methods (D. Frede 208).  
Ackrill also makes a distinction between dialectic and the method of collection 
and division, although his assessment of the latter is much more positive. The method of 
collection and division is not the same as dialectic, Ackrill makes clear, but it certainly 
assists dialectic. He states that “Dialectic as the study of the interrelations of forms … 
still looks a good deal richer than division into kinds.” But Ackrill follows this remark by 
stating that the method can discover Forms that connect and divide other Forms (108). 
For example, there is at least “a close connection” between the method and the central 
argument of the Sophist, where dialectic is used to explore interrelationships among 
Forms (Ackrill 96). Here, the method clarifies interrelationships of concepts and sets the 
stage for further analysis. Ackrill emphasizes that only some interrelationships are 
revealed by the method, and that only dialectic can systematically study Forms in general. 
Nonetheless, under Ackrill’s interpretation the method is by no means irrelevant. It plays 
an important role in Plato’s later dialogues.  
In my view, Ackrill is correct to point out a close connection between collection 
and division and dialectic. Whole-part reasoning sets the stage for a methodical 
investigation of the interrelations between Forms. For example, two Forms can be seen as 
Pasqualoni 54 
 
interrelated if they overlap – i.e., if they have a part in common. On the other hand, I 
agree with Ackrill that dialectic is a form of reasoning that is not identical to the method 
of collection and division. While dialectic presupposes the kind of whole-part reasoning 
carried out through collection and division, unlike the latter, dialectic is a procedure 
designed specifically for one domain of inquiry, the Forms and their interrelations.  
 
1.4.3 The Role of collection 
 
Not only is the relation of collection and division to dialectic open to debate, so is 
the relation of collection to division. While division divides a whole into parts, collection 
can be understood as the reverse process; i.e., it brings many into one. To use an example 
from the Philebus, disparate vocal sounds can be unified as a single system of speech, the 
alphabet. This is one reading, and the precise role and function of collection is debated in 
the literature. A passage in the Republic, “ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν 
ἄλλων πάντων ἀφελὼν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν” (“…one not able to distinguish the form of 
the Good from all others…”, 534b), was a point of disagreement between Adam and 
Hackforth. This passage, according to Adam, “perhaps suggests the διαίρεσις, which was 
an essential part of Plato's dialectical method” (Adam). Hackforth disagrees. He says that 
division is “complementary to συναγωγή … it involves the preliminary task of setting 
beside the definiendum a number of co-ordinate species which are ‘seen together’ (cf. 
συνορῶντα Phaedr. 265 D) as constituting the extension of a genus. How can the αὐτὸ 
ἀγαθόν be included in a συναγωγή?” (Hackforth, “Plato's Divided Line” 5). Thus, 
according to Hackforth, division presupposes collection, but since the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν (i.e., 
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the “good itself”) is the ultimate Form, it has no co-ordinate species and as a result it 
cannot be collected with anything. In this case, division has nothing to divide. Thus, for 
Hackforth, collection is indispensable. 
In my view, Hackforth is correct when he says that collection is indispensable, but 
not for the reasons he gives. Hackforth presumes that collection and division operate on 
genus-species structures. But why must this be the case? Perhaps the Good overlaps with 
other Forms, in which case, the Good can be divided into aspects – e.g., if the Good has a 
share in Knowledge and Pleasure, then part of the Good is Knowledge, and part of it is 
Pleasure. In Chapter 3, two readings of the method that argue for the possibility of 
division into overlapping Forms or kinds will be discussed. 
Some interpreters feel that collection plays a secondary role at best. Under this 
interpretation, Plato is mainly concerned with division, and collection is seen as an 
accessory method or a preliminary step contingent on the problem at hand. For example, 
Stenzel claims that while Plato emphasizes the interdependence of collection and division, 
the latter is the core component of dialectic and is the more important of the two (107).  
Menn takes the opposite point of view, though he admits that it is especially 
difficult to clarify the concept of collection. Referring to the story of Theuth and the 
alphabet in the Philebus, Menn states, “commentators have generally been puzzled about 
why it should illustrate collection rather than division. Indeed, they have been puzzled 
about collection as such; and it has been suggested that Plato is really describing only a 
single method, the method of division” (292). Against a common interpretation, Menn 
argues that collection is not restricted to defining a species or genus within a genus-
species tree. Rather, collection can be the means by which the elements of a domain can 
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be learned and mastered, much as children learn the alphabet. In this use of collection, the 
student learns each element (στοιχεῖον) by comparing its use in sets of larger complexes 
(Menn 299). Thus, the letter ‘α’ can be learned by comparing its use in syllables such as 
‘βα’ and ‘γα’ (Menn 297). Taken together, the syllables are a collection by means of 
which the elements are recognized and mastered. Collection also applies to the more 
difficult problem of learning to decipher “the long and difficult syllables of reality” 
(Statesman 278d4-5).  This involves learning not letters of the alphabet but rather ἀρχαί 
or “the most basic of Forms” (Menn 300).  
Menn is correct: collection is not restricted to defining a species or genus within a 
logical tree. A part can be an element – there is no reason why one cannot collect 
together the elements of something into a whole. This is seen not only with the alphabet, 
but in other domains. To use another example from the Philebus, musical notes are not 
“species” but elements or aspects of musical structures. That collection is not restricted to 
genus-species trees will be discussed in the following section and in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
  
1.4.4 Relation to genus-species hierarchies  
 
In “Classification in the ‘Philebus’,” J. R. Trevaskis subscribes to what he calls 
“the commonly held opinion”: division is a means by which a genus is divided into 
species or kinds (39). Its limit is the level of the infima species – particulars “below” this 
level are beyond its scope (Trevaskis, “Classification in the Philebus” 39). However, in a 
later publication Trevaskis holds a different view. Referring to the Statesman 262d, 
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where Man is (incorrectly) divided into Greek and Barbarian, he writes, “We have a clear 
case here of Division proceeding below the infima species Man ... It seems that we have 
no warrant for attributing the anachronistic expression infima species to the lower limit of 
Platonic Division, and that we should not do so” (Trevaskis, “Division and its Relation to 
Dialectic” 127).26  
Trevaskis’ latter interpretation is the more correct view. For example, Plato often 
talks of dividing Number into Odd and Even (Heath 292). However, the concept of 
infima species seems incompatible with the idea of Number. It seems more likely that the 
method can divide not only into kinds and species, but also into elements and aspects. 
Importantly, Trevaskis states that “it seems that we should abandon any preconception in 
favour of ‘specific’ differentiae. Plato is willing to see different criteria observed in 
different divisions, even where the same class is to be divided” (Trevaskis, “Division and 
its Relation to Dialectic” 128).  
However, in his discussion of the Philebus, Letwin claims that the genus-species 
interpretation is common among scholars. He states, “According to this interpretation – 
which has been favoured by commentators such as Ross, Taylor and Hackforth – Plato is 
concerned to divide a given concept not into its species and aspects, but only into its 
species” (Letwin 194). To use Letwin’s examples, Man would not be divided into 
“rationality” and “concupiscence,” but into kinds such as “good men” and “bad men” 
(Letwin 194). 
But for Letwin the distinction between species and aspect is crucial and it solves 
some important interpretive problems. Like Gosling, Letwin argues that to restrict the 
method to kinds or species contradicts Plato’s own examples of the method (Letwin 194). 
                                                 
26 Chapter 3 will further discuss the limitations of the concept of an infima species and kindred concepts. 
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For example, pitch, rhythm, and measure are amenable to division because “although 
these are not species of sound, they are clearly aspects of it” (195). This is similar to 
Menn’s interpretation (discussed in Section 1.4.3 above) but not quite the same. Instead 
of “aspects” Menn sees “elements” (“στοιχεῖα”) in Plato’s illustrations of the method. But 
the general tack is the same in both cases: the method is not limited to the construction of 
genus-species trees. In my view, this interpretation is correct: the method is not restricted 
to division into species, and it can define logical structures that are not strict hierarchies.  
However, some scholars continue to interpret collection and division in terms of 
only species and kinds. Barker argues that “the process is one of anatomising one general 
form or kind into a collection of subkinds, and those subkinds into still lesser kinds. 
There really should never have been any dispute about that, though indeed there has” 
(144). For Barker, a kind is a collection of sub-kinds which form a unity. Even what is 
typically seen as an infima species such as βοῦς (“ox”) can be divided, according to 
Barker: “βοῦς … contains Alderney βοῦς, Hereford βοῦς, Aberdeen Angus βοῦς etc. as 
sub-kinds,” and these sub-kinds fall under broader kinds such as “ungulate, ruminant, 
mammal, animal, and so on” (164). 
M.L. Gill disagrees. She argues that βοῦς is not divided into sub-kinds but into 
varieties based on their “accidental features” (“The Divine Method” 39). She agrees that 
in some dialogues, such as the Phaedrus, the method aims to divide kinds into sub-kinds. 
But this kind of division is dichotomous division, which is to be distinguished from sister 
methods seen in the Statesman and other dialogues. Dichotomous division is not the full-
fledged method that Plato illustrates for more complex cases. In the Philebus, for 
example, collection and division constitute a more advanced method that aims to divide a 
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unity into parts and features instead of kinds and sub-kinds (“The Divine Method” 42). 
The genus-species model and other interpretations of collection and division will be 
discussed further in Section 3.2 (pg. 158). In this section, it will be shown that the genus-
species model does not capture the broad range of logical structures that can be defined 
through collection and division.  
Debate on the relation between collection and division and genus-species trees is 
paralleled by debate on the objects or domains of collection and division. In other words, 
while the former asks what kind of structure is delineated by collection and division, the 
latter asks which sets of objects or elements form the content of these structures. Are 
collection and division applicable to physical objects, sensory data, concepts, numbers, 
Forms, or a combination of these? Or is it mistaken to assume that there is a real 
distinction between structures and the objects that form them? At the center of this debate 
is a question concerning Plato’s theory of Forms: are collection and division restricted to 
Forms, or are they more inclusive?  
Trevaskis argues against the interpretation that division is essentially concerned 
with Forms. He points out that in the Phaedrus, ψυχὴ (“soul”) is subject to division: “… 
τούτων δὲ δὴ οὕτω διῃρημένων …” (“… these [i.e., kinds of soul] must be divided …”, 
271d; Trevaskis, “Division and its Relation to Dialectic” 124). Here, διαίρεσις is applied 
to ψυχὴ. But, citing the Phaedrus myth, Trevaskis states that ψυχὴ is not a Form. 
Therefore, this passage is “a prima facie case … of Division applied outside the scheme 
of Ideas, and that the case needs answering by anyone who holds that Division is 
essentially concerned with Ideas” (Trevaskis, “Division and its Relation to Dialectic” 
124). Furthermore, considering now the Sophist, Trevaskis raises the question of how 
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Ideas relate to the intermediate classes that are discovered in the course of a division. He 
states his point cogently: “Are we to believe, then, that Plato posited an Idea of 
‘semblance-production by ignorant mimicry’? ... I find it difficult to believe that he did” 
(Trevaskis, “Division and its Relation to Dialectic” 125). Apparently this is a case in 
which the method is applied neither to Forms nor to species.  
However, while it may be the case that Plato did not posit “semblance-production 
by ignorant mimicry” as a single Form, this concept (and similar compound expressions 
seen in the Sophist) is posited by the Eleatic Stranger, not by Plato. Moreover, the 
concept is not incompatible with the theory of Forms if it is understood as a community 
of concepts – i.e., as an interweaving of Forms. In other words, arguably, there is a Form 
of Production, a Form of Semblance (or similarity), a Form of Ignorance, and a Form of 
Mimicry (Imitation). I use the word ‘arguably’ because there is an age-old debate in the 
secondary literature about what may or may not count as a Form. It is well beyond the 
scope this work to settle such a debate. However, in the Parmenides, Parmenides tells 
young Socrates that without Forms, thinking has nowhere to turn (“οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν 
διάνοιαν ἕξει”; Parmenides 369b-c). If we take the claim that reasoning is not even 
possible without Forms seriously, then we can say that even the intermediate 
classifications of the Sophist are based on overlapping Forms. Moreover, under a similar 
interpretation, how we collect and divide kinds of soul is governed by Forms: e.g., if we 
say a soul is just, we do so based on our knowledge of Justice, if a soul is courageous, we 
do so based on our knowledge of Courage, and if a soul is both, overlapping Forms 
provide a lens through which we define the soul that is just and courageous. 
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However, Julius Stenzel presents a different take on the matter in his oft-cited and 
influential Plato’s Method of Dialectic. Unlike Trevaskis, Stenzel believes that not only 
is the method tied to Plato’s theory of Forms, he argues that διαίρεσις bridges the gap 
between Forms and particulars. Commenting on Sophist 235d, a key passage on the 
method, Stenzel argues that Plato was aiming for “rapprochement between individual and 
εἶδος, each coming to resemble the other” (99). Intuition is a “vision of the mind” that 
can descend from the highest εἶδος, Being, to intermediate kinds (“Patterns in the strictest 
sense”), and ultimately reaches its limit in the particulars (Stenzel 120 - 121). This 
network of Forms, kinds, and particulars is understood and articulated through διαίρεσις 
– it is through this process, which typically operates unconsciously, that a particular is 
recognized. A particular is known only through an εἶδος, without which it is 
indeterminate (“ἄπειρον”) (Stenzel 125). In Stenzel’s view this makes διαίρεσις 
necessary for apprehension of both Forms and particulars. It is a central part of Plato’s 
philosophy. 
In “Pythagoras Bound: Limit and Unlimited in Plato’s Philebus,” Kolb questions 
the extent to which we can distinguish between a particular object and its classification. 
He says that empiricist presuppositions can cause us to misinterpret passages on 
collection and division. Oft-cited examples such as the tradesmen who are classified by 
Socrates, and common objects like tables and chairs, mislead us into thinking that in 
general, things are first seen as individuals, then seen as members of classes (Kolb 500). 
The story of Theuth’s discovery of the alphabet in the Philebus serves as a 
counterexample. Here, there is no clear distinction between classifying a thing and 
knowing it as an individual. In other words, one does not start with a “crowd of 
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particulars” which are classified (Kolb 501). Instead, the recognition of an individual as 
individual (e.g., the letter C apart from indeterminate sound) and the classification of the 
individual are processes that are inseparable and simultaneous. Kolb’s argument applies 
to Forms as well as to sensible particulars.  
To conclude, the question as to whether collection and division produce a genus-
species hierarchy rests on precisely what kind of structure is produced by collection and 
division. This question and the genus-species debate will be discussed further in Chapter 
3. Section 3.2.5 will argue that the Fabric and Lens models (i.e., models that allow for 
non-hierarchical structures) more accurately describe the results of collection and 
division. The question as to whether collection and division also apply to particulars as 
well as kinds and classes will be discussed in Chapter 5, where it will be argued that 
collection and division are not limited to reasoning about universals. 
 
1.4.5 Criticisms of the method of collection and division 
 
Epicrates the comic poet parodied the method of collection and division by 
portraying students of the method attempting to classify a pumpkin and reaching an 
impasse (Lever 177). And, according to Diogenes Laertius, Diogenes the Cynic had 
plucked a chicken and said “οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Πλάτωνος ἄνθρωπος” (“Here is Plato’s man”; 
Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VI.40; Page et al. 42), thus mocking Plato’s definition of 
man as a featherless bipedal animal.  
There is some truth in these jokes, and philosophers such as Aristotle have 
levelled articulate criticisms against the method of division. In the Analytics Aristotle 
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argues that the method assumes what it should prove, i.e. the correct branches of a 
division are not deduced by way of necessary connection but merely assumed to be 
correct (G. Lloyd 156). In this sense, a definition is achieved not by deduction, but 
merely by a series of disjunctions, none of which involve necessary consequence. 
However, at Posterior Analytics 91b28 Aristotle claims that some of the limitations of the 
method can be overcome by applying comprehensive, ordered divisions to the essential 
attributes of the target object (G. Lloyd 156). But even in this case, although division 
does provide knowledge, it provides neither definition nor proof.  
Tarán argues that Aristotle was targeting a variation of the method, dichotomous 
division, as practiced by Speusippus (396). Similarly, D.M. Balme states that Aristotle 
was evidently criticizing a form of the method that might have developed after Plato's 
dialogues were written (69). But G. Lloyd points out that “almost all” divisions that 
Aristotle criticizes in the Organon, Metaphysics, and De Partibus Animalium can be 
found in the Sophist and the Statesman, and so Aristotle may have been specifically 
targeting the method of division espoused by Plato (153 - 154). 
However, as mentioned above, Aristotle does not advocate jettisoning the method 
in its entirety. Rather, in Topics, Categories, Posterior Analytics, Metaphysics, and De 
Partibus Animalium, Aristotle presents a modification of division based on three 
improvements: (1) a distinction between genus, species, differentia, property, and 
essential and inessential accident, (2) successive differentiation, and (3) simultaneous 
division by multiple differentia (Balme 69). Taken together, these are intended to 
overcome serious defects of the method.  
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Balme argues that Aristotle’s purpose in De Generatione Animalium and De 
Partibus Animalium was not to classify animals, but to find essential differences in 
animal parts and to determine the causes of these parts (88). If Balme is correct, then it is 
not surprising that Aristotle would reject the method of division as described in Plato’s 
dialogues. The latter is much more general, and it is applied to diverse areas such as 
sensory phenomena, numbers, and psychology (see Section 1.6.3, pg. 88). How would 
the ideas of essential difference and causation apply in these cases? For example, what 
are the essential, as opposed to accidental, differences of the natural numbers? The 
question seems out of place in mathematics, as does the idea of causation. The same is 
true for musical intervals, which seem to be better understood in terms of numerical 
relations rather than causation and essence.  
But Balme points out other criticisms of the method, such as the apparently 
arbitrary order of division as described by Plato (70). This is an especially interesting 
criticism because Plato was very keen on order – the aim of the Philebus, for example, 
was a precise and accurate ranking of the elements of the good life. Yet the order in 
which collections and divisions should occur – if, indeed, order is not arbitrary – is not 
explained by Plato. However, in models that allow for overlapping concepts as opposed 
to genus-species hierarchies, relations are symmetric; e.g., the statement that art overlaps 
production is equivalent to production overlaps art. This is not the case when genus-
species relations are being defined; e.g., production is a species of art is not equivalent to 
art is a species of production. These models will be compared in Section 2.2, where it 
will be argued that models that allow for non-hierarchical relations more accurately 






While collection and division are important to Plato’s philosophy and play a 
prominent role in his later dialogues, there is significant disagreement on precisely what 
collection and division are; consequently, the secondary literature taken as a whole 
presents a wide spectrum of interpretations. Are they psychological processes so 
fundamental that thought and speech are not possible without them? Or are they 
techniques that can be learned and practiced only by trained specialists? Or are they 
components of a deductive system? There is little agreement on these questions. 
In the Phaedrus, Socrates states that collection and division give him the ability to 
speak and to think (“λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν”; 266b4-5). This claim should be taken 
seriously, and Chapters 2 and 3 will present the argument that collection and division are 
not restricted to the province of specialists or philosophers. In some cases, collection and 
division operate as a step-by-step procedure that can be learned and taught, but I will 
argue that in general, collection and division are commonplace and elementary. They are 
used to formulate definitions (even simple definitions such as love is a kind of madness) 
as well as hierarchical and non-hierarchical logical structures. Chapters 4 and 5 will show 
how collection and division underlie both deductive forms of reasoning, such as the 






In the Sophist, collection and division are referred to as “ἡ τῶν λόγων μεθόδος” 
(227a), and this expression highlights the fact that both ‘μεθόδος’ and ‘λόγος’ are key 
words for understanding collection and division. In addition, ‘μεθόδος’ is closely related 
to another term used to describe collection and division, ‘ὁδὸς.’ Each of these terms, as 
well as related terms such as ‘logic,’ will be discussed below. 
 
1.5.1 ‘λόγος’   
 
The importance of λόγος is supported by several passages in Plato’s dialogues. 
For example, according to the Statesman, when used correctly, λόγος makes us “better 
dialecticians” and allows us to display the things that are (“γενόμενα τοὺς συνόντας 
ἀπηργάζετο διαλεκτικωτέρους καὶ τῆς τῶν ὄντων λόγῳ δηλώσεως εὑρετικωτέρους”; 
287a). However, the flip side of the coin is that λόγος lends itself to abuse: sophists 
bewitch children through λόγος (Sophist 234c), those who practice rhetoric can inflame 
crowds by means of λόγος (Phaedrus 267c), and the young treat λόγος as a plaything by 
means of which they corrupt their parents and disseminate confusion (Philebus 15d-e). 
That Plato stressed the various ways in which λόγος can be misused explains his 
motivation for promoting a way of λόγος that purportedly yields clarity (Phaedrus 265d) 
if not knowledge.   
In the Theaetetus, Socrates and Theaetetus explore the thesis that knowledge is 
true belief (“δόξης ἀληθοῦς”) with an account (λόγος; 206c3-4). Three definitions of 




1. λόγος is the ‘vocal image’ of thought (206d). 
2. λόγος is a list of elements of which a whole is composed (207a) – i.e., it is a  
way to the whole through the elements (207c); for example, a wagon is a whole that can 
be understood as wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke, etc. (207a). 
3. λόγος is a distinguishing mark or characteristic (208c). For example,  
Theaetetus is distinguished through his snub nose (209c); the sun is the brightest body in 
the heavens (208d). 
  
The first definition is dismissed because while being a vocal image of thought  
may be an aspect of λόγος (206d), it does not tell us how λόγος (whether as speech or 
thought) can yield knowledge in conjunction with true belief (206d-e). The second 
definition fails because command over the elements of a whole is possible without 
knowledge of the whole (207a-208b). The third definition fails because it is circular: if 
we have to know the individual and know how he or she differs from other individuals to 
begin with, then we already have knowledge and λόγος would be superfluous (209b-
210a). 
The illustrations of collection and division do not articulate a theory of knowledge, 
but rather a method of reasoning that may or may not yield true belief. However, the 
second and third definitions of λόγος in the Theaetetus are useful because they tell us 
about features or aspects of λόγος that are relevant to collection and division.  
The second definition is relevant to collection and division because it states that 
λόγος is a way to the whole through the elements (“διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὅλον περάναντα”; 
207c3-4). As will be discussed in Section 1.5.3 (pg. 74), collection and division can be 
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understood as a way of articulating parts and wholes. A key difference is that in the 
Theaetetus, it is the elements – i.e., indivisible parts that can only be named and 
perceived – that serve as the way to the whole (208c), while in collection and division, it 
is often overlapping and divisible parts that define a whole. However, while collection 
and division apply to parts, not necessarily indivisible parts, understanding the parts of a 
whole – whether elements or complex parts – is one way to define or map out a whole, 
one way to form a belief or judgment about it. That something can be understood through 
its parts is emphasized at Theaetetus 205c, where it is stated that no λόγος (i.e., no 
account) can be given of the elements because they are incomposite – i.e., they lack 
parts.27 
The third definition of λόγος is relevant because the examples used to illustrate 
the definition tell us that λόγος not only concerns universals but also individuals. Here, 
two examples used to illustrate the notion that λόγος is a mark by which a thing is 
distinguished are the following: (1) the sun is the brightest of bodies that move round the 
earth in the heavens (208d), and (2) Theaetetus is an individual with a particular snub-
nose and other characteristics (209c). It is noteworthy that not only kinds are the subjects 
of knowledge, but individuals such as the sun and Theaetetus. It would have been equally 
permissible to speak of how species or kinds can differ from one another, but instead, the 
emphasis here is on how individuals differ. Thus, λόγος applies to both universals and 
individuals, and it will be argued in Chapter 5 that this is also true of collection and 
division. 
                                                 
27 “Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ὀλίγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εὖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τῶν πρώτων 
οὐκ εἴη λόγος ἐξ ὧν τἆλλα σύγκειται, διότι αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον εἴη ἀσύνθετον…” (205c4-7) 
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 In passages on collection and division, λόγος can be understood in one of two 
ways. First, λόγος is understood as something that is discovered – i.e., it is treated as the 
object of a search. For example, the Philebus states that the goal or destination of the 
method of collection and division is “τὸν λόγον ἀνευρεῖν” (16b). This expression is 
translated as “the goal of our argument” (Henderson, Philebus 219), “to show us a better 
solution to the problem” (D. Frede in Plato 404), and “finding a better way … to conduct 
the argument” (Gosling 6). Taking the infinitive “ἀνευρεῖν” into account, however, this 
expression indicates that λόγος is discovered. What λόγος refers to in this case is 
unspecified, but the implication is that we reason our way to something – perhaps a 
definition or account – that is hidden, and Socrates presents a method or way (i.e., a 
“ὁδὸς”) to do this. A similar picture of the method is presented in the Sophist, where the 
“λόγος” of the angler is finally grasped (“εἰλήφαμεν”) at the end of a search, and as a 
result an account or definition of the angler is discovered (221b). Thus, in both the 
paradigmatic illustration of the method in the Sophist and at Philebus 16b, “λόγος” is 
understood as the goal or endpoint of collection and division.  
When ‘λόγος’ is used to refer to the result of collection and division as described 
in the preceding paragraph – i.e., when ‘λόγος’ is treated in an objective sense, as 
something to be found or produced – ‘account,’ ‘characterization,’ or ‘definition’ will be 
used to translate this word. In this case, ‘λόγος’ can also be considered as a logical 
framework. A logical framework is a definition or account produced by collection and 
division that can serve as the basis for other forms of reasoning. The construction of 
frameworks through collection and division will be discussed further in Chapter 2, where 
it will be argued that three operations are at work when a framework is produced. 
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When ‘λόγος’ is used to stand for an activity – i.e., when the term is used in the 
sense of thinking, speaking, or reflecting – it will be translated as “reasoning.” This term 
is broad enough to reflect the wide scope of collection and division, and it reflects the 
fact that collection and division are an activity and a form of thought and discourse.  
To return to the first sense of the word, in general, there are two ways of 
understanding ‘λόγος’ as a definition. Under one reading, ‘λόγος’ in this sense is 
understood as a statement of the essential characteristics of the target being defined – i.e., 
it is a “definitive” account in the modern sense of the word. Under a different reading, 
‘λόγος’ is understood as one of multiple ways of indicating or characterizing the target 
being defined. This reading of the term is summarized by M.L. Gill in her discussion of 
the Sophist: 
 
The sophist is not unique in his tendency to turn up in many different places. Any 
object, including very simple ones, can do the same, because people experience the 
same thing in different ways and so have different conceptions of it. Whereas most 
people share the same conception of an angler, because he engages in a single 
observable activity, they may well have different views of complex things which 
engage in several activities. Some conceptions may capture the entity by a feature or 
activity essential to it, but many others will capture it in some accidental way. 
Division does not itself guarantee that one attends to essential features … Plato’s late 
dialogues investigate complex and controversial kinds, and disputes about them 
cannot be readily settled (“Division and Definition” 179-180).  
 
Other commentators, such as J.M.E. Moravcsik, argue similarly, and this understanding 
of ‘λόγος’ will be discussed further in Section 3.2.2 (pg. 162). For the purposes of this 
study, ‘λόγος’ as ‘definition’ should be understood in the latter sense; i.e., it implies that 




1.5.2  ‘μέθοδος’ and ‘ὁδός’ 
 
 The term ‘μέθοδος’ derives from ‘ὁδός’ (Liddell and Scott 1091; Beekes 1047). 
The latter term signifies ‘road,’ ‘way,’ ‘traveling,’ and ‘journey’ (Liddell and Scott 1199) 
and it occurs more frequently in Plato’s writings.28 In “Division and Definition in Plato's 
Sophist and Statesman,” M.L. Gill explains the importance of the terms ‘μεθόδος’ and 
‘ὁδός’: 
 
The word ‘method’ itself—μεθόδος—calls attention to the route (ὁδός) we take in our 
enquiry. The Sophist and the first part of the Statesman represent the search by means 
of an elaborate system of branching roads. We travel down these roads; at each fork 
we must choose which branch to take in the hopes of finding our quarry, and that 
quarry alone, at the terminus (172). 
 
This observation is correct: not only is ‘ὁδός’ the etymological root of ‘μεθόδος,’ but 
both terms are used in the dialogues to describe a network of branching roads. It will be 
argued in Section 3.2.5 (pg. 173) that the image of branching roads is a useful way to 
represent the structures defined by collection and division because they describe 
structures more elaborate than genus-species trees. 
  It is important to note that the word ‘μέθοδος’ does not always connote a rule-
based procedure akin to modern-day scientific methods. More specifically, the μέθοδος 
of collection and division is not a prescription for reasoning that will necessarily lead to 
knowledge. Rather, collection and division share an affinity with the way of inquiry 
described in the Timaeus (29b-d) that yields a plausible story (“εἰκὼς λόγος”; Timaeus 
                                                 
28 The Thesaurus Linguae Graecae lists 86 instances of ὁδὸς and 26 instances of ‘μέθοδος’ (including their  
declensions) in the Platonic corpus.  
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29c) on the one hand, and with the Way of Opinion described in the poem of Parmenides 
on the other. These ways of reasoning may be contrasted with strict procedures that are 
designed to yield scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). The contrast between these methods is 
described by Robert Bolton as follows:  
 
Plato is telling us, in effect, that the likely story in the Timaeus is not to be understood 
as science (epistēmē) as he himself understands it, but rather as the result of another 
methodos, parallel in certain respects to what Parmenides had already offered as a 
likely story not satisfying the standards for strict science or knowledge, in his Way of 
Opinion (B8.60) (105). 
 
This is not to say that the μέθοδος of collection and division is to be equated with the 
forms of inquiry described in the Timaeus and the poem of Parmenides. Rather, the point 
is that these three forms of inquiry share a key property: they provide a means to perform 
a search that yields belief or judgement as opposed to knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). In other 
words, they produce results that are defeasible. This is one reason why, for example, the 
definition of the sophist is revised six times before a final definition is reached; while the 
method of collection and division does provide a route or way to a definition – a 
definition that may be truthful – there is no guarantee that the definition is correct. For 
this reason, the method of collection and division often provides a series of routes or 
ways to multiple definitions, with each definition along the way to the final result subject 
to scrutiny and revision.29  
Regardless of the truthfulness or lack thereof of the end result of the method, 
collection and division provide a means to search for or pursue the target to be defined. 
                                                 
29 In Chapter 2 I will argue that collection and division comprise three operations through which reasoning 
moves forward, step-by-step, toward a definition. However, these operations in and of themselves, while 




This is reflected in the meaning of the word ‘μέθοδος’: definitions of the term include 
“following after, pursuit” and “pursuit of knowledge, investigation” (Liddell and Scott 
1091). These overlapping meanings highlight one of the primary images of the method in 
the Sophist: much of the dialogue is a pursuit for a quarry, the dialogue’s namesake. The 
definition “following after, pursuit” likens the method to a kind of hunting, in which 
something is gradually entrapped in a series of narrowing enclosures. Commenting on the 
search for the sophist, Notomi states “The image of hunting and escaping has been 
predominant in the inquiry into the definition of the sophist, and associated especially 
with the method of division: the inquirers trace the species of the sophist in each branch 
of the division, and try to find and capture him in his proper species” (164). Incidentally, 
this indicates that the employment of the method in the Sophist is a display of irony: it is 
the sophist who is supposed to be the hunter (222b), yet the method as it is applied in this 
dialogue presents the Eleatic Stranger, the practitioner of the method, as a hunter who 
hunts the sophist. In Section 3.3, these two perspectives are explored further: the “hunter” 
can be understood as a practitioner of the method of collection and division, while the 
“hunted” can be understood as one who is defined by the method – i.e., the “target” of the 
method. These correspond to two different perspectives by which a framework can be 
understood. 
In the Philebus Socrates describes the method as a “ὁδὸς”: “οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων 
ὁδὸς οὐδ' ἂν γένοιτο ἧς ἐγὼ ἐραστὴς μέν εἰμι ἀεί, πολλάκις δέ με ἤδη διαφυγοῦςα ἔρημον 
καὶ ἄπορον κατέστησεν.” (“there certainly is no better road, nor can there ever be, than 
that which I have always loved, though it has often deserted me, leaving me lonely and 
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forlorn.”30; 16b). Fowler (Henderson, Philebus 219), Frede (Plato 404), and Gosling (6) 
translate “ὁδὸς” as “road” or “way,” and Hackforth translates it as “method” (Phaedrus 
23). Hackforth’s translation is not far removed from the others: as explained above, the 
Greek word for ‘method,’ ‘μέθοδος,’ derives from ‘ὁδὸς,’ and when Plato describes the 
method as “ἡ τῶν λόγων μεθόδος” at Sophist 227a, he is using terminology similar to that 
of Philebus 16b. Collectively, ‘ὁδὸς’ and ‘μέθοδος’ paint the image of a path or way by 
which one can pursue a goal or travel to a destination. More specifically, collection and 
division can be understood as “ways of reasoning” (“ἡ τῶν λόγων μεθόδος”, Sophist 
227a) that allow one to acquire intelligence and give one the capability of thought and 
speech (Sophist 227b, Phaedrus 266b).  
To conclude, the image of a road (ὁδός), which is central in the illustrations of 
collection and division in the dialogues, is an integration of space and time: a road is both 
a place and a journey; it connotes both structure and movement. Collection and division 
can be understood as both a movement of thought – i.e., as a process of inquiry – as well 
as a form of reasoning in which a static whole is articulated into clearly defined parts, 
each fixed in its own place.  
 
1.5.3 ‘logic’ and ‘framework’ 
 
Our English word ‘logic’ ultimately derives from ‘λόγος,’ and in many ways 
collection and division constitute a basic form of logic. It is noteworthy that ‘λόγος’ 
derives from the word ‘λέγω,’ which means “to collect, gather” as well as “to count, 
recount” (Beekes 1:841), and a derivative of ‘λέγω’ is ‘λογή,’ the Greek word for 
                                                 
30 Translated by H.N. Fowler (Henderson, Philebus 219) 
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“reasoning, way” (Beekes 1:841).  
According to some commentators, before Aristotle promoted the syllogism, the 
method of division was the only system of logic known to the Greeks. Commenting on 
Aristotle’s criticism of the method of division, Cherniss states the following: “the fact 
that Aristotle thought it necessary after having outlined his own system of logical proof to 
refute the pretensions of the method of diaeresis and that method alone, indicates that the 
latter was the only systematic ‘logic’ with which at this time the field had to be disputed” 
(Aristotle's Criticism of Plato 30).  
In fact, the same kind of reasoning seen in collection and division – i.e., reasoning 
in terms of wholes and parts – plays a prominent role outside of Plato’s dialogues, for 
instance in the works of Archytas. Not only was Archytas an important mathematician in 
his own right, he was also an associate of Plato and there are significant parallels in their 
work. More specifically, Huffman argues that there are similarities between division and 
Archytas’ mathematical procedures. For example, both Plato’s Philebus and Fragment 1 
of Archytas start with sound as a unity and divide it into high and low pitch, the result in 
both cases being a division of scales (Huffman 90). Huffman also points out that there are 
parallels between Plato’s description of collection and division in the Phaedrus and the 
concept of “the nature of the whole” found in the works of Archytas and Hippocrates of 
Cos (89).  
Thus, the systematic application of the fundamentals of collection and division – 
i.e., of reasoning in terms of wholes and parts – is seen not only in Plato’s dialogues, but 
also in the works of ancient mathematicians such as Archytas. This is additional evidence 
in support of Cherniss’ claim that division was considered to be a system of logic 
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comparable to the syllogistic.  
However, Cherniss’ claim raises the question as to what logic is. For better or 
worse, this question is difficult to answer because there is no consensus on the definition 
of ‘logic.’ Even a general characterization of logic, according to some, is beyond our 
grasp. For example, in his article, “What is Logic?” Ian Hacking states, “It is not to be 
expected that logic can be or should be characterized to everyone’s satisfaction, for the 
subject is too ancient, its workers too active, and its scope too vast for that” (285). In the 
same article, Hacking specifies the following problem: “… as Tarski had earlier implied, 
there is no delineation of the logical constants. We can at best list them. It is as if we 
could characterize the concept planet of the sun only by reciting Mars, Venus, Earth, etc., 
and could not tell by any general principle whether the heavenly body epsilon is a planet 
or not” (287). Nonetheless, contemporary logicians do provide definitions, even if very 
general ones; for example, Graham Priest states that “logic is the investigation of the 
right way to reason” (“Entrevista – Graham Priest” 167-168). The advantage of Priest’s 
definition is that it is broad enough to include the various forms of logic that have been 
studied over the centuries, and it emphasizes the connection between logic and reason, a 
connection that, as will be explained below, was made explicit in ancient Greece. 
For the purposes of this study ‘logic’ is to be understood broadly as a way of 
reasoning that is oriented toward a goal or endpoint. More specifically, logic is a way of 
reasoning in which a series of steps is taken for the purpose of reaching a statement that, 
if the correct steps are taken, is true. This definition is broad enough to include ancient 
conceptions of λόγος as a form of reasoning, yet narrow enough to exclude thinking that 
is aimless or circular. It is possible for the latter to arrive by chance at a true statement, 
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but the goal of taking the right steps and tracing out a path that leads to truth is lacking. 
Conversely, logical inference may arrive at a false conclusion (e.g., even a valid 
argument with false premises can yield a false conclusion), but a false conclusion in itself 
does not determine whether thinking is logical or not. The importance of attempting to 
reach a true conclusion is an aspect of reasoning that is lacking in aimless or stream-of-
consciousness thinking, and it is movement directed toward a correct conclusion that 
distinguishes collection and division from other forms of reasoning.  
Thinking that reaches an endpoint is described by Plato at Theaetetus 189e-190a. 
Here, in response to Theaetetus, Socrates explains what he means by “thinking” 
(“διανοεῖσθαι”): 
 
     ΣΩ. Λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ 
ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. ὥς γε μὴ εἰδώς σοι ἀποφαίνομαι. τοῦτο γάρ 
μοι ἰνδάλλεται διανοουμένη οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ 
190 (a) ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ 
φάσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ ὁρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον εἴτε καὶ 
ὀξύτερον ἐπᾴξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φῇ καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, δόξαν 
ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. (189e6-190a4) 
 
     Socrates: A talk which the soul has with itself about the objects under  
its consideration. Of course, I’m only telling you my idea in all ignorance;  
but this is the kind of picture I have of it. It seems to me that the soul  
when it thinks is simply carrying on a discussion in which it asks itself  
questions and answers them itself, affirms and denies. And when it arrives  
at something definite, either by a gradual process or a sudden leap, when  
it affirms one thing consistently and without divided counsel, we call this  
its judgment. So, in my view, to judge is to make a statement…31 (189e-190a) 
 
Here, Socrates is describing a particular kind of thinking. This is thinking that is 
not simply a series of unanswered questions, nor is it a series of thoughts that lack well-
defined endpoints (as one might see in stream-of-consciousness or incoherent talk). Nor 
                                                 
31 Translated by M.J. Levett, revised by Myles Burnyeat (Plato 210). 
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is it circular thinking, where the soul recycles the same series of thoughts without limit. 
Instead, this kind of thinking is a talk – i.e., a λόγος – comprising a series of affirmations 
and denials that ends when a determination has been made (“ὅταν δὲ ὁρίσασα”). 
 The point of arrival is a statement that may or may not be true (it is a judgment, 
not a proven statement), but it serves as a conclusion – i.e., a limit or endpoint, a 
destination at which the reasoning process comes to rest, even if momentarily. A similar 
description of thinking that reaches an endpoint is given at Sophist 264a-b, where 
thinking is the soul’s conversation with itself, and belief the conclusion of thinking.  
Collection and division constitute a series of steps in which an endpoint – a 
definition or classificatory scheme – is reached, and given the definition of logic given 
above, collection and division can be understood as a form of logic. In other words, 
collection and division can be distinguished from other forms of thought because when 
they are applied, they are directed toward a conclusion.  The conclusion is a judgment or 
belief (i.e., a λόγος) that serves as a definition.  
This is not to say that collection and division always arrive at the truth – in fact, 
often the end-result is defeasible. We see this in the Sophist, for example, where 
definitions are repeatedly tested and revised until a final, seventh definition is reached. 
Moreover, collection and division can be misused to reach a tentative definition that is 
presented as a true and conclusive answer. Similarly, an invalid or unsound deduction, or 
a weak induction can be used to deceive one’s audience. Nonetheless these are forms of 
logic. 
There is a counter-argument to the claim that collection and division constitute a 
form of logic. It can be argued that collection and division depend on the semantics or 
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meaning, not the logical structure, of the particular object being collected or divided.. For 
example, when Man is divided into Male and Female (Statesman 262e), the division is 
based on knowledge of what Man is. In other words, it is the semantics of the word 
‘Man,’ as opposed to an abstract logical structure, that determines how Man is divided. 
Since this is the case, collection and division are not logical operations but simply the 
analysis of a concept, the analysis being determined by the meaning of the concept.  
However, the same argument holds for mathematical operations. Consider 
mathematical division: we divide five in half, for example, using our knowledge of what 
‘five’ refers to: i.e., we have to know, among other things, that five is an odd number, and 
so our division of this number will differ from that of an even number. Even though this 
is the case, we can still speak of division as a mathematical operation. Similarly, when 
logical division is applied to Man, the particular result will depend on our knowledge of 
the concept Man, just as the particular result of dividing a number depends on our 
knowledge of that particular number.  
Moreover, even apart from the semantics of the particular object being divided, in 
general, the result of logical division is always the same: a conceptual whole is divided 
into two or more parts. It does not matter which whole is being divided, when it is 
divided, the division yields parts, each of which is related to the whole and to each other. 
This is an inferential “step” in the sense that one concept is succeeded by a set of other 
concepts, and in every case these concepts are interrelated. In fact, any division can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
If a whole a is divided, then there are at least two parts b and c such that b and c 
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are parts of a.32    
 
This raises the following questions: what does the term ‘part’ mean, as opposed to 
related terms such as ‘kind’ or ‘species?’ Why even use the term ‘part’ at all? In answer 
to the first question, in this study ‘part’ is a general term that encompasses more specific 
terms such as ‘kind,’ ‘species,’ and ‘aspect.’ For example, to say that love is a kind of 
madness is also to say that love is a part of madness, but the reverse is not necessarily the 
case because the term ‘kind’ is more specific than the term ‘part.’ The second question is 
related to the first and it is especially pertinent because Plato often speaks of kinds 
(γένος) rather than parts. Thus, considering the division of the Phaedrus, it makes sense 
to say that love is a kind of madness. If this is the case, why make this more abstract? 
There are at least two reasons. First, the terminology of parts occurs frequently in the 
illustrations of collection and division.33 Second, a division does not always yield a kind. 
In many cases, the result of division is not a kind or species. Thus, the letter ‘a’ is a part 
of speech, but not a kind of speech in the sense that ‘vowel’ and ‘consonant’ designate 
kinds. Commentators such as Menn have pointed out that a part of a whole is not 
necessarily a species or kind: mutes, for example, are a part of sound, but they are not a 
kind of sound (see Section 1.2.4, pg. 38). Thus, the word ‘part’ may refer to a kind, a 
species, an aspect, or, more generally, any one of a set of components of which a whole is 
comprised.   
                                                 
32 This is expressed at Parmenides 144d as “Καὶ μὴν τό γε μεριστὸν πολλὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ 
μέρη.” (“Furthermore, a divided thing certainly must be as numerous as its parts.”; Plato 378). Parmenides 
144e states that the parts are parts of a whole.  
 




Given the definitions of the terms ‘logic’ and ‘part’ above, the term ‘logical 
framework’ is defined as follows: a logical framework is a structure in which a whole and 
its parts serve as the means by which reasoning can move to an endpoint. More 
specifically, a logical framework comprises named parts that are unified into a structure 
which provides the means for reasoning to move step-by-step toward a conclusion. To 
clarify using an example, consider the division of Number into Odd and Even in the 
Statesman (262c -263a; see Appendix A 25). Number and its two parts, Odd and Even, 
constitute a logical framework because they define the steps by which one can reach a 
conclusion. To use a simple example, one can start with the concept for Even and 
conclude in one step that Even is a part of Number. One can then use this conclusion as 
the starting point of another line of reasoning: e.g., since some numbers are prime, 
perhaps some even numbers are also prime. Or, one might start with a particular number 
and given the parts of Number as a whole, try to determine whether it is odd or even: the 
relations between Number, Odd, and Even provide the basis – i.e., the underlying 
framework – for this form of reasoning. While this may be a simple form of reasoning, 
the fact that it is simple is crucial: it explains why Socrates would make the claim that 
collection and division give him the ability to speak and to think (see Section 1.6.3, pg. 
88).  
In short, whole-part relations defined through collection and division serve as the 
means by which steps are made so that reason can reach an endpoint. These whole-part 
relations are structures – in other words, frameworks – that underlie thinking that is 
directed toward a conclusion. Whether they are simple structures or not is irrelevant: the 
fact that thinking can be structured is the key point. 
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 Given the definition of ‘logic’ above, the formulation of a framework or 
definition, too, is a form of thinking that is logical. It will be argued in Chapter 2 that 
seeing, naming, and placing are operations that act as “steps” that ultimately yield a 
framework. So, a framework produced by collection and division is ‘logical’ in two 
ways: first, a framework is the product of logical thinking: reasoning moves step-by-step 
through three operations to arrive at an endpoint, the framework itself. This framework 
can then serve as a starting point for step-by-step reasoning to reach a conclusion. To 
clarify, consider as an analogy the construction of a geometric figure. When constructing 
the square in the Meno, for example, we can say that Socrates is reasoning 
mathematically by using principles of geometry to perform his construction. After the 
square is constructed, when Socrates and the slave boy manipulate and eventually double 
the square, they are also reasoning mathematically by applying their knowledge of 
geometry to understand and manipulate the parts of a square. Thus, the completed square 
serves as a ‘framework’ upon which further mathematical reasoning moves. An even 
simpler case is the construction of a line-segment: two points are placed and a line is 
drawn between them. Using knowledge of elementary concepts of geometry (all the more 
important for being elementary), one has already completed a structure – a minimal 
structure to be sure, but a structure nonetheless. One can then manipulate this simple 
structure: one can divide it into two or more smaller segments, one can conclude that 
there is only one straight line between two points, etc. In short, behind the seemingly 
“simple” statements such as ‘Number divides into Odd and Even,’ or ‘letters are parts of 
speech’ lie great discoveries, and Plato was pointing out that behind the seemingly simple 





1.6 Origin, purpose, and scope of collection and division 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of collection and division by 
discussing the method’s origin, purpose, and scope. It will be argued that collection and 
division in their simplest forms pre-date the later dialogues, they serve as a means of 




 In Plato’s Individuals, M.M. McCabe states that “Plato insists, in several of the 
later dialogues, that he has discovered a new and stunning ‘method’ of dialectic: 
collection and division” (258). But nowhere in the dialogues does Plato claim that he has 
discovered the method of collection and division. On the contrary, in the Philebus, 
Socrates refers to the method as follows: “θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὥς γε 
καταφαίνεται ἐμοί, ποθὲν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη διά τινος Προμηθέως ἅμα φανοτάτῳ τινὶ πυρί.” 
(“A gift of gods to men, as I believe, was tossed down from some divine source through 
the agency of a Prometheus together with a gleaming fire.”34; 16c). The next sentence 
elaborates on this observation: the method was handed down from the ancients (παλαιοί; 
16c) who were better than Socrates and his contemporaries. This may be one reason why 
Socrates is often left in a state of puzzlement when he attempts to employ the method 
                                                 




(16b): collection and division were well understood by the ancients, but apparently they 
have become something of a lost art by the time of Socrates. In the same passage of the 
Philebus (16c), Socrates also states that it is through the way (ὁδὸς) of collection and 
division that all the discoveries of the arts are made (“πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόμενα 
ἀνηυρέθη πώποτε διὰ ταύτης φανερὰ γέγονε”). Commenting on this remark and a similar 
statement by Socrates at Phaedrus 266b, Hallvard Fossheim states the following: 
 
This is an extraordinary thing to say, and one which creates enormous difficulties for 
anyone wanting to claim that Plato is here expounding on some specialized method. 
The way in question does not constitute anything new, but something which has been 
around at least since the dawn of civilized society … it should therefore not be 
thought of as anything like a radical innovation developed only in the late Platonic 
dialogues. What the Philebus lets us take away concerning collection-and-division is, 
on the contrary, that it constitutes an aspect of understanding which is all-pervasive 
(34).35 
 
Other commentators have made similar observations. For example, Guthrie states that 
“Evidently the method of definition by division, exemplified in the Sophist and 
Statesman, was not a new departure, but a technical elaboration of something with which 
                                                 
35     It is important to note that Plato was well aware of the fact that the Greeks did not have a monopoly on 
great discoveries in the arts and sciences. For example, at Phaedrus 274c, Socrates credits the invention of 
number, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, draughts and dice, and letters to the Egyptians. This is not to say 
that in actuality the Egyptians had a monopoly on innovation; the Babylonians and other ancient 
civilizations also paved the way. The gist of Phaedrus 274c is that Socrates recognizes that the Greeks had 
inherited powerful devices of reasoning, at least some of them deriving from the Egyptians. Moreover, 
claims in the dialogues about the Greek’s predecessors do have a basis in historical fact. Recent 
commentators such as Stephen Menn have stated that “in modern scholarly opinion, the invention of 
alphabetic writing was roughly as Plato describes it” in the Philebus (298), and that “what is logically 
required at each stage in the development of a writing-system is something much like the process of 
collection that Plato ascribes to Theuth” (299).  
     As for division in general, an important connection between ancient Greece and Egypt, and between 
Plato and earlier thinkers, is the idea that a unit can be divided into parts. This was expressed 
mathematically by both civilizations as the unit fraction (i.e., a fraction in which the numerator is one). 
Knorr observes that the manipulation of unit fractions “dominates the computations with fractions found in 
the ancient Egyptian papyri … and despite the passage of over two millennia is still to be found in late 
Greek papyri from the Graeco-Roman and Byzantine periods” (134). Knorr emphasizes that sources that 
affirm Greek and Egyptian continuity in mathematics must be taken seriously (135). He states, “the Greek 




Plato was familiar from the beginning” (5: 27). It is worth emphasizing that the method 
of collection and division as described in the Sophist and the Statesman is an elaboration, 
and an understanding of what is being elaborated – i.e., collection and division in their 




According to the Philebus, the purpose of the method is to enable one to inquire, 
learn, and teach. At Philebus 16e, Socrates states “οἱ μὲν οὖν θεοί, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὕτως 
ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν σκοπεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ διδάσκειν ἀλλήλους” (“The gods, then, as I 
said, handed down to us this mode of investigating, learning, and teaching one 
another”36). The key words in this passage are ‘σκοπεῖν’ (to inquire), ‘μανθάνειν’ (to 
learn), and ‘διδάσκειν’ (to teach), and they reveal a great deal about the method’s role 
and purpose.  
The term ‘σκοπεῖν’ is translated as “inquiring” or “inquire” (Gosling 7, Plato 404), 
“investigating” (Henderson, Philebus 221), and “enquiry” (Hackforth, Examination of 
Pleasure 24). Some of its meanings are visual: among the meanings listed by Ast for 
‘σκοπῶ’ are video and specto (254), and its definitions include “examine, inspect” and 
“look to or into” (Liddell and Scott 1614). In Plato’s dialogues ‘σκοπῶ’ and its 
derivatives occur frequently,37 and it is not always used in reference to sensible objects. It 
is often used to refer to the activity of inspecting a concept for “parts” that at first sight 
                                                 
36 Translated by H.N. Fowler (Henderson, Philebus 221). 
 




are hidden. For example, in the Sophist, the concept belief-mimicry (δοξομιμητική) is 
inspected (σκοπέω) as if it were a piece of iron until its internal structure is discovered 
(267e-268a). The activity of inspecting a whole for parts corresponds to the operation of  
seeing. 
 The term ‘μανθάνειν’ is translated as “learn” or “learning” (Fowler in Henderson, 
Philebus 221; Hackforth, Examination of Pleasure 24; D. Frede in Plato 404; Gosling 7). 
This term reinforces the idea that the method is a way of learning – i.e., it provides a path 
or road that leads from ignorance to discovery. The image that comes to mind is that one 
begins in a state of ignorance or puzzlement and progresses to a clarification if not 
knowledge and discovery. Definitions of ‘μανθάνειν’ include not only “learn” but also 
“perceive, remark, notice” (Liddell and Scott 1079), and Ast lists percipio as one of its 
meanings (277). Thus, both ‘σκοπεῖν’ and ‘μανθάνειν’ imply looking and perceiving. 
Given the uses of ‘σκοπεῖν’ by Plato discussed above, this does not necessarily imply that 
sense-perception of empirical phenomena is involved. An intellectual seeing – e.g., when 
one “sees” a mathematical object such as a number or a geometric figure – may be 
involved. In addition, the visual senses of ‘μανθάνειν’ reinforce the description of the 
method at Phaedrus 265d, where the word ‘συνορῶντα’ (“with seeing”) is used to 
describe collection (see Section 2.2.1.2, pg. 105). Thus, both ‘μανθάνειν’ and ‘σκοπεῖν’ 
emphasize the role of seeing – whether intellectual or perceptual – in the method. The 
importance of seeing in collection and division will be discussed further in Section 2.2.1 
(pg. 103). 
The word ‘διδάσκειν’ is usually translated as “to teach” (D. Frede in Plato 405; 
Fowler in Henderson, Philebus 221; Gosling 7; Hackforth, Examination of Pleasure 24). 
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This term complements ‘μανθάνειν.’ Collection and division are not only a way of 
reasoning, but a means by which one can teach others how to reason. In the Sophist and 
the Statesman, for example, the Eleatic Stranger does not simply formulate definitions, he 
teaches his interlocutors how to collect and divide correctly; in other words, he teaches 
his interlocutors how to discern resemblances and differences. Section 2.3.1 (pg. 135) 
will explain that since one of the purposes of collection and division is to teach, it relies 
on images and representations to clarify and illustrate the target being defined.  
In her discussion on the Sophist and the Statesman, M.L. Gill states that reflection 
on mistaken divisions ultimately leads the inquirers to a solution, and that both dialogues 
are “philosophical exercises” (“Division and Definition” 198). She states that mistakes as 
well as correct moves demonstrate how to investigate kinds through the practice of 
division (Gill, “Division and Definition” 198). In my view, Gill’s interpretation is correct, 
and collection and division are not to be understood as a procedure governed by strict, 
detailed rules or as a method of proof. Trial and error and the opportunity to make 
mistakes and question oneself are the method’s strong points as well as its limitations.  
In short, if the method of collection and division were infallible – i.e., if there were 
precise rules by which collection and division could be employed so that they always led 
to a correct result, it would be so to the detriment of its educational value. The method 
makes us better thinkers by making us question appearances, so that by questioning we 
may learn that that which appears to be similar is actually different, and that which 
appears to be different is actually similar. Often when we question, we hypothesize 
something that is incorrect, and it is only after considering our hypothesis that we realize 
a mistake was made, and we return to the beginning and try again, only this time having 
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learned from our mistake, and trying anew. The geometry lesson in the Meno is an 
adequate parallel: Socrates could have simply had the slave boy memorize the rules for 
doubling a square, in step-by-step sequence. Instead, he questions him, and lets him make 
errors. The boy then learns that despite appearances, doubling the side of a square does 
not double its area (82b-85b). He learns through trial and error what the correct approach 
is – he learns how to look for hidden structures behind the appearances. 
 
1.6.3 Scope 
   
As discussed in the literature review above, the scope of collection and division is 
debatable. In the dialogues, it is not immediately evident whether the method applies only 
to genus-species structures, for example, nor is it clear whether the method applies to 
sensible individuals as well as Forms. Considering the illustrations of collection and 
division in the Phaedrus, the Sophist, the Statesman, and the Philebus as a whole, there 
are three ways in which collection and division may be understood: 
 
1. Collection and division are rare: in their true forms they are as common as the 
discovery of new ideas and the formulation of new names and classifications. In other 
words, they are as unusual as the discovery of the alphabet or the first division of 
Number into Odd and Even. They require a great deal of insight, if not wisdom, 
whenever they are employed. This is the impression given by the illustrations in the 
Philebus: it was a god or demigod who was wise enough to use the method to 




2. Collection and division are uncommon: they require long-term, deliberate effort, 
but they can be taught to those who are willing to learn. In other words, they require 
the methodological application of a procedure as exhibited in the Sophist and the 
Statesman. Collection and division can be taught and applied in the way that most 
techniques can, but they are beyond the ken of everyday reasoning. This is indicated 
by a passage in the Statesman (277e-278c) where through careful schooling children 
are taught how to recognize letters of the alphabet through collection (see Section 
1.4.3, pg. 54). 
 
3. Collection and division are common: through them reasoning of an everyday sort is 
possible, and they do not always require specialized knowledge of a procedure. For 
example, wherever two concepts are brought together and unified into a single 
statement, collection and division are at work. This is indicated by the Phaedrus, 
where it is stated that collection and division give us the ability to “speak and to 
think” (“λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν”; Phaedrus 266b).  
 
This study will argue for the third interpretation. Collection and division are broad in 
scope, and in their most basic form – i.e., when they are not applied as part of a rule-
based procedure – they serve as a common way of reasoning that underpins thinking and 
speech in all domains of discourse. In other words, collection and division do not require 
specialized training, and they are not restricted in their fields of application. This 
interpretation is supported both in the dialogues and in the secondary literature. For 
Pasqualoni 90 
 
example, in the Phaedrus, when Socrates states that collection and division allow him to 
speak and to think (“λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν”; 266b), there is no qualification: Socrates 
does not say that collection and division allow him to speak and to think in a specific 
domain of inquiry, for example, or in a particular way. Moreover, a sampling of the areas 
in which collection and division are applied in the dialogues indicates their scope: 
 
Love and madness (Phaedrus 265e)                                         
Definitions of the angler and the sophist (Sophist 218e, 221c) 
Definition of the statesman (Statesman 258b) 
Vocal sound (Philebus 18b5-18d2) 
Music (Philebus 17c) 
Dance (Philebus 17d) 
Number (Statesman 262e) 
 
In this selection alone, collection and division extend into the domains of psychology, 
religion, linguistics, the performing arts, and mathematics. Also, as was shown in Section 
1.2.2 (pg. 26), a wide range of subjects is considered even within one division. 
Additionally, the third interpretation is to be understood as including the first and 
the second.  Collection and division are applied in all three cases. To clarify this point 
using a mathematical example: the natural numbers have esoteric as well as 
commonplace applications; e.g., Plato had enumerated the five highest Forms in the 
Sophist (255e), yet children use the same numbers for counting physical objects. 
Similarly, one may start with an indefinite number of sensible objects and conceive of 
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them as one, or start with a number of abstract concepts and bring them into one 
interrelated whole. The difficulty of collecting and dividing varies depending on their 
application, of course, but the underlying principles are the same. Collection that 
underlies the discovery of new ideas and the formulation of new concepts is collection to 
the extent that it brings together many into a whole, and similarly for division. In short, 
wherever there is reasoning in terms of wholes and parts, collection and division are at 
work. 
As will be discussed in Section 2.4, collection and division are sometimes 
employed as a method in the modern sense of the word – i.e., not just as a way of 
reasoning, but as a procedure that requires specialized knowledge. This is seen in the 
Sophist and the Statesman, for example. But even when collection and division are 
applied in this sense, they are based on the primitive (i.e., commonplace and elementary) 
concepts of collecting many into one, and dividing one into many. It is through 
understanding these concepts that the procedures illustrated in the Sophist and the 
Statesman come to light, and vice versa: the method of collection and division as a 
procedure sheds light on the underlying concepts. 
Regarding the question as to whether particulars as well as Forms fall within the 
scope of collection and division, there is strong evidence that indicates that collection and 
division are not limited to Forms. For example, some commentators claim that in some 
cases, division applies to sensible particulars. Commenting on the divisions of the Sophist, 
Cristina Ionescu argues the following: 
 
Focusing on the specific sequence of the definitions obtained in the Sophist and on 
what count as proper objects of division, we come to realize that, instead of treating 
the method of division as exclusively confined to taking either particulars or 
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intelligible forms as its objects, we are to take the objects of division to be intelligible 
or sensible depending on the level of understanding at which the divisions are carried 
out. When we map the Stranger’s approach onto the Republic's Divided Line, we see 
that collections and divisions can be carried out at various levels corresponding to one 
or another of the four segments of the Line: imaging (eikasia), belief (pistis), thought 
(dianoia), and understanding (noēsis). Thus whether the objects of one division are 
forms or particulars depends on the level of comprehension at which the division is 
made (42). 
 
Ionescu is correct; in fact, the argument can be extended as follows: the image of the 
divided line is an image in the sense that we are not to understand imaging, belief, 
thought, and understanding as in reality being placed on a line, but by imagining the parts 
in this way, relations between the parts become perspicuous. More specifically, the 
divided line makes evident (1) that the four parts of the line form a whole, or conversely, 
the whole is divided into four parts; (2) the names of the parts clarify what the parts stand 
for, and (3) each part is placed in the whole relative to the others, its position indicating 
its relation to the other parts. In other words, by constructing an articulate image and 
dividing it into parts, Plato makes clear the relation between imaging, belief, thought, and 
understanding. The employment of images as devices of reasoning will be explored 
further in Section 2.3.2, where a passage from the Laws states that in some cases, we 
cannot reason without images (pg. 139). It will be argued that images are not only useful, 
but sometimes necessary, for reasoning. 
Another way of answering the question of scope is by considering a hypothetical 
argument against the claim that collection and division are wide in scope: if (so the 
argument goes) division applies only to one section of the Divided Line, for example, the 
understanding of Forms, then there would be a separate kind of division that applies to 
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the other segments, such as images.38 The key question in this case is, do the two kinds of 
division – one for Forms, and one for images – have a common characteristic? This must 
be the case since they both involve a kind of reasoning in which one is divided into 
many; i.e., both the division of a Form and the division of an image operate by dividing a 
whole into parts. In this sense, there is one general kind of division that covers both 
Forms and images. To argue the contrary – that there are two distinct kinds of division 
that share a common characteristic – would be contradictory; it would be similar to the 
argument that there are two Forms of bed as discussed in the Republic (597c-d). Here, 
Socrates argues that it would be wrong to posit two Forms for a single nature: the second 
Form would be superfluous. In other words, since two separate Forms of bed would have 
a shared nature – they are both Forms of bed – ultimately they must be unified under a 
single Form that comprises both.  
Counting and number serve as an analogy. Whether one is reasoning about three 
trees, three segments of a line, or three Forms, for example, the number is the same. In 
the Republic, Socrates states that number touches everything: it is “that common thing 
that every craft, every type of thought, and every science uses …”39 (“Οἷον τοῦτο τὸ 
κοινόν, ᾧ πᾶσαι προσχρῶνται τέχναι τε καὶ διάνοιαι καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι ...”; 522c). It would be 
wrong, though not evidently so, to posit a separate kind of counting and number for 
physical objects on the one hand, and for geometric figures and Forms on the other. The 
principles of counting and the ordering of lesser and greater apply equally in all cases. 
Similarly, reasoning about wholes and parts underlies thinking about Forms, 
                                                 
38 Clearly, a given image can be understood in terms of its parts; this is a rudimentary way of thinking that 
is nearly universal. Similarly, objects of belief and thought can also be understood as having parts. 
 
39 Translated by G.M.A. Grube (Plato 1139) 
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mathematical objects, sensible objects, and images. In all cases, the parts of a whole can 
be discerned, they can be named, and their relations can be established. Precisely how 
these operations function will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
1.7 Conclusion  
 
There is good reason to revisit the role that collection and division play in the 
dialogues. By doing so, questions regarding ancient views on logic and reasoning can be 
formulated. Through these questions, a better understanding of Plato’s later dialogues and 
their influence on modern-day thought can be approached.  
More specifically, the following questions can be asked. Are systems of deductive 
logic such as the syllogistic independent of collection and division? Similarly, what is the 
relation between collection and division and non-deductive reasoning? To answer these 
questions, a better understanding of what collection and division are, as well as the nature 
of their results, is required. I will argue that collection and division define logical 
frameworks that underlie deductive and non-deductive reasoning. To defend this thesis, I 
will answer three questions. 
First, precisely how can collection and division produce a logical framework? The 
short answer is that collection and division are based on three operations: seeing, naming, 
and placing. In terms of division, seeing is a form of reasoning in which the parts of a 
conceptual whole are discerned – i.e., the internal structure of a concept is brought to 
light through this operation. Naming articulates the parts of a whole, allowing each part to 
be treated as a concept in its own right. Finally, it is through placing that the 
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interrelations between parts are defined. Repeated applications of these three steps yield a 
logical framework that serves as a definition or starting point for further reasoning. All 
three operations will be discussed further in Chapter 2.  
Second, what precisely is a logical framework? Chapter 3 will present the 
argument that collection and division do not always produce genus-species trees. In other 
words, collection and division often produce a logical structure of overlapping concepts 
that are not arranged in a strict hierarchy. Moreover, instead of using collection and 
division to define something or someone other than oneself, one may find that one is 
already defined by others – i.e., one is “inside” of a logical framework produced by 
collection and division. If the definition is incorrect, the task then becomes one of how to 
look for and recognize errors in the framework for the purpose of arguing against the 
definition. 
Third, what is the relation between collection and division and deductive and non-
deductive forms of reasoning? This question will be explored in Chapters 4 and 5. Using 
the syllogistic as defined in Aristotle’s Analytics as a representative deductive system, 
Chapter 4 will show that frameworks produced by collection and division serve as the 
basis of deductive reasoning. It will do so by showing how four moods of the first figure 
can be derived from a framework defined in the Sophist using axioms from non-
extensional mereology. Chapter 5 will argue similarly: non-deductive reasoning is also 
based on collection and division. In this regard two dialogues in particular will be 
discussed, the Meno and the Euthyphro. The conclusion of this chapter will argue that 
Meno’s definition of virtue is the result of an incomplete application of collection and 
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division, while Euthyphro’s definition of piety illustrates how collection and division 
integrate reasoning about individuals and universals. 
The concluding chapter will summarize some of the key points of the previous 
chapters and discuss the problems involved in constructing images that accurately reflect 
their objects. It will also discuss some unanswered questions about collection and 
division and indicate avenues for future research by raising questions about how wholes 
and parts can be discerned. These questions will be discussed in the context of a passage 
from the Parmenides, where the movement from one to many and many to one is 
discussed. 
To summarize, Chapter 2 will discuss how a framework is constructed through 
three operations; Chapter 3 will discuss what a framework is and two different 
perspectives by which a framework can be understood; Chapters 4 and 5 will discuss how 
a framework serves as the basis for deductive and non-deductive reasoning respectively, 
and Chapter 6 will provide a summary of key points from the previous chapters and 












This chapter describes how collection and division operate to produce a logical 
framework. I will argue that collection and division are based on three basic operations: 
seeing, naming, and placing.40 In short, seeing is the discernment of conceptual wholes 
and parts; naming articulates the parts of a whole; and placing orders the parts of a whole 
into a structure. Section 2.2 will explain that these operations typically apply to concepts 
and parts thereof. Section 2.2.4 describes how the three operations interact in a stepwise 
process: (1) the parts of a conceptual whole are discerned; (2) the parts are named, and 
(3) the target to be defined is placed into one of the parts. Repeated applications of these 
three steps yield a logical framework that serves as a definition and a starting point for 
further reasoning.  
The remainder of this chapter will address three related questions. While Section 
2.2 explains the function of each operation, the question remains as to the means by 
which reasoning is carried out in collection and division. This question is addressed in 
Sections 2.3 and 2.4, where the relations between collection and division and images and 
reasoning will be discussed. Section 2.5 will address a special case of collection and 
division by considering the question of how the three operations can be applied to a 
                                                 
40 These operations were introduced in Section 1.3 and will be discussed in detail in Section 2.2 below. 
Pasqualoni 98 
 
continuum such as sound. Section 2.6 will conclude the chapter by emphasizing that 
seeing, naming, and placing are elementary and commonplace; i.e., they are “trivial” in 
the true sense of the word. Since they are elementary, they are seen in everyday forms of 
reasoning as well as the procedures illustrated in the Sophist and the Statesman. 
 
2.2 Three operations: seeing, naming, and placing 
 
This section will discuss each of the three operations that underlie collection and 
division. In this discussion, an “operation” is an activity of reasoning that is applied to a 
concept or parts thereof for the purpose of bringing the reasoner one step closer to a 
conclusion. In other words, given the definition of logic as a step-by-step process for 
reaching an endpoint (Section 1.5.3, pg. 74), an operation is the means by which a step is 
taken. The example below outlines a series of three steps, each of which is an operation 
of collection and division, from the divisions of the angler in the Sophist: 
 
Step 1: the concept of fishing is seen to have parts (220b9-10). 
Step 2: one part is named ‘striking,’ thereby distinguishing it from aquatic hunting         
            with nets (220b12-13). 
Step 3: the angler is placed under striking (221b7).41 
 
                                                 
41 There is no explicit reference to the final step in this case; instead, the placement of the angler under 
striking as opposed to other kinds of fishing is implicitly made when the former is stated as part of the 
definition of the angler (Appendix B 2). As will be shown in Section 2.2.4 and 2.6, even though all three 
steps are not always evident in the illustrations of collection and division, the resulting definition 




In Step 1, seeing moves the process forward one step by discerning the parts of fishing. In 
Step 2, naming moves the reasoner another step forward by naming one part ‘striking,’ 
thereby articulating a boundary between one part of fishing and another (hunting with 
nets). In Step 3, placing moves another step forward by placing the target to be defined 
under one of the two parts of fishing, striking. It is through repeated applications of these 
operations that a definition – i.e., a logical framework – is ultimately produced. Thus, in 
this case, striking becomes part of the definition of the angler (see Appendix B 2). When 
enough parts are in place, construction of the framework is complete. This process will be 
discussed in more detail below, and it will be argued in Section 2.2.4 that the three 
operations typically, but not always, operate in the order specified above; i.e., seeing, 
naming, and placing.   
In Section 1.5.3 (pg. 74), it was explained that the definition of logic as a stepwise 
process of reasoning with an endpoint derives from the Theaetetus, where thinking is 
described as a series of affirmations and denials that leads to something definite (189e6-
190a4). Each of the three operations listed in the example above can be understood as an 
affirmation with a corresponding denial. Thus, in Step 1, it is affirmed that fishing is not 
indivisible (and denied that it is), but has a structure. In Step 2, it is affirmed that one part 
of the structure is articulated by the name ‘striking.’ In Step 3 it is affirmed that the 
angler practices striking (and simultaneously, it is denied that he uses nets). Thus, each 
step is an affirmation in a process of reasoning that reaches something definite – a 
definition that serves as a logical framework.  
Seeing, naming, and placing are used in various guises throughout the collections 
and divisions of the Sophist, the Statesman, and the Philebus. In short, the function of 
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seeing is to discern the parts of a whole, the function of naming is to “seal” a part by  
articulating its conceptual boundaries, thus allowing it be treated as a whole of parts in its 
own right, and the function of placing is to define the interrelations between the parts and 
the parts and the whole. 
This analysis of collection and division into three operations is not the only way 
of analyzing collection and division. For example, Moravcsik lists three “ingredients” of 
“the anatomy of the divisions and collections” of the dialogues: “(a) a series of namings, 
(b) a series of cuttings and (c) the interweaving of the products into definitions” (“Plato’s 
Method of Division” 160). However, Moravcsik’s analysis is circular. While he refers to 
“a series of cuttings” as an ingredient of collection and division, he also refers to the 
same ingredient as “the series of divisions and cuttings” (Moravcsik, “Plato’s Method of 
Division” 162). In general, the terms for cutting and dividing are conflated,42 and this 
begs the question as to what precisely division is. Does it make sense to define love, for 
example, using the term ‘love?’ No. Then why use the term ‘division’ when analyzing 
collection and division? Also, the question remains as to whether this “series of divisions 
and cuttings” is an ingredient of collection. If not, then it is a part of (or the same as) 
division, not collection and division. Yet Moravcsik claims that the three ingredients are 
parts of “the anatomy of the divisions and collections,” not just the anatomy of division 
(“Plato’s Method of Division” 160). In short, it is not clear how, precisely, the three 
ingredients relate to collection and division either separately or as a unified process. What 
is needed is not an analysis of the method of collection and division that stops at the level 
                                                 
42 For example: “As we turn our attention to the series of divisions and cuttings, the first question is: what 
is it that is being cut, and what are the results of the divisions? In general, the answer is that the Form of art 
is being cut, and that it is divided into parts or kinds…Again, as above, the question can be raised whether 
the divisions involve the cutting of a plurality…” (Moravcsik, “Plato’s Method of Division” 162-163).   
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of division, but a finer-grained analysis that avoids the problem of circularity. 
A similar criticism can be made against S. Marc Cohen’s response to Moravcsik’s 
analysis. In his article “Plato’s Method of Division,” Cohen claims that “the method” 
requires the following “procedures”: selection, division, collection, location, and closure 
(187-188). If the method of division (or collection and division – Cohen does not specify) 
requires “collection” and “division,” what does this tell us? If by “collection” and 
“division” Cohen is really referring to something else, why use the names ‘collection’ and 
‘division?’ Such terminology only calls into question what precisely “the method” is 
supposed to be – as with Moravcsik’s list of three ingredients, the analysis is circular if 
by “the method” Cohen is using an abbreviated expression that stands for ‘the method of 
division’ or ‘the method of collection and division.’  
Thus, while analyses of collection and division into “ingredients” or “procedures” 
have been presented, in my view there is a need for an analysis along different lines. In 
short, the purpose of analyzing collection and division into three operations, seeing, 
naming, and placing, is twofold: (1) it explains the forms of reasoning that underlie 
collection and division, and (2) the analysis explains more precisely how collection and 
division operate as a step-wise inferential process.   
In Section 1.6.3 it was argued that collection and division apply to a range of 
objects. However, this chapter will focus on conceptual wholes, since these are the focus 
of attention in the illustrations of collection and division. Thus, in general, the terms 
‘whole’ and ‘conceptual whole’ refer to a concept that is under consideration. For 
example, in the Phaedrus, Socrates divides madness into the human and the divine, and 
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the latter is divided into four kinds:43 the prophetic, mystic, poetic, and erotic. He 
performs the divisions while composing a speech for Phaedrus in the countryside, using a 
figurative scheme in which the human kind is placed on the left, and the divine kind on 
the right (see figure 1, pg. 22). There is no presumption that Socrates had gathered 
empirical data on Eros, Aphrodite, and other aspects of divine madness that he describes, 
the point being that he is describing his conception of love and madness. The Phaedrus 
illustrates how collection and division are used to divide a concept as if it were a whole 
of named parts. In other words, a concept is treated as a whole subject to division which, 
if it is applied correctly, yields a conceptual map that accurately represents the object 
(Form or community thereof), its parts, and their interrelations. Note that at 265b 
Socrates states that his picture of madness may not be true: “We expressed the passion of 
love figuratively; perhaps it had a measure of truth in it, though it may also have led us 
astray”44 (“καὶ οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπῃ τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθος ἀπεικάζοντες, ἴσως μὲν ἀληθοῦς τινος 
ἐφαπτόμενοι, τάχα δ’ ἂν καὶ ἄλλοσε παραφερόμενοι”). In other words, there may not be a 
corresponding reality if the image is incorrect – perhaps there is no such thing as divine 
madness as Socrates describes it. Thus, Socrates is analyzing a concept which may or 
may not correspond to reality, but the central question for this chapter is, how is any 
concept at all “mapped out” to begin with, or in other words, how is it treated as a whole 
of parts?  
                                                 
43 The reader is referred to Section 1.5.3 (pg. 74) for a clarification of the term ‘kind’ as opposed to ‘part.’ 
 







In collection and division, seeing is the discernment of wholes and parts. More 
specifically, through the recognition of similarities, seeing brings many into a whole; 
through the recognition of differences, it discerns the parts of a whole. With division, a 
unity is seen to have an internal structure; it is seen not as an opaque whole, but a whole 
of parts. With collection, the many are seen to have a similarity and are brought into a 
single whole. 
The term ‘seeing’ is used to reflect the terminology employed in the illustrations 
of collection and division. This will be discussed further below. Moreover, seeing – 
whether as a kind of intellectual seeing or the perception of sense objects, or a 
combination of both – is ubiquitous, i.e. it underlies everyday reasoning. The slave boy in 
the Meno could easily “see” the sides of the square drawn by Socrates, for example. This 
is not to say that discerning the parts of a whole is a simple matter in every case: to use an 
example from the Statesman (277e-278c), a child learning the alphabet can see writing on 
a page or hear spoken sound, but learning how to distinguish each letter – i.e., to perceive 
each part of the text or sound as a discrete and recognizable unit – requires the ability to 
discern the parts correctly, to “see” in the right way. In both the simple and the difficult 
cases, a way of reasoning that performs the same function, bringing the parts of a whole 




2.2.1.1 Seeing and reasoning  
 
Seeing and knowing are intimately connected, both in the dialogues and in ancient 
Greek philosophy and literature at large. For Plato as well as Aristotle, sight is privileged 
among the senses.45 For example, the power of the eyes is described in the Timaeus as 
follows: 
 
τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὀμμάτων συμμεταίτια πρὸς 
τὸ σχεῖν τὴν δύναμιν ἣν νῦν εἴληχεν εἰρήσθω· τὸ δὲ μέ- 
γιστον αὐτῶν εἰς ὠφελίαν ἔργον, δι’ ὃ θεὸς αὔθ’ ἡμῖν 
47(a) δεδώρηται, μετὰ τοῦτο ῥητέον. ὄψις δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν 
λόγον αἰτία τῆς μεγίστης ὠφελίας γέγονεν ἡμῖν, ὅτι τῶν 
νῦν λόγων περὶ τοῦ παντὸς λεγομένων οὐδεὶς ἄν ποτε ἐρρήθη 
μήτε ἄστρα μήτε ἥλιον μήτε οὐρανὸν ἰδόντων. νῦν δ’ ἡμέρα τε 
καὶ νὺξ ὀφθεῖσαι μῆνές τε καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν περίοδοι καὶ ἰσημερίαι (5) 
καὶ τροπαὶ μεμηχάνηνται μὲν ἀριθμόν, χρόνου δὲ ἔννοιαν 
περί τε τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως ζήτησιν ἔδοσαν· ἐξ ὧν 
(b) ἐπορισάμεθα φιλοσοφίας γένος, οὗ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν οὔτ’ ἦλθεν 
οὔτε ἥξει ποτὲ τῷ θνητῷ γένει δωρηθὲν ἐκ θεῶν. λέγω δὴ 
τοῦτο ὀμμάτων μέγιστον ἀγαθόν (46e6-47b3) 
 
Let us conclude, then, our discussion of the accompanying auxiliary 
causes that gave our eyes the power which they now possess. We must 
next speak of that supremely beneficial function for which the god gave 
them to us. As my account has it, our sight has indeed proved to be a 
source of supreme benefit to us, in that none of our present statements 
about the universe could ever have been made if we have never seen any 
stars, sun or heaven. As it is, however, our ability to see the periods of 
day-and-night, of months and of years, of equinoxes and solstices, has led 
                                                 
45 In the first book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle states that sight is the most preferable of the senses: 
 
οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἵνα πράττωμεν ἀλλὰ καὶ μηθὲν 
μέλλοντες πράττειν τὸ ὁρᾶν αἱρούμεθα ἀντὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν  (25) 
τῶν ἄλλων. αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι μάλιστα ποιεῖ γνωρίζειν ἡμᾶς  
αὕτη τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ πολλὰς δηλοῖ διαφοράς. (1.1, 980a24-980a27) 
 
For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer sight 
to almost everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings 
to light many differences between things.   
 




to the invention of number, and has given us the idea of time and opened 
the path to inquiry into the nature of the universe. These pursuits have 
given us philosophy, a gift from the gods to the mortal race whose value 
neither has been nor ever will be surpassed.46 
 
It is the power (δύνᾰμις) of the eyes that reveals not only the visible universe, but leads to 
great discoveries of a more abstract kind, such as the invention of number. In other words, 
seeing is a form of inquiry that is wide in scope: it applies to both the visible and the 
invisible. As such, it is intimately connected with philosophy and inquiry in general. 
Michail Maiatsky observes that “Socrate-Platon insiste sur les différences qui distinguent 
la vue des autres sens,” and, commenting on 47ab in the Timaeus, he states “la vertu 
(‘bonté’) suprême des yeux (ommatôn megiston agathon, b3) consiste en leur fonction 
protreptique à l’égard de la philosophie qui, elle, est le cadeau le plus grand des dieux 
(b1-2). La suprématie de la vue ne se mesure donc pas par comparaison avec d’autres 
«sens», mais plutôt relativement à la philosophie à laquelle elle n’a affaire que 
protreptiquement”47 (161). As a gift of the gods through which philosophy instructs, 
seeing has much in common with the source and purpose of collection and division (see 
Section 1.6.2). 
              
2.2.1.2 Seeing and collection and division 
 
                                                 
46 Translated by Donald J. Zeyl (Plato 1249). 
 
47 “Socrates-Plato insists on the differences which distinguish sight from the other senses. ... The supreme 
virtue (‘good’) of the eyes … consists in their protreptic function in respect to philosophy, this being the 
greatest gift of the gods. The supremacy of sight is not measured relative to the other senses, but rather in 
relation to its instructive role in philosophy.”  
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There are at least two ways of seeing that are exhibited in illustrations of 
collection and division. One is the “seeing together” of the Phaedrus, which sees a 
likeness or resemblance of many things and brings them into one. This corresponds to 
collection. The other is to “see” a difference, in other words, to see a “cut” or a “fissure” 
in one thing, thereby articulating a whole into two or more parts. This corresponds to 
division. Laura Grams explains the importance of seeing as follows: 
 
Plato often appeals to the ability of a particular practitioner to ‘see’ the appropriate 
places to divide into kinds and grasp the unity of a subject. Socrates praises the ability 
of the godlike person who is able to discern unities, while the Visitor praises the 
person who knows how to discriminate according to kinds… (Phdr 266b, Sph 253e1-
2). (154) 
 
In my view, this reading is correct, and it emphasizes the two-fold nature of 
seeing: on the one hand, seeing brings together the scattered many into a unity, on the 
other, it discerns differences within a whole – i.e., it recognizes the parts of a whole.  
Recent commentators are not in agreement as to whether collection and division 
involve perceiving sensible phenomena as opposed to intellectual or imaginative seeing, 
nor do they always make a distinction between the two. For example, Sayre describes 
collection in terms of seeing in the conventional sense, i.e. the perception of sensible 
phenomena. According to Sayre, in the Phaedrus and the Sophist, collection is a process 
in which a dialectician “perceives a single Form pervading many instances”; i.e. a Form 
whose “presence is somehow revealed in many sensible things” (Metaphysics and 
Method 48). In other words, while the Form itself is not directly perceived, it is 
recognized through perception of its sensible participants. Similarly, David Ambuel states 
that in the Phaedrus, collection is “the grouping together of perceived resemblances” (22) 
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and collection and division both operate on “the appearance of resemblance and 
difference as discovered by perception, followed by the determination of what genuine 
resemblances or differences underlie the perception” (22). But not all commentators 
believe that collection involves “sensible things” that reveal a single Form or 
resemblance. For example, Moravcsik states that collection does not involve “empirical 
observations” but “the mental survey of a certain collection of abstract entities” (“Plato’s 
Method of Division” 179).  
At Phaedrus 265c-266b, collection and division are defined as two “εἴδη” that 
perform complementary operations: a “seeing” and “bringing” together into one idea, and 
a cutting or dividing along the natural joints of an idea. Plato describes collection in 
particular – the first “εἴδη” of the pair – at Phaedrus 265d3-5: “Εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν 
συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, ἵνα ἕκαστον ὁριζόμενος δῆλον ποιῇ περὶ οὗ 
ἂν ἀεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ” (“Seeing and bringing together many scattered things and 
collecting them into one idea, so that by defining each thing we can make clear the 
subject of any instruction we wish to give”).48 In this passage, “συνορῶντα” is often 
translated as “seeing” or “perceiving” (e.g. Goold 533; Hackforth. Phaedrus 132; A. 
Nehamas and P. Woodruff in Plato 542). The word derives from the Greek words ‘συν’ 
(‘with,’ ‘together’) and ‘ὁράω’ (‘seeing,’ ‘perceiving’) (Beekes 1095), and it essentially 
means “seeing-together,” the idea being that the “bringing” (“ἄγειν”) together into one 
occurs with or by way of seeing. Plato is not specific about what kind of seeing takes 
place during collection, but examples of the method that are found in the Phaedrus and 
other dialogues make it clear that Plato is not always describing empirical observation. 
                                                 




For example, in the Statesman the natural numbers (ἀριθμός) are divided into two classes 
using the method (262e).49 When “πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα” are unified into a single idea 
through collection, madness is revealed as a whole of parts – i.e., as an abstract structure, 
not a partless unity. Griswold’s conceptual map of madness as it is described at Phaedrus 
265a-c (179; see figure 1) provides an illustration of the parts of madness according to 
Socrates’ description. The spatial arrangement of this map is imaginary; left and right, up 
and down are projections of a structure that takes shape in the intellect, not in physical 
space. Thus, when Plato speaks of dividing an “εἶδος” into left-hand and right-hand parts 
at Phaedrus 266a, he is referring to an intellectual capacity in which the parts of madness 
are seen in an imaginary or figurative space. Griswold’s diagram clearly shows that for 
Socrates, madness is not just an opaque whole, but it has many “parts.” These parts are 
“named” and “placed” – these are separate but related functions that will be discussed in 
detail below. For now, it is important to note that the mere bringing together into a whole 
results not only in a whole, but a whole in which parts are discerned.  
Seeing and thinking are intertwined. In his discussion on collection and division 
in the Phaedrus, Griswold refers both to a capacity of noesis (perception of the mind) and 
of collection and division as the capacity to see; according to Griswold, both noesis and 
collection and division “depend on the capacity to see what it is we wish to say or analyse, 
to see how to analyse it, and to see when the analysis is finished and completed” (176). 
He also states that “there is a corresponding emphasis in the passages on division and 
collection on verbs related to ‘seeing’” (176). In my view, Griswold is correct: 
similarities and differences must be recognized in order to analyze and combine. Thus, 
                                                 
49 Intellectual seeing occurs in many other places in the dialogues; e.g. numbers are understood as having a 
“σχῆμα” (“shape”) at Theaetetus 147e, and an imagined geometric figure that represents an argument is 
described at Gorgias 465b. 
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when Socrates sees that the “scattered many” can be brought into one idea (Phaedrus 
265d), he recognizes similarities among the many forms of madness, and in turn madness 
is analyzed according to differences between the divine and human aspects. This brings 
Socrates a step closer to formulating a definition of love. More generally, collection and 
division allow Socrates to think and to speak (Phaedrus 266b). The connection between 
seeing and thinking is also supported by the passage from the Timaeus quoted above, 
where the power of sight is the basis of inquiry into both the visible and the invisible. 
Seeing and collection and division appear together in dialogues other than the 
Phaedrus. For example, in the Statesman, when instructing the younger Socrates in how 
to divide correctly, the Eleatic Stranger states the following: 
 
… ὅταν (b) μὲν τὴν τῶν πολλῶν τις πρότερον αἴσθηται κοινωνίαν,  
μὴ προαφίστασθαι πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐτῇ τὰς διαφορὰς ἴδῃ πάσας 
ὁπόσαιπερ ἐν εἴδεσι κεῖνται, τὰς δὲ αὖ παντοδαπὰς ἀνομοιό-  
τητας, ὅταν ἐν πλήθεσιν ὀφθῶσιν, μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι δυσωπού-  
μενον παύεσθαι πρὶν ἂν σύμπαντα τὰ οἰκεῖα ἐντὸς μιᾶς (5) 
ὁμοιότητος ἕρξας γένους τινὸς οὐσίᾳ περιβάληται. (285a7-285b6) 
 
... when a person at first perceives only the unity or common  
quality of many things, he must not give up until he  
sees all the differences in them, so far as they exist in  
classes; and conversely, when all sorts of dissimilarities  
are seen in a large number of objects he must  
find it impossible to be discouraged or to stop until  
he has gathered into one circle of similarity all the  
things which are related to each other and has included  
them in some sort of class on the basis of their  
essential nature.50  
 
Here, one who applies the method must “see” (‘ἴδῃ,’ ‘ὀφθῶσιν’) both commonalities and 
differences.51 The reference to “gathering into a circle” connotes a perimeter that 
                                                 




encloses the many into a unity. Moreover, not only are many gathered into one, 
differences are seen as well. To return to the Phaedrus, while Socrates brings together the 
“scattered many” into one idea, madness, madness is also understood as having parts (the 
human and the divine).  
 
2.2.1.3 Limit to the analysis of seeing 
 
As argued above, seeing is the discernment of wholes and parts. However, 
precisely what happens when discernment occurs is a mystery. This raises the following 
question: we can see similarities and differences, thereby discerning wholes and parts, but 
can we do so consistently? Apparently not: even within the same dialogue, one’s image 
of the statesman or sophist changes significantly (see Appendix B).  
When a whole is suddenly seen to have parts, a crucial step on the way to a 
conclusion – i.e., on the way to constructing a framework – has taken place, but precisely 
how this step is made is a mystery. For example, in the Statesman, the Stranger searches 
for a “cut” (τομή) in the “self-directing” kind of expertise: 
 
     ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μετρίως ἀφέστηκεν ἀπ’ ἐκείνων, 
ἀλλοτριότητι διορισθὲν πρὸς οἰκειότητα, τοῦτο αὐτὸ πάλιν αὖ 
διαιρεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, εἴ τινα τομὴν ἔτι ἔχομεν ὑπείκουσαν ἐν (5) 
τούτῳ; 
     ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε. 
     ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν φαινόμεθα ἔχειν· ἀλλ’ ἐπακολουθῶν σύν- 
τεμνε. (261a3-9) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
51 It is important to note that the discernment of commonalities and differences does not presuppose the 
perception of sense objects, and it will be argued below that the operation of seeing is not restricted to 




     Stranger: Well then, since [self-directing expertise] is at a certain distance from 
those others, distinguished by difference in relation to kinship, we must in turn divide 
it too, if we still find some cut yielding to us in it? 
     Young Socrates: Certainly. 
     Stranger: And what’s more, it appears we have one: follow on and make  
the cut with me.52  
 
Here, a search initiated at line 261a5 yields the appearance of a cut at line 268a8, but 
there is no indication of precisely how the search was performed or how the cut was 
found. It is similar in the following example from the Sophist. In this case, the Stranger 
asks Theaetetus to determine if discrimination (διάκρισις) can be divided into two kinds: 
 
     ΞΕ. Σκόπει δὴ ταύτης αὖ δύο ἄν πῃ δυνώμεθα κατιδεῖν (10) 
εἴδη. 
     ΘΕΑΙ. Ταχεῖαν ὡς ἐμοὶ σκέψιν ἐπιτάττεις. 
(d)     ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἔν γε ταῖς εἰρημέναις διακρίσεσι τὸ μὲν 
χεῖρον ἀπὸ βελτίονος ἀποχωρίζειν ἦν, τὸ δ’ ὅμοιον ἀφ’ 
ὁμοίου. (226c10-226d3) 
 
     Stranger: Think about whether we can see two kinds in it. 
     Theaetetus: You’re asking me to do some quick thinking. 
     Stranger: In fact in what we’ve called discriminations one kind separates  
what’s worse from what’s better and the other separates like from like.53 
 
The turning point occurs between 226c10 and 226d1, i.e. at some point when Theaetetus 
says “Ταχεῖαν ὡς ἐμοὶ σκέψιν ἐπιτάττεις,” the two kinds are discovered. The question is: 
what kind of thinking or inquiry (σκοπέω; σκέψις) took place – i.e., how precisely were 
the two kinds discovered? 
A similar process takes place in the Sophist at 229d, where the parts of education 
are seen (Appendix A 11), and at 268a1, where a seam (διπλόη)54 is discovered in belief-
                                                 
52 Translated after C.J. Rowe (Plato 300), with modifications. 
 




mimicry (see Section 2.2.4, pg. 129). In the latter case, there is a movement from a 
seamless unity to the revelation that it has parts – i.e., there is a point at which a hidden 
structure is uncovered by way of inspection. But how this seam is brought to light 
remains a mystery.  
These passages raise the following question: in general, what happens when 
reasoning moves from one to many? There is an important transition that takes place 
between seeing a whole, and seeing that the whole has parts – i.e., that it has a hidden 
structure. It seems that there is a moment in which a cut or seam appears in the whole. 
This is a crucial moment, as it is the time at which the parts of a whole are discerned. 
Conversely, in the case of collection, there is a moment in which the scattered many are 
seen as one (see Section 2.2.1.2, pg. 105). It will be argued in Section 6.3.3 that passages 
in the Parmenides and the Symposium may shed light on the precise means by which the 
movement from one to many and from many to one takes place. An alternative solution 
to this problem will be presented in Section 2.2.4 below (pg. 129), where it will be argued 
that seeing does not operate in isolation, but occurs as one step in a unified process. The 
role that seeing plays in reasoning is clarified when understood in the context of the 




In my view, the illustrations of collection and division in the dialogues make it 
clear that seeing is not restricted to empirical phenomena. Like naming and placing, 
                                                                                                                                                 
54 It is noteworthy that even the seam – i.e., the boundary between parts of a whole – is treated as an 
individual with attributes. It is perceptible through an intellectual sight of a sort. This raises the question as 
to whether a seam or cut in itself can be the object of inquiry. 
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seeing applies to concepts which may or may not apply to sensible objects. For example, 
when the hidden structure of sound was discovered by Theuth (Philebus 18b5-18d2; see 
Appendix A 49), the discernment of perceptible phenomena is involved: otherwise, 
Theuth would not know where to begin. However, this is not to say that the recognition 
of the structure of sound is entirely a matter of perception – clearly, Theuth needed to 
reason about what he perceived in order to divide sound into parts that had hitherto 
remained undiscovered. In some cases at least, because of the nature of the object being 
studied, there must be an interplay between perception and reasoning. On the other hand, 
there are cases in which collection and division are applied to concepts that do not derive 
from sense perception; e.g., the Odd and the Even (Statesman 262e). But regardless of 
whether sense perception is involved, the essential point is that seeing in all of its modes 
of application is the same operation: discerning a conceptual whole and its parts via the 
recognition of similarities and differences, and ultimately this is a process of reasoning, 
i.e. of formulating a definition and discovering hidden structures.55  
 
                                                 
55 If this is the case, why is the term ‘seeing’ used at all? Clearly, similarities and differences in sound were 
discerned by Theuth. In answer to this question, we may note that while it makes sense to say that there is a 
mental analog to seeing with the eyes of the body, namely seeing with the eyes of the soul (Plato uses this 
expression at 254a in the Sophist, for example), in Plato the other senses do not have mental analogs. For 
example, by a stretch of the imagination, one could posit a mental analog to the sense of smell: there is a 
“nose of the soul” that reasons through imagined odors instead of mental images. I am not aware of any 
passage in Plato where such an image is used, and the same applies for ears of the soul, tongue of the soul, 
etc. To use another example, while we can imagine that Justice has a “shape” (cf. the Sophist 267c), why 
would we imagine Justice having a smell, taste, or sound? Such an image is indicated by a statement made 
by Heraclitus: Fragment 98 (DK) states “αἱ ψυχαὶ ὀσμῶνται καθ' Ἅιδην” (“souls smell things in Hades”; 
Kahn, 78-9). However, I believe that for Plato at least, it is seeing that is intimately related to thinking, and 
for this reason the terminology of collection and division often employs words related to seeing. For the 





The function of naming in the context of collection and division is to articulate the 
parts of a conceptual whole – i.e., when employed successfully, naming brings to light 
the “natural joints” (ἄρθρα; Phaedrus 265e) of an internal structure which has been 
discerned through seeing. To use an example from the Phaedrus, one may at first discern 
that madness has two aspects, but only tenuously – i.e., while it may be seen that there 
are different kinds of madness, the means by which they may be precisely distinguished 
from each other may not be evident at first sight. But when these aspects are named 
‘human’ (ἀνθρώπινος; 265a10) and ‘divine’ (θεῖος; 266a7), the aspects of madness 
become articulated, they can be communicated to others, and the means by which they 
can be distinguished becomes established. As explained below, naming is not limited to a 
purely linguistic function. In other words, in addition to allowing the reasoner to 
communicate the similarities and differences that have been discerned through seeing, 
naming also articulates the joints and segments of the structure being defined. The 
purpose of this section is to clarify and explain how naming operates within the context 
of collection and division.  
  
2.2.2.1 Names have a wide scope in the dialogues 
 
Plato develops a theory of names and naming in the Cratylus. For Plato, the word 
‘ὄνομα’ (name) has a much wider scope than its English equivalent, ‘name.’ David 
Sedley remarks that names are understood in the Cratylus as “a loose linguistic category” 
Pasqualoni 115 
 
that includes common nouns and adjectives in addition to proper names (4). Similarly, in 
his commentary on the Cratylus, Francesco Ademollo observes that the characters of the 
Cratylus take a “generous view” of names; for them, names include “common nouns, 
adjectives and verbs in infinitive (414ab, 426c) or participle (421c) mood” (1). Ademollo 
points out that this understanding of names is not restricted to the Cratylus: “it is standard, 
and doubtless right, to take it that in our dialogue (and elsewhere as well) the term ὄνομα 
generically applies to any word whose function is not primarily syntactic (hence not to 
conjunctions and prepositions)” (1).   
Other commentators share similar views on the scope of ‘ὄνομα.’ Gold points out 
that ‘ὄνομα’ “is often used much like the English word ‘word’ since nouns, verbs, and 
adjectives are all considered ὀνόματα (names)” in the Cratylus. This broad view of names 
is also seen outside of the Platonic corpus; Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, for example, 
states that verbs (‘ῥήματα’) are also names (16b20-21; Gold 223). Examples of names 
listed in the etymological section of the Cratylus include proper names such as ‘Hector’ 
and ‘Apollo,’ general terms such as ‘man,’ ‘soul,’ and ‘justice,’ adjectives such as 
‘advantageous’ and ‘profitable,’ and verbs such as ‘to flourish’ (Gold 223). Barnes makes 
a similar observation when he states that for Plato and Aristotle alike, ὀνόματα comprise 
proper names (e.g., ‘Theaetetus’), common nouns (e.g., ‘man’) and adjectives (Barnes, 
“Grammar on Aristotle’s Terms” 195-196).56 In conclusion, it is clear that names have a 
                                                 
56 Barnes also observes that at 261e-263a in the Sophist, Plato states that a sentence such as ‘Theaetetus 
sits’ is an “interweaving” (συμπλέκειν; 262d4) of a name (ὄνομα) and a verb (ῥῆμα). However, Barnes 
correctly points out that Plato is describing a particular kind of sentence; i.e., he is describing “first” or 
“primary” sentences (“πρῶτός τε καὶ σμικρότατος”; Sophist 262c6-7) (180). A sentence of this sort can be 
distinguished from a definition produced by collection and division such as ‘Love is a kind of madness’ or 
‘the Sophist is a hunter.’ Unlike the primary sentences described in the Sophist, the definitions articulated 
by collection and division involve not the interweaving of a single name with a verb, but the joining 




wide scope in the Platonic dialogues. In the following discussion, names are to be 
understood in the broad sense of the term: not only nouns and personal names, but verbs 
and adjectives count as names.  
 
2.2.2.2 Naming as an operation of collection and division 
 
Despite the fact that names have such a wide scope, the importance of naming in 
collection and division is not always recognized. Moravcsik remarks that the importance 
of names in division is often overlooked by commentators: “One of the most striking 
aspects of the divisions is the frequency with which the question of naming arises. It is 
peculiar that this feature of the divisions has not received much attention by modern 
commentators.” (“Plato’s Method of Division” 160). 
However, the dialogues themselves are not entirely positive: because names play 
an important role in collection and division, they are often criticized for their limitations. 
For example, in the Sophist, because a good supply of names is lacking, the Eleatic 
Stranger must coin new names for two kinds of imitators: 
 
Πόθεν οὖν ὄνομα ἑκατέρῳ τις αὐτῶν λήψεται 
πρέπον; ἢ δῆλον δὴ χαλεπὸν ὄν, διότι τῆς τῶν γενῶν κατ’ (5) 
εἴδη διαιρέσεως παλαιά τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀργία τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν 
καὶ ἀσύννους παρῆν, ὥστε μηδ’ ἐπιχειρεῖν μηδένα διαιρεῖσθαι· 
καθὸ δὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνάγκη μὴ σφόδρα εὐπορεῖν. ὅμως 
δέ, κἂν εἰ τολμηρότερον εἰρῆσθαι, διαγνώσεως ἕνεκα τὴν 
(e) μὲν μετὰ δόξης μίμησιν δοξομιμητικὴν προσείπωμεν, τὴν δὲ 
μετ’ ἐπιστήμης ἱστορικήν τινα μίμησιν. (267d4-e2) 
 
Where would you get a suitable name for each of them [i.e., each kind of imitator]? 
Isn’t it obviously hard to, just because the people who came before us were 
thoughtless and indolent about dividing kinds into types, and so they never  
even tried to divide them. That’s why we necessarily lack a good supply  
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of names. Still, even though it sounds daring let’s distinguish them by  
calling imitation accompanied by belief  “belief-mimicry” and imitation  
accompanied by knowledge “informed-mimicry.”57 
 
Even in this case, however, the fact that the Stranger is impelled to coin new names only 
emphasizes the fact that names are sometimes indispensable. On the other hand, like 
images, names are not always trustworthy; in the Cratylus,Socrates states that some 
names “swerve us away from what we wish to name” (“πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε δεῖ 
ἐννοῆσαι περὶ ὀνομάτων, ὅτι πολλάκις ἐπεμβάλλομεν γράμματα, τὰ δ’ ἐξαιροῦμεν, παρ’ 
ὃ βουλόμεθα ὀνομάζοντες, καὶ τὰς ὀξύτητας μεταβάλλομεν”; 399a). Moreover, during 
some divisions, naming each part of a whole is considered unnecessarily complicated (e.g. 
at Statesman 265c). However, while names can divert us from the task at hand, it would 
be wrong to overlook their importance. Indeed, as stated in Section 1.5.1, discourse 
(λόγος) itself is not always trustworthy: in the wrong hands it can be employed to 
bewitch children, inflame crowds, or sow confusion (pg. 66). Nonetheless, discourse is 
essential to reasoning. I will argue the same for names below. 
While the importance of names in collection and division is often ignored in the 
secondary literature, some recent commentators have discussed the significance of names 
for the method of division. In his commentary on the Cratylus, Ademollo states the 
following:  
  
Names ... play an important role in division – not just for the trivial fact that the 
performance of a division is a linguistic matter, but also, more specifically, because 
one needs names to separate or distinguish each kind from the others. So it is usual to 
see those engaged in a division asking what the name of each kind they identify is, 
and sometimes applying an already established name, sometimes coining a new one, 
sometimes also deciding to leave the kind unnamed ... (113) 
 
                                                 
57 Translated after Nicholas P. White (Plato 292), with modifications. 
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In short, names allow us to articulate the differences between concepts – for 
example, as explained in Section 1.3.2 (pg. 44), the name “self-directors” (“τῶν 
αὐτεπιτακτῶν”) distinguishes the statesman from those who appear to be like him, such 
as seers, heralds, and the like. Moreover, Ademollo states that perhaps “the highest and 
noblest use” of names is their employment in division and definition, and that this may be 
enough to justify the claim that “division and definition are the function of names” (113). 
According to Ademollo, when a name is coined during a series of divisions, the new 
name is most often a portmanteau or compound name that immediately articulates the 
nature of the kind being named; as examples he lists ‘ἀγελαιοτροφία’ (‘herd-rearing’; 
Statesman 261e) and comparable English words such as ‘steamboat,’ ‘whirlpool,’ 
‘trainspotter,’ and ‘paradichlorobenzene’ (113). To his list may be added names such as 
‘self-director’ (αὐτεπιτάκτης), which was coined by Plato to separate the statesman from 
others who are also directors (260d11-261a9; see Appendix A 21 and Section 1.3.2, pg. 
44) as well as ‘appearance-making’ (“φανταστικὴν”), which distinguishes the sophist as a 
deceptive sort of image-maker (264c4-5; see Appendix A 14 and Section 1.3.3, pg. 45). 
In my view, Ademollo is correct: names play a crucial role because they articulate the 
distinctions that have been discerned. Without this function, a concept cannot be 
consistently distinguished from another and the target to be defined is confused with 
others. This is not to say that names play a purely linguistic role. On the one hand, one 
function of naming is to make the similarities and differences that have been discerned 
through seeing communicable. On the other hand, this is not the full extent of the 
function of naming. When collection and division accurately follow the “natural joints” 
(“κατ᾽ ἄρθρα ᾗ πέφυκεν”; Phaedrus 265e) of the concept being investigated, it is through 
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naming that these joints – i.e., the nodes and boundaries of a concept’s internal structure 
– are articulated.  
Similarly, Notomi states that “In the process of defining the sophist, names play a 
central role” (75); more specifically, he observes that “to grasp a kind in the process of 
division is to give it a proper name” (75). Thus, in general, wholes are divided through 
the discernment of named parts. Moreover, by naming a part, it too can be treated as a  
whole – i.e., a named part that is divisible can be treated as a whole that can be 
articulated into its own parts. Thus, naming allows a particular “section” of a concept to 
be distinguished from other parts of the same concept and treated as a concept in its own 
right. As an illustration, consider the definition of the angler from the Sophist (Appendix 
B 2). Here, the parts of a definition and their interrelations are articulated by means of 
names. For example, the first part of the definition tells us that not only is the angler an 
artisan, he is the kind of artisan that does not produce but acquires – i.e., it is through the 
name ‘acquisition’ that the part of artistry that applies to the angler is distinguished from 
other arts, such as the productive arts. Moreover, acquisition is also divided into parts, 
forcible and coercive (219d). By giving a part of production its own name, it too can be 
treated as a whole that can be divided in turn. 
Names tell us what the angler is and what he is not – how else could the angler be 
defined? The alternative is an image, but even in this case, the specific parts of the image 
can be articulated and investigated through the use of names. For example, a painting of 
the angler can be considered as a portrait of ‘hunting,’ a portrait of ‘animal-hunting,’ or a 
portrait of ‘fishing’ – each of these names would serve as a way of distinguishing 
between various aspects of the painting – i.e., the “parts” of the image can be articulated 
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and communicated through the use of names. Thus, a dialogue on the painting would 
move in different directions depending on whether it is considered as a painting of 
‘acquisition’ as opposed to a painting of ‘fishing,’ for example. In short, names pick out 
and articulate parts or aspects of the same image or concept, thereby giving shape and 
direction to reasoning about the image or concept.  
Not only names of kinds, but also names of individuals play an important role in 
collection and division. The latter as well as the former serve to articulate the parts of a 
whole, and to indicate the concepts that it includes and excludes. In some cases, both 
names of individuals and names of kinds are used in the same division. For example, in 
the Phaedrus, names of the gods are associated with the four kinds of divine madness: 
prophetic madness is associated with Apollo, mystic with Dionysus, poetic with the 
Muses, and erotic with Aphrodite (265b). By naming individuals, new features of the 
concept being defined come to light. For example, the name ‘Aphrodite’ indicates that 
one part of divine madness may be associated not only with Eros but also with the 
feminine and the beautiful. Thus, the name of a paradigmatic individual such as 
Aphrodite brings with it other names: ‘passion,’ ‘beauty,’ ‘female,’ ‘divinity,’ etc., all of 
which may be important parts of the “right-hand” part of madness. The relevance of 
collection and division to reasoning about individuals as well as universals will be 
discussed further in Section 5.4.2 (pg. 258), where it will be argued that collection and 






Understood in terms of spatial metaphors, names articulate the conceptual space 
that is divided. A name allows a particular “section” of an idea or concept to be treated as 
a concept or idea in its own right. To return to the example of collection and division in 
the Phaedrus, madness is divided into two parts, each of which is given a name, ‘human’ 
and ‘divine.’ The latter in turn is treated as a whole divided into four named parts, the 
‘prophetic,’ ‘mystic,’ ‘poetic,’ and ‘erotic’ kinds. It is because one part of madness is 
given the name ‘divine’ that it can be articulated into parts of its own. In other words, if 
Socrates had stated simply that there are different kinds of madness, and left it at that, 
then the dialogue would reach a standstill: all Phaedrus would know is that there are 
“parts” of madness, but without the use of names he would not know what those parts are, 
how they differ from each other, and how they are related to the whole.  
In short, names serve as devices for articulating the parts of a framework. By 
naming we move from a perception or discernment of many loosely-defined parts of a 
whole to the articulation of the perimeters around each relevant part – i.e., for each part 
under which the target falls we enclose or “pen in” many things into one by the use of a 
name, thus excluding what falls outside of the perimeter. An example of this was 
discussed in Section 2.2.2.2 (pg. 116), where the name ‘self-director’ is used to 
distinguish the statesman from others who appear to be similar. In other words, things are 






Placing establishes the relations between the parts of a whole. In this section I will 
argue that in the illustrations of collection and division, at least two kinds of placement 
are evident: the placement of a part within a whole on the one hand, and the placement of 
the target to be defined within a part on the other. An illustration of the former kind of 
placement occurs in the Phaedrus: human madness is placed on the “left-hand” (σκαιόν) 
of madness, while divine madness is placed on the “right-hand” (δεξιᾷ) side. This shows 
that everything that falls under the divine kind – i.e., everything placed under the right-
hand part of madness – is distinguished from the human. An example of placement in the 
second sense occurs in the Sophist, where imitation is divided into two parts, ‘likeness-
making’ and ‘appearance-making,’ and the sophist is placed in the latter kind as opposed 
to the former. By placing the sophist in the latter kind of imitation, appearance-making 
becomes part of his definition (Appendix B 9) – i.e., part of who he is. In both cases, the 
purpose of placement is to arrange the parts of a whole in such a way that they become a 
structure. In other words, collection and division do not yield an unordered list of named 
parts; rather, because the parts are ordered in such a way that they are related to 
themselves and to the whole, the final result of collection and division is a logical 
structure – i.e., a definition that serves as a logical framework of interrelated parts. 
The Greek word ‘τίθημι’ is often used in the illustrations of collection and 
division to express placement. One of the primary meanings of ‘τίθημι’ is “to put, place” 
and its connotations include military and legal senses such as “rest arms” (i.e., halt, but 
with arms readily accessible) and “to lay down as a law” (Liddell and Scott 1790). But it 
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also connotes a form of reasoning in which a specific claim is posited. In collection and 
division, the term is often used to tentatively “place” the target to be defined under one of 
two or more parts yielded by division, and it is often translated as ‘assume’ (e.g., 
Henderson, Sophist 283) or ‘suppose’ (e.g., Henderson, Sophist 363). For example, the 
first series of the divisions used to define the sophist begin with a question of placement 
within a kind, and the words ‘τίθημι’ and ‘θετέος’ are used to express this question. 
Looking back on the definition of the angler as a guide, Socrates states the following: 
“Καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖνό γ’ ἦν τὸ ζήτημα πρῶτον, πότερον ἰδιώτην ἤ τινα τέχνην ἔχοντα θετέον 
εἶναι τὸν ἀσπαλιευτήν.” (“Well, then, the first question we asked was whether we must 
assume that the angler was just a man or was a man with an art.”58; 221c). The key word 
is ‘θετέον,’ which is translated as “assume” by Fowler (Henderson, Sophist 283) and 
“suppose” by White (Plato 241). This question is then followed by a question about the 
sophist: “Καὶ νῦν δὴ τοῦτον ἰδιώτην θήσομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἢ παντάπασιν ὡς ἀληθῶς 
σοφιστήν;” (“Shall we assume that he is just a man, or by all means really a man of 
wisdom?”59; 221d). Here, ‘θήσομεν’ is a form of ‘τίθημι,’ and this word serves to 
reinforce the idea of placement in the divisions of both the angler and the sophist. In short, 
placement involves an ordering of parts and wholes that is based on reasoning by 
assumption – i.e., placement produces an ordering which, although tentative and subject 
to revision, delineates a structure that can serve as a starting point for further reasoning. 
It is important to note that spatial terminology (e.g., ‘σκαιόν’ (‘left’) and ‘δεξιᾷ’ 
(‘right’) at 266a in the Phaedrus) is used to clarify parts of an abstract structure, and that 
Plato’s theories concerning physical space do not play a role in this context. As a parallel, 
                                                 
58 Translated by H.N. Fowler (Henderson, Sophist 283) 
 
59 Translated by H.N. Fowler (Henderson, Sophist 283) 
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consider the square drawn in the sand in the Meno. Here, clearly, the drawn diagram uses 
spatial relations to illustrate the parts of the square, but Plato’s theories about physical 
space (as discussed in the Timaeus, for example) are irrelevant to understanding the 
reasoning process: what matters is that the square can be “seen” and manipulated through 
an everyday understanding of spatial relations and familiarity with elementary geometry. 
Similarly, in the Phaedrus, it is our everyday understanding of “left” and “right” that 
allows us to imagine two parts of madness, human and divine, as occupying opposing 
positions in an imaginary space. In this case as well, the terms “left” and “right” serve as 
cues to the imagination that highlight the relations between human, divine, and madness 
apart from any theoretical presuppositions about the nature of physical space. Thus, for 
the purposes of this discussion, spatial terms refer to everyday, pre-theoretical 
understanding of spatial relations.  
As will be explained below, a series of placements establishes order and structure. 
The syntactical placement of words in a sentence serves as an analogy. For example, the 
sentences ‘One is a factor of two’ and ‘Two is a factor of one’ both employ the same 
names, but they articulate different relations through the syntactical ordering of the 
names ‘one,’ ‘two,’ and ‘factor.’ Similarly, ‘love is a kind of madness’ comprises the 
same names as ‘madness is a kind of love’ but the placement of the names – i.e. their 
syntactical ordering – determines the relations between the names and the structure of 
each sentence as a whole. In addition, a mere list of unordered names like ‘one, two, 
factor’ or ‘love, madness’ does not articulate a structure at all. The point is not that 
placement in collection and division is syntactical placement, only that the former is 
analogous to the order of words in a sentence. Without ordering in a sentence, the terms 
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of the sentence do not fit together as a syntactical whole. Similarly, without some kind of 
ordering or placement of the parts relative to each other and to the whole, a structure is 
lacking, and without structure, there can be only an unordered list of names, not a 
definition (see also Section 5.2). In short, the function of placement is to articulate a 
logical framework through the arrangement and ordering of named parts.  
 
2.2.3.1 Placement of parts relative to a whole 
 
Entire branches of a classification may be “placed” in a certain part of a 
framework. This occurs in the Phaedrus, where divine madness is placed on the “right” 
side of madness, as opposed to its counterpart, human madness, which is placed on the 
“left” side (266a). The opposition between left and right serves to clearly mark off the 
two kinds and to indicate the form and shape of the overall composition. Just as 
Griswold’s diagram of madness (figure 1, pg. 22) maps out a structure in which the parts 
of madness are placed relative to one another, the use of spatial terms by Socrates in the 
Phaedrus presents a picture that clarifies the relations between the parts and the whole. 
More specifically, when the right side of madness is further sub-divided into the four sub-
kinds of divine madness, each of the four parts is seen as being on the side opposite to the 
human part of madness due to the placement of their parent kind. Since each part of the 
structure is placed in its own locality but relative to the other parts, the structure as a 
whole comes to light. In short, the logical structure of a whole and its parts is clarified 
through the use of an imaginary space. 
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A similar use of the operation of placement occurs in the Sophist. As in the 
Phaedrus, the concepts of the human and divine are used once again, but this time it is 
production (ποιητικός), not madness, that is divided. But after the initial division of 
production into human and divine, a second division is made along its “length” (μῆκος): 
 
    ΞΕ. … καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον δύο ποιητικῆς γένη, τὸ μὲν (5) 
ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ θεῖον. 
    ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς. 
    ΞΕ. Τέμνε δὴ δυοῖν οὔσαιν δίχα ἑκατέραν αὖθις. 
    ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς; 
266. (a)    ΞΕ. Οἷον τότε μὲν κατὰ πλάτος τέμνων τὴν ποιητικὴν 
πᾶσαν, νῦν δὲ αὖ κατὰ μῆκος. 
    ΘΕΑΙ. Τετμήσθω. 
    ΞΕ. Τέτταρα μὴν αὐτῆς οὕτω τὰ πάντα μέρη γίγνεται, 
δύο μὲν τὰ πρὸς ἡμῶν, ἀνθρώπεια, δύο δ’ αὖ τὰ πρὸς θεῶν, (5) 
θεῖα.  
    ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. 
    ΞΕ. Τὰ δέ γ’ ὡς ἑτέρως αὖ διῃρημένα, μέρος μὲν ἓν 
ἀφ’ ἑκατέρας τῆς μερίδος αὐτοποιητικόν, τὼ δ’ ὑπολοίπω 
σχεδὸν μάλιστ’ ἂν λεγοίσθην εἰδωλοποιικώ· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα (10) 
δὴ πάλιν ἡ ποιητικὴ διχῇ διαιρεῖται. (265e5-266a10) 
 
     Stranger: …According to this account there are two kinds of production,  
human and divine. 
     Theaetetus: Right. 
     Stranger: Since there are two of them, cut each of them in two again. 
     Theaetetus: How? 
     Stranger: It’s as if you’d already cut production all the way along its  
width, and now you’ll cut it along its length. 
     Theaetetus: All right. 
     Stranger: That way there are four parts of it all together, two human ones 
related to us and two divine ones related to the gods. 
     Theaetetus: Yes. 
     Stranger: Then if we take the division we made the first way, one part 
of each of those parts is the production of originals. Just about the best 
thing to call the two parts that are left might be “copy-making.” That way, 
production is divided in two again.60  
 
 
                                                 




Fig. 2. Division of production in the Sophist (265e-266a) 
 
Here, placement is being used to clarify the relations between the parts of 
production. A symmetric logical structure comes to light: just as the divine side of 
production has two parts, copy-making and the production of originals, so its counterpart, 
the human form of production, has two parts with the same names. In other words, the 
human and divine parts of production are mirror images of each other. The diagram 
shown in figure 2 illustrates the relations between the parts of production, but Plato’s 
description serves the same purpose as a diagram: it uses two dimensions in a figurative 
space for the purpose of defining the relations between parts of a whole.  
In addition, because the sophist is placed on the human side, by default all of the 
remaining placements of the sophist fall under the right side of the diagram – i.e., the 
sophist in all of his productive activities is occupied with human production, not divine 
production.  
The diagram raises the question as to the precise relations between the parts of the 
structure, however. Are the relations hierarchical, as implied by the diagram; e.g., is 
human a subordinate kind of production? In other words, the diagram indicates a 
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hierarchy of kinds and sub-kinds, but there is also the possibility that both human and 
production are simply overlapping kinds in a non-hierarchical structure. Section 3.2 (pg. 
158) will present the argument that while collection and division define a strict hierarchy 
of kinds in some cases, they define structures of overlapping parts in others. For now, the 
point is that without some kind of ordering or placement of the parts relative to each other 
and to the whole, a structure is lacking, and without structure, there can be only an 
unordered list of parts, not a definition. In other words, a logical framework is articulated 
through the arrangement and ordering of named parts. 
 
2.2.3.2 Placing the target to be defined into a part  
 
Placing also performs a separate but related function: the target to be defined is 
placed within a part. The pattern is as follows: a whole is divided into two parts, each part 
is named, and then one of the parts is determined to be applicable to the target, the other 
not. In other words, the target is placed under the former part, the name of the part 
becoming part of the definition. For example, in the Sophist, imitation is divided into two 
parts, ‘likeness-making’ and ‘appearance-making,’ and the sophist is placed under the 
latter kind as opposed to the former (264d). By placing the sophist in the latter kind of 
imitation, appearance-making becomes part of his definition (see Section 1.3.3, 
Appendix B 9). Placement for this purpose is also evident in the Statesman. For example, 
at 260e6 the statesman is placed (τίθημι) under the ‘self-directing’ sort of expertise to 






When parts of a concept are placed within the whole, relations between the parts 
are defined. The placement of parts is used frequently during collection and division. 
Because parts of a framework are placed relative to one another, the entire structure can 
be seen as an ordered whole.  In addition, placing a target to be defined “in” a part of a 
larger logical whole serves to define the target by distinguishing it from that which is 
similar.   
In conclusion, the placing of the parts of a concept serves at least two purposes. 
First, it gives structure to the conceptual whole. Each part of a concept has a place in the 
whole, the result being that the whole is defined as a set of delineated parts that form a 
specific arrangement. Placement allows one to visualize the entire structure as a set of 
ordered, interrelated parts. Second, the target to be defined can be placed in a part, 
thereby adding a component to the final definition. Thus, when love is placed “on the 
right” under the divine part of madness in the Phaedrus, divine madness becomes a part 
of the definition of love. More specifically, through this placement the definition love is a 
kind of divine madness is established. This distinguishes love from an alternative 
placement; e.g., if love were placed “on the left” under human madness, its definition 
would change to “love is a kind of human madness.”  
 




Seeing, naming, and placing do not operate in isolation, and although a rule-
governed procedure for their employment is not specified in the dialogues, the following 
pattern can be seen in the illustrations of collection and division: 
 
1. The parts of a whole are seen. 
2. The parts are named. 
3. The target is placed into one of the parts. 
 
For example, towards the end of the divisions in the Sophist, the Stranger states 
the following about belief-mimicry, a kind under which the sophist is eventually placed: 
“Let’s examine the belief-mimic the way people examine iron, to see whether it’s sound 
or has a seam in it.” (“Τὸν δοξομιμητὴν δὴ σκοπώμεθα ὥσπερ σίδηρον, εἴτε ὑγιὴς εἴτε 
διπλόην ἔτ’ ἔχων τινά ἐστιν ἐν αὑτῷ.”). A “seam” (διπλόη) is discovered (268a1), and the 
two parts of belief-mimicry are associated with sincere and insincere imitators (“ἁπλοῦν 
μιμητήν” and “εἰρωνικὸν μιμητὴν” respectively; 268a6-7). The latter kind applies to the 
sophist, and it is examined in turn: 
 
     ΞΕ. Τούτου δ’ αὖ τὸ γένος ἓν ἢ δύο φῶμεν; 
     ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρα σύ. (10) 
(b)     ΞΕ. Σκοπῶ, καί μοι διττὼ καταφαίνεσθόν τινε· τὸν 
μὲν δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ μακροῖς λόγοις πρὸς πλήθη δυνατὸν 
εἰρωνεύεσθαι καθορῶ, τὸν δὲ ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ βραχέσι λόγοις 
ἀναγκάζοντα τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον ἐναντιολογεῖν αὐτὸν 
αὑτῷ. (5) 
     ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεις ὀρθότατα. 
     ΞΕ. Τίνα οὖν ἀποφαινώμεθα τὸν μακρολογώτερον εἶναι; 
πότερα πολιτικὸν ἢ δημολογικόν; 
     ΘΕΑΙ. Δημολογικόν. 
     ΞΕ. Τί δὲ τὸν ἕτερον ἐροῦμεν; σοφὸν ἢ σοφιστικόν; (10) 
     ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ μέν που σοφὸν ἀδύνατον, ἐπείπερ οὐκ εἰδότα 
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(c) αὐτὸν ἔθεμεν· μιμητὴς δ’ ὢν τοῦ σοφοῦ δῆλον ὅτι παρω-  
νύμιον αὐτοῦ τι λήψεται, καὶ σχεδὸν ἤδη μεμάθηκα ὅτι 
τοῦτον δεῖ προσειπεῖν ἀληθῶς αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον τὸν παντάπασιν 
ὄντως σοφιστήν (268a9-268c4)  
 
     Stranger: And are there one or two kinds of insincere ones? 
     Theaetetus: You look and see. 
     Stranger: I’m looking, and there clearly appear to be two. I see that one 
sort can maintain his insincerity in long speeches to a crowd, and the other 
uses short speeches in private conversation to force the person talking  
with him to contradict himself. 
     Theaetetus: You’re absolutely right. 
     Stranger: How shall we show up the long-winded sort, as a statesman 
 or as a demagogue? 
     Theaetetus: A demagogue. 
     Stranger: And what shall we call the other one? Wise, or a sophist? 
     Theaetetus: We can’t call him wise, since we took him not to know  
anything. But since he imitates the wise man he’ll obviously have a name 
derived from the wise man’s name. And now at least I see that we have  
to call him the person who is really and truly a sophist. 
 
There are two series of seeing, naming, and placing in this passage, as outlined below: 
 
267e – 268d: 
1. The concept of belief-mimicry is examined until a “seam” is discovered, thereby 
yielding two parts (267e7-268a1). 
2. The parts are named after sincere and insincere imitators (268a6-7). 
3. In the final definition of the sophist, insincere imitation becomes part of the 




268b – 268d: 
1. Insincere imitation is treated as a whole in its own right; upon inspection, it is seen 
to have two parts (268b1). 
2. One part is named after the demagogue, the other after sophistry (imitation of the 
wise) (268b9-268c4). 
3. The sophist is placed under the latter kind (268b11-268c4).   
 
The same pattern is seen in a more condensed form when Socrates presents his portrait of 
madness to Phaedrus: 
 
1. Madness has two parts (265a9). 
2. They are named ‘human’ and ‘divine’ (265a9-10). 
3. Love, the concept being defined, is placed under the latter (265b4-5). 
 
In general, seeing opens a breach in a conceptual whole that at first appears to be opaque: 
its internal structure is hidden from reasoning, but becomes visible upon inspection. In 
some cases the breach is explicitly referred to as a “cut” (τομὴ) or “seam” (διπλόη), and it 
provides an access point to the parts of the whole. These parts are given names in order to  
articulate their boundaries and to indicate their content, and by means of the operation of 
placement the target to be defined is located in one of the parts. 
It is not clear whether seeing, naming, and placing always operate in the same 
order. An alternative reading of the Phaedrus, for example, is that Socrates was given the 
name ‘ἔρως’ (love) by Phaedrus by way of Lysias’ speech (227c), then, once given the 
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name, he “placed” it under madness, which was seen to have two parts. Moreover, even 
in the three outlines above, the first step begins with a name: ‘belief-mimicry,’ ‘insincere 
imitation,’ and ‘madness’ introduce the concept in which parts are discovered. Since the 
final step also involves a name (e.g., ‘ἔρως’ in step 3 of the Phaedrus), an alternative 
reading is that in each case, a definition is formulated through intervals of reasoning 
demarcated by names. In other words, names articulate both the parts of a whole and the 
whole itself; as such they serve as “stepping stones” by which reasoning proceeds from a 
starting point toward a conclusion. Even under this model, however, seeing and placing 
both play a role; i.e., similarities and differences must be discerned and the parts of a 
whole must be ordered into a structure. In the Phaedrus, for example, it can be argued 
that the name ‘ἔρως’ (‘love’) arose only after a unity was discerned by bringing the 
“scattered many” (265d) into a single idea that was at first nameless. In any case, it is 
clear that seeing, naming, and placing work together to produce a definition – i.e., a 
framework that serves as the basis for further reasoning.  
Returning to the definition of madness in the Phaedrus, Socrates has mixed 
feelings about his picture of madness: “We expressed the passion of love figuratively; 
perhaps it had a measure of truth in it, though it may also have led us astray”61 (“καὶ οὐκ 
οἶδ’ ὅπῃ τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθος ἀπεικάζοντες, ἴσως μὲν ἀληθοῦς τινος ἐφαπτόμενοι, τάχα δ’ 
ἂν καὶ ἄλλοσε παραφερόμενοι”). When is a definition accurate? Given the above, a 
definition should reflect three things: (1) discernment of the correct number of parts; (2) 
names that accurately reflect the content and scope of the parts; and (3) the correct 
relations between the parts. In the Phaedrus, perhaps Socrates was wrong, divine 
madness does not have four parts, one of them being love. Perhaps love is, after all, a 
                                                 
61 Translated after A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff (Plato 542), with modifications. 
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human ailment. But at the very least, Socrates’ scheme clearly presents the underlying 
structure behind his definition of madness, and this structure can be used as the starting 
point for further discussion. For example, Socrates could compose a myth about Love 
and Strife, thereby clarifying the relation between love, madness, and other phenomena. 
Or, Socrates could employ the method of elenchus and argue against the scheme by 
finding an inconsistency in the definition. Or, he can syllogize and claim that since love 
is a part of divine madness, and since divine madness is a part of madness, love is 
therefore a part of madness. He can then question the first premise, and present another 
image of love by dividing madness differently. In each case, collection and division 
provide the groundwork for further discussion. 
 
2.3 Reasoning and images 
 
This section will explore the relation between images and reasoning, paying 
particular attention to the role that images play in the Statesman. Since collection and 
division constitute a way of reasoning (see Section 1.2.5, pg. 41), exploring the relation 
between mental images and reasoning as described in the dialogues sheds light on the 
means by which collection and division operate. It will be argued below that collection 
and division rely on imagination and images to clarify and explain. Moreover, according 





2.3.1 Three levels of reasoning: sensible images, imagination,  
         and pure reason  
 
The purpose of this section is to outline three levels of reasoning that are 
articulated in the Statesman: (1) reasoning through sensible images (e.g., paintings and 
diagrams), (2) reasoning through mental images, and (3) pure reason that is completely 
removed from sensible and mental imagery.  
After a series of divisions that leads to the first definition of the Statesman, a 
distinction is made between two kinds of reasoning, both of which are contrasted with 
understanding through reason alone: 
 
... ἀλλ’ ἀτεχνῶς ὁ 
(c) λόγος ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ζῷον τὴν ἔξωθεν μὲν περιγραφὴν ἔοικεν 
ἱκανῶς ἔχειν, τὴν δὲ οἷον τοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τῇ συγκράσει 
τῶν χρωμάτων ἐνάργειαν οὐκ ἀπειληφέναι πω. γραφῆς δὲ 
καὶ συμπάσης χειρουργίας λέξει καὶ λόγῳ δηλοῦν πᾶν ζῷον 
μᾶλλον πρέπει τοῖς δυναμένοις ἕπεσθαι· τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις διὰ  (5) 
χειρουργιῶν. (277b7-277c6) 
 
...but our reasoning, just like a picture of a living creature,  
seems to have a good enough outline, but not yet to  
have received the clearness that comes from pigments  
and the blending of colors. And yet it is more fitting  
to portray any living being by speech and reasoning  
than by painting or any handicraft whatsoever to persons  
who are able to follow; but to others it is better to do it  
by means of works of craftsmanship.62  
 
                                                 
62 Translated after H.N. Fowler (Henderson, Philebus 77), with modifications. 
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At the end of this passage (277c5-6), reference is made to the use of paintings and 
craftworks as teaching devices. In the first case (277c1-4), an image is formed in the 
mind or soul of the inquirers, “just like a picture of a living creature.”  
A third kind of reasoning is related by the Eleatic Stranger in the Statesman at 
285e-286a:  
 
…τοῖς δ’ αὖ μεγίστοις οὖσι καὶ τιμιωτάτοις  
(286 a) οὐκ ἔστιν εἴδωλον οὐδὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰργασμένον 
ἐναργῶς, οὗ δειχθέντος τὴν τοῦ πυνθανομένου ψυχὴν ὁ 
βουλόμενος ἀποπληρῶσαι, πρὸς τῶν αἰσθήσεών τινα  
προσαρμόττων, ἱκανῶς πληρώσει. διὸ δεῖ μελετᾶν λόγον ἑκάστου 
δυνατὸν εἶναι δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι· τὰ γὰρ ἀσώματα, κάλλιστα (5) 
ὄντα καὶ μέγιστα, λόγῳ μόνον ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ σαφῶς δείκνυ- 
ται, τούτων δὲ ἕνεκα πάντ’ ἐστὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα. ῥᾴων 
(b) δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττοσιν ἡ μελέτη παντὸς πέρι μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ 
τὰ μείζω. (285e4-286b2) 
 
For those beings that are greatest and most valuable,  
there is no image at all which has been worked in plain view for the  
use of mankind, the showing of which will enable the person who wants  
to satisfy the mind of an inquirer to satisfy it adequately, just by fitting it  
to one of the senses. That is why one must practice at being able to give  
and receive an account of each thing; for the things that are without body,  
which are finest and greatest, are shown clearly by reason only, and  
everything that is now being said is for the sake of these things. But  
practice in everything is easier in smaller things, rather than in relation  
to the greater.63 
 
Thus, the greatest beings (μεγίστοις οὖσι) must be exhibited “by reason only” (“λόγῳ 
μόνον”) rather than through images (εἴδωλον). The general idea behind these two 
passages from the Statesman can be understood with the following scheme, with the most 
basic kind of reasoning listed first: 
 
1. Reasoning through the perception of paintings and other works of handicraft (277c) 
                                                 
63 Translated by C.J. Rowe (Plato 329), with modifications 
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2. Reasoning through images in the imagination (277b-c) 
3. The use of reason alone (285e-286a) 
 
The Phaedrus as well as the Statesman provide an example of the second kind of 
reasoning. The conceptual map of madness with the human kind on the “left” and the 
divine kind on the “right” is described by Socrates in terms of a likeness or figure: “We 
expressed the passion of love figuratively” (“καὶ οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπῃ τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθος 
ἀπεικάζοντες”; 265b). Thus, while there is a difference between imagining an entire 
classificatory scheme on the one hand, and imagining a figure such as the Statesman or 
the angler as a person with a set of characteristics on the other, in both cases collection 
and division rely on imagination and images to clarify and explain. The imagination is 
used because thinking through reason alone is very difficult; when the method is used for 
the purpose of teaching (see Section 1.6.2, pg. 85) or as a way of practicing on things 
other than the greatest beings, as is the case in the Statesman, the second kind of 
reasoning is appropriate. Thus, when Socrates paints a picture of madness with the 
human on the “left” side and the divine on the “right” side, he is acting not only as a 
reasoner but also as a teacher – i.e., he speaks figuratively in order to clearly present his 
definition of love and madness to Phaedrus.  
That images play an important role in collection and division is pointed out by 
recent commentators. Commenting on the use of division to define the angler and the 
sophist, Notomi states the following: 
 
The contrast between a small and easy and a great and difficult object may correspond 
to that between the visible and the invisible. Only by analogy and using visible 
images are invisible things comprehended (cf. Plt. 285c4-286b3). Accordingly, the 
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sophist is investigated by appealing to similarities to other more familiar things: the 
angler is first taken up as a model and the painter is later chosen as another (233d3 ff.), 
but actually all the other images, namely, hunter, trader, fighter, purifier (a kind of 
medical doctor), painter, juggler, and mimic actor, are concrete images which 
illustrate the difficult object, the sophist. We need imagination to integrate these 
images and go beyond them to grasp the essence of the sophist (77).  
 
This is the correct way of looking at the matter: images and the imagination serve as 
stepping stones that allow us to understand the target being defined. Images are not 
shunned by Plato; on the contrary, they are crucial elements of reasoning. An image can 
serve as a device that leads the inquirer to a point beyond the image.   
 The divided line in the Republic (509d–511e) is often taken as evidence that Plato 
had shunned the use of images because conjecture (εἰκασία) and its corresponding objects, 
images (εἰκών), are placed in the lowest segment of the line. At first glance, this appears 
to conflict with the claim that images for Plato can play a useful and positive role in 
reasoning. However, if the divided line is itself an image, as some commentators such as 
Sonja Tanner have argued (92; see also Section 1.6.3, pg. 88), then the following 
question can be raised: is the image of the divided line an accurate image? In other words, 
does the divided line truthfully represent the four different kinds of cognition and their 
interrelations? If the divided line is an accurate image, then it is an example of an image 
that is useful and instructive. If on the other hand it is not accurate, there is no need to 
believe that conjecture and images are at the lowest segment of the line.  
But even if, for the sake of argument, we accept the claim that the divided line is 
not an image, then one must look only a few pages further in the Republic to find an 
image that plays a positive and crucial role in the dialogue: at 515a4 the description of the 
Cave is referred to as an image (εἰκών; see also Section 2.3.3, pg. 141). Moreover, as will 
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be discussed below, Plato's last dialogue, the Laws, explains that in some cases images 
are necessary – i.e., some objects cannot be reasoned about without the use of images. 
This will be discussed further in the following section.  
 
2.3.2 Images are necessary for reasoning 
 
In the Laws, the use of images as devices for reasoning shows that in some cases 
images are not only useful but necessary for reasoning. At 897d, the Athenian Stranger 
employs the image of a lathe to answer the question, “What is the nature of the motion of 
reason?” (“Τίνα οὖν δὴ νοῦ κίνησις φύσιν ἔχει;”). In answer to this question, the 
Athenian Stranger states the following: 
 
    ΑΘ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἐξ ἐναντίας οἷον εἰς ἥλιον ἀποβλέποντες, 
νύκτα ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ ἐπαγόμενοι, ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, 
ὡς νοῦν ποτε θνητοῖς ὄμμασιν ὀψόμενοί τε καὶ γνωσόμενοι (10) 
(e) ἱκανῶς· πρὸς δὲ εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου βλέποντας  
ἀσφαλέστερον ὁρᾶν. (897d8-897e2) 
 
    Athenian: Still, in answering this question we mustn’t assume that  
mortal eyes will ever be able to look upon reason and get to know it  
adequately: let’s not produce darkness at noon, so to speak, by looking at  
the sun direct. We can save our sight by looking at an image of the object  
we’re asking about.64 
 
This is a curious passage. Here, an image serves as a means by which we can reason 
about the motion of reason. The idea here is that an image can serve as a device by means 
of which an elusive concept can be represented. Such a figurative device is necessary 
because if we look directly at reason, while paradoxically using reason itself to do so, we 
are in danger of being blinded, as if looking directly at the sun. In other words, a reasoner 
                                                 
64 Translated by Trevor J. Saunders (Plato 1554) 
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may not be able to “step outside” of reason to examine the shape and motions of reason – 
to do so would require an abandonment of reason. For this reason, an image is used as a 
device not unlike a schematic or diagram that allows us to see, albeit indirectly, the 
answer to the question. In this case, at least, an image provides the only way to reason. 
Equally important is the fact that the image is skillfully made or constructed. At 
898a-b the Athenian Stranger explains how the motions of reason can be understood as 
the revolution of the turning wheels of a lathe. He states that by using this image to 
understand the motions of reason, a skilful use of “beautiful images by means of 
reasoning” (“λόγῳ καλῶν εἰκόνων”) is being employed:  
 
    ΑΘ. Τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ δήπου καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ 
καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἕνα λόγον καὶ τάξιν 
(b) μίαν ἄμφω κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, νοῦν τήν τε ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένην 
κίνησιν, σφαίρας ἐντόρνου ἀπεικασμένα φοραῖς, οὐκ ἄν ποτε 
φανεῖμεν φαῦλοι δημιουργοὶ λόγῳ καλῶν εἰκόνων. (898a8-b3)  
 
    Athenian: Take reason on the one hand, and motion in a single location 
on the other. If we were to point out that in both cases the motion was  
determined by a single plan and procedure and that it was regular; uniform;  
always at the same point in space; around a fixed center; in the same position  
relative to other objects; and were to illustrate both by the example of a  
sphere being turned on a lathe, then no one could ever show us up for  
incompetent makers of beautiful images by means of reasoning.65 
 
Here, an image wrought by reason (λόγῳ καλή εἰκών) is constructed through the use of 
named parts such as ‘σφαῖρα’ (globe or lathe) and ‘κίνησις’ (motion). The reference to 
motion around a fixed center tells us how the motions of reason are arranged in an 
imaginary space. By seeing the motions as spherical, the placement of each part of the 
image is made clear, as if each part were arranged as a point on a geometric figure or as 
the part of a schematic. In short, reason is used to construct an image that clarifies the 
                                                 
65 Translated after Trevor J. Saunders (Plato 1555), with modifications 
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structure of an object or phenomenon that is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive by 
means of reason alone. 
 
2.3.3 Images and truthfulness 
 
It is frequently assumed in the secondary literature that Plato believed that images 
have no philosophical value; rather, images are to be mistrusted as sources of error and 
confusion. For example, Nigel Thomas states the following: 
 
Indeed, although [Plato’s] writings contain at least three different words (eidolon, 
phantasma, and, most frequently, eikon) that may often, in context, reasonably be 
translated as “image,” Plato does not seem to use these terminological resources to 
mark any particularly important distinctions. In effect, he lumps mental images 
(including imprints in the wax of memory, and paintings on the canvas of the soul) 
together with other sorts of images, such as sculptures, paintings, shadows, and 
reflections, and assigns them all to the very lowest rung of the divided line that 
represents the hierarchy of being (Republic 509 d). All are imperfect, and thereby 
misleading, copies of material things, which are themselves, of course, merely 
imperfect instantiations of the eternal forms, the proper objects of philosophic enquiry. 
Images (mental or otherwise) are doubly removed from the forms, and are to be 
shunned as a likely source of error and delusion.  
 
One could make a similarly erroneous reading of Plato’s attitude toward discourse 
(λόγος). According to the dialogues, discourse lends itself to abuse: it is used by sophists 
to bewitch children (Sophist 234c), rhetoricians use it to inflame crowds (Phaedrus 
267c), and the young use discourse to corrupt their parents and disseminate confusion 
(Philebus 15d-e; see Section 1.5.1, pg. 66). But it would be wrong to say that because of 
this misuse, discourse in general should be shunned as a source of error. It is because 
discourse is essential to knowledge and reasoning that its misuse needs to be highlighted. 
Similarly, it is not the use of images that is misleading, but their misuse. Images are 
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central to working out problems in the dialogues and for elucidating difficult concepts. 
The classic example of an image that plays a positive role in the dialogues is Plato’s 
image of the Cave, which is explicitly referred to as an image (εἰκών) at 515a4 in the 
Republic.  
In addition, it is noteworthy that the dialogues are replete with vivid images that 
are used to explain the method of collection and division and its correct use. Thus, 
Socrates paints the picture of the correct use of division by using the image of a skilful 
butcher who cuts along the natural joints of an animal (Phaedrus 265e). Similarly, in the 
Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger advises Theaetetus to look for a point of division as if 
inspecting a piece of iron for a seam (267e). While Plato in some cases was very critical 
of art and image-making (e.g. in the Republic), as a philosopher-poet Plato made ample 
use of vivid images for making his ideas clear. Of course, he did not have to: he was free 
to rely on more abstract terminology. We see this in the Parmenides, for example, where 
eight deductions are explored with scant use of the usual Platonic imagery. The fact that 
he chose to use vivid images and metaphors in the Phaedrus and other dialogues that 
illustrate collection and division indicates that Plato thought that images are at least 
instructive for explaining how collection and division operate.66  
                                                 
66   The significance of images in reasoning is not restricted to ancient times, nor is it limited to non-
deductive reasoning. For example, C.S. Peirce states that deductive reasoning “involves an element of 
observation; namely, deduction consists in constructing an icon or diagram the relations of whose parts 
shall present a complete analogy with those of the parts of the object of reasoning, of experimenting upon 
this image in the imagination, and of observing the result so as to discover unnoticed and hidden relations 
among the parts.” (3: 212-13). Thus, Peirce recognizes the intimate relation between deductive reasoning, 
the imagination, and reasoning in terms of wholes and parts. 
     Regarding ancient thought in particular, similar observations may be made about Aristotle. In fact, the 
Analytics is replete with visual reasoning, so much so that more than one commentator has put forth the 
conjecture that Aristotle had used diagrams to represent the logical relations between terms of a syllogism. 
Benedict Einarson, for example, proposed that Aristotle had used diagrams of “horizontal lines of varying 
length placed one above the other” (168). In this model, the lengths of the lines represent the extensions of 
the terms, and predication is understood in terms of whole-part relations, where the predicate is a whole of 
which the subject is a part (Einarson 168). Thus, the major term of the first figure is represented by the 
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Images are ideal for reasoning because they clarify, just as the drawn square in the 
Meno does, and they are easily revised, just as the appearances and portraits of the target 
in the Sophist and the Statesman are. But Plato makes it clear that images, like names, 
can be deceptive. In the Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger makes a distinction between two 
kinds of image (εἰκών), likeness-making and appearance-making, which are defined as 
follows:  
 
     ΞΕ. Μίαν μὲν τὴν εἰκαστικὴν ὁρῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τέχνην. 
ἔστι δ’ αὕτη μάλιστα ὁπόταν κατὰ τὰς τοῦ παραδείγματος 
συμμετρίας τις ἐν μήκει καὶ πλάτει καὶ βάθει, καὶ πρὸς 
(e) τούτοις ἔτι χρώματα ἀποδιδοὺς τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστοις, τὴν 
τοῦ μιμήματος γένεσιν ἀπεργάζηται. (235c8-235d3) 
 
           Stranger: One type of imitation I see is the art of likeness-making. That’s  
the one we have whenever someone produces an imitation by keeping to  
the proportions of length, breadth, and depth of his model, and also by  
keeping to the appropriate colors of its parts.67   
 
 
           ΞΕ. Τί δέ; τὸ φαινόμενον μὲν διὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐκ καλοῦ 
θέαν ἐοικέναι τῷ καλῷ, δύναμιν δὲ εἴ τις λάβοι τὰ τηλικαῦτα (5) 
ἱκανῶς ὁρᾶν, μηδ’ εἰκὸς ᾧ φησιν ἐοικέναι, τί καλοῦμεν; ἆρ’ 
οὐκ, ἐπείπερ φαίνεται μέν, ἔοικε δὲ οὔ, φάντασμα; (236b4-7) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
longest line, and the minor by the shortest line.   
     Other commentators have also argued that the syllogistic was understood diagrammatically. In his 
commentary on the Prior Analytics, Ross bases his interpretation of some passages on the idea that 
Aristotle had employed diagrams to explicate the syllogistic. For example, at Prior Analytics 1.5 28a14-15, 
Aristotle states “τίθεται δὲ τὸ μέσον ἔξω μὲν τῶν ἄκρων, ἔσχατον δὲ τῇ θέσει.” (“The middle is placed 
outside the extremes and is last in position.”*). Commenting on this passage, Ross states that “His meaning 
is simply that in his diagram the middle term comes above both extremes in the second figure, and below 
both in the third, and that in his ordinary formulation the middle term does not come between the extremes 
in either figure...” (307, emphasis added). It is important to note that under this interpretation, the word 
‘τίθεται’ connotes not a figurative kind of placement, one associated only with the concepts of assumption 
or supposition, but a literal placement in a diagram. That this interpretation is even possible shows that the 
operation of placing and visual reasoning in general play an important role in Aristotle’s conception of the 
syllogistic.  
 
 * Translated by Robin Smith (Smith 9) 
 




           Stranger: Now, what are we going to call something that appears to be 
like a beautiful thing, but only because it’s seen from a viewpoint that’s  
not beautiful, and would seem unlike the thing it claims to be like if you  
came to be able to see such large things adequately? If it appears the way 
the thing does but in fact isn’t like it, isn’t it an appearance?68  
 
The first kind of image is a “likeness” since it is like (ἔοικα; 236a8) the thing it depicts 
(235c8-235d3), while the second kind of image is an “appearance” or “apparition” 
(φάντασμα), which includes painting and the rest of imitation (236b4-7). The latter kind 
of image only seems beautiful, when it is not – the makers of these images abandon the 
truth (“οὐ χαίρειν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐάσαντες οἱ δημιουργοὶ”; 236a4).  
The distinction between likeness and appearance is a crucial one, and recent 
commentators are keen to emphasize this distinction as well as the role of images in 
general in the dialogues. Notomi states the following:  
  
The dialogue concerning the definitions of the sophist as a whole illustrates and 
exemplifies how to distinguish between true and false appearances. We clearly see 
that the philosophical inquiry makes a likeness, which is similar, and discerns and 
rejects an apparition, which appears to be similar but is actually dissimilar (278).  
 
As stated above, a likeness is a species of image; unlike an apparition, a likeness is “a 
correct image of the original” (Notomi 153).  
However, the difference between appearance and likeness not only serves as a 
means by which the sophists can be accused of appearance-making, it also applies to 
collection and division. More specifically, one can always ask if the definitions produced 
by collection and division only seem to be true. After the sixth and penultimate definition 
is formulated, the sophist seems to be no more than a lineage of ever-changing 
apparitions descending from the initial divisions of the angler. Before the final definition 
                                                 
68 Translated by Nicholas P. White (Plato 256), with slight modifications. 
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is formulated, Theaetetus expresses doubt as to whether the Stranger will ever hit upon 
the truth: 
 
     ΘΕΑΙ. … ἀπορῶ δὲ ἔγωγε ἤδη διὰ τὸ πολλὰ 
(c) πεφάνθαι, τί χρή ποτε ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγοντα καὶ διισχυριζόμενον 
εἰπεῖν ὄντως εἶναι τὸν σοφιστήν. (231b9-231c2) 
 
     Theaetetus: … But the sophist has appeared in many different  
ways. So I’m confused about what expression or assertion could convey  
the truth about what he really is.69 
 
Thus, while a true (ἀληθής) account is the goal, it is an elusive target. That a 
definition is an image that may or may not be true is not unique to the definitions of the 
sophist. In the same dialogue, the Stranger refers to beliefs (δόξᾰ) and definitions (λόγος) 
in general as images: 
 
(e) … τούτων γὰρ μήτ’ ἐλεγχθέντων μήτε ὁμολογηθέντων σχολῇ 
ποτέ τις οἷός τε ἔσται περὶ λόγων ψευδῶν λέγων ἢ δόξης, 
εἴτε εἰδώλων εἴτε εἰκόνων εἴτε μιμημάτων εἴτε φαντασμάτων 
αὐτῶν…. (5) (241e1-4) 
 
…We’ll never be  
able to avoid having to make ourselves ridiculous by saying conflicting 
things whenever we talk about false statements and beliefs, either as copies 
or likenesses or imitations or appearances…70 
 
 That definitions or accounts (λόγοι) are also appearances is recognized by recent 
commentators. Notomi states that “Interestingly enough, it is a definition (logos) which 
appears and reveals the sophist’s new face, just as the sophist is found ‘in the definition 
which now appears’ [231b6-7]. In this way, the figures of the sophist (presented as the 
                                                 
69 Translated by Nicholas P. White (Plato 251), with modifications. 
 
70 Translated by Nicholas P. White (Plato 262). 
Pasqualoni 146 
 
definitions of the sophist) appear through the inquiry...” (88). This point is reinforced by 
Richard Patterson, who, discussing the dialogues as a whole, emphasizes that there is an 
important parallel between λόγοι and images: 
 
... both images and logoi are about something. The primary logoi of Sophist 262e are 
about something, as are the doxai of Republic 478b which are imaged in logoi. 
Moreover, images purport to reveal something about their models, just as logoi say 
something about their subject ... The general idea is that images in their own way tell 
us something about their models, the image being correct or incorrect depending on 
whether what it tells us is true or false (111-12). 
 
Additionally, Patterson claims that the message of the Phaedo (100a) is that “Studying 
things in logoi is implicitly agreed by all to be a study of things in images, the idea of 
logoi as mimēmata of things being entirely commonplace” (28).  Furthermore, he 
observes that the concepts of true and false extends to images. Commenting on the 
analogy of the scribe and the painter in the Philebus, Paterson remarks that “The true 
eikōn [image] is that which illustrates a true logos or doxa [opinion]: As the true logos 
states things as they are, so the true picture pictures things as they are” (113). In other 
words, just as λόγοι (i.e., definitions or accounts) may be true or false, so too may 
images.  
This raises the question as to which criteria, if any, should be used in evaluating 
the truthfulness of an image. More specifically, given the definition of logic as a step-by-
step form of reasoning that aims toward the truth (Section 1.5.3, pg. 74), how is one to 
know if an image or representation produced by collection and division is a true one? 
This question will be revisited in Section 6.3, where criteria provided in the Laws will be 
discussed in the context of Meno’s paradox (pg. 273). It will be argued that knowledge of 
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the Forms may be one route by which an image may be compared with its object, thereby 
providing objective criteria by which the accuracy of a definition may be judged. 
 
2.4 Two senses of the word ‘method’ 
 
The purpose of this section is to present the argument that collection and division 
are not always applied as a deliberate, skill-based procedure. For example, collection and 
division as described in the Phaedrus are two forms or principles of reasoning that are 
not deliberately imposed but work more or less as an undercurrent of thought and speech. 
In contrast to this is the picture of the method as a rule-based procedure as shown in the 
Statesman and the Sophist.  
Plato introduces collection and division at Phaedrus 265c-d, where Socrates states 
“τούτων δέ τινων ἐκ τύχης ῥηθέντων δυοῖν εἰδοῖν” (“but in these chance utterances were 
involved two principles”71). The “chance utterances” (“ἐκ τύχης ῥηθέντων”) refer to a 
discussion on the nature of love (ἔρως) and its relation to madness (μανία). In Socrates’ 
second speech, madness was divided into two kinds, human and divine, and the latter was 
sub-divided into four kinds, one of which is love (265b). The “δυοῖν εἰδοῖν” (“two 
principles”) at 265c9 refer to collection and division. It is not immediately evident what 
“εἰδοῖν” means, and the term is not consistently translated. Translations of “εἰδοῖν” in this 
passage include “principles” (Goold 533, Rowe 103), “kinds” or “kinds of things” (Rowe 
199; Plato 542), “procedures” (Hackforth, Phaedrus 132), and “forms” (Griswold 179). 
Rowe notes that the term ‘εἶδος’ (along with its kindred term, ‘ἰδέα’) “allows Plato to talk 
                                                 
71 Translated by H.N. Fowler (Goold).  
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about the features of particular collections of items without having to specify precisely 
what they are collections of” (155).  
But this passage of the Phaedrus is not completely silent on the question of how 
division is performed; Plato does specify that λόγος (here understood as “discourse” – i.e., 
speech or reasoning or a combination thereof) is the agency of both collection and 
division. This is made clear three times in Phaedrus 265e-266a. First, it is “τὼ λόγω” (i.e., 
two “discourses” or “reasonings”) that posit the single idea of madness (265e). Second, it 
is one of the “τὼ λόγω” that cuts or divides (“τεμνόμενος”) the “left side” or human part 
of madness (266a). Finally, the remaining λόγος of the pair “leads” (“ἀγαγὼν”) to the 
right-hand side of madness, where the divine part of madness is sub-divided into four 
sub-kinds (266a). 
The term “λόγω” at Phaedrus 265e is translated as “speeches” (Hackforth, 
Phaedrus 133; Plato 542) and “discourses” (Goold 535). Under the first translation, one 
could argue that there is nothing significant in Plato’s terminology: he is simply saying 
that Socrates composed “τὼ λόγω” (i.e., the two “speeches”), and it is really Socrates 
who is practicing collection and division, using λόγος as a means to convey the results to 
his audience. Under this interpretation, a practitioner of collection and division would 
employ λόγος just as a rhetorician might use λόγος in a variety of ways to persuade his or 
her audience.  
But Plato – or Socrates, as the case may be – was free to express this idea 
differently. He could have used the Greek equivalent of wordings such as the following: 
“In my first speech, I divided the left hand side of madness … and in my second speech, I 
led the discussion to the right hand side …” (similar uses of the term ‘λόγος’ appear at 
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257e and 260b). But the actual Greek wordings in this passage of the Phaedrus make it 
clear that the two discourses or reasonings, not their author, are the actors; i.e., it is λόγος, 
not Socrates, that collects, divides, and leads. Not even the instrumental dative is used – 
instead, λόγος occurs in the plural nominative. 
The idea that λόγος, as opposed to an individual such as Socrates, is the active 
agency when collection and division are applied, may be contrasted with what is seen in 
dialogues such as the Statesman and the Sophist, where a specific technique or procedure 
is applied to arrive at a definition, with steps along the way meticulously described. For 
example, in the Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger carefully illustrates the method using the 
angler as a model. Here, each step of the method is illustrated for the benefit of 
Theaetetus, and the definition or final account of the angler is neatly wrapped up in the 
end. The Stranger’s attitude in this case resembles the confidence that Socrates displayed 
when he was giving instructions in how to double the square in the Meno. In both cases, 
the deliberate application of a specific kind of reasoning is illustrated. In addition, in the 
Statesman, applying the method is described more than once as “work” (ἔργον, 258c, 
284c), and as with the Sophist it is evident that a great deal of careful and methodical 
attention is used to apply the method and to reach a conclusion.  
Thus, there are two ways in which collection and division can be understood: (1) 
collection and division do not require effortful and skill-based activity, or (2) they do 
require such activity.  
In defense of the former reading is the fact that in the Phaedrus Socrates 
recognizes collection and division in hindsight – i.e., after his speeches are composed – 
and refers to the speech in which they are employed as “chance utterances”: “τούτων δέ 
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τινων ἐκ τύχης ῥηθέντων δυοῖν εἰδοῖν” (“but in these chance utterances were involved 
two principles”72; 265c). Moreover, as explained above, Socrates was led by discourse – 
i.e., λόγος as speech or reasoning ‘led’ him to the ‘left’ and ‘right’ hand parts of madness. 
The image here is that of an imaginary space divided into two halves, and Socrates, rather 
than making his way to a known destination, is brought to it and thereby discovers it.  
In the introduction to Rationality in Greek Thought, M. Frede contrasts the 
present-day understanding of reason with that of ancient Greece. Regarding the former, 
he states that “We tend to think of reason primarily as a formal ability to reason, as an 
ability to process data with which reason is provided from the outside, and to which, 
perhaps, it is neutral, in such a way as to calculate what it is reasonable to assume given 
certain assumptions…” (M. Frede 5). Moreover, he states that the present-day notion of 
the will “has had the effect that reason has come to be seen as having merely a cognitive 
function.” (M. Frede 6) This is in stark contrast to the ways in which Socrates and Plato 
portray reason. Instead of a willful human agent using reason as a means to calculate, in 
the dialogues reason is one part of an individual, an agent with its own volition and its 
own desires. Frede states that the division of the soul in the Republic (473bff) is 
“crucially based on the assumption that there are conflicting desires which we can only 
understand, Plato argues, if we assume that there are different parts of the soul, each with 
its own needs and interests” (7). Thus, when Plato divides the soul in the Republic, “he 
not only explicitly speaks of the desires of reason, he is also firmly committed to this 
view to the extent that the division of the soul is based on it” (M. Frede 7). Frede’s 
assessment of the portrayal of reason in the dialogues is on par with the role that λόγος 
plays in the Phaedrus. Instead of a willful human agent processing and calculating data to 
                                                 
72 Translated by H.N. Fowler (Goold) 
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reach a conclusion, a different picture is presented: reason makes its way to a conclusion 
without the calculated use of a set of rules. 
Understanding ‘μέθοδος’ as ‘way’ (see Section 1.5.2, pg. 71) unifies the 
seemingly opposed pictures of collection and division as elementary forms of reasoning 
on the one hand, and as systematic ways of thinking that require deliberate effort and the 
meticulous application of rules on the other. The word ‘μέθοδος’ can be understood in the 
broader sense as ‘μέθ-ὁδός,’ i.e., ‘with  road’; in this sense it is a ‘way’ to arrive at 
something that is sought, leaving open the possibility that not all ways are followed 
through a set of deliberately-applied rules.  
To use a mathematical analogy, in arithmetic, one can perform basic operations 
such as counting and adding small numbers without specialized training. But for 
representing and manipulating large numbers, a technique or device such as long 
addition, and the use of numerical symbols arranged according to specific rules, is 
required. Understood in the latter sense, collection and division in the Phaedrus serve as 
deliberately-applied principles for the composition of Socrates’ speech. In other words, 
under this interpretation collection and division allow Socrates to purposefully delineate 
the overall structure of his speech with careful planning. But in the former case, 
collection and division are more like the activity of counting and similarly elementary 
ways of reasoning. Understood in this sense, collection and division are basic and natural 





2.5 Collection and division and the unlimited 
 
In the Philebus, the method of collection and division is described in relation to 
‘ἄπειρον’ (‘indeterminate,’ ‘unlimited,’ ‘indefinite’). As discussed in Section 1.2.4 (pg. 
38), depending on the interpretation, ‘ἄπειρον’ can refer to the variable characteristics of 
particulars, to an unlimited number of individuals, or to an undifferentiated continuum 
(Gosling 62). To outline the differences between each interpretation, consider sound 
(φωνή). Under the first interpretation, each instance of a spoken letter such as ‘a’ will 
have subtle variations in pitch and tonality, and there are unlimited variations and 
combinations thereof that make each instance a unique occurrence. Under the second 
interpretation, there are unlimited occurrences of each letter. Under the third 
interpretation, sound is a continuum in the sense that there are unlimited gradations of 
pitch, just as there are countless gradations in the color spectrum.  
The first reading is especially interesting because it is related to the problem of 
individuals: while Forms remain the same over time, individuals are in flux, and therefore 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to define an individual apart from universals. Gosling 
illustrates this interpretation using the image of a Persian cat. A particular cat of this sort 
exhibits the form of its species and in this respect it is determined, and at the level of the 
infima species “precise numerical specifications” – e.g., proportions of hardness and 
softness, heat and coolness – can be given, but below this level of specification the 
indeterminate is reflected in “a wishwash of potentiality for varying temperatures and 
solidity that is matter” (Gosling 156). This reading of ἄπειρον – i.e., as the variable 
characteristics of individuals – will be discussed further in Section 6.3.2 (pg. 275), where 
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it will be argued that beliefs as well as organisms can also be seen as individuals with 
idiosyncratic variations. 
Returning to the division of φωνή in the Philebus, we can see that while sound is 
a continuum, it also has a structure. As voice, sound is divided into three kinds (vowels, 
consonants, and mutes); as music, sound is divided into intervals and the high and low 
and fast and slow (26a). In both cases, the unlimited nature of sound is tempered by limit 
– i.e., sound is shaped by the compresence of limit and the unlimited, and collection and 
division are known as “the divine gift” through which the structure of sound may be 
discerned. 
In the Philebus, Socrates describes Theuth’s discovery of the alphabet (18b5-
18d2; see Appendix A 49). Here, Theuth is credited with having discovered the structure 
of voice (φωνή): while voice is unlimited (ἄπειρον; 18b5), Theuth was the first to 
discover that it has parts. Moreover, the parts can be named and ordered, thereby defining 
the alphabet. Regardless of which of the three readings of ἄπειρον above is accepted, this 
passage illustrates how the three operations of collection and division yield the structure 
of voice: 
 
1. Seeing: Theuth was the first to discover that voice has parts: i.e., voice is  
    divided into kinds (18b7) .  
2. Naming: The three kinds are named ‘vowels,’ ‘consonants,’ and ‘mutes’  
    (18b7-c3). 
3. Placing: Each of the three kinds are further subdivided so that each letter  




The process is similar with music, where ‘φωνή’ (sound) is seen as a whole of 
named parts, where each part is placed within a structure. For example, the musical 
intervals of “high,” “low,” and “intermediate” (ὀξύ, βαρὺ, and ὁμότονον) are named as 
such and placed within a structure.  
Of course, music is heard and not seen, but it is often visualized using a geometric 
device such as a line. Recent commentators describe such a device in terms of seeing, 
representation, and placement. For example, in his commentary on Theuth’s discovery of 
three kinds of voice (that which “can be spoken alone,” that which “cannot be spoken 
alone,” and the semi-vowels) Gosling states the following (emphasis added): 
 
This again [i.e., the division of voice into three kinds] seems to invite linear 
representation, and what Theuth does is to see that there are main points on the 
continuum, and that permissible combinations can be expressed as relations between 
these points. There are many sounds which, from the point of view of knowing one’s 
letters, are simply not represented, but fall somewhere on the apeiron. The discovery 
of the alphabet-system is the discovery that the vocal-sound phenomenon allows of 
systematization into elements such that permissible sound combinations are 
represented by combinations of elements... (171) 
 
Clearly, understanding a phenomenon such as voice in terms of a “linear representation” 
in which points are “seen” or in which letters fall “somewhere,” is to understand what is 
essentially invisible  – voice – in terms of an image, in this case a geometric device that 
represents a continuum as a whole of parts.  
In “Plato’s Description of Division,” A.C. Lloyd argues similarly: he states that 
collection and division are “the discovery of the One in the Many” (105). Roughly 
speaking, Many is equivalent to ἄπειρον, “the infinite … number of parts of a whole,” 
while the One refers to a whole or species that can be divided into a finite number of parts 
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(A. Lloyd 105). Division is likened to dividing a continuum (e.g., a line in geometry or a 
sensory experience such as sound) into parts. To use an example from Philebus, Theuth, 
when he divides voice into letters, mirrors a geometer who divides a line into segments. 
In this sense, Plato had recognized “identity of logical structure” between a continuous 
magnitude and the world of experience and knowledge (A. Lloyd 105).  
Gosling and Lloyd are correct in their assessment of collection and division as 
portrayed in the Philebus: visualization of the invisible (e.g. voice, music) using a device 
such as a line in which parts are placed clarifies the structure of the object or 
phenomenon being studied. More specifically, images are powerful devices by which the 




When a framework is constructed through collection and division, three 
operations are at work: seeing, naming, and placing. Seeing is the discernment of 
conceptual wholes and parts. More specifically, through the recognition of similarities, 
seeing brings many into a whole – i.e., into a unified concept; through the recognition of 
differences, seeing discerns the parts of a concept. Parts are not only discerned, however, 
they are named and placed. The function of naming is to articulate the conceptual 
boundaries between each of the parts and to indicate the contents of the parts. The 
function of placing is to arrange the parts in an ordered whole, thereby revealing the 
interrelations between the parts.  
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The importance of the three operations can be explained in a negative sense: 
without seeing, there is nothing to name – i.e., without a coherent structure of similarities 
and differences, there is only a “scattered many.” Without naming, the parts of a whole 
and the whole itself remain inarticulate, and they cannot be consistently discerned or 
communicated. Without placing, the parts of a whole remain unordered and structureless. 
However, there are cases in which a definition is formulated, but only incompletely – i.e., 
a partial application of seeing, naming, and placing will yield a partial framework or in 
other words a “loose structure” of sorts. This will be discussed further in Chapter 5.  
 Seeing, naming, and placing are trivial in the true sense of the word: they are both 
elementary and commonplace. And it is precisely because they are “trivial” that they are 
of fundamental importance and on par with other basic forms of reasoning, such as 
arithmetic. The three operations have more abstract applications (e.g., we can name a 
class of numbers), and they also underlie more mundane forms of reasoning, but they 
serve the same purpose in the inferential process. In other words, whether one is learning 
how to recognize letters, or mapping out the forms of madness, reason is moved forward 









As stated in Section 1.1, the purpose of this work is to defend the thesis that 
collection and division define logical frameworks that underlie deductive and non-
deductive reasoning. This chapter complements Chapter 2: while the previous chapter 
describes the means by which a framework is constructed, this chapter will discuss 
theoretical models that tell us what a framework is. More specifically, while Chapter 2 
describes how a framework is constructed through three operations, the present chapter 
describes what these operations produce. However, recent commentators are by no means 
settled on this issue; according to some, collection and division produce hierarchical 
genus-species trees, while others argue that the method produces non-hierarchical 
structures of overlapping parts. Section 3.2 will discuss four models for interpreting the 
logical structures that are produced by collection and division. For reasons given below, 
in this work these models have been dubbed ‘Tree,’ ‘Fabric,’ ‘Lens,’ and ‘Mesh.’ Each of 
these names corresponds to a device or image for interpreting a framework. It will be 
argued that models that allow for non-hierarchical frameworks – i.e., logical structures in 
which parts overlap – most accurately describe the results of collection and division.  
Section 3.3 complements Section 3.2 by arguing that there are at least two 
perspectives that apply to a framework that defines individuals. More specifically, 
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regardless of precisely what kind of structure is produced by collection and division, 
there is the special case in which the reasoner is the target being defined as opposed to 
one who is defining another through collection and division. In this case, structural errors 
in a framework can be recognized, allowing the target to overturn the definition. 
 
3.2 Four models: Tree, Fabric, Lens, and Mesh 
 
Sections 3.2.1 - 3.2.4 will discuss four models or interpretations of collection and 
division that have been presented in secondary literature. Section 3.2.1 will discuss the 
idea that a framework is equivalent to a genus-species tree. Section 3.2.2 will present 
arguments by Julius Moravcsik and Laura W. Grams that collection and division produce 
something like a “woven fabric” in which conceptual threads overlap and intertwine. 
Section 3.2.3 will discuss Kenneth Sayre’s argument that the method is based on 
symmetric relations between Forms. Section 3.2.4 will discuss M.M. McCabe’s argument 
that collection and division produce a structure that serves as a “context” in which 
individuals are placed.  
It will be argued that the second and third models, Fabric and Lens, most 
accurately describe the structures produced by collection and division. These models 
capture relations and structures that are not hierarchical, and for this reason they are 
consistent with some of the divisions seen in the dialogues. Moreover, these models 
respect the fact that collection and division underlie everyday reasoning – i.e., collection 
and division enable us “to speak and to think” (“λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν”; Phaedrus 266b; 
see Section 1.6.3, pg. 88). In short, the Fabric and Lens models are broad enough to 
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encompass both hierarchical and non-hierarchical structures, and for this reason they 




The conceptual scheme of the genus-species tree is seen at least as far back as 
Porphyry’s Introduction. The Introduction was a standard textbook for over 1,000 years, 
and as Barnes points out, it is not a commentary on the Categories but an introduction to 
logic and philosophy in general:  
 
The Introduction is not in the least like the several ancient texts which are generally 
introductions to this or that work. In any case, Porphyry himself indicates for what 
study the Introduction provides preparatory material: not for a study of the Categories, 
but for a study of the theory of predication, and the construction of definitions, and, in 
general, matters connected with division and with proof (1.3-6). That is to say, 
Porphyry presents his essay as a preparation for the study of logic (Porphyry xv).73   
 
As will be shown below, the genus-species tree often holds sway in present-day 
interpretations of collection and division. Moreover, as will be explained below, 
Porphyry also explains how collection and division can be understood as “movements” 
along a genus-species tree. In short, Porphyry’s Introduction is relevant and worthy of 
study for two reasons: (1) over the centuries it has been influential in the study of logic 
and division, and (2) it clearly articulates underlying aspects of genus-species trees and as 
                                                 
73 Barnes argues that Porphyry’s essay serves as an introduction to logic and to philosophy, and as such it is 
“accidentally” an introduction to the Categories (“Introduction,” xv). In my view, Barnes is correct, 
although it is beyond the scope of this work to discuss in detail the textual evidence that supports his claim. 
In any case, regardless of its connection or lack thereof to the Categories, Porphyry’s Introduction is 
invaluable for a better understanding of division and logic and for clarifying the basic concepts that 
underlie genus-species trees. 
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such it is a useful text for uncovering some of the properties of these structures as 
understood in ancient times up to the present day. 
The logical structure of the genus-species tree is defined by a hierarchy of kinds 
and sub-kinds, with the more general kinds “containing” (περισχεῖν) the more specific 
ones (Introduction 5.14-17). The summum genus is the most general kind; it is all-
inclusive of the species “below” it. Each species that falls under the summum genus is 
distinguished from other species by differentia, properties that mark off and define each 
species. At the lowest level of the tree are the infima species: these are the most specific 
kinds. Beyond this level are the countless individuals that fall under the infima species. 
References to the image of a logical tree are very common in recent commentaries 
on the method of collection and division. For example, Leslie Brown describes the 
primary function of the method in the Sophist and the Statesman as locating the target to 
be defined on “one branch” of a “whole tree-structure” (154). Similarly, Constance 
Meinwald states, “I believe the Philebus should be understood in the context of Plato’s 
initiative to treat forms by giving genus-species trees: that is, to understand the kinds in 
question in accordance with the process of ‘Platonic division.’” (“The Philebus” 492). 
Likewise, Mary Louise Gill refers to a “top” and “bottom” of a “tree” when contrasting 
different modes of the method of collection and division (“Division and Definition,” 192-
3).  
One of the advantages of the Tree model is that the strict ordering of kinds and 
sub-kinds can serve as a basis for two logical operations: one for moving “up” the tree to 
the more general, and one for moving “down” the tree to the more specific. Porphyry 





μὲν οὖν εἰς τὰ εἰδικώτατα ἀνάγκη διαιροῦντας διὰ πλήθους ἰέναι, 
ἀνιόντων δὲ εἰς τὰ γενικώτατα ἀνάγκη συναιρεῖν τὸ πλῆθος εἰς ἕν· συνα- 
γωγὸν γὰρ τῶν πολλῶν εἰς μίαν φύσιν τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ γένος, 
τὰ δὲ κατὰ μέρος καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστα τοὐναντίον εἰς πλῆθος ἀεὶ διαιρεῖ τὸ (20) 
ἕν (6.16-20). 
 
So, when we are descending to the most special items, it is necessary to  
divide and to proceed through a plurality, and when we are ascending to  
the most general items, it is necessary to bring the plurality together. For  
species — and still more, genera — collect the many items into a single  
nature; whereas the particulars or singulars, in contrary fashion, always  
divide the one into a plurality (7).74  
 
In Porphyry’s scheme, ascent corresponds to collection (συναίρω), descent to division 
(διαιρέω). As one moves “up” the tree, a movement from the more specific (i.e., from the 
species) to the more general takes place. For example, one might start at the bottom of a 
tree with an infima species such as Persian cat and move up to cat, mammal, and animal. 
Similarly, as one moves “down” the tree, the reverse movement from general to specific 
takes place; e.g., one might start with the genus animal and branch off to more specific 
kinds such as mammal, then cat, and so on until an infima species such as Persian cat is 
reached. In short, “higher” corresponds to more general, “lower” to more specific. Thus, 
collection and division correspond to movements along a hierarchy of kinds. 
Another advantage of the Tree model is that it reflects natural and familiar ways 
of reasoning; more specifically, it is similar to the kind of reasoning exhibited in a family 
tree, in which a common ancestor serves as the highest point in a tree. Just like the 
individuals of a family tree, everything in a genus-species tree is in its own place: nodes 
and branches don’t overlap and each is clearly marked off from the others. 
                                                 
74 Translated after Jonathan Barnes (Porphyry 7), with modifications. 
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As will be discussed in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 below, hierarchical ordering with 
clearly demarcated elements of a logical structure does occur in illustrations of the 
method of collection and division. This can be likened to a branch that divides into two or 
more smaller branches. To the extent that these relations occur, the genus-species tree is 
an adequate model for describing a framework produced by collection and division. 
However, I will argue below that it is overly restrictive; i.e., it does not allow for other 




The image of a framework as a woven fabric is promulgated by Julius Moravcsik 
and Laura W. Grams. In her article, “The Eleatic Visitor’s Method of Division,” Grams 
argues against the model of the genus-species tree: “Rather than producing a branching, 
hierarchical tree of kinds, the procedure of diairesis is analogous to unravelling 
individual threads from a messy knot and then weaving the related strands back together” 
(131). She notes that the weaving metaphor is drawn from the paradigm of weaving 
illustrated in the Statesman (Grams 131). Grams states that the analogy of weaving in this 
dialogue is used to show how statesmanship can be clearly separated from similar fields 
of conduct (131). 
Grams argues that in some cases, division separates overlapping pairs of kinds 
(130). For example, at 225c in the Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger separates the art of 
contradiction (ἀντιλογικός) into skilled and unskilled forms of arguing, the latter being a 
form practiced by the non-expert. However, the art of contradiction is one of the sub-
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divisions of expertise (τέχνη), the starting point of the divisions. Under the genus-species 
model, unskilled arguing, since it belongs to the non-expert, should be excluded from 
τέχνη and its sub-divisions, including the art of contradiction. Similarly, at 222d wage-
earning (μισθαρνητικός) and gift-giving (δωροφορικός) appear in subsequent divisions of 
conquering, but wage-earning and gift-giving are forms of exchange as opposed to 
conquering (219d; Grams 133). Under the genus-species model, exchange and 
conquering are mutually exclusive; as forms of exchange, wage-earning and gift-giving 
would be excluded in the hierarchy of kinds that fall under conquering.  
Regarding these seemingly contradictory relations, Grams argues:  
 
This is not a difficulty for the weaving model of division, since it rejects the idea that 
exchanging and conquering are exclusive opposites. Instead, the intensions of 
exchanging and conquering are distinguished from one another on the grounds that 
one is agreeable while the other is accomplished by force, but their extensions overlap 
insofar as many distinct activities may be accomplished through either mutual 
agreement or force (134).  
 
Thus, intensionally, the concepts of exchanging and conquering are mutually exclusive. 
More specifically, exchanging is distinguished by the fact that it is agreeable, while 
conquering is not agreeable but instead takes by force (219d; Grams 133). Thus, the 
meanings of these two concepts are mutually exclusive: one is an activity based on 
agreement, the other is not.  But in terms of their extension – i.e., in terms of the instances 
of these activities – exchange and conquering are not mutually exclusive. For example, 
an instance of gift-giving may be a way of hunting and capturing a lover – i.e., not an 
agreeable exchange but a way of trapping one’s beloved by means of gifts (222e). As 
Grams points out, a sophist can “conquer” by means of offering gifts to the young men 
that he hunts, just as a lover can “conquer” by offering gifts to the beloved (134). In this 
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case, the activity of gift-giving is a form of hunting and therefore conquering. On the 
other hand, gift-giving may be part of an agreeable transaction; e.g., one may give a gift 
only with the expectation of gratitude in return, in which case gift-giving is not a form of 
conquering but exchange (cf. 219d; Grams 133). In short, instances of the same kind of 
activity (gift-giving) are not restricted to either exchanging or conquering; instead, gift- 
giving overlaps both kinds of acquisition; i.e., some instances of gift-giving are forms of 
exchange, some are forms of conquering. Thus, through division a structure based on 
relations of overlap, as opposed to a hierarchy of mutually-exclusive kinds, is defined. 
Grams emphasizes that hierarchical relations often do occur in a series of divisions, but 
certainly not in every case, and the hierarchical model fails to account for seemingly 
contradictory divisions that can be explained through a model that accommodates 
overlapping parts or kinds (142). 
Grams notes that the weaving metaphor was partly inspired by Moravcsik’s 
remark that division produces something like a “quilt pattern” (131). Moravcsik too 
emphasizes that division is not restricted to hierarchical relations – instead, overlapping 
parts and kinds are not uncommon in division. This interpretation is based on the fact that 
divisions of the same whole do not always yield the same parts. For example, Moravcsik 
states that in the Sophist, Art (τέχνη) is divided into the acquisitive and the productive, 
while in the Statesman, Art is divided into the theoretical and practical (Plato and 
Platonism 217). He argues that the two differing divisions of the same thing “gives us 
cross-classification, or even more complicated structures” (Moravcsik, Plato and 
Platonism 216). Sophistry and the arts are “multi-faceted,” and there is no single, 
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definitive division that is the only “natural” way to divide them (Moravcsik, Plato and 
Platonism 216-217).  
Like Grams, Moravcsik contrasts division with Aristotelian classification, and 
argues that the latter model is restricted to non-overlapping species and hierarchies of 
genera (Plato and Platonism 217). In short, “we should not think of the divisions as 
giving Aristotelian structures ... Rather, we should think of the parts as overlapping, 
crisscrossing, yielding a conceptual quilt, articulating the complexity of the generic Form 
and also the different facets of the specific technē to be delineated.” (Moravcsik, Plato 
and Platonism 217). Unlike the Platonic model of division, Aristotelian classifications 
based on genus-species hierarchies yield ontological “tree” structures; thus, dividing 
animals into mammals and non-mammals, for example, or into birds and insects, does not 
yield the “cross-classifications” seen in Platonic division, where one kind can be divided 
in one of several different ways.  
Under Moravcsik’s model, since a target to be defined, such as the sophist, is 
multi-faceted – i.e., since there is no single, definitive representation or formula that 
integrates only one set of essential properties – multiple definitions of the same thing are 
permissible in the Platonic scheme. These are not definitions in the usual sense of the 
word – i.e., instead of one “definitive” characterization for each object of inquiry, an 
object may have multiple definitions each of which sufficiently distinguish it from others. 
In other words, often there are several unique characterizations of the same thing, any one 
of which will serve as a definition, though some characterizations may be more revealing 
than others. To use one of Moravcsik’s examples, any given natural number can be 
characterized in multiple ways by distinguishing the kinds of number under which it falls 
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and its relations to other numbers (“Plato’s Method of Division” 166). Thus, the number 
2 can be characterized as the lowest even number, the successor of 1, or one half of 4, for 
example (Moravcsik, “Plato’s Method of Division” 165). In short, the idea of a definition 
in the traditional sense does not hold in Platonic division: 
 
... just as some true characterizations of number are more revealing than others, so 
some characterizations of sophistry, i.e. those that include a full analysis of deceit and 
meaningful falsehood, are more revealing ...The existence of a plurality of divisions is 
in no way an argument against their being grounded in reality. Only if we insist, 
anachronistically, that by ‘logos’ Plato must mean ‘definition’ in the modern sense 
does it seem implausible that several divisions of statesmanship should be reflecting 
reality. Plato, however, did not operate with the modern dictionary-type definitions 
(Moravcsik, “Plato’s Method of Division” 166)  
 
Like Grams, Moravcsik observes that biological hierarchies are produced by the method 
of division (Plato and Platonism 217), but he is more interested in contrasting Platonic 
division with Aristotelian classification than in pointing out its similarities. He states that 
“Classifications come in many sizes and shapes. In biology and some of the other natural 
sciences, tree-like structures are useful for understanding relations between kinds and 
sub-kinds.” (Moravcsik, Plato and Platonism 219). However, Platonic division covers a 
much wider ground, where arts, number, and sound are divided, for example (Moravcsik, 
Plato and Platonism 215). To Moravcsik’s list of examples may be added the division of 
madness into the human and the divine (Phaedrus 265a); the division of all activities into 
two general kinds, combination and separation (Statesman 282b); and the division of 
political constitutions into various aspects such as poverty and wealth and force and 
consent (Statesman 291e-292a; see also Appendix A 47). Why should the definitional 
scheme of a genus-species hierarchy hold sway in these cases? Here, as in Grams’ model, 
the cross-classifications and overlapping kinds of the “quilt” model play a useful role.  
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In conclusion, the advantage of the ‘woven fabric’ and ‘quilt’ models is that they 
are not tied to a strict genus-species hierarchy. These models respect the fact that 
collection and division have a wide scope. More specifically, if collection and division 
underlie everyday reasoning – i.e., if they enable us “to speak and to think” (“λέγειν τε 
καὶ φρονεῖν”; Phaedrus 266b), they would have to have a wide scope: people think 
outside of the genus-species tree all the time, and this is to be expected because reality is 
not always so neatly divided. As such collection and division are more inclusive of 
different kinds of reasoning, and the image of overlapping, criss-crossing threads takes 




The lens metaphor is described by Kenneth Sayre in Plato's Analytic Method. 
Sayre argues that a combination of Forms, not a hierarchical genus-species structure, 
yields a definition in the Platonic sense. He explains his interpretation using an example 
from the Sophist, where the definition of the angler comprises Art, Acquirer, Captor, and 
other Forms corresponding to properties of the angler. A key difference between Sayre’s 
model and the genus-species tree is that the former is based on symmetric relations 
between Forms, not a hierarchy of genera and species. Sayre argues that “there is no 
relationship of decreasing generality built into the ordering of the properties in Plato’s 
division leading to the Angler.” (Plato's Analytic Method 191). Thus, the concept of a 




There is no reason why, in the first place, if a genus must be found in Plato’s 
definition of the Angler, that genus might not be either Acquirer or Captor instead of 
Artisan. It is as appropriate to say of an angler that he is an acquirer or that he is a 
captor as to say that he is an artisan. An angler, among other artisans, is acquisitive, 
hence an acquisitive artisan; but an angler is no less an artisan among acquirers, hence 
an artful acquirer. In the same sense he is no less an artisan who captures than a 
captor who employs artful means (Sayre, Plato's Analytic Method 190). 
 
On the other hand, Sayre’s model does allow for hierarchical relations of the kind seen in 
the genus-species tree, and these relations are not uncommon in division. However, 
where hierarchical relations do occur, they occur incidentally (Sayre, Plato's Analytic 
Method 197); the primary relation that governs division is that of the symmetric 
combination of Forms. In other words, if Form A combines with Form B, then Form B 
combines with Form A. This relation is in marked contrast to what Sayre calls the 
“Aristotelian model,” where relations are antisymmetric: if A is a species of B, B is not a 
species of A (Plato's Analytic Method 190). 
Sayre argues that class intersection is a “more felicitous model” for understanding 
the relationship among Forms in a Platonic definition (Plato's Analytic Method 202). In 
general, a Form A will combine only with a subset of other Forms, Form B with another 
subset, and so on. The result is that Form A will combine with more Forms than the pair 
of Forms A and B together, and similarly, A and B will combine with more Forms than A, 
B, and C together (Sayre, Plato's Analytic Method 202). In short, each Form that is added 
to a combination of other Forms narrows down the concept that reflects the combination. 
Sayre uses the image of a window or lens to explain this process: 
 
According to this model, then, any grouping of Forms might be conceived as 
providing a “window” through which some but not all other Forms can be 
“viewed.” ... Perhaps the metaphor of a lens would be even more helpful, for then we 
could think of a given group of Forms as providing a unique focus under which only 
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some other Forms come into view. The more Forms in general entering into the 
“lens,” at least up to a certain point, the fewer other Forms stand sharply in view at its 
focal point ... the function of a dialectical division is to bring together just those 
Forms and only those Forms which in combination articulate uniquely the nature of 
the thing or Form to be defined (Plato's Analytic Method 203). 
 
Thus, under this model, a definition produced by collection and division is constructed by 
combining Forms iteratively, with each combination serving as a focal point that brings 
into view a subset of overlapping Forms. Forms are combined successively over each 
stage of a division and the focal point is gradually refined. The end result is a 
combination of Forms that converges onto a definition. 
Sayre notes that Cherniss argued convincingly against hierarchical models of 
division (Plato's Analytic Method 192), and there is a great deal of similarity between 
Cherniss’ interpretation of division and Sayre’s model. For Cherniss, division has nothing 
to do with genus and species. He states that “Nor does Plato anywhere make the 
distinction of genus and species among the ideas; but what Aristotle calls genus, 
differentia, and species are for him all distinct ideal units...” (Cherniss, Riddle of the 
Early Academy 54). The “ideal units” that Cherniss refers to are the highest kinds of the 
Sophist, such as “Identity” and “Difference” (Riddle of the Early Academy 54). Unlike 
genus-species relations these do not produce hierarchical structures; rather, as in Sayre’s 
model, ideas relate to each other symmetrically, and the appropriate terms for Cherniss 
are “blending” and “communion” as opposed to containment (Riddle of the Early 
Academy 54). Thus, unlike a genus-species relation, which is antisymmetric, if an idea A 
blends or communes with another idea, B, then B also blends or communes with A. For 




Plato could not, then, have intended by the use of diaeresis to produce an ontological 
hierarchy of the world of ideas. The Sophist and Politicus, which have come to be 
considered as handbooks of diaeresis, show that he meant it rather to be a heuristic 
method, an instrument to facilitate the search for a definite idea, the distinction of that 
idea from other ideas, and its implications and identification ... He describes it as a 
useful means of narrowing the field of search (Riddle of the Early Academy 54-55).  
 
Cherniss also states that diaeresis is “a process the stages of which are important rather as 
a safeguard to insure the right direction of the search than as representative of necessary 
ingredients of the idea,” and he points out that “longer” and “shorter” roads can lead to 
the same conclusion (Riddle of the Early Academy 55).  
The strength of Sayre’s model is that it is not encumbered by the Aristotelian 
model. It is broader than the latter in that it allows for strict hierarchical relations, but 
these are not required. Symmetric relations, including overlapping relations, are 
compatible with this model. Moreover, Sayre’s model highlights the fact that the starting 
point of an inquiry is not necessarily a most general kind – i.e., a summum genus. In fact, 
there may be multiple starting points for a given inquiry, each of which may lead to the 
same conclusion. Thus, when Sayre argues that one may start either with Art or 
Acquisition and achieve the same results, he removes the problem of how to identify the 




In Plato’s Individuals, M.M. McCabe offers a different model for understanding 
collection and division, “the mesh of identity.” In this model, a universal is understood as 
if it were an individual item located within a specific context. For example, consider 
Pasqualoni 171 
 
speech and music. Collection and division articulate what McCabe calls “individual 
sound universals” (247) – i.e., not particular instances of sound, but rather discrete, well-
defined types of sound, such as the letter ‘a’ or the musical note ‘C.’ Even though ‘a’ and 
‘C’ are types of sound, each can be treated as an individual in the sense that each type of 
sound occupies one “place” within a specific context (247). For example, each musical 
note has its own location relative to other notes in the context of the musical scale.  Here 
is an example of how McCabe understands this model, using an example from the 
Philebus, where the method is applied to music:  
 
Music is structured, essentially, because music is about the relations between one note 
and another. Furthermore, each note only is the note it is because of its place on the 
scale, its position within the structure ... Music, like speech, is the context within 
which individual notes and sounds (middle C, D flat, “s,” “b”) find their determinate 
place (247). 
  
Thus, McCabe emphasizes the role of placement in collection and division. More 
specifically, the location of an item relative to other items in the same conceptual scheme 
is one determinant of its identity.   
Without the method of collection and division, human speech and musical sound 
are perceived as being “indefinite” or “indeterminate” (ἄπειρον) (McCabe 246). But 
because collection and division “bring limit to the unlimited,” individual sound types 
(e.g., a letter type such as ‘a’ or ‘b,’ or a musical note such as C or D) can be 
differentiated and placed within a context (McCabe 246-247). The “context” can be 
understood as a continuum (spoken sound in one case, pitch in another) in which 
different letters and notes each have their own “fixed place” relative to the others 
(McCabe 253). This interpretation applies not only to universals such as sound types but 
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also to physical, concrete objects, each of which can be understood as having its own set 
of spatio-temporal coordinates (253). McCabe extends her argument to concrete objects 
as follows: 
 
Being something or other is determined by the context in which the something [sic] 
occurs; that is, its relations to other items and their relation to it. It is, then, on a 
continuum; and it is (to be an individual) at a fixed place on that continuum. Imagine 
this in the most abstract terms – the continuum might be space/time; the limit on the 
continuum will be the coordinates that individuate a particular object. And the 
combination of the two (spatio-temporal coordinates) will allow us to identify and to 
count each individual particular thus determined. (253). 
  
McCabe is not making the anachronistic claim that Plato had applied the concept of 
spatio-temporal coordinates in his illustrations of the method. Rather, there are analogous 
concepts found in Plato’s illustrations of the method of collection and division; e.g., just 
as pitch can be seen as a continuum in which notes are placed, as described in the 
Philebus, so too can space and time be seen as a continuum in which physical objects 
have determinate locations.  
In my view, the Mesh model is flawed because it fails to account for the overlap 
relation. For example, not all letters of the alphabet are discrete, non-overlapping items, 
where each is in its own determinate “place” within a context. In other words, while one 
can argue that musical notes are arranged in such a fashion, this is not the case with 
letters. Thus, while the notes C and D, for example, each have their own (i.e., non-
overlapping) locations on the musical scale, this is not the case with the letters ‘α’ and 
‘ο,’ to use a parallel example. Rather, ‘α’ and ‘ο’ overlap in the sense that phonetically 
they are similar. More specifically, while they have differences in pronunciation they also 
have similarities, and within the vowels they do not have their own positions on a well-
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ordered ‘scale,’ as musical notes do. In a similar vein, how would McCabe’s argument 
apply to universals such as Art and Acquisition? Sayre argues convincingly that these 
concepts overlap – i.e., they do not occupy a “fixed place” in a context as if they were 
notes in a musical scale or physical individuals with spatio-temporal coordinates; rather, 




The four models discussed above75 exhibit two tendencies in understanding 
collection and division: 
 
1. One tendency reflects the need for a clear picture of the method of collection and 
division in line with traditional (i.e., Aristotelian) terminology. This picture clarifies 
both how the method works and the rules by which it operates. In this case, the genus-
species tree is a suitable model. If the method produces a logical “tree” – i.e., a 
hierarchy of containment relations without overlapping species, with everything in its 
proper place – the logical structures produced by the method can be understood as 
providing clarity and definition to the elements it subsumes.  
 
                                                 
75  Stepping back to look at the bigger picture, it is worth noting that the construction of post-Platonic 
models for representing the logical structures of collection and division also reflects the three operations. 
The four models indicate that interpretations of collection and division can be divided into kinds, the names 
‘Tree,’ ‘Fabric,’ ‘Lens,’ and ‘Mesh’ demarcate each kind and indicate their contents, and each kind can be 
‘placed’ into broader kinds (e.g., those that restrict collection and division to hierarchical structures, and 




2. The opposite tendency reflects the desire to break free of what appears to be a 
model for rigid taxonomical systems, a model that seems more fitting in the sciences 
of biology and zoology as opposed to logic and philosophy. In this case, models 
which allow for overlapping parts and multiple characterizations of the same kind or 
object are useful.  
 
The second tendency articulates models which are broader in scope because they allow 
for the possibility of genus-species structures within a framework. However, the 
possibility of overlapping relations comes only at the price of clarity. How can there be 
definition if there is overlap, given that definition in the traditional sense of the word is a 
kind of demarcation? In terms of concrete particulars, how can an organism be counted as 
one individual if two or more organisms can occupy the same space? In short, the 
symmetric and overlapping relations permitted by the Fabric and Lens models call into 
question the supposed clarity that the method of collection and division produces.  
However, there may be reasons other than an apparent lack of clarity for favoring 
the hierarchical tree model. Peter Simons observes that in general, in human thought 
there is a tendency to avoid relations of “proper overlap” in which individuals overlap, 
but neither is a proper part of the other: 
      
There appears to be a certain conceptual uneasiness about proper overlapping. This 
might be connected with its abnormality for human beings (as a permanent state – the 
mother-foetus case is quite normal), but may be more general. We readily accept 
stateless tracts of sea between nations, but the idea of two nations’ having overlapping 
territories is most uncomfortable for more than one reason. There appears to be a 
general tendency to draw conceptual boundaries, cast concepts of physical things and 
events in such a way that for most practical purposes proper overlapping is avoided 




Thus, it may be the case that hierarchical structures are favoured for psychological or 
perhaps “anthropological” reasons (Simons, Parts: A Study in Ontology 12) as opposed to 
purely conceptual or logical ones. Furthermore, the relation of proper overlap, unlike that 
of proper parts, is not transitive. More specifically, while a transitive relation between 
proper parts is the basis of Barbara (e.g., if A is a proper part of B, and B is a proper part 
of C, then A is a proper part of C), overlapping parts fail in this regard. This will be 
explained in more detail in Section 4.4.3 (pg. 211).  
While clarity is one of the advantages of the hierarchical model, in my view it is 
overly simplistic. Grams, Moravcsik, and Sayre are correct to point out that the 
illustrations of collection and division clearly indicate that in some cases, collection and 
division articulate non-hierarchical relations. As explained in Section 3.2.2 above, the 
division of Number into Odd and Even is just one example that shows that genus-species 
relations – i.e., a “tree” or hierarchy – are not the sole province of collection and division. 
In general, it is odd to try to restrict collection and division – that which allows us “to 
speak and to think” (“λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν”; Phaedrus 266b) – to a form of reasoning in 
which hierarchical relations are a requirement. As discussed in Section 1.6.3, collection 
and division have a very wide scope, even when they are applied as a skill-based 
procedure; the method is useful in all the arts (Philebus 16b).  
Thus, the genus-species tree is one of several possible results of collection and 
division. It is very useful in understanding a subset of the divisions that are illustrated in 
the dialogues. But it can also be misleading: in general, the concepts summum genus and 
infima species – i.e., the notions of “highest” and “lowest” points on a logical structure – 
are artefacts or side-effects of images represented by the idea of a genus-species 
Pasqualoni 176 
 
hierarchy. It makes sense to say that a physical tree has “highest” and “lowest” points, 
but why should this be the case for structures defined by collection and division which 
may or may not include genus-species relations? Understanding a framework produced 
by the method in terms of only one kind of relation can generate false questions. For 
example, in his article “Platonic Diairesis,” James Philip’s description of the method of 
division as seen in the Sophist is replete with spatial metaphors that reflect the Tree 
model: 
 
To sum up, the first step in the procedure [of division] is to move upwards from the 
definiendum to its summum genus. Though it is suggested that this occurs by a sort of 
synopsis – by an over-all survey of similars and dissimilars – no formal procedure is 
prescribed, and it would appear that we are to see or intuit. The sophist practises a 
skilled activity, and all activities involving peculiar skills are to be subsumed under 
the genus technê. It may be that Plato considered this a practical and adequate 
solution. In any case we are not told how he would proceed if technê had to be 
defined and so subsumed under a yet higher genus. Nor indeed are we told whether 
we would eventually arrive at an ultimate summum genus or summa genera, nor 
whether there are (highest) genera that are not definable (349).  
 
This interpretation of Platonic division is not very different from that of another recent 
commentator on division, Constance Meinwald: 
 
For us today it may be easiest to catch onto the idea [of Platonic division] by thinking 
of the program of Linnaeus. We can think of such a scheme as starting with a genus 
and producing its species by adding differentiae, then adding differentiae to each 
species, and so on until lowest kinds are reached. An account, or real definition, of 
each of the lower kinds is then available via genus and differentia(e)…The totality of 
such genus-species structures would map out the underlying structure of reality (“The 
Philebus” 492).  
 
In the first passage, Philip questions how the “highest” genera are to be 
determined. In the second passage, Meinwald states that a series of divisions ends with 
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the “lowest kinds.”76 The question of how to find the summum genus or the “highest” 
point (and similarly the question of where the “lowest” species is to be found) does make 
sense in the Porphyrian tree model, but if a framework is understood as a “woven fabric” 
with overlapping threads, or a “lens” that brings into view a community of overlapping 
Forms, questions that concern “highest” and “lowest” points are misleading. This is not 
to say that such questions are always misleading – there clearly are instances where a 
framework defines a hierarchy not unlike a genus-species tree. But the method of 
collection and division often works differently. Moreover, in ancient times the image of a 
hierarchical “tree” was not the only way to understand genus-species relations. At 1.18 – 
2.13 in the Introduction Porphyry points out that the term “genus” (γένος) had three 
primary meanings: 
 
1. A family related to one ancestor 
2. The origin of someone’s birth – either a person or place 
                                                 
76 It is important to note that not all commentators share Meinwald’s interpretation. For example, Tuominen 
states that in both Plato and Aristotle, a search for a definition begins not with reasoning from the “top” to 
the “bottom” of a tree, but rather one begins with the subject under consideration (e.g., the number three) 
and then considers the genus to which it belongs (e.g., number) (Tuominen, “Apprehension and Argument” 
65-66). To illustrate this, consider one of Aristotle’s examples from the Posterior Analytics, where 
reasoning about magnanimity (μεγαλοψυχία) is discussed (2.13 97b16–27). Tuominen argues that 
Aristotle’s approach in this case resembles the method of collection and division: 
 
The example bears a strong resemblance to Plato’s analysis of love by collection and division in the 
Phaedrus ... Both in the Phaedrus and in Aristotle’s example some phenomena are first located under a 
more general type. In the Phaedrus love is taken to be a kind of madness, in Aristotle’s example 
Alcibiades, Achilleus and Ajax as well as Lysander and Socrates are recognised as magnanimous men 
(“Apprehension and Argument” 66). 
 
Thus, there is a movement from the phenomena under consideration to a more general type; i.e., from love 
to madness in the first case, and from individuals such as Alcibiades and Achilleus to magnamanity in the 
second. There is then a “downward” movement and the procedure ultimately yields a definition of the 
subject under consideration. A similar analysis of the procedure is described by James Lennox: one begins 
with the phenomenon being investigated, then considers the properties that belong to the kind under which 
the phenomenon is subsumed, and then with a “downward movement” the reasoner ultimately formulates a 
conclusion about the subject under consideration (98-99).  
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3. That under which a species is ordered (3-4) 
 
At 2.14 Porphyry states that the third meaning is of interest to philosophers (4), but the 
other meanings are also pertinent. For example, the second definition tells us that a genus 
can be a geographic point of origin. The image of a geographic origin frees us from the 
scheme in which the “highest” and “lowest” serve as endpoints of a logical structure (as 
with, for example, the summum genus and the infima species), or where “containment” is 
the primary relation. Rather, just as Athens, for example, connects to other locations 
through a network of roads, a framework can be seen as a set of non-hierarchical relations 
between different points on a logical structure. Under this model, a node in a network of 
kinds would branch out in many directions, just as Athens branches out to many other 
nodes (cities). Thus, starting at Athens, one can trace out paths such as Athens – Corinth 
– Sparta, Athens – Corinth – Arcadia, Athens – Boetia – Epirus, etc. Similarly, returning 
to Griswold’s map of madness in figure 1, one does not have to start at the “top” with 
madness and work one’s way down, instead, one can trace out other routes such as Erotic 
– Prophetic – Divine or Erotic – Divine – Madness. Under these models, various 
combinations of overlapping Forms may be articulated, just as a geographic route can 
comprise various combinations of roads and places. 
 Porphyry’s first definition in the list above, a family related to one ancestor, is 
also of interest. It will be explained in Section 5.4.2 (pg. 258) that γένος and εἶδος can 
refer to an individual as well as a species in both Plato and Aristotle. It will be argued 
that reasoning about a γένος or εἶδος does not always involve reasoning about universals 
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– i.e., collection and division are amenable to reasoning about individuals and lineages in 
addition to universals and genus-species trees.   
In conclusion, in my view both the Fabric and Lens models most accurately depict 
the structures produced by collection and division. The advantage of the latter is that 
Sayre clearly shows how a search can, step-by-step, arrive at its object: overlapping 
Forms provide the means by which a search is narrowed down to its target. Sayre also 
clearly explains how symmetric relations are defined through collection and division. On 
the other hand, the models presented by Grams and Moravcsik clearly show how there 
may be multiple characterizations of the same object. Moravcsik’s example of how a 
natural number can be defined in multiple ways states this point clearly. This supports the 
claims made by commentators such as Griswold who argue that there is more than one 
way to divide the same thing (see Section 1.2.1, pg. 21). However, regardless of the 
particular merits of the Fabric and Lens models, I believe that the most important 
consideration in the evaluation of these models is the following: does a model allow for 
the possibility that non-hierarchical relations can be defined through collection and 
division? In other words, if a model is compatible with both genus-species trees as well 
as other structures, then this is the deciding factor. To state the case negatively, models 
that restrict collection and division to hierarchical structures require an interpretation of 
the dialogues that is too narrow, as Grams, Moravcsik, and Sayre have convincingly 
argued. McCabe’s interpretation is strong in this regard, but as I have argued above, it is 
undermined by the fact that it does not account for the overlap relation. In short, 
interpretations that consistently account for the diversity of structures seen in the 
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dialogues are the strongest. For this reason I believe that both the Fabric and Lens models 
most accurately represent collection and division. 
 
3.3 Two Perspectives on a Framework 
 
For frameworks that define persons or representative individuals (e.g. the sophist, 
the statesman), two points of view may be compared. One is that of a philosopher or 
logician carrying out the method of collection and division, the other is that of the person 
being defined, i.e. the “target” of a definition, such as a sophist. Thus, there are two 
perspectives to consider: on the one hand, there is the viewpoint of one who applies 
collection and division, on the other, there is the viewpoint of the individual being 
defined – i.e., the person or kind of person to which collection and division are applied.77 
More specifically, both the sophist and the statesman are defined and pictured by the 
Eleatic Stranger – we can think of this as the difference between a portrait artist on the 
one hand, and the subject of the portrait on the other; i.e., one can be a target as well as a 
practitioner of collection and division. In the former case, how can a person reason his or 
her way out of a “portrait” or “definition” produced by another through collection and 
division? For example, how might a sophist respond to any of the seven definitions 
produced by the Eleatic Stranger using collection and division (see Appendix B 2-9)? It 
will be argued below that the target can overturn an established definition by locating 
                                                 
77 A distinction that parallels the two perspectives is made in the Phaedrus, where Socrates states “δεῖ οὖν 
πρῶτον ψυχῆς φύσεως πέρι θείας τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ἰδόντα πάθη τε καὶ ἔργα τἀληθὲς νοῆσαι” (“First, we 
must understand  the truth about the nature of the soul, divine or human, by examining what it does and 
what is done to it.” ; 245c). This remark raises two questions in regards to collection and division: how can 
one act – i.e., reason – through collection and division, and conversely how is one acted upon by others 
who use collection and division? The discussion above will focus on the second question. 
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errors in the construction of the framework – i.e., structural defects in a framework can be 
recognized, allowing the one defined to overturn the definition or classification. Below, 
two examples that illustrate the concept of being the target of a framework will be 
discussed, the sophist and a foreigner who is defined as a slave. 
At 235b in the Sophist, reasoning (‘λόγος’) is depicted as an instrument for 
encircling something that is difficult to capture – i.e., for placing limits around that which 
appears to be tenuous, vague, shadowy, or indefinable. More specifically, reasoning is 
employed in order to contain the sophist. In this passage, the Eleatic Stranger says “Ἄγε 
δή, νῦν ἡμέτερον ἔργον ἤδη τὸν θῆρα μηκέτ’ ἀνεῖναι · σχεδὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν περιειλήφαμεν 
ἐν ἀμφιβληστρικῷ τινι τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀργάνων, ὥστε οὐκέτ’ 
ἐκφεύξεται τόδε γε.” (“Well, now it’s our job not to let the beast escape. We’ve almost 
hemmed him in with one of those net-like devices that reasoning provides for things like 
this.”78). Here, a “net-like device” is implemented through the method, and it is used to 
contain something that seems uncontrollable. Indeed, because the sophist is accused of 
having an infinite (“ἀπεράντων”) supply of tricks – i.e., countless arguments and counter-
arguments – in which to elude and refute his opponents (241c), it is deemed necessary to 
find some way of encircling – i.e. placing limits around – him. Thus, by defining the 
sophist through the method he is contained, marked off and separated from others. At the 
end of the dialogue, the Eleatic Stranger “binds” or “ties together” (συνδήσομεν) the 
sophist’s name into the final definition (268c).  
There are at least two ways in which a target can respond to a definition. One is to 
reason deductively, to try to prove a definition wrong. Stepping away from the example 
of the sophist for a moment, consider Aristotle’s claim in the Politics that barbarians are 
                                                 
78 Translated after Nicholas P. White (Plato 255), with modifications 
Pasqualoni 182 
 
natural slaves (1.1252b). Assume that a barbarian such as a Lydian needs to face a 
deductive “argument” based on a syllogism of the traditional form such as the following: 
 
All Lydians are barbarians 
All barbarians are natural slaves 
 
All Lydians are natural slaves 
 
In this case, a Lydian has the option of arguing deductively in turn. However, it will be 
argued in Chapter 4 that the syllogism rests on a framework produced by collection and 
division, and rather than arguing deductively to break free of the classification, the 
Lydian (or whomever is being targeted) can formulate a counter-argument by identifying 
errors in any of the three operations used to construct the framework.  
Errors in seeing are described at 284e – 285a in the Statesman. Here, “many of 
the sophisticated people” (“πολλοὶ τῶν κομψῶν”) who believe they are clever are in fact 
liable to make errors by failing to correctly see similarities and differences. More 
specifically, according to the Eleatic Stranger, they fail to observe the following 
principles: 
 
1. … ὅταν (b) μὲν τὴν τῶν πολλῶν τις πρότερον αἴσθηται κοινωνίαν,  
μὴ προαφίστασθαι πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐτῇ τὰς διαφορὰς ἴδῃ πάσας 
ὁπόσαιπερ ἐν εἴδεσι κεῖνται, τὰς δὲ αὖ παντοδαπὰς ἀνομοιό-  
τητας… (285b1-4) 
  
…the rule is that when one perceives first the community  
between the members of a group of many things, one should not desist  
until one sees in it all those differences that are located in classes79...  
                                                 





2. … ὅταν ἐν πλήθεσιν ὀφθῶσιν, μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι δυσωπού-  
μενον παύεσθαι πρὶν ἂν σύμπαντα τὰ οἰκεῖα ἐντὸς μιᾶς  (5) 
ὁμοιότητος ἕρξας γένους τινὸς οὐσίᾳ περιβάληται. (285b4-6) 
  
…when [unlikenesses] are seen in multitudes,  
one should be incapable of pulling a face and stopping before  
one has penned all the related things within one likeness and actually  
surrounded them in some real class.  
 
In the first case, an error is made if one fails to discern the real parts of a whole. 
Instead, the relevant differences are ignored and only the similarities are seen. In the 
second case, hidden similarities are not discerned – rather, only differences are seen, and 
the many instead of the whole are seen. These errors indicate how a “natural slave” can 
respond to the deduction above: it is not a matter of responding to the argument per se, 
but the divisions that define the parts of the argument – i.e., the terms of the premises. In 
this case, irrelevant similarities and differences serve as the basis for the concept of a 
natural slave. The non-Greeks have the property of not being Greek in common, yet the 
premises in the syllogism above assume a difference of nature; in short, the deduction 
rests on rotten foundations. The same form of reasoning is illustrated by the Stranger in 
the Statesman, where an intelligent crane arrogantly divides creatures into beasts and 
cranes:  
 
     ΞΕ. Τὸ δέ γε, ὦ πάντων ἀνδρειότατε, τάχ’ ἄν, εἴ που 
φρόνιμόν ἐστί τι ζῷον ἕτερον, οἷον δοκεῖ τὸ τῶν γεράνων, 
ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο, ὃ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἴσως διονομάζει καθάπερ (5) 
καὶ σύ, γεράνους μὲν ἓν γένος ἀντιτιθὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις 
καὶ σεμνῦνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτό, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα μετὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων 
συλλαβὸν εἰς ταὐτὸ οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν ἴσως θηρία προσείποι. (263d3-8) 
 
    Stranger: But indeed, my courageous friend, perhaps, if there  
is any other animal capable of thought, such as the crane appears  
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to be, or any other like creature, and it perchance gives names,  
just as you do, it might in its pride of self oppose cranes to all  
other animals, and group the rest, men included, under one head,  
calling them by one name, which might very well be that of beasts.  
So let us try to be on our guard against all that sort of thing.80 
 
Here, the crane has discerned the parts of a whole incorrectly, and uses names to establish 
a division between cranes and all other animals, human and otherwise. Hypothetically, 
once the division is established a taxonomy can be developed by defining real or 
imaginary species of crane and placing them under one side of the division, while 
developing a tree of species that encompasses all other creatures and placing it under the 
other side of the division, the side corresponding to the “non-cranes.” It would not be 
difficult for philosophers to develop taxonomies of slaves and non-slaves in the same 
fashion. The point is that the Lydian or whomever is targeted as a slave should question 
the underlying framework – the terms and their interrelations – as opposed to the 
premise-conclusion structure of the philosopher’s argument. The same goes for those 




Four models from the secondary literature that describe the results of collection 
and division were discussed. These have been dubbed ‘Tree,’ ‘Fabric,’ ‘Lens,’ and 
‘Mesh.’ Under the first model, frameworks are understood as genus-species trees; in 
other words, collection and division produce hierarchical structures, and these structures 
exclude symmetric relations between the parts of a whole. This is not the case in the 
                                                 
80 Translated after H.N. Fowler (Henderson, Philebus 27), with modifications 
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second and third models, where a framework may be defined through overlapping parts. 
In the final model, the individual in a determinate context is primary. In this case as well, 
the overlap relation is not captured. 
In my view, the second and third models, ‘Fabric’ and ‘Lens,’ most accurately 
describe the structures produced by collection and division. These models capture 
relations and structures that are not hierarchical, and for this reason they are consistent 
with many of the divisions seen in the dialogues (see Section 3.2.2). In addition, these 
models are broad enough to include the hierarchical structures which are sometimes 
defined in the illustrations of collection and division. In short, the Fabric and Lens 
models are broad enough to encompass both hierarchical and non-hierarchical structures.  
The perspective of being the target of a framework is a special case, and it raises 
some interesting problems. Rather than presenting a deductive counter-argument to 
respond to a framework based on faulty divisions, a target defined by collection and 
division would do well to identify errors in the framework that may be rooted in seeing, 









Collection and Division and Deductive Reasoning 
 
4.1 Introduction   
 
As stated in Section 1.1, the purpose of this study is to defend the thesis that 
collection and division define logical frameworks that underlie deductive and non-
deductive reasoning. Chapter 2 discussed how three operations are employed to produce 
a framework, while Chapter 3 presented the argument that collection and division 
produce both hierarchical and non-hierarchical structures. As will be argued below, these 
structures not only underlie the definitions that are articulated in dialogues such as the 
Sophist and the Statesman, they also serve as the basis for deductive systems such as the 
syllogistic.  
  This chapter will consider two opposing hypotheses: (1) collection and division 
are not the basis of deductive reasoning, and (2) collection and division are the basis of 
deductive reasoning. Section 4.2 will introduce the argument for the latter hypothesis, 
which will be developed in detail in Section 4.4. However, before the central argument is 
presented, Section 4.3 will discuss two counter-arguments in favor of the first hypothesis. 
Section 4.4 will develop the argument that collection and division define whole-part 
relations that underlie syllogistic reasoning on the one hand, and the formulation of 




4.2 Deductive reasoning and collection and division 
 
In this study, ‘deductive reasoning’ is meant to be taken as a broad term that 
comprises the formulation and study of valid arguments – thus, it encompasses formal 
and mathematical logic, including the logic of Aristotle and the Stoics. However, it is 
beyond the scope of this work to discuss the numerous deductive systems that have been 
developed since Plato’s time; rather, this chapter will discuss Aristotle's deductive system, 
the syllogistic, which is representative of a deductive system that was formulated soon 
after Plato and dominant in the following centuries up until modern times. The syllogistic 
was chosen as a representative deductive system because commentators such as Cherniss 
have argued that division was seen as the only rival system of logic when the syllogistic 
was developed (see Section 1.5.3, pg. 74), and, as will be discussed below, Aristotle 
explicitly compares division to the syllogistic. Moreover, a valid syllogism with true 
premises will yield a conclusion that is necessarily true, and this will serve as a point of 
contrast between the syllogistic and collection and division in the discussion below. 
In the Prior Analytics Aristotle compares the method of division to the syllogism, 
calling the former a “weak” or “degenerate” syllogism (Prior Analytics 1.31 46a33; see 
Section 4.3.2), and his claim raises the question as to the relation between collection and 
division and the deductive systems promulgated by Aristotle and other logicians from 
antiquity. It will be shown in Section 4.4 that a framework produced by collection and 
division can serve as the basis of a syllogism by establishing the relations between its 
terms. It does so by showing how named parts are placed relative to each other – i.e., how 
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parts of a logical whole interrelate. Without a framework, the logical relations from 
which a syllogism derives its deductive power would remain undefined. In other words, it 
is through collection and division that names and concepts are woven into a structure that 
serves as the logical basis of deductive reasoning. A set of axioms from non-extensional 
mereology will be used to derive this conclusion. In addition, Section 4.4 will show how 
non-extensional mereology can be used to formalize and clarify the structures defined by 
collection and division in dialogues such as the Sophist and the Statesman. 
 
4.3 Hypothesis: collection and division are not the basis of deductive  
      reasoning 
 
Some commentators argue that there is no connection between the method of 
collection and division and the syllogism. David Ambuel argues that “It would say too 
much to assign division a place within the Aristotelian deductive logical apparatus” (13). 
He states that “Though some have sought or seen a precursor of the syllogism in it, it is 
clear that Aristotle ... did not himself view it as such. Nor is there reason to suspect a 
connection. The syllogism will yield true conclusions from true premises. It follows 
formally upon the connection provided by the middle term” (Ambuel 13-14). Ambuel 
also states that “There is no formal derivation, and no refinement or modification of the 
method could change it into syllogistic inference” (14). However, in Section 4.4 it will be 
shown that a framework defined by collection and division – i.e., a conceptual whole 
divided into parts – serves as the basis of syllogistic reasoning.  
The purpose of this section is to discuss two other reasons for arguing that the 
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syllogistic and collection and division are unrelated. First, it can be argued that the use of 
variables distinguishes the syllogistic from other forms of reasoning. In response to this 
argument, I will argue that this is not a sufficient reason to conclude that syllogistic 
reasoning is independent of collection and division. Second, it can be argued that the fact 
that a valid syllogism will yield a conclusion that is necessarily true is another 
distinguishing mark of the syllogism. However, in response I will argue that the logical 
structure that underlies and defines the relations between the premises and the conclusion 
of a syllogistic inference is defined through collection and division. 
 
4.3.1 The syllogistic is distinguished by the use of variables 
 
Arguably, Aristotle was the first in Western history to use variables in a system of 
logic and his use of variables to explain the syllogism has been lauded by commentators 
and historians of logic (Kneale and Kneale 61). William and Martha Kneale claim that in 
both Plato and Aristotle, “generality is indicated by a rather clumsy use of pronouns or by 
examples in which it is left to the reader to see the irrelevance of the special material,” 
and that in both cases the use of variables would have given “greater clarity and 
conciseness” (61). In addition, they claim that for expressing more complicated rules, 
such as those of the syllogism, the use of variables “is almost indispensable” (Kneale and 
Kneale 61). Referring to the use of variables in the syllogistic, Bocheński remarks that 
“this is an immense discovery: the use of letters instead of constant words gave birth to 
formal logic” (69). 
A response to this argument is that historically, the use of variables is not a strict 
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requirement in systems of mathematics and logic.81 In addition, interpreting letters that 
appear in Aristotle’s Analytics as variables results in nonsensical statements. More 
specifically, if Aristotle intended letters in expressions such as “the A” (“τὸ A”) and “the 
B” (“τὸ β”) to function as variables (i.e., symbols which may be replaced by any Greek 
term), then absurdities result. This is argued by Barnes in Truth, etc.: Six Lectures on 
Ancient Logic with several examples from the Analytics. For example, consider “εἰ οὖν 
μηδενὶ τῶν B τὸ A ὑπάρχει, οὐδὲ τῶν A οὐδενὶ ὑπάρξει τὸ β.”  (“If the A holds of none 
of the Bs, then the B will hold of none of the As.”; Prior Analytics 1.25a15-16; Barnes, 
Truth 334). Barnes emphasizes that “no replacement of letters by appropriate expressions 
produces a sentence”; to illustrate his point he lists the expressions “The stone holds of 
none of the men” and “The justice holds of none of the vices” (Truth 334). He states that 
“Such monsters may be said to have the syntax of sentences; but they are not sentences—
they are nonsense.” (Barnes, Truth 334). Thus, letters in the Analytics are not used as 
variables; rather, the letter A in such formulas as ‘the A’ or ‘the item on which the A is’ 
is used as the name of a concrete and determinate predicate. An expression such as ‘the 
item on which the A is’ is exactly on par with ‘the item of which ‘aardvark’ is true of…’ 
(Barnes, Truth 335). In short, Barnes argues that letters in the Analytics are not variables; 
rather, “Aristotle's logical letters, in their central and characteristic use, are concrete and 
determinate predicate expressions” (Truth 335). While Barnes’ hypothesis concerning 
predicate expressions is open to debate, his main point still stands: Aristotle’s statements 
                                                 
81 Mathematical works are sometimes expressed in a natural language. For example, Abu Ja’far 
Muhammad ibn Mūsā al-Khwārizmī’s algebraic treatise, al-Kitāb al-mukhtaṣar fī ḥisāb al-jabr wa’l-
muqābala was the foundational work in algebra in the Islamic world (Gowers 736). Timothy Gowers 
remarks that “No algebraic symbolism is employed: everything, including numerals, is expressed in words” 
(736). So while variables may be “almost indispensable,” the history of mathematics has shown that it is 
possible to develop a system of formal reasoning without them. 
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are nonsensical if the letters are understood as variables. Moreover, it will be argued in 
the following section that it is not the use of variables but rather the idea of logical 
consequence, or in Aristotelian terms necessity (ἀνάγκη), that distinguishes the 
syllogistic as a deductive system.  
 
4.3.2 The syllogistic is distinguished by logical consequence 
 
Logical consequence – expressed by Aristotle using the concept of necessity 
(ἀνάγκη) – is a key feature because it distinguishes the syllogism as a form of deductive 
reasoning. It is because of its deductive force that the syllogistic can be understood as a 
method of proof, and Aristotle uses this feature of the syllogistic to distinguish it from 
division. In the first book of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle argues that division is a “weak 
syllogism” because “what it ought to prove, it begs.”82 (“ἔστι γὰρ ἡ διαίρεσις οἷον 
ἀσθενὴς συλλογισμός· ὃ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ δεῖξαι αἰτεῖται”; 1.31.46a33). To use Aristotle’s 
example, if one aims to define man and divides animal into two kinds, mortal and 
immortal, then the practitioner of division merely assumes that man is mortal and selects 
this as the appropriate kind. The key point is that while the assumption may be correct, it 
is only an assumption – nothing is proven and so the question is begged. A valid 
syllogism structured with the correct middle and extreme terms, on the other hand, can 
prove that man is a mortal animal provided the premises are true.  
One response to this argument is that the method of collection and division can 
provide a proof if all but one of the disjuncts that are derived from a division result in 
impossibility. Thus, if all animals are either mortal or immortal and man is an animal, 
                                                 
82 Translated by A. J. Jenkinson (cited under Aristotle, The complete works of Aristotle in Works Cited) 
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then if positing man as immortal leads to an absurdity, man necessarily is mortal. Plato 
uses this method of reasoning. For example, in the middle part of the Sophist, a set of 
three disjuncts is specified: “either everything is willing to blend, or nothing is, or some 
things are and some are not.”83 (“Καὶ μὴν ἕν γέ τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον, ἢ πάντα ἢ μηδὲν ἢ 
τὰ μὲν ἐθέλειν, τὰ δὲ μὴ συμμείγνυσθαι.”; 252e). However, the first two options are 
deemed impossible (“Καὶ μὴν τά γε δύο ἀδύνατον ηὑρέθη”; 252e), so “everyone who 
wants to give the right answer will choose the third.”84 (“Πᾶς ἄρα ὁ βουλόμενος ὀρθῶς 
ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν τριῶν θήσει.”). Here, a number is used to define and limit a 
set of disjuncts (i.e., there are exactly three possibilities); two of the disjuncts lead to 
impossibilities, so the conclusion is that the remaining disjunct must be correct.  
However, it is not clear that this way of reasoning is often seen in collection and 
division, nor is it evident that disjunction elimination in itself is an essential aspect of the 
method. On the other hand, arguably, at least some illustrations of the method can be 
understood in these terms. Thus, in the example of the angler, one posits in the first step 
that the angler practices τέχνη (Sophist 219a). In the next step, τέχνη is divided into two 
exclusive disjuncts, production and acquisition (219a-b). Once the former is ruled out, 
the angler is shown to be in the remaining disjunct, acquisition (219d), and the process 
continues. Under this reading, each division and selection of a mutually exclusive 
disjunct is a step in the inference. The conclusion of the inference is the collection of 
disjuncts that have not been eliminated.  
However, this interpretation is problematic. As discussed in Section 3.2.5 (pg. 
173), under some readings, the method allows for overlapping parts of a whole. In other 
                                                 





words, not all divisions yield mutually exclusive parts. In addition, even in cases where a 
whole is divided into non-overlapping parts, what is the procedure for reducing the 
number of possible parts into which the target can fall to only one? The process by which 
disjuncts are eliminated is unspecified, and this indicates that disjunction elimination is 
not a central part of the method of collection and division. 
Another reply to Aristotle’s criticism is to argue against the assumption that 
division in the dialogues is expected to prove anything at all. Plato did not consider the 
method of collection and division to be a method of proof. As discussed in Section 1.6.2, 
the method serves as a means of investigating, learning, and teaching, and the Phaedrus 
makes it clear that the results of the method may or may not be correct (see Section 2.2.4, 
pg. 129). In his article on Platonic division, James Philip remarks on Aristotle’s criticism 
as follows: “As there is no indication in the dialogues that Plato thought he was proving 
anything by diairesis this criticism only shows that Aristotle thought the method 
susceptible of improvement as a consequence of his discovery of the syllogism” (352). 
Philip also states that “It is ... obvious that [Plato] does not conceive of method as does 
Aristotle. He does not suggest division as a fool-proof, open-and-shut method of solving 
problems by following rules ... It is not meant to grind out ultimate truths, which are not 
for Plato in the ordinary sense communicable” (350-351). Philip is correct; in short, 
collection and division do not prove, they produce defeasible results that are open to 
further revision. The fact that the definitions produced by collection and division are 
revised in both the Statesman and the Sophist (see Appendix B 2-11) after flaws are 
discovered clearly shows that Plato was not formulating a method of proof. On the 
contrary, the amount of revisions and the emphasis on recognizing errors in the results of 
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collection and division highlight the fact that Plato was well aware that collection and 
division often lead to results that are incorrect.  
My reply to Aristotle’s criticism is as follows: division is not a kind of syllogism, 
rather, a syllogism rests on a framework that is produced by collection and division. This 
argument will be developed in Section 4.4.3.3 (pg. 219), where it will be shown that a 
framework produced by collection and division defines whole-part relations that underlie 
the four moods of the first figure. 
 
4.4 Hypothesis: collection and division are the basis of deductive  
      reasoning 
 
The aim of this section is to take the very strong claims of the Phaedrus and the 
Philebus seriously to argue that since the syllogism is a kind of reasoning it is an offshoot 
of collection and division. At Phaedrus 266b Socrates states that collection and division 
give him the ability to speak and to think (Section 1.6.3, pg. 88), and Philebus 16b states 
that “all the discoveries of the arts have been made” through the method of collection and 
division (see Section 1.6.1, pg. 83). The central claim of the argument below is this: to 
the extent that a syllogism is a form of reasoning, it rests on a framework defined through 
collection and division. 
 
4.4.1 Similarities between the syllogism and collection and division 
 
In the first book of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle defines the syllogism as follows: 
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“συλλογισμὸς δέ ἐστι λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης 
συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι.” (“A syllogism is a reasoning in which, certain things having 
been supposed, something different from the things supposed results of necessity because 
these things are so.”85; 1.2 24b18-20). Barnes refers to this passage as “Aristotle’s classic 
account of Deduction,”86 and both Barnes and Robin Smith translate the word 
‘συλλογισμὸς’ as “deduction” (Smith 2; Barnes, “Proof and the Syllogism” 23). 
Necessity (ἀνάγκη) is a key part of this definition and this distinguishes both deduction 
and the syllogistic from collection and division, but, as will be shown below, there are 
important similarities between Aristotle’s syllogistic and deductive reasoning on the one 
hand, and collection and division on the other.  
The word ‘τεθέντων’ is the passive form of ‘τίθημι.’ As argued in Section 2.2.3 (pg. 
122), this term often expresses one of the three basic operations of collection and division, 
placing. Commenting on this passage, Robin Smith states the following:  
 
Given the mathematical flavor of much of the Prior Analytics, it is probably worth 
observing in passing that the phrase ‘a discourse in which, certain things having been 
supposed’ [λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν] can be given a different interpretation: logos 
might mean ‘relationship,’ and the phrase might mean ‘a relationship such that when 
some things are put in it’ (110).  
                                                 
85 Translated by Robin Smith (Smith 2), with modifications 
 
86 In “Proof and the Syllogism,” Barnes characterizes three “logical notions” that he names ‘Inference,’ 
‘Deduction,’ and ‘Syllogism.’ According to Barnes, the Syllogism is Aristotle’s formal logic and is an 
Aristotelian innovation, while Deduction is a “semi-technical idealization of our ordinary, pre-theoretical, 
concept of inference” (“Proof and the Syllogism” 24-5). By Barnes’ own admission, Aristotle contradicts 
this scheme when he states that (using Barnes’ terminology) all Deductions are Syllogisms at 1.28 44b7-8 
(Barnes, “Proof and the Syllogism” 25), and Barnes’ interpretation has been debated in the recent literature. 
In any case, under Barnes’ reading, all Syllogisms are Deductions, and what is common to both Deductions 
and Syllogisms is the fact that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises (“Proof and the 
Syllogism” 22). In the discussion that follows, this is one of the primary differences that distinguishes the 
argument forms explicated in the Analytics from collection and division. In other words, both the syllogistic 
as a system of formal logic, and deduction in general, are distinguishable from collection and division 
because they involve logical consequence. In addition, the discussion that follows will focus on the 
syllogistic as a theory of deductive inference, as opposed to a demonstrative science in which the premises 




As explained in Section 2.2.3, the function of placing in collection and division is to 
establish relations between the parts of a whole, and this parallels the interpretation that a 
syllogism is a relationship between terms. But this parallel raises the following question: 
what method or procedure is used to formulate terms and their interrelations to begin 
with? More specifically, considering the first part of the definition of the syllogism above, 
how are premises and the terms of the premises formulated? It will be argued below that 
the limits of the parts of a whole define the terms of a syllogism, while the placement of 
terms within intervals (διαστήματα) define the premises. The following is an outline of 
the argument below: 
 
1. When many are brought into a whole, limits form between the parts of the whole 
(Parmenides 158c-d ). Collection and division articulate these limits. For example: 
collection and division establish the ‘terms’ of music by defining intervals (Philebus 
17c-d). It is because limits (i.e., intervals) are imposed on a continuum that the 
internal structure of sound is defined.  
 
2. Terms and limits play a parallel role in the syllogistic – i.e., limits between the 
parts of a whole such as a continuum define the terms of a syllogism. Aristotle 
describes terms as being placed in the premise of a syllogism as if the latter were an 
interval. 
 
3. In conclusion, the terms of a syllogism are defined through the limits between the 
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parts of a whole, and these limits are articulated through collection and division.  
 
This argument serves the purpose of showing that the formulation of a syllogism relies on 
collection and division. Hence, the argument supports the thesis that collection and 
division underlie deductive reasoning. The following discussion explains the argument in 
detail.  
If a whole has parts, then there are limits between the parts themselves and 
between the parts and the whole. This is stated in the following passage from the 
Parmenides, where Parmenides describes to Socrates the process by which parts are 
formed through the imposition of unity on the unlimited:  
 
Καὶ μὴν ἐπειδάν γε 
(d) ἓν ἕκαστον μόριον μόριον γένηται, πέρας ἤδη ἔχει πρὸς 
ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μόρια. — 
Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. — Τοῖς ἄλλοις δὴ τοῦ ἑνὸς συμβαίνει ἐκ μὲν 
τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τι 
γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ὃ δὴ πέρας παρέσχε πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἡ (5) 
δ’ ἑαυτῶν φύσις καθ’ ἑαυτὰ ἀπειρίαν (158c7-158d6). 
 
“And whenever each part comes to be one part, the parts then  
have a limit in relation to each other and in relation to the whole, and the  
whole has a limit in relation to the parts.” — “Quite so.” — “Accordingly,  
it follows for things other than the one that from the one and themselves  
gaining communion with each other, as it seems, something different comes  
to be in them, which affords a limit for them in relation to each other; but  
their own nature, by themselves, affords unlimitedness.”87 
 
This passage describes the formation of parts and the limits between them when the 
unlimited (ἄπειρον) coheres into a whole. In Verity Harte’s terms, it describes the 
formation of a “composition” or “structure” (137). In epistemological terms, conceptual 
boundaries or demarcations between the parts of a conceptual whole define the structure 
                                                 
87 Translated by Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan (Plato 390) 
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of the whole: to the extent that parts are borderless – i.e., lacking in limit – structure and 
coherence are missing. In other words, the well-defined parts of a whole – whether the 
whole is sound (φωνή) or another universal like Man or Art – define the structure of the 
whole; i.e., when the limits between the parts of a concept are defined, the internal 
structure of the concept comes to light. It is this structure which underlies deductive 
reasoning. 
It will be argued below that some of the underlying concepts of this passage from 
the Parmenides are also evident in Aristotle’s conceptualization of the syllogism. 
Moreover, there are also similarities between this passage of the Parmenides and 
descriptions of collection and division in Platonic dialogues such as the Philebus.  
The many becoming one as described in the passage from Parmenides above 
resembles the description of collection in the Phaedrus where the “scattered many” are 
seen and brought together into “one idea” (see Section 2.2.1.2, pg. 105). But the most 
striking similarity between this passage and collection and division is brought out by the 
terms ‘ἄπειρον’ and ‘πέρας.’ As discussed in Sections 1.2.4 and 2.5, the concepts of limit 
and the unlimited play a crucial role in descriptions of collection and division in the 
Philebus. The method brings the unlimited into a coherent whole, where each part is 
clearly discerned and seen in its correct place within the whole.  
In the Philebus, the “limits” between the parts of a whole are sometimes described 
using another term, ‘ὅρος.’ For example, the harmonic structure that is defined when the 
method is applied to sound is described using the expression “τοὺς ὅρους τῶν 
διαστημάτων” (“the limits of the intervals”88; 17c-d). The key word here is ‘ὅρος’ – in 
                                                 




addition to serving as a term that expresses the concept of limit in this passage, it is also 
used by the Eleatic Stranger in the Statesman, where it stands for a definitional boundary 
beyond which the statesman can be found: “Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο, ἵνα μή με φθῇς 
ἐρωτήσας τὴν βραχυτέραν ὁδὸν ἥτις τότε ἦν ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ βασιλέως ὅρον, αὐτός σοι 
πρότερον ἔλθω;” (“Then shall I now, without waiting for you to ask me, guide you of my 
own accord along that shorter way referred to a moment ago that leads to the definition of 
the king?”89; 266d-e).  
The term ‘ὅρος’ is also used later in the Statesman at 292c to mark off different 
forms of government that are distinguished through division. Merrill interprets the 
expression “τὸν ὅρον” in this passage as “the delimiting mark” between kinds of 
government (48). The idea that a “ὅρος” is a mark of some kind reflects R.M. Dancy’s 
observations on the role of this term and kindred terms such as ‘ὁρίζειν’; he states that in 
Plato’s writings, “All these words have to do originally with (spatial) boundaries” and 
remarks that the concept of a ὅρος as a metaphorical “boundary stone” is still alive in the 
Republic (23-24). Thus, the term reinforces the importance of having a clear conceptual 
boundary between two parts of a whole. Just as the perimeter of a city can be defined 
through the placement of boundary stones, a concept can be clearly distinguished and 
demarcated from a “neighboring” (i.e., similar) concept through the use of a term. An 
example of this was discussed in Section 1.3.2 (pg. 44), where the name ‘self-directing’ 
was employed to distinguish one concept from a similar but separate part of the whole. 
The term ‘ὅρος’ also plays a key role in the syllogistic because it signifies the 
“terms” of a syllogism – i.e., the middle terms and extremes. Aristotle’s definition of 
‘ὅρος’ is as follows: “Ὅρον δὲ καλῶ εἰς ὃν διαλύεται ἡ πρότασις, οἷον τό τε 
                                                 
89 Translated by H.N. Fowler (Henderson, Philebus 41) 
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κατηγορούμενον καὶ τὸ καθ’ οὗ κατηγορεῖται, προστιθεμένου [ἢ διαιρουμένου] τοῦ εἶναι 
ἢ μὴ εἶναι” (“I call that a term into which a premise may be broken up, i.e., both that 
which is predicated and that of which it is predicated (whether or not ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is 
added or divides them)”90; Prior Analytics 1.1 24b16-18). Thus, terms define the basic 
components of a premise.  
Furthermore, Aristotle refers to the premise of a syllogism as an interval 
(διάστημα), the same word used in the Philebus to designate the musical intervals that are 
articulated through collection and division (17c11). This word is used by Aristotle to 
express the idea of a statement in which terms are placed (“τεθήσεται”): “ἢ γὰρ ἔξωθεν ἢ 
εἰς τὸ μέσον τεθήσεται ὁ παρεμπίπτων ὅρος· ἀμφοτέρως δὲ συμβαίνει ἑνὶ ἐλάττω εἶναι τὰ 
διαστήματα τῶν ὅρων” (“for the term inserted will be placed either outside or in the 
middle; but in both ways it results that the intervals are one fewer than the terms, and the 
premises are equal to the intervals”91; Prior Analytics 42b8-10). The idea of an interval as 
a statement or proposition in a syllogism also occurs in the Posterior Analytics – e.g., at 
82b8 Aristotle refers to a pair of terms as a “διάστημα,” and Barnes notes that διάστημα 
in this passage stands for “proposition” (Posterior Analytics 172). Thus, the idea that 
intervals are divided by terms or limits is expressed both by Plato in his description of the 
method in the Philebus, and by Aristotle in his discussion of the syllogistic in the 
Analytics.   
Aristotle too uses the term ‘ὅρος’ in the sense of limit – more specifically, he uses 
the term to refer to a boundary between two species (εἶδος) in the following passage from 
the Physics: 
                                                 
90 Translated by Robin Smith (Smith 2) 
 




... πότε οὖν (25) 
ἕτερον τὸ εἶδος, ἐὰν ταὐτὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἢ ἂν ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ;  
καὶ τίς ὅρος; ἢ τῷ κρινοῦμεν ὅτι ταὐτὸν τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ 
γλυκὺ ἢ ἄλλο—ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ φαίνεται ἕτερον, ἢ ὅτι ὅλως 
οὐ ταὐτό; (Physics 7.4 249a25-29)    
 
When, then, is there a difference of species? If the same thing is in different 
recipients? or if different things are in different recipients? And how are we to 
define the limits of a species? What will enable us to decide that particular 
instances of whiteness or sweetness are the same or different? Is it enough that it 
appears different in one subject from what it appears in another? Or must there be  
no sameness at all?92 
 
This echoes the use of the word ‘ὅρος’ in the Philebus. In the Physics, the 
examples are color and taste, in the Philebus, the subject of division is sound; in both 
cases, the question is the same: how are we to correctly discern the parts of a continuum 
so that the internal structure of the whole – i.e., the parts of the continuum and their 
interrelations – can be defined? In the Physics, the question is, what “limits” (ὅρος) are 
there between different species (εἶδος) of whiteness and sweetness, in the Philebus, what 
“limits” are there between different parts of sound that demarcate the musical intervals? 
Similarly, in the Statesman, a conceptual limit distinguishes the statesman from others 
with which he may be similar.   
In addition, in the Analytics both the subject-predicate relation and deduction in 
general are defined in terms of wholes and parts, thus reinforcing the connection between 
the Parmenides passage quoted above and collection and division on the one hand, and 
the syllogistic on the other. In the first book of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle states “τὸ δὲ 
ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ καὶ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι θατέρου θάτερον ταὐτόν 
ἐστιν.” (“For one thing to be in another as a whole is the same as for one thing to be 
                                                 




predicated of every one of another.”93; 1.1 24b26-28). A similar parallel is stated in the 
Prior Analytics at 1.8 30a3: “...τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς ὁμοίως ἀποδώσομεν.” 
(“...we can interpret ‘being in as a whole’ and ‘predicated of all’ in the same way”94).95 
Aristotle also states in the Posterior Analytics that deduction depends on whole-part 
relations: “…ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐξ οὗ συλλογισμός ἐστιν ὃ ἂν οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥστε ἢ ὅλον πρὸς 
μέρος ἢ μέρος πρὸς ὅλον ἔχειν…” (“…but what a deduction depends on is something 
related as whole to part or part to whole”;96 1.26 87a22-23).97   
In summary, to return to the Parmenides passage above, when one is imposed on 
the many and a whole is formed, limits form between the parts. This is analogous to the 
imposition of limit on the unlimited as described in the Philebus, where the method is 
used to articulate the parts of musical sound (17c-d). In this case, indeterminate sound is 
                                                 
93 Translated by Robin Smith (Prior Analytics 2) 
 
94 Translated by Robin Smith (Prior Analytics 13) 
 
95 For example, in the Prior Analytics Aristotle defines the deductive properties of two syllogisms of the 
first figure, Barbara and Celarent, as follows:  
 
Ὅταν οὖν ὅροι τρεῖς οὕτως ἔχωσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὥστε τὸν 
ἔσχατον ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι τῷ μέσῳ καὶ τὸν μέσον ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ πρώτῳ 
ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη τῶν ἄκρων εἶναι συλλογισμὸν 
τέλειον. καλῶ δὲ μέσον μὲν ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλο (35) 
ἐν τούτῳ ἐστίν, ὃ καὶ τῇ θέσει γίνεται μέσον · ἄκρα δὲ τὸ αὐτό 
τε ἐν ἄλλῳ ὂν καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἄλλο ἐστίν. (1.4 25b32-37) 
 
Whenever, then, three terms are so related to each other that the last is in  
the middle as a whole and the middle is either in or not in the first as a  
whole, it is necessary for there to be a complete deduction of the extremes  
(I call that the middle which both is itself in another and has another in it –  
this is also middle in position – and call both that which is itself in another  
and that which has another in it extremes.)  
(translated by Robin Smith; Smith 4) 
 
Here, terms are understood as if they were “in” (“ἐν”) wholes, and their relations as parts of wholes make 
deduction possible. 
 
96 Translated after Jonathan Barnes (Posterior Analytics 41), with modifications. 
 
97 This is reinforced by remarks at Prior Analytics 1.25 42a9-12 and Posterior Analytics 2.5 92a12-13. 
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divided and defined by “ὅροι,” notes of the musical scale that demarcate the intervals, 
thereby giving form and structure to sound. The interrelated concepts of wholes and parts, 
and the role of terms and limits as described in the Parmenides and the Philebus are 
paralleled in two ways in the Analytics. First, statements or propositions in a syllogism 
are understood as “intervals” that are divided into terms (ὅροι). Second, as Verity Harte 
notes, the unlimited many yield a “structure” with the imposition of limit (137), and the 
connection between wholes and parts and structure in the Parmenides and other dialogues 
foreshadows the subject-predicate relation as defined in the Analytics, where predicates 
serve as parts of a subject. More generally, as stated above Aristotle claims that deduction 
depends on whole-part relations. Thus, regardless of whether one considers the 
statement-term or subject-predicate relation as fundamental to the syllogistic, both 
relations parallel the whole-part relation as described in the Parmenides and the Philebus. 
Furthermore, as will be shown below, a logical framework produced by collection and 
division serves as the basis of syllogistic reasoning.   
 
4.4.2 Collection and division define structures that underlie deductive  
         reasoning 
 
 The purpose of this section is to present the argument that Aristotle’s method for 
constructing syllogisms relies on the method of collection and division. After discussing 
relevant passages from the Prior Analytics and comparing them with Plato’s illustrations 
of collection and division, this section will present M. Tuominen’s observations on 
Aristotle’s method and argue that the generation of terms employed in syllogisms, and 
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the formulation of their relations, is made possible through collection and division. 
 In chapters 27-30 of the first book of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle describes a 
method (ὁδός) for constructing syllogisms. At the beginning of Chapter 27, he states the 
following: 
 
πῶς δ’ εὐπορήσομεν αὐτοὶ πρὸς τὸ τιθέμενον ἀεὶ συλλογι- (20) 
σμῶν, καὶ διὰ ποίας ὁδοῦ ληψόμεθα τὰς περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρ- 
χάς, νῦν ἤδη λεκτέον· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἴσως δεῖ τὴν γένεσιν 
θεωρεῖν τῶν συλλογισμῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν τοῦ 
ποιεῖν (1.27 43a20-24). 
 
Now it is time to explain how we may ourselves always 
be supplied with deductions about what is placed, and the route by 
which we may obtain the principles concerning any particular subject. 
For surely one ought not only study the origin of deductions, but also 
have the power to produce them.98  
 
Here, the importance of having a method for constructing syllogisms is emphasized. Such 
a method allows us to solve problems by means of formulating deductive arguments. But 
precisely how is a deduction constructed? In the same chapter of the Prior Analytics 
Aristotle states the following:  
             
(43b)    Δεῖ δὴ τὰς προτάσεις περὶ ἕκαστον οὕτως ἐκλαμβάνειν, 
ὑποθέμενον αὐτὸ πρῶτον καὶ τοὺς ὁρισμούς τε καὶ ὅσα ἴδια 
τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, εἶτα μετὰ τοῦτο ὅσα ἕπεται τῷ πρά- 
γματι, καὶ πάλιν οἷς τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀκολουθεῖ, καὶ ὅσα μὴ 
ἐνδέχεται αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν. οἷς δ’ αὐτὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεται, οὐκ (5) 
ἐκληπτέον διὰ τὸ ἀντιστρέφειν τὸ στερητικόν. διαιρετέον δὲ καὶ 
τῶν ἑπομένων ὅσα τε ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι καὶ ὅσα ἴδια καὶ ὅσα 
ὡς συμβεβηκότα κατηγορεῖται, καὶ τούτων ποῖα δοξαστικῶς 
καὶ ποῖα κατ’ ἀλήθειαν· ὅσῳ μὲν γὰρ ἂν πλειόνων τοιούτων 
εὐπορῇ τις, θᾶττον ἐντεύξεται συμπεράσματι, ὅσῳ δ’ ἂν (10) 
ἀληθεστέρων, μᾶλλον ἀποδείξει (1.27 43b1-11).                          
 
    So one must select the premises about each subject in this way,  
                                                 




first laying down the subject itself and both its boundaries and whatever  
is peculiar to the subject, next after this, whatever follows the subject; 
next, whatever the subject follows; and then, whatever cannot belong 
to it. (Those to which it is not possible for the subject to belong need 
not be selected, because the privative converts). The terms which 
follow the subject must also be divided into those which are predicated 
of it essentially, those which are peculiar to it, and those which are 
predicated incidentally. And these, again, <should be divided> into 
such as are matters of opinion and such as are according to the truth. 
For to the extent that someone is supplied with more of these, he will 
more quickly hit on a conclusion; but to the extent that he is supplied 
with more true things, the more will he demonstrate.99 
 
Here, terms that apply to the subject being studied are collected for the purpose of 
constructing a syllogism. In the first step, “ὑποθέμενον” (ὑποτίθημι) expresses the idea 
that the subject, what is peculiar to it, its boundaries (ὁρισμός), and that which it excludes 
should be laid down. The term ‘ὑποτίθημι’ is used for a similar purpose in illustrations of 
collection and division in Plato’s dialogues. For example, it is used in the Statesman to 
place nurture under a kind that differs from that of the statesman: 
 
     ΞΕ. Τὴν δὴ τῆς τροφῆς κτῆσιν, καὶ ὅσα εἰς τὸ σῶμα 
συγκαταμειγνύμενα ἑαυτῶν μέρεσι μέρη σώματος εἰς τὸ 
(a) θεραπεῦσαί τινα δύναμιν εἴληχε, λεκτέον ἕβδομον ὀνομά- 
σαντας αὐτὸ σύμπαν ἡμῶν εἶναι τροφόν, εἰ μή τι κάλλιον 
ἔχομεν ἄλλο θέσθαι· γεωργικῇ δὲ καὶ θηρευτικῇ καὶ γυμνα- 
στικῇ καὶ ἰατρικῇ καὶ μαγειρικῇ πᾶν ὑποτιθέντες ὀρθότερον 
ἀποδώσομεν ἢ τῇ πολιτικῇ (5). (288e8 – 289a5)    
 
     Stranger: Then again that sort of possession that consists in nutrition, and  
all those things which when they are blended into the body, their own  
parts with parts of the body, have a capacity for promoting its care, we  
must say is a seventh [kind], calling it all together ‘nurture,’ unless we have some  
more attractive term to propose. And if we place it under the arts of the  
farmer, the hunter, the trainer in the gymnasium, the doctor and the cook,  
we shall be assigning it more correctly than if we give it to the art of  
the statesman.100    
                                                 
99 Translated by Robin Smith (Smith 42-43), with modifications. 
 




In this passage, things that promote the care of the body are given the name ‘nurture’ 
(τροφός) and placed under (“ὑποτιθέντες”) the arts of the farmer, the hunter, the cook, etc. 
By placing nurture in a kind that differs from that of the statesman, the properties of the 
statesman become more clearly defined – i.e., he is not confused with those who are 
similar to him. As one of the three operations discussed in Chapter 2, placing, this is an 
important step in arriving at a definition since it indicates which attributes belong to the 
statesman and which do not. This parallels Aristotle’s instruction to determine which 
terms belong and which do not belong to the subject being studied (1.27 43b4-5 in the 
passage above). 
  Another passage from Chapter 30 of the Prior Analytics describes the method 
(ὁδὸς) for constructing syllogisms as follows: 
 
    Ἡ μὲν οὖν ὁδὸς κατὰ πάντων ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ περὶ φι- 
λοσοφίαν καὶ περὶ τέχνην ὁποιανοῦν καὶ μάθημα· δεῖ γὰρ 
τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει περὶ ἑκάτερον ἀθρεῖν, καὶ  (5) 
τούτων ὡς πλείστων εὐπορεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν τριῶν ὅρων 
σκοπεῖν, ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν ὡδί, κατασκευάζοντα δὲ ὡδί, 
κατὰ μὲν ἀλήθειαν ἐκ τῶν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν διαγεγραμμένων 
ὑπάρχειν, εἰς δὲ τοὺς διαλεκτικοὺς συλλογισμοὺς ἐκ τῶν κατὰ 
δόξαν προτάσεων (10). (1.30 46a3-10) 
 
    The method is the same with respect to all things, then, whether 
concerning philosophy or concerning any kind of art or study whatever. 
For one must discern the things which belong to each term and the 
things to which it belongs, and be provided with as many of them as 
possible, and examine these things through the three terms, refuting 
in this way and establishing that: <when arguing> in accordance 
with truth, <this must be> from things that have been strictly proved 
to belong in accordance with truth, but in dialectical deductions it is 
from premises according to opinion.101 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
101 Translated by Robin Smith (Smith 48), with modifications. 
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Note the universal applicability of Aristotle’s method: it is the same in all the arts and all 
areas of inquiry (“Ἡ μὲν οὖν ὁδὸς κατὰ πάντων ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ περὶ 
τέχνην ὁποιανοῦν καὶ μάθημα”). This echoes Socrates’ claim in the Philebus that it is 
through the way (ὁδὸς) of collection and division that all the discoveries of the arts are 
made (“πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόμενα ἀνηυρέθη πώποτε διὰ ταύτης φανερὰ γέγονε”; 
Philebus 16c).  
Note too that according to the passage above we must “examine” (σκοπεῖν) the 
attributes and subjects of the terms of a deduction, another key word that is used in 
illustrations of collection and division (see Section 1.6.2, pg. 85). For example, the 
following exchange between Theaetetus and the Stranger occurs in the Sophist after 
Theaetetus asks how appearance-making (φανταστικὸν) should be divided: 
 
     ΞΕ. Μιμητικὸν δὴ τοῦτο αὐτῆς προσειπόντες ἀπονειμώ- (10) 
μεθα· τὸ δ’ ἄλλο πᾶν ἀφῶμεν μαλακισθέντες καὶ παρέντες 
(b) ἑτέρῳ συναγαγεῖν τε εἰς ἓν καὶ πρέπουσαν ἐπωνυμίαν 
ἀποδοῦναί τιν’ αὐτῷ. 
     ΘΕΑΙ. Νενεμήσθω, τὸ δὲ μεθείσθω. 
     ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι διπλοῦν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἄξιον 
ἡγεῖσθαι· δι’ ἃ δέ, σκόπει. (5) 
     ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε. 
     ΞΕ. Τῶν μιμουμένων οἱ μὲν εἰδότες ὃ μιμοῦνται τοῦτο 
πράττουσιν, οἱ δ’ οὐκ εἰδότες. καίτοι τίνα μείζω διαίρεσιν 
ἀγνωσίας τε καὶ γνώσεως θήσομεν; 
     ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδεμίαν (10). (267a10-b10)  
 
     Stranger: Let’s set this part off by calling it imitation, and let’s be lazy 
and let the other part go. We’ll leave it to someone else to bring it together 
into a unit and give it a suitable name. 
     Theaetetus: All right, let’s take the one and let the other go. 
     Stranger: But the right thing, Theaetetus, is still to take imitation to have 
two parts. Think about why. 
     Theaetetus: Tell me. 
     Stranger: Some imitators know what they’re imitating and some don’t.  
And what division is more important than the one between ignorance 
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and knowledge?102  
 
Here, a part or aspect of appearance-making is given the name ‘imitation’ (‘Μιμητικὸν’). 
In turn, imitation is examined (“σκόπει”; 267b5) in order to determine its parts; in this 
case, the examination yields two aspects, one associated with ignorance and one with 
knowledge. Thus, examination can result in the discovery of the properties or parts of 
something, and this parallels the examination of attributes of terms in Aristotle’s method. 
In her article on Greek commentators’ readings of the Prior Analytics, Miira 
Tuominen describes Aristotle’s procedure as a process of collecting terms that are to 
serve as predicates: “... what Aristotle recommends us to do is to collect a list of all the 
different kinds of predicates that belong to a subject and to distinguish the way in which 
they belong: i.e. whether they belong essentially; as a peculiar property (ἴδιον); for the 
most part; or accidentally...” (“Alexander and Philoponus” 143). Commentators such as 
Alexander of Aphrodisias and Philoponus applied this procedure by collecting terms that 
can serve as predicates for ethical subjects, such as ‘good’ (‘ἀγαθόν’) and ‘pleasure’ 
(‘ἡδονή’) (Tuominen, “Alexander and Philoponus” 148). A subset of the terms can then 
serve as a means by which the premises of a syllogism can be constructed. In some cases, 
the relations between the terms were defined using a geometric structure; e.g., Philoponus 
arranged the terms as a star-shaped map (Tuominen, “Alexander and Philoponus” 149).  
According to Tuominen, both Alexander and Philoponus seem to think that the 
procedure is the same for constructing syllogisms to be employed in both dialectical and 
scientific arguments (“Alexander and Philoponus” 153). This resembles the wide scope 
of the method of collection and division. In her conclusion, Tuominen states the 
                                                 




following about this procedure: 
 
In every field of theoretical study which can be counted as a science, there is an 
intelligible structure to be found in the background, and a scientist should try to find 
out what this structure is like. For instance, if we study animals, we must pay 
attention to predicates that are shared universally among different species. In this way, 
we can group animals into larger classes that have some properties in common, 
because they share a common nature. Additionally, the fact that Alexander and 
Philoponus use an ethical example indicates that they follow Aristotle in assuming 
that there is a similar intelligible structure to be found in ethics as well (“Alexander 
and Philoponus” 153). 
 
Tuominen also observes that Aristotle’s scheme for grouping predicates does not allow 
one to determine whether a predicate belongs to a subject (“Alexander and Philoponus” 
143). Moreover she emphasizes that “Aristotle’s scheme provides us with a powerful tool 
for the production of syllogisms only on the condition that we already know all the 
relevant relations ...” (Tuominen, “Alexander and Philoponus” 143), and, as recent 
commentators have pointed out, Aristotle claims that division is useful for obtaining 
predicates. Citing Posterior Analytics 2.14, James Lennox states that divisions are useful 
“as a potentially exhaustive source of predicates from which to select appropriate 
predications” (98). Here, one starts with a general kind (e.g. animal) and by dividing it 
into sub-kinds (e.g., bird, fish), the predicates of the various sub-kinds come to light 
(Lennox 98). A similar way of reasoning is also seen in the illustrations of collection and 
division. For example, as discussed in Section 1.2.2 (pg. 26) in the Sophist the concept 
art is divided into productive and acquisitive, and the aspects of the latter (by force and 
by exchange) are revealed on further inspection. 
The collection of terms and their placement into groups or geometric shapes that 
display a logical structure bears a resemblance to the final result of collection and 
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division: a set of interwoven names that serves as a framework. It will be argued below 
that a framework can be understood as a “background structure” that underlies other 
forms of reasoning, including syllogistic reasoning. In other words, to use Tuominen’s 
terminology, the intelligible structure that reflects a “common nature” among many 
things is a framework. 
 
4.4.3 Mereological  formalizations 
 
 In this section, a system of mereology is used as a means to formalize the 
structures produced by collection and division. The basic concepts of mereology will be 
introduced below. Then, Section 4.4.3.3 will show how four moods of the first figure in 
Aristotle’s syllogistic can be derived from a logical framework defined by collection and 
division, after which Section 4.4.3.4 will formalize frameworks defined in the Sophist 
and the Statesman.  
Mereology is the study of wholes and parts, and the most basic and intuitive 
relation in mereology is that of part to whole (Simons, Parts: A Study in Ontology 9). 
Simons points out that examples of the part-whole relation “are so legion, and it is so 
basic to our conceptual scheme, that it seems almost superfluous to offer examples,” but 
the following list provided by Simons indicates the scope and ubiquity of the part-whole 
relation: a trunk is part of a tree, a roof is part of a house, a chapter is part of a novel, a 
mountain’s summit is part of the mountain, and the opening shot of a battle is part of the 
battle (Parts: A Study in Ontology 9-11). Clearly, mereology covers wide ground; 
however, since this chapter focuses on the mereological formulation of definitions and 
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the syllogistic, this section will discuss mereological relations between universals (e.g., 
courage is a part of virtue, man is a part of animal).  
Because the part-whole relation is “basic to our conceptual scheme” (Simons, 
Parts: A Study in Ontology 9-11) it is appropriate to use mereology to represent structures 
produced by collection and division – i.e., that which gives us the ability “to speak and to 
think” (Phaedrus 266b; see Section 1.6.3, pg. 88). However, there is a form of mereology 
that is incompatible with Plato’s views on wholes and parts. The standard formal theory 
of whole-part relations is classical extensional mereology, which was articulated by 
Stanislaw Leśniewski and developed into the Calculus of Individuals by Henry S. 
Leonard and Nelson Goodman (Simons, Parts: A Study in Ontology 1). Simons points 
out that extensional mereology is subject to a major criticism: it asserts the existence of 
individuals known as “mereological sums” for which we have no evidence outside of the 
theory of extensional mereology itself (Parts: A Study in Ontology 1). A mereological 
sum is just a collection – any collection, no matter how arbitrary, constitutes a 
mereological sum.103 For this reason Verity Harte argues that classical extensional 
mereology is incompatible with Plato’s view on wholes and parts: for Plato, a whole does 
not exist merely because one may conceive of an arbitrary sum of items (17). Thus, it 
would be problematic, to say the least, to model collection and division on extensional 
mereology. However, the mereological deductions below rely on a minimal axiom set 
that excludes the axioms of even Minimal Extensional Mereology as defined by Simons 
(Parts: A Study in Ontology 31). Only two axioms based on a primitive mereological 
relation, the proper-part relation, are employed in the deductions below. 
                                                 
103 For example, consider the following collection: (1) the tail of a cat, (2) the page of a book, and (3) a 
snowflake: according to classical extensional mereology even this collection is a sum and as such it is a 
composition, i.e., a whole of parts.  
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Two basic relations of mereology are the proper part relation and the overlap 
relation, where the latter is defined in terms of the former. The proper part relation is 
expressed using the ‘≪’ symbol as follows:   
 
x ≪ y: x is a proper part of y 
 
Here, variables signify unspecified objects that can be treated as individuals in the 
broad sense of the word; i.e., anything that can be treated as a single object – a person, a 
Form, a universal, etc. The proper-part relation is asymmetric (if x is a proper part of y, 
then y is not a proper part of x) and transitive (if x is a proper part of y, and y is a proper 
part of z, then x is a proper part of z). It is paralleled in the syllogistic by universal 
statements such as “All A is B,” and as shown below this relation is the basis of Barbara. 
 The overlap relation is expressed using the ‘○’ symbol as follows: 
 
x ○ y: x overlaps y  
 
This means that x and y have a part in common, but it leaves open the possibility 
that all parts of x are parts of y or vice versa. The proper overlap relation is more 
specific: it specifies that x and y have a part in common, but neither is a proper part of the 
other.  
The difference between the proper part relation and the proper overlap relation is 
illustrated in figure 3. In the first diagram, x not only overlaps y, x is a proper part of y. 
This relation is antisymmetric: while x is a part of y, y is not a part of x. In this sense, we 
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can say that there is a “hierarchy” – in other words, y subsumes x (much as a genus 
subsumes a species), but not vice versa. The second and third diagrams illustrate the 
proper overlap relation. The second diagram makes evident the fact that the proper 
overlap relation, unlike the proper part relation, is symmetric: x overlaps y and y overlaps 
x. The third diagram illustrates why the proper overlap relation is not transitive: x 
overlaps y and y overlaps z, but x does not overlap z.  
 
 
 Fig. 3. Diagrams of proper-part (1) and proper-overlap (2-3) relations. 
 
As shown in the derivations below, it is the proper part relation that dominates the 
syllogistic. In figure 3, we can see that in the first case, all x is y, but in the second and 
third cases, only some x is y. Thus, if collection and division produce a structure in which 
there is a hierarchy of parts – i.e., in which parts are proper parts, as in the first diagram, 
then transitivity applies, and the framework will serve as the basis for syllogistic 
reasoning. It will be argued in Section 4.4.3.4, however, that even in cases where the 
proper-part relation does not predominate, a framework can serve as the basis of 
deduction. Both kinds of framework (i.e., both hierarchical and non-hierarchical 
frameworks) will be formalized using non-extensional mereology below.  
In the deductions in Section 4.4.3.3, the proper-part relation will be used to 
formalize the relations between parts of a logical framework produced by collection and 
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division and to express these relations as universal statements in Aristotle’s syllogistic. 
For example, the statements ‘Love is a kind of madness’ and ‘All love is madness’ can be 
represented by the same mereological relation, ‘love is a proper part of madness.’ This 
will be explained further below. First, however, mereology will be compared with set 
theory for the purpose of justifying the use of the former instead of the latter.  
 
4.4.3.1 Mereology compared with set theory 
 
In general, there are at least three reasons for choosing mereology over set theory 
for the purpose of formalizing collection and division and the syllogistic. First, as 
explained above, the foundational concepts of mereology, wholes, parts and their 
relations, play key roles in both collection and division and in Aristotle’s syllogistic. For 
this reason, the formalization of whole-part relations in mereology is suitable for 
representing logical relations seen in both collection and division and the syllogistic. 
Second, set theory includes the notion of the singleton. While this concept is 
useful within set theory, it is problematic, to say the least, for representing the reasoning 
behind collection and division and Aristotle’s syllogistic. More specifically, the idea of a 
singleton calls into question the intuitive notions that a collection contains more than one 
item and that a whole contains more than one part. Observing that the founder of 
mereology, Stanisław Leśniewski, rejected the ideas of the null set and the singleton, 
Peter Simons describes the crucial difference between set theory and mereology as 
follows: 
 
Quite properly, Leśniewski’s intuitions did not allow him to accept such a thing, and 
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he railed against those set theorists who accepted a null set as engaging in specious 
invention ... The important difference between mereology and set theory lies not in 
the algebraically minor issue of whether there is a zero or not, but in the lack of 
singletons in mereology. Leśniewski denied that there is a difference between an 
object a and the singleton of a. (“Real Wholes” 600) 
  
Simons also states that “it is in the existence of singletons distinct from their elements 
that almost all the power and magic of set theory resides” (“Real Wholes” 600). Thus, the 
concepts of the null set and the singleton call into question the suitability of set theory for 
representing collection and division and the syllogistic. The singleton is especially 
problematic, however, because the null set can be avoided in collection and division by 
stipulating that every series of divisions must terminate at the level of the individual. In 
other words, once the target has been reached, there is no need to continue dividing, and 
therefore the null set is avoided. However, this is not the case with the singleton – using 
sets, a series of divisions would terminate at the level of a set with one member, the target 
to be defined. For this reason, J.M.E. Moravcsik points out that while set theory is 
“cleaner” than cruder approaches such as those based on strictly hierarchical genus-
species models, mereology is more suitable for representing division formally because it 
avoids the problem of the singleton (“Plato’s Method of Division” 167). According to 
Moravcsik, a set-theoretical interpretation of collection and division is based on the 
relations of class-membership and class-inclusion (“Plato’s Method of Division” 174). 
The problematic nature of this model in relation to division is as follows: 
 
…while we carve off smaller and smaller sub-classes, we operate with the notion of 
class inclusion. But when we arrive at the final element … we are considering not a 
sub-class but a member of the original generic class. Alternatively, we would have to 
assume that at the final cut in the division we have a class with only one member; and 
then we would have to attribute to Plato the distinction between a unit-class and its 
only element. Such an interpretation has no basis in the text and seems anachronistic 
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(Moravcsik, “Plato’s Method of Division” 174). 
 
Thus, the concept of a singleton, or a class with only one element, is problematic because 
it conflicts with the intuitive notion that a whole necessarily comprises more than one 
part. Mereology, on the other hand, avoids this difficulty, and it is general enough to 
include logical relations defined through collection and division and Aristotle’s 
syllogistic. 
Third, in mereology, no assumptions are made as to the composition of a whole, 
and a whole can be understood in terms of extension or intension. In the former case, 
each part of a whole can be understood as a particular; e.g., each individual that falls 
under the species ‘Man’ is considered a part of the species as a whole. Under some 
interpretations the syllogistic can be understood as a form of extensional reasoning, but it 
is questionable as to whether the extensional model is compatible with collection and 
division, and at least some argue that division is governed by a concept’s intension 
(Moravcsik, “Plato’s Method of Division” 167, Cohen 181). Regardless, a logical system 
that can represent both extensional and intensional forms of reasoning can avoid the 
incompatibility between the two, and mereology meets this criterion. In general, 
mereology is very inclusive; Simons remarks that outside of extensional mereology, 
mereology “is first and foremost a formal analysis of the part-whole relation and its 
cognates. As such it can have little or nothing to say about what parts or wholes there 
actually are or what is part of what, any more than an analysis of causation could tell us 




4.4.3.2 Axioms and definitions 
 
The following axioms and definitions of non-extensional mereology are defined 
by Peter Simons in Parts: A Study in Ontology (26-28). A minimal axiom set is used to 
preclude incompatibility with metaphysical assumptions underlying the method of 
collection and division and the syllogistic. The fundamental axioms (SA) and definitions 
(SD) of mereology used in the deductions below are as follows:104 
 
Axioms: 
SA0 Any axiom set sufficient for first-order predicate calculus with identity 
SA1 ∀x∀y (x ≪ y ⊃ ∼ y ≪ x)       if x is a proper part of y, y is  
                                                                                       not a proper part of x 
SA2 ∀x∀y∀z ((x ≪ y & y ≪ z) ⊃ x ≪ z)    transitivity of proper parts 
 
Definitions: 
SD1 ∀x∀y(x < y ≡ x ≪ y ∨ x = y)    ‘x is a part of y’ is equivalent to  
        ‘x is a proper part of y’ or  
        ‘x is identical to y’ 
SD2 ∀x∀y(x ○ y ≡ ∃z (z < x & z < y))        definition of the overlap relation 
SD3 ∀x∀y(x ι y ≡ ∼ x ○ y)     definition of the disjoint relation  
 
                                                 




Figure 4 diagrams some of the whole-part relations established by collection and division 
for the purpose of defining the angler (Sophist 219d-220a). Here, a stands for acquisition 
and is divided into two parts, b (exchange) and c (hunting). The latter is divided into d 
(land hunting) and e (sea hunting). As shown below, this logical framework will be used 
to express the four moods of the first figure. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Whole-part relations from the definition of the angler (Sophist 219d-220a). 
 
 
4.4.3.3 Deductions of the first figure   
 
  Each of the four moods of the first figure105 will be represented below using a set 
of mereological relations defined by collection and division. Aristotle shows that the 
moods of the second and third figures can be reduced to the first figure (Prior Analytics 
1.7 29b1-26), so the following section is limited to the first figure. After preliminary 
remarks on the formalization of the moods, mereological deductions of Barbara, Celarent, 
Darii, and Ferio will be presented. 
                                                 
105 See Patzig (1, 13) for specifications of each mood. 
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In Section 3.2 it was argued that collection and division can produce both 
hierarchical and non-hierarchical structures. Thus, at least some of the parts of the 
definition of the angler can be understood in terms of the overlap relation. This 
interpretation will be discussed in Section 4.4.3.4 (pg. 225) below. Universal statements 
in the syllogistic, however, are based on the proper-part relation. In other words, to state 
that “All A is B” is the equivalent of stating in mereological terms that A is a proper part 
of B (i.e., “A ≪ B”). As explained above, the overlap relation is not transitive; e.g., if A 
overlaps B and B overlaps C, A does not necessarily overlap C (Section 4.4.3, pg. 211). 
For this reason, in the deductions below each universal premise of a syllogism is stated as 
an assumption in which an overlap relation defined by collection and division is specified 
as a proper-part relation. For example, ‘c ○ a’ stands for ‘c overlaps a’ – i.e. (using the 
terms shown in figure 4), some of hunting is acquisition and, conversely, some of 
acquisition is hunting. This is compatible with the models of collection and division 
presented by Sayre, Moravcsik, and Grams, among others, which include the possibility 
of symmetric relations between parts of a whole (see Section 3.2.5, pg. 173). But in the 
deductions below, ‘c ○ a’ is specified as ‘c ≪ a’ to represent the first premise of Darii, 
‘All c is a,’ i.e., ‘All hunting is acquisition.’ As SA2 states, the proper part relation is 
transitive, and it is transitivity that underlies the logic of Darii and other syllogisms, as 
will be shown below. Similarly, universal negative statements are specified as disjoint 
relations. Thus, ‘c ι b’ (c is disjoint from b, i.e., c and b do not overlap) serves as the first 
premise of Celarent, “No C is B” – in this case, “No hunting is exchange.” In 
mereological terms, C and B do not have a part in common – i.e., they are disjoint.  
  Thus, in the following deductions, the premises of each syllogism represent the 
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mereological relations established by collection and division as shown in figure 4. For 
example, the premises of Barbara, (1) ‘e ≪ c’ and (2) ‘c ≪ a,’ derive from the following 
relations, respectively: (1) sea hunting (e) is a proper part of hunting (c), and (2) hunting 
(c) is a proper part of acquisition (a). The structure shown in figure 4 derives from 219d-
220 in the Sophist and is used to define the premises of the four moods of the first figure, 
Barbara, Celarent, Darii, and Ferio.  
 
The following deductions use rules for predicate logic with identity from Bergmann.  
       
Barbara: 
 
1. e ≪ c 
2. c ≪ a 
 
3. e ≪ a  
 
1.   e ≪ c      Assumption  
2. c ≪ a      Assumption 
3. e ≪ c & c ≪ a     1,2 &I 
4.  (e ≪ c & c ≪ a) ⊃ e ≪ a   instantiation of SA2 
5.  e ≪ a      3,4 ⊃E   
 
 






1. c ι b           
2. e ≪ c 
 
3. e ι b 
    
1. c ι b                  Assumption 
2. e ≪ c       Assumption 
3.  e ○ b     Assumption 
4.  ∃z(z < e & z < b)    3 Substitution by SD2 
5.         f < e & f < b   Assumption 
6.       f < e    5 &E 
7.        f ≪ e ∨ f = e   6 Substitution by SD1 
8.           f ≪ e   Assumption 
9.              e ≪ c & f ≪ e     2,8 &I 
10.                                    f ≪ e & e ≪ c  9 Com 
11.                                     (f≪e & e≪c) ⊃ f ≪ c  instantiation of SA2   
12.               f ≪ c                 10,11 ⊃E 
13.               f = e         Assumption 
14.               f ≪ c     2,13 =E 
15.         f ≪ c     7,8-12,13-14 ∨E 
16.         f ≪ c ∨ f = c   15 ∨I 
17.         f < c                           16 Substitution by SD1 
18.          f < b     5 &E 
19.       f < c & f < b    17,18 &I 
20.   ∃y(y < c & y < b)  19 ∃I 
21.  ∃y(y < c & y < b)   4,5-20 ∃E  
22.   c ○ b     21 Substitution by SD2 
23.         ~ c ○ b     1 Substitution by SD3 
24. ~ e ○ b      3-23 ~I  
25. e ι b      24 Substitution by SD3                  
 
                                                             









1. c ≪ a 
2. e ○ c 
 
3. e ○ a 
  
1. c ≪ a      Assumption 
2. e ○ c      Assumption 
3. ∃z (z < e & z < c)    2 Substitution by SD2     
4.  f < e & f < c    Assumption  
5.  f < c     4 &E 
6.  f ≪ c ∨ f = c    5 Substitution by SD1 
7.   f ≪ c    Assumption 
8.   c ≪ a & f ≪ c    1,7 &I 
9.                        f ≪ c & c ≪ a   8 Com  
10.     (f ≪ c & c ≪ a) ⊃ f ≪ a   instantiation of SA2 
11.   f ≪ a    9,10 ⊃E 
12.   f = c    Assumption 
13.   f ≪ a    1,12 =E 
14.  f ≪ a     6, 7-11, 12-13 ∨E 
15.  f ≪ a ∨ f = a    14 ∨I 
16.  f < a     15 Substitution by SD1 
17.  f < e     4 &E 
18.  f < a & f < e    16, 17 &I 
19.   f < e & f < a    18 Com 
20.  ∃y(y < e & y < a)   19 ∃I  
21. ∃y(y < e & y < a)    3, 4-20 ∃E  
22. e ○ a      21 Substitution by SD2   
 
 






1. c ι b 
2. e ○ c 
 
3. ∃x(x < e & ~x < b) 
 
1. c ι b      Assumption 
2. e ○ c      Assumption 
3. ~ c ○ b      1 Substitution by SD3  
4. ~∃z(z < c & z < b)    3 Substitution by SD2 
5. ∀z~(z < c & z < b)    4 QN 
6. ∃z(z < e & z < c)    2 Substitution by SD2 
7.  f < e & f < c    Assumption 
8.  ~(f < c & f < b)   5 ∀E  
9.  ~f < c ∨ ~f < b    8 DeM 
10.  f < c     7 &E  
11.  ~ ~ f < c    10 DN 
12.  ~f < b     9,11 DS   
13.  f < e     7 &E 
14.  ~f < b & f < e     12,13 &I  
15.    f < e & ~f < b    14 Com  
16.  ∃x(x < e & ~x < b)   15 ∃I 15   
17. ∃x(x < e & ~x < b)     6,7-16 ∃E  
 
In conclusion, a framework serves as the basis of a syllogism by establishing the 
relations between its terms. More specifically, a framework shows how named parts are 
placed relative to each other – i.e., how parts of a logical whole interrelate. Without a 
framework, the logical relations from which a syllogism derives its deductive power 
would remain undefined. In other words, it is through collection and division that names 




4.4.3.4 Formalization of structures defined in the Sophist  
            and the Statesman 
 
As argued in Section 3.2.5 (pg. 173), models that allow for non-hierarchical 
relations more accurately describe the various structures defined through collection and 
division. More specifically, a framework defined through collection and division is not 
necessarily restricted to proper part relations. To illustrate this, the three diagrams shown 
in figure 5 show how acquisition, hunting, and sea hunting (parts a, c, and e of the angler 





Fig. 5. Hierarchical and non-hierarchical interpretations of the relations between 
acquisition (a), hunting (c), and sea hunting (e) described at 219d-220a in the Sophist. 
 
The first diagram (i) shows a strictly hierarchical relation of proper parts: sea hunting (e) 
is a proper part of hunting (c), and hunting is a proper part of acquisition (a). This 
interpretation is compatible with the premises of Barbara shown in the previous section. 
The second diagram (ii) includes not only the proper-part relation (c is a proper part of 
Pasqualoni 226 
 
both a and e), it also includes a proper overlap relation (a overlaps e, but neither is a 
proper part of the other). The third diagram in figure 5 (iii) does not include any proper 
part relations; instead, a, c, and e exhibit the proper overlap relation. 
The following formula,106 which expresses a set of overlapping relations, is 
compatible with all three interpretations shown in figure 5:  
 
F1:  ∃x(x < a & x < c & x < e)   
 
In the formula F1, since there is an x such that x < a and x < c, a and c have a part in 
common; i.e., they overlap. 107 In other words, considering the first conjunction in F1, 
∃x(x < a & x < c) ≡ a ○ c. Similarly, the remaining pairs of relations in F1 express the 
following equivalences:  
 
 ∃x(x < a & x < e) ≡ a ○ e 
 ∃x(x < c & x < e) ≡ c ○ e 
 
Thus, given SD2, the formula ∃x(x < a & x < c & x < e) implies that (a ○ c & a ○ e & c ○ 
e).108  
                                                 
106 For ease of reference, formulas referred to in the text will be labelled Fn, where n indicates the order in 
which the formula is introduced. 
 
107 SD2 defines the overlap relation as follows: ∀x∀y(x ○ y ≡ ∃z (z < x & z < y)). Thus, two wholes 
overlap if they have a part in common.          
 
108 Note, however, that (a ○ c & a ○ e & c ○ e) does not imply F1, because the former leaves open the 
possibility that the part common to a and c, the part common to a and e, and the part common to c and e are 
not identical. More specifically, by SD2 the following equivalence holds: 
 
(a ○ c & a ○ e & c ○ e) ≡∃x(x < a & x < c) & ∃y(y < a & y < e) & ∃z(z < c & z < e) 
 
This allows for the possibility that x, y, and z are not identical. But the formula ∃x(x < a & x < c & x < e) 
implies that the same part, x, is a part of a, c, and e, and by SD2 this implies that a, c, and e all overlap, as 




The formula F1 leaves open the following possibilities: (1) all of the parts of the 
framework under consideration are proper parts (as shown in diagram (i) in figure 5);109 
(2) some of the parts are proper parts (as shown in (ii)); and (3) the entire framework is a 
non-hierarchical structure of overlapping parts (as shown in (iii)). Thus, the formula  
F1 allows for the possibility that the framework being defined is hierarchical (i), non-
hierarchical (iii), or both hierarchical and non-hierarchical (ii). In the case of the angler, 
F1 does not make the unnecessary assumption that hunting is “contained” by (i.e., is a 
proper part of) acquisition; rather, it allows for the possibility that hunting and 
acquisition are overlapping concepts; as such, F1 is compatible with the Fabric and Lens 
models described in Section 3.2.  
In general, the advantage of defining frameworks in terms of overlapping 
concepts, as with F1 above, is that the overlap relation is not overly restrictive; it permits 
a wide range of interpretations. In cases where it is not clear whether a hierarchical or 
non-hierarchical structure is being defined, the overlap relation is specific enough to 
show that concepts are interrelated (e.g., hunting overlaps with acquisition) but general 
enough to allow for the possibility that a non-hierarchical structure is being defined.  
Moreover, in some cases it is evident that the overlap relation as well as the 
proper part relation is needed to accurately define a framework. For example, consider 
the division of number into odd and even in the Statesman (262c -263a; see Appendix A 
25). Using ‘n’ to stand for number, ‘o’ to stand for odd and ‘e’ for even, the relations 
between these three concepts can be formalized as follows: 
 
                                                 
109 In the first diagram of figure 5, e is not only a proper part of c, it also overlaps c; similarly, c is both a 
proper part of a, and c overlaps a. As stated in Section 4.4.3 (pg. 211), the overlap relation (as distinguished 
from the proper overlap relation) does not exclude the proper part relation. 
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F2: o ≪ n & e ≪ n & o ι e  
 
Here, the proper part relation is specified because all odd numbers are numbers (o ≪ n) 
and all even numbers are numbers (e ≪ n). In other words, we know that no odd number 
is not a number (and similarly for even numbers), so the proper part relation holds. The 
formula F2 also specifies that no odd number is an even number; i.e., odd and even do not 
have a part (a number) in common, so they are disjoint (o ι e). F2 is limited to the proper 
part and disjoint relations, but if the framework being defined is expanded to include 
prime numbers (p), then the overlap relation is required, as shown in the following 
formula: 
 
F3: (o ≪ n & e ≪ n & o ι e) & (p ≪ n & p ○ e & p ○ o) 
 
In this formula, ‘p ≪ n’ indicates that all prime numbers are numbers, ‘p ○ e’ indicates 
that prime numbers and even numbers overlap,110 and similarly ‘p ○ o’ indicates that 
prime numbers and odd numbers overlap. This formalization incorporates a mixture of 
hierarchical relations (i.e., proper part relations) as well as non-hierarchical relations 
(relations of overlap). Thus, the overlap relation as well as the proper part relation is 
needed to accurately define the framework being described. 
Interpretations based on the overlap relation allow for consistency in interpreting 
passages in the dialogues in which a single concept can be seen to overlap with two other 
concepts. For example, in the Sophist, production is divided into divine and human 
                                                 
110 The number 2 is the only even prime number. Hence, even numbers and prime numbers overlap; more 
specifically, the number 2 is a part of the collection of prime numbers, while all other even numbers are not. 
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aspects (265e), while in the Phaedrus, it is madness that is divided into the divine and the 
human (265a). Taking the two passages in these dialogues as a whole, the concepts of the 
divine and the human overlap not only with production, but with the concept of madness 
as well. Under one reading, the relations between the divine and the human and 
production and madness can be represented as a hierarchy, as follows: 
 
F4: h ≪ p & d ≪ p & h ≪ m & d ≪ m 
 
But why should this be the case? A more convincing reading of the passages in question 
is that the divine and the human are aspects of many things, including production and 
madness. As such, the divine and human overlap with other concepts, as opposed to being 
proper parts of them. Under this interpretation, which in my view is much more 
convincing, the following formalization applies: 
 
F5: h ○ p & d ○ p & h ○ m & d ○ m 
 
This formula specifies that the human and the divine are aspects of both production and 
madness. It is not too specific, however; i.e., F5 is broad enough to leave open a variety 
of possibilities. For example, upon further investigation, one can conclude that 
production and madness overlap (p ○ m) or, conversely, that they are disjoint (p ι m), 
without contradicting the relations specified in F5. These possibilities serve as open 
questions that can be pursued or ignored, depending on their relevance to the definition 
being formulated; i.e., depending on the target being defined, one can flesh out only part 
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of the framework. More specifically, if the target falls within a particular section of the 
framework, the parts that fall outside of the section can be ignored, while the section 
itself can be refined further through collection and division. Arguably, this is done at 
265e5-266a10 in the Sophist, where (employing the overlap relations of F5 as a basis of 
interpretation) the overlap between human and divine and production (the first two 
conjuncts of F5) is developed to include two other concepts, copy-making and production 
of originals. Under this interpretation, the relations between the concepts can be 




Fig. 6. Diagram showing overlap between production (p), the divine (d), the human (h), 
copy-making (c), and the production of originals (o) 
  
As discussed in Section 2.2.3.1 (pg. 125), one need not assume that a hierarchy of 
proper parts is being defined; i.e., there is the possibility that human and production on 
the one hand, and divine and production on the other, are overlapping pairs in a non-
hierarchical structure. Thus, the relations shown in figure 6 may be expressed in terms of 
overlapping parts, as follows:111 
                                                 




F6:  ∃x(x < p & x < h & x < c) & ∃y(y < p & y < d & y < c) &  
∃z(z < p & z < h & z < o) & ∃w(w < p & w < d & w < o) & (h ι d)  
 
In figure 6, considering the part of production that is relevant to the sophist (i.e., copy-
making as opposed to production of originals), the shaded area on the right side of c (the 
intersection of c and h) represents the part that is common to production, human, and 
copy-making (i.e., the first conjunct in F6), while the shaded area on the left side of c (the 
intersection of c and d) represents the part that is common to production, divine, and 
copy-making (the second conjunct in F6).112  
Even in an interpretation which includes the proper overlap relation, as shown in 
figure 6, the lack of a strict hierarchy does not hinder the completion of a framework that 
defines the target. In this case, the sophist can be “placed” in one section of the 
framework, i.e., the section defined by the overlap of production, human, and copy-
making. In other words, the sophist can be placed in the part that is common to p, h,  
and c: 
 
F7: ∃x(x < p & x < h & x < c)113  
                                                                                                                                                 
between copy-making (c), production of originals (o), and production (p). The diagram, however, implies 
that c and o are proper parts of p since it seems more intuitive to assume that all copy-making is a form of 
production (and, clearly, all forms of the production of originals are forms of production). In any case, the 
point is that in contrast to the hierarchical structure shown in figure 2, in figure 6, while c and o overlap 
human (h) and divine (d), they are not proper parts of them. 
 
112
 A similar set of relations applies to production of originals, which, as figure 6 shows, mirrors copy-
making. Thus, under this interpretation, when the Stranger refers to four parts at 266a4 (“Τέτταρα μὴν 
αὐτῆς οὕτω τὰ πάντα μέρη γίγνεται”), he is referring not to four compound concepts, human-copy-making, 
divine-copy-making, human-production-of-originals, divine-production-of-originals, but to the four ways in 
which the following concepts overlap: human, divine, copy-making, and production of originals. The latter 
interpretation leaves open the possibility that the four concepts under consideration overlap with other 
concepts (e.g., madness) in multifarious ways. 
 




As will be explained below, placing the target to be defined within a part that is common 
to overlapping parts distinguishes the target from those with whom he may be confused; 
in this case, the sophist, as a producer of copies, is distinguished from those who engage 
in original production.   
Another advantage of the framework represented by F6 is brought to light by a 
flaw in the hierarchical tree shown in figure 2: the latter is counter-intuitive in the sense 
that copy-making on the one hand, and production of originals on the other, each occupy 
two places in the framework. More specifically, in terms of copy-making, if a strict 
hierarchy is assumed, i.e., if copy-making is a proper part of both human and divine, and 
human and divine are disjoint,114 then there are two disjoint parts for only one concept, 
copy-making. However, contrary to what is conveyed by the tree diagram in figure 2, a 
more convincing reading of the passage in question is expressed by F6: i.e., copy-making 
is one concept that overlaps with other concepts, such as human and divine, and the same 
holds for production of originals.115 
Stated negatively, one reason for not using a strictly hierarchical model is that 
such a model leads to the conclusion that there are multiple concepts when, in fact, there 
is only one concept under consideration. Thus, consider the following formalization of 
the hierarchical tree diagram shown in figure 2: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the following overlap relations: p ○ h & p ○ c & h ○ c.  
  
114  That human and divine are disjoint is made evident in the dialogue; the Stranger makes it clear at  
265c-e in the Sophist that he is talking about gods when he talks of the divine producers. 
 
115 Hypothetically, the framework expressed by F6 could be expanded to show that copy-making overlaps 
not only with human and divine, but with other kinds as well; e.g., animals and machines also produce 
copies.   
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F8:  (c ≪ d & o ≪ d & d ≪ p) & (c ≪ h & o ≪ h & h ≪ p) & (h ι d) 
 
 
This states that copy-making and production of originals are proper parts of divine  
(c ≪ d & o ≪ d), and in turn divine is a proper part of production (d ≪ p); similarly, 
copy-making and production of originals are proper parts of human (c ≪ h & o ≪ h), and 
in turn human is a proper part of production (h ≪ p). F8 also states that human and divine 
do not overlap (h ι d).   
In fact, F8 is self-contradictory; i.e., a contradiction results if, as stated in F8, the 
following assumptions hold: (1) divine and human are disjoint, (2) divine and human are 
proper parts of production, and (3) copy-making is a proper part of both divine and 
human. The following proof shows that there is a contradiction if these assumptions are 
made. 
 






















1.    d ≪ p & h ≪ p & h ι d  Assumption 
2.    c ≪ d & c ≪ h  Assumption 
3.       c ≪ d    2 &E 
4.    c ≪ d ∨ c = d  3 ∨I 
5.   c < d    4 Substitution by SD1  
6.       c ≪ h    2 &E 
7.       c ≪ h ∨ c = h  6 ∨I 
8.       c < h    7 Substitution by SD1 
9.       c < d & c < h   5,8 &I 
10.   c < h & c < d   9 Com       
11.      ∃x(x < h & x < d)  10 ∃I 
12.   h ι d    1 &E 
13.      h ○ d    11 Substitution by SD2 
14.     ~h ○ d      12 Substitution by SD3 
15.  ~(c ≪ d & c ≪ h)    2-14 ~I 
 
In the above proof, lines 1 and 2 express the hierarchical relations between divine, 
human, production, and copy-making, as specified in F8. The conclusion shows that, 
given these assumptions, it is not possible for copy-making to be a proper part of both 
divine and human. A similar proof can be constructed that reaches the same conclusion 
about production of originals; i.e., if, as indicated in F8, production of originals is a 
proper part of human and divine, and human and divine are disjoint, then a contradiction 
will result unless it is assumed that there are two disjoint forms of production of originals. 
Yet, a much more intuitive reading of the Stranger’s divisions is that there is only one 
concept that corresponds to copy-making, and only one concept that corresponds to 
production of originals, and in each case the concept overlaps with other concepts, such 
as human, divine and production.116 This reading is expressed by the overlapping 
                                                 
116 The Stranger’s remarks to Theaetetus at 240a in the Sophist support this reading: 
 
     ΞΕ. Τὸ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἃ πολλὰ εἰπὼν ἠξίωσας ἑνὶ  






relations specified in F7. In addition to avoiding the contradictions inherent in the 
hierarchical framework of F8, the non-hierarchical reading also agrees with the argument 
in the Republic that concludes that each Form is unique (597c-d); i.e., it would be 
mistaken to assume that there are two Forms of bed, for example – there can be only one 
(see Section 1.6.3, pg. 88). 
It is important to note that non-hierarchical structures do not preclude deductive 
inference; i.e., a hierarchy of proper parts (as in, e.g., Barbara) is not a necessary 
condition for deduction. As an example, in Section 1.3.2 (pg. 44) it was stated that in the 
Statesman the Stranger divides directive expertise (ἐπιτακτική τέχνη; 260c6; see 
Appendix A 21) into two kinds, one kind comprising interpreters, seers, heralds and the 
like, while the other kind consists of self-directors (260c-261a). In addition, no member 
of the former kind is a self-director (260c-d). Thus, the part of directive expertise that 
comprises interpreters, seers, etc.117 is disjoint from the part that comprises self-directors.   
The relations between interpreters, the statesman and directive expertise can be 
understood in terms of overlapping and non-overlapping parts to show that even a non-
hierarchical framework can be the basis of a deduction that reveals hidden relations 
between the parts of a whole. More specifically, while interpreters (i) and self-directors 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
     Stranger: He [the sophist] will ask about what runs through  
all those things which you call many, but which you thought  
you should call by the one name, copy, to cover them all, as  
if they were all one thing… (translated by Nicholas P. White;  
Plato 260) 
 
To paraphrase, the Stranger tells Theaetetus that the sophist would argue that there is one thing, the idea of 
a copy, that runs through the many. Since this claim agrees with the theory of Forms (and, moreover, with 
the underlying principles of collection, which brings the many into one), it cannot be rejected by Theaetetus. 
 
117 The Stranger does not name the kind that comprises interpreters, seers, heralds, etc., since the statesman 
is not a member of their group (260e-261a), and for the sake of brevity this kind will be referred to as 
“interpreters” in the discussion that follows. 
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(s) overlap with directive expertise (d) – i.e., (i ○ d & s ○ d) –  interpreters do not overlap 
with self-directors – i.e., both kinds are disjoint (i ι s). Using these relations as premises, 
it can be deduced that there is at least one part of directive expertise that is (1) a part of 
the self-directing kind and (2) separate from the kind that comprises interpreters and the 
like. The following proof demonstrates this. 
 




1.    i ○ d        Assumption 
2.    s ○ d        Assumption  
3.    i  ι  s        Assumption  
4.    ∃x(x < s & x < d)       2 Substitution by SD2 
5.     a < s & a < d       Assumption 
6.  a ○ i       Assumption  
7.   ∃y(y < a & y < i)     6 Substitution by SD2 
8.   z < a & z < i     Assumption 
9.   z < a      8 &E 
10.   a < s      5 &E 
11.   z ≪ a ∨ z = a     9 Substitution by SD1 
12.    z ≪ a                          Assumption 
13.    a ≪ s ∨ a = s    10 Substitution by SD1 
14.     a ≪ s                      Assumption 
15.     z ≪ a & a ≪ s      12,14 &I 
16.     (z ≪ a & a ≪ s) ⊃ z ≪ s instantiation of SA2 
17.                          z ≪ s     15,16 ⊃E 
18.                                             a = s                             Assumption 
19.               z ≪ s                        12,18 =E 
20.                                           z ≪ s         13,14-17,18-19 ∨E 
21.    z ≪ s ∨ z = s                 20 ∨I 
22.                                           z < s                                 21 Substitution by SD1 
23.    z = a                             Assumption 
24.    z < s     10,23 =E  
25.   z < s      11,12-22,23-24 ∨E 
26.   z < i                                8 &E 
27.   z < s & z < i                                  25,26 &I    
28.   z < i & z < s       27 Com 
29.   ∃w(w < i & w < s)         28 ∃I 
30.               i ○ s      29 Substitution by SD2 
31.  i ○ s                                            7,8-30 ∃E                               
32.    ~ i ○ s       3 Substitution by SD3 
33.   ~a ○ i        6-32 ~I 
34.         a < s & a < d & ~a ○ i               5,33 &I 
35.         ∃w(w < s & w < d & ~w ○ i)        34 ∃I 
36.    ∃w(w < s & w < d & ~w ○ i)         4,5-35 ∃E 
 
The conclusion of this proof states that there is a part of directive expertise  
(w < d) that does not overlap with another part of the whole, i.e., the part comprising 
interpreters and the like (~w ○ i), but instead it is a part of the self-directing aspect of 











261a; Appendix A 21), and this placement serves to refine the definition of the statesman 
by specifying that he is similar to interpreters in one respect (both the statesman and 
interpreters are parts or aspects of directive expertise), but different in a key respect 
(unlike interpreters, the statesman is a self-director). The discovery of the difference 
moves the dialogue one step closer to arriving at a definition that distinguishes the 
statesman from all those with whom he appears to be similar. Moreover, in the above 
example, the part w can be named and treated as a concept in its own right, and through 
repeating the process (i.e., determining which concepts do and do not overlap with w), the 
framework can be developed even further.118 
In general, interpretations that are based on overlapping as opposed to proper 
parts agree with many other passages featuring collection and division. For example, one 
reading of the definition of love in the Phaedrus (265a-c; see figure 1) is that while 
human and divine overlap with madness, they do not overlap with each other (i.e., they 
are disjoint), and there are parts of divine (e.g., Ἀφροδίτη and Ἔρως) that overlap with 
madness, but not with human madness. This reading parallels the interpretation of the 
passage from the Statesman (260c-261a) discussed just above, where it was stated that 
while interpreters and self-directors overlap with directive expertise, interpreters and 
self-directors are disjoint, and there is a part of the latter (e.g., the statesman) that 
overlaps with directive expertise, but not with interpreters. Similarly, in the Sophist, 
likeness-making and appearance-making are disjoint, yet both overlap with copy-making 
(236c; see Appendix A 14). The sophist, as a producer of appearances (264d), can be 
                                                 
118 Note that, as stated in Section 1.1, a framework produced by collection and division in and of itself is 
not sufficient for deductive reasoning; rather, the point is that even a non-hierarchical framework can 
provide the basis for such reasoning provided that the reasoner performs the additional steps needed for 
deductive inference.  
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distinguished from other copy-makers in this key respect.119 In all of these cases, the 
overlap relation and its negation can be used to distinguish the target from that with 
which it is similar. Thus, the overlap relation can be used as the basis of a framework that 
serves to define the target. 
   
4.5 Conclusion 
 
Arguably, logical consequence and the use of variables distinguish the syllogistic 
from other forms of reasoning. For these reasons, one may conclude that the syllogistic is 
an entirely new development in the history of logic. In opposition to this view is the 
central thesis of this chapter: whole-part relations defined through collection and division 
make possible deductive inference. By articulating the parts of a whole, collection and 
division define the limits between the parts, thereby revealing a logical framework. 
If the parts of a whole are arranged hierarchically, then syllogistic inference is 
possible; i.e., a definition produced by collection and division that expresses proper-part 
relations can serve as a framework through which a syllogism can be formulated.  
In terms of the three operations discussed in Chapter 2, seeing and naming define 
the terms of a syllogism, while placing defines the premises (i.e., the interrelations 
between the terms). As explained in Section 3.3 (pg. 180), if errors are introduced into a 
framework through incorrect application of one or more of the operations, then 
deductions that rest on the framework are flawed. On the other hand, the correct 
application of the three operations provides the logical structure that underlies deductive 
                                                 
119 Stated negatively, even if one is a copy-maker, one is not a sophist if one produces likenesses as 




As explained above, collection and division often define non-hierarchical 
relations between overlapping parts. In this case, mereology can be used to articulate 
some of the structures described in dialogues such as the Sophist and the Statesman. 
Section 4.4.3.4 showed that even frameworks in which the proper part relation does not 
predominate can serve as the basis of deductive reasoning. 
The following chapter will discuss the relation between collection and division 
and non-deductive reasoning. Focusing on the formulation of definitions in the Meno and 
the Euthyphro, Chapter 5 will defend the thesis that collection and division define logical 











As stated in Section 1.1, the purpose of this work is to defend the thesis that 
collection and division define logical frameworks that underlie deductive and non-
deductive reasoning. The previous chapter discussed the relation between collection and 
division and deductive reasoning. The purpose of this chapter is to defend the final part of 
the thesis: logical frameworks produced by collection and division underlie non-
deductive reasoning. As will be explained below, this chapter will focus on reasoning at 
the level of statements and definitions as opposed to argumentative reasoning. 
The motivation for this chapter is as follows. If frameworks defined by collection 
and division serve as the basis only for deductive reasoning, then collection and division 
would be narrow in scope. But as argued in Chapter 1, collection and division have a 
wide scope; indeed, they allow us to think and to speak, according to Socrates (see 
Section 1.6.3, pg. 88). If this is the case, collection and division are not just the basis of 
deductive systems such as the syllogistic; rather, collection and division are seen in many 
other forms of reasoning as well. The purpose of this chapter is to explain in more detail 
the ways in which collection and division underlie non-deductive reasoning. More 
specifically, I will argue that even reasoning that operates at the statement level – i.e., 
reasoning that is neither based on a premise-conclusion structure nor a skill-based 
procedure as seen in the Statesman and Sophist – is based on collection and division. 
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Even the formulation of a definition that is the result neither of a procedure nor a set of 
premises is also a form of reasoning that rests on collection and division. This is the 
central claim of this chapter.  
Two definitions have been chosen to best illustrate the relation between collection 
and division and non-deductive reasoning: Meno’s definition of virtue and Euthyphro’s 
definition of piety. At first glance, these definitions do not appear to be related to 
collection and division. But the key words here are “at first glance”: I will argue below 
that collection and division are very much involved in these cases, even though they are 
not explicitly mentioned. First, however, an outline of each section of this chapter is 
provided below.  
Section 5.2 will clarify the term ‘definition,’ while Sections 5.3 and 5.4 will 
discuss the definition of virtue presented in the Meno (71e - 72a) and the definition of 
piety presented in the Euthyphro (5d-e), respectively. Section 5.5 will conclude by 
explaining that Meno’s definition of virtue expresses only a partial application of the 
three operations of collection and division. Nonetheless, although the framework defined 
by Meno is incomplete, at least some parts of virtue are discerned and named, bringing 
Meno one step closer to a coherent definition by means of collection and division. The 
Euthyphro, on the other hand, shows how whole-part reasoning applies to both 
individuals and collections thereof as well as to universals.  
 




A definition is a logical framework: it is the result of a process in which the parts 
of a conceptual whole are discerned, named, and placed within a structure, even if each 
step of the process that leads to the definition is not explicitly stated. Just as the premises 
of an argument may be unstated, the steps of collection and division that produce a 
definition may remain unexpressed. As an example, consider this definition of piety from 
the Euthyphro: 
 
    ΕΥΘ. Λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅσιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νῦν 
ποιῶ, τῷ ἀδικοῦντι ἢ περὶ φόνους ἢ περὶ ἱερῶν κλοπὰς ἤ τι 
ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων ἐξαμαρτάνοντι ἐπεξιέναι, ἐάντε πατὴρ (10) 
(e) ὢν τυγχάνῃ ἐάντε μήτηρ ἐάντε ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν, τὸ δὲ μὴ 
ἐπεξιέναι ἀνόσιον. (5d8-5e2) 
 
    Euthyphro: I say that the pious is to do what I am doing now, to  
prosecute the wrongdoer, be it about murder or temple robbery or anything  
else, whether the wrongdoer is your father or your mother or anyone else;  
not to prosecute is impious.120 
 
This passage does not exhibit deductive reasoning, nor does it have a premise-conclusion 
structure, but it does express a relation between wholes and parts: piety is a kind of 
prosecution – more precisely, piety is a named part of prosecution, the prosecution of 
wrong-doing. In short, the definition tells us how piety and prosecution fit together into a 
whole; i.e., it outlines a whole that is divided into named parts.  
This form of reasoning can be contrasted with unstructured thinking; i.e., it can be 
distinguished from “collections” of a sort that lack structure and order. To illustrate this 
point, the definition of piety above can be represented as a mere list of names in no 
                                                 
120 Translated by G.M.A. Grube (Plato 5) 
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particular order121 – here, taking ‘name’ in the broad Platonic sense (see Section 2.2.2.1, 
pg. 114): 
 







Within the definition of piety, each name serves as a part of a λόγος – i.e., each name is 
part of the definition as a whole. But outside of the definition, as shown in the list above, 
these names do not form a coherent whole. More specifically, the names are not placed in 
a logical structure – i.e., how the “parts” of the definition relate to each other is not 
indicated by a mere list of names. In other words, the list is structureless. That a mere list 
of names cannot constitute coherent speech or thought is expressed by the Stranger in the 
Sophist as follows:   
 
    ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν ἐξ ὀνομάτων μὲν μόνων συνεχῶς λεγομένων 
οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδ’ αὖ ῥημάτων χωρὶς ὀνομάτων (10) 
λεχθέντων. (262a9-11) 
 
    Stranger: So no discourse is formed just from names  
spoken in a row, and also not from verbs that are spoken  
                                                 
121 Such a list occurs at Theaetetus 207a, where the parts of a wagon are simply listed as “wheels, axle, 
body, rims, yoke.” Since the relations between the parts in the list are not specified, the list is structureless; 
i.e., it does not define a whole. 
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without names.122  
 
To use an example provided by the Stranger, the expression ‘lion stag horse’ (‘λέων 
ἔλαφος ἵππος’; Sophist 262b9-10), as a mere list of names, is not coherent discourse 
(λόγος). Thus, in respect to collection and division, it is only when named parts are 
brought together into a coherent definition, i.e., when their interrelations are defined, that 
a structure is formed.  
Euthyphro’s formulation of the definition of piety is a form of logical reasoning 
because the structure that results when named parts are brought into a coherent whole, as 
in the definition of piety above, is the endpoint of thinking about the individual parts of a 
whole. As such, it agrees with the definition of logic given in Section 1.5.3: logic is 
thinking that reaches an endpoint. Here, the naming and placement of each part, while not 
explicitly stated, constitutes a series of steps that leads to the final step, the articulation of 
the whole and its parts (see Section 2.2, pg. 98). To reiterate, the steps are not explicitly 
stated in the definition of piety quoted above, but steps of this sort must precede the 
formulation of any coherent definition, just as steps that occur when a word is spelled 
letter-by-letter, or when a sentence is composed word-by-word, must precede the 
formulation of the word or sentence. 
This chapter will argue that even a simple definition such as piety is a kind of 
prosecution or love is a kind of madness, where no extended hierarchy of genus-species 
relations is defined, is also a framework – i.e., it is a set of overlapping concepts that 
serve as the basis for reasoning about the parts of a whole and the whole itself. Even a 
definition that apparently lacks a logical structure, such as Meno's definition of virtue, 
                                                 
122 Translated after Nicholas P. White (Plato 285), with modifications 
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can be understood as a kind of “loose structure” that is the result of an incomplete 
application of collection and division. Even in cases such as this, collection and division 
underlie the formulation of the definition. Finally, Euthyphro’s definition shows that 
collection and division apply to reasoning about individuals as well as universals. This 
shows how extensive collection and division are in the dialogues, and it adds weight to 
the claim that collection and division have a very wide scope. Thus, the passages from 
the Meno and the Euthyphro discussed below are counter-examples to the claim that 
collection and division are restricted to the definition of genus-species trees and to 
deductive reasoning.  
 
5.3 The Meno 
 
At 71d in the Meno, Socrates asks Meno to define virtue (ἀρετή). Meno’s 
response is as follows: 
 
(e)   ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλ’ οὐ χαλεπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον 
μέν, εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ῥᾴδιον, ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς 
ἀρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα 
τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ’ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, καὶ αὐτὸν 
εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς (5) 
ἀρετήν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν, ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὴν τὴν οἰκίαν εὖ 
οἰκεῖν, σῴζουσάν τε τὰ ἔνδον καὶ κατήκοον οὖσαν τοῦ ἀνδρός. 
καὶ ἄλλη ἐστὶν παιδὸς ἀρετή, καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἄρρενος, καὶ 
πρεσβυτέρου ἀνδρός, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐλευθέρου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, 
72(a) δούλου. καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥστε οὐκ 
ἀπορία εἰπεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅτι ἐστίν· καθ’ ἑκάστην γὰρ 
τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον ἑκάστῳ 
ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἡ 
κακία. (71e1 - 72a5)  
 
    Meno: It is not hard to tell you, Socrates. First, if you want the virtue  
of a man, it is easy to say that a man’s virtue consists of being able to  
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manage public affairs and in so doing to benefit his friends and harm his  
enemies and to be careful that no harm comes to himself; if you want the  
virtue of a woman, it is not difficult to describe: she must manage the  
home well, preserve its possessions, and be submissive to her husband;  
the virtue of a child, whether male or female, is different again, and so is  
that of an elderly man, if you want that, or if you want that of a free man  
or a slave. And there are very many other virtues, so that one is not at a  
loss to say what virtue is. There is virtue for every action and every age,  
for every task of ours and every one of us – and, Socrates, the same is true  
for wickedness.123 
 
At 72a Socrates complains that Meno’s description of virtue resembles a “swarm” 
(σμῆνός) : “Πολλῇ γέ τινι εὐτυχίᾳ ἔοικα κεχρῆσθαι, ὦ Μένων, εἰ μίαν ζητῶν ἀρετὴν 
σμῆνός τι ἀνηύρηκα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κείμενον.” (“I seem to be in great luck, Meno; 
while I am looking for one virtue, I have found you to have a whole swarm of them.”124) 
He refers to the swarm as an εἰκών (image; 72a), and according to Socrates this image 
can be used to identify the problems that undermine Meno’s description of virtue. 
Below, Meno’s definition of virtue will serve as a representative example of non-
deductive reasoning. It will be argued in Section 5.3.1 that Meno’s definition is unrelated 
to collection and division; i.e., the differences between non-deductive reasoning and 
collection and division outweigh whatever similarities, if any, the two may have. Section 
5.3.2 will defend the opposite claim: Meno’s definition of virtue only appears to be far 
removed from collection and division, but on further consideration, it will be argued, the 
appearances are deceiving. 
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5.3.1 Hypothesis: Meno’s definition of virtue does not derive from  
         collection and division 
 
This section will take the standpoint of arguing against the hypothesis that 
collection and division are the basis of non-deductive reasoning. Instead it will argue the 
opposite: collection and division and non-deductive reasoning are so different that they 
have nothing of significance in common. The point of this exercise is to highlight ways 
(some obvious, some not) in which Meno’s definition of virtue does not appear to be 
associated with collection and division. After all, one could argue that collection and 
division are to be found only where Plato explicitly illustrates the method. The remainder 
of this section elaborates this argument for the purpose of clarifying and strengthening 
the opposing argument that will be defended in Section 5.3.2.  
Meno’s description of virtue resembles the “scattered many” of the Phaedrus 
(265d; see Section 1.2.1). It lacks shape and coherence; Meno’s description seemingly 
has some amount of consistency, but it is only a nominal consistency; what binds the 
elements of the list together is not a core meaning of virtue but merely the name ‘ἀρετή’ 
(virtue).  In short, there is no ordering. No interrelations are defined between the items of 
Meno’s list; e.g., how does the virtue of man relate to the virtue of woman, and how do 
these relate to the virtue of the young and old? 
It is true that there are definitions included in Meno’s description of virtue. For 
example, Meno defines the virtue of man as the ability to manage public affairs (71e). 
This gives us some idea of what unifies virtue, but this is immediately followed by a 
different picture of virtue: for women, virtue is to manage the home well, among other 
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things (71e). If there is a thread that binds these two definitions, it is not evident. 
Socrates’ image of the swarm is an adequate parallel: to the extent that a swarm lacks 
order and structure, so does Meno’s description of virtue. In fact, Meno emphasizes that 
there is no common thread, even if one searches for one: he emphasizes that there is a 
virtue for each one of us – as if virtue could be chopped up and spread out among 
numberless individuals and actions. Not only this, but each age (ἡλικία) has its own 
virtue; so virtue is in flux – there is not even a consistency across the ages, let alone 
across individuals. This brings to mind the Heraclitean relativism as portrayed in the 
Theaetetus: nothing is stable, things are constantly in motion (160d). Meno is implying 
that it is impossible to pin virtue down, impossible to define it, and this is contrary to the 
purpose of collection and division. In addition, Meno’s list of virtues, like the parts of a 
swarm, lacks number; we know only that it is plural. If virtue were “one,” Meno’s 
description would be a coherent, unified form of reasoning, a definition. Similarly, if 
Meno had provided a number of kinds or aspects of virtue – even a relatively large 
number – he would have been on the road to a definition.  
In general, Meno’s reasoning is fragmented; it does not present the picture of a 
coherent whole. Later in the dialogue, Socrates states the following: 
 
...ὅτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὅλον 
εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν, αὐτὴν μὲν πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστίν, 
πᾶσαν δὲ φῂς πρᾶξιν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἐάνπερ μετὰ μορίου 
(c) ἀρετῆς πράττηται, ὥσπερ εἰρηκὼς ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν τὸ ὅλον 
καὶ ἤδη γνωσομένου ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἐὰν σὺ κατακερματίζῃς αὐτὴν 
κατὰ μόρια (79b7-79c3). 
 
...when I begged  
you to tell me about virtue as a whole, you are far from telling me what  
it is. Rather, you say that every action is virtue if it is performed with a  
part of virtue, as if you had said what virtue is as a whole, so I would  
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already know that, even if you fragment it into parts.125  
 
Socrates is referring to a later definition provided by Meno (virtue is the power of 
securing goods; 78b), but his observation sums up the general problem well. The purpose 
of collection and division is to instruct and clarify, yet Meno’s reasoning lacks cohesion 
to the point of being fractured and discordant. It exemplifies the idea of crumbling 
something into small pieces rather than dividing a whole along natural joints. In contrast 
to Meno’s description of virtue, when Socrates had applied collection and division to 
define love and madness in the Phaedrus, he enumerated and named four kinds of divine 
madness (Section 1.2.1, pg. 21). Enumeration and naming yield structure and clarity, but 
these are lacking in Meno’s account.  
To conclude this argument, Meno’s reasoning appears to be a far cry from the 
method of collection and division, which may not yield a proven conclusion but at least 
brings clarity and consistency through definition (Phaedrus 265d). In short, instead of a 
structured whole, Meno gives us a jumble of names painting a random, incoherent 
picture, or in modern terms “a heap of broken images” (Eliot 61). Far from being a form 
of collection and division, in many ways it is what collection and division oppose. 
Collection and division and Meno’s reasoning differ to such an extent that they are 
entirely different kinds of reasoning.   
 
5.3.2 Hypothesis: Meno’s definition of virtue derives from collection and  
         division 
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The preceding section presented an argument for the purpose of setting the stage 
for the following counter-argument. In this section, it will be argued that Meno’s 
definition of virtue only appears to be far removed from collection and division, but on 
further consideration, this is not the case: there are several reasons for concluding that 
Meno’s reasoning ultimately derives from collection and division.  
Arguably, Meno’s “swarm” represents the first steps of collection. Under some 
interpretations, it is simply a list that can serve as the starting point for reflection and 
argumentation that will ultimately lead to a definition. In her article, “Division and 
Definition in Plato’s Sophist and Statesman,” M.L. Gill notes the following: 
 
Collection without division often occurs in the Socratic dialogues, at the start of an 
investigation. When Socrates asks ‘What is X?’ the interlocutor often initially gives 
some sort of list—e.g. Euth. 5d8–e2; Meno 71e1–72a5; Tht. 146c7–d3. Socrates 
always objects to the list and insists that he wants to know what all the items have in 
common, what it is that makes them all examples of one kind. Although Socrates 
objects, the list is very important in getting the investigation started, because 
reflection on the items enumerated can help one recognize the common character they 
share (198). 
 
However, it will be argued below that Meno’s definition is more than a list. While it is 
not a fully-developed framework that delineates each kind of virtue, it occupies an 
intermediate area between a list of names and a fully-structured collection or logical 
whole.  
There are two reasons why Meno’s definition of virtue should not be considered 
as simply an unstructured list or, as argued in the preceding section, as merely an 
incoherent and disjointed collection of concepts and images. First, Meno provides two 
definitions, one for man and one for woman (71e). These are expressed in general terms 
(e.g., “ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν” – “being able to manage public affairs”) that 
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indicate the scope and meaning behind the name ‘ἀρετή.’ While these may not be 
consistent definitions, they are a step above and beyond merely listing instances of virtue. 
Treating virtue as a whole, at least some parts of virtue are specified by these definitions.  
Second, Meno’s definition of virtue indicates a common thread, the idea of the 
human, that binds the items of the list into a whole. More specifically, his definition 
presents a consistently human picture of virtue, as opposed to a list of abstract concepts 
or a mixture of abstract and concrete. His examples of different kinds of virtue, those of 
man, woman, child, elderly man, etc., are all human examples. Although it is not spelled 
out, there is at least an unstated connection between virtue and the human. Meno could 
have presented a completely scattered account of virtue, listing the virtue of numbers, say, 
side-by-side with the virtues of gods as well as humans, and the virtues of different kinds 
of knowledge. In response to this claim, it can be argued that the initial question posed at 
the start of the dialogue, whether virtue is teachable (70a), already implies that virtue is 
related to the human. But this is not the case – if there were virtues of numbers, let’s say, 
Meno could still argue that such virtues are or are not teachable – in other words, Meno 
did not have to restrict the scope of his definition to the human in order to answer 
Socrates’ question. But even if the concept of the human is already implicit in Socrates’ 
question, what does this prove? Only that Meno, like Socrates, was reasoning about a 
certain kind of virtue – i.e., the human kind. He could have replied that ‘virtue’ applies to 
everything, not just the human, but he did not. Thus, Meno’s definition is wide in scope, 
spanning all ages and activities, yet it is restricted to the sphere of the human. In short, 
there is a kind of loose structure – an outline of a whole – in Meno’s definition that 
extends beyond the appellation ‘virtue.’ 
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In addition, Meno is not dogmatic; he is willing to revise his account of virtue. 
This resembles the practice seen in the Sophist and Statesman, where definitions are 
revised several times during collection and division. In fact, Meno presents at least six 
definitions of virtue in response to Socrates’ criticisms in the first part of the dialogue 
(73d, 74a, 77b, 78c, and 79a). Moreover, as a whole the definitions re-affirm the 
connection between virtue and the human. To reiterate the first point, Meno did not slip 
into a realm of abstraction or some strange Pythagorean mode in which the virtue of 
number is grouped together with the virtue of man, for example. Finally, Meno’s use of 
exemplars to paint a vivid picture of an abstract idea resembles collection and division as 
seen in the Sophist and the Statesman. The figures of the elderly man and the slave, the 
householder and child, come to mind when reflecting on Meno’s examples. This is not 
unlike the summoning of exemplars in the Statesman, for example, where representative 
individuals and activities such as the architect and householder, and arithmetic and 
carpentry, are used to illustrate the initial divisions that eventually yield a definition 
(258d-259e). 
In these ways Meno gives us a partial and questionable image of virtue, but it is 
also a representative image: it uses the idea of the human to illustrate a key aspect of 
virtue. As such it is more than a mere list of names or concepts completely lacking in 
structure or consistency. On the other hand, it is not a fully-developed image; it only 
approximates the precision of the classificatory scheme of madness that is described in 
the Phaedrus, for example. Thus, instead of naming each kind of virtue, Meno names 
only some of them: he indicates that virtue overlaps with other concepts: those of man, 
woman, slavery, freedom, etc. But the vast majority of “virtues” remain unnamed, and 
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their relations, if any, to the virtues of man, woman, etc. are unstated. The parts of virtue 
and their interrelations (i.e., their arrangement or placement within a logical structure) is 
only hinted at. To borrow an analogy from one of the models of collection and division 
discussed in Chapter 3, Meno’s picture of virtue is like a fabric that is only partially 
woven; i.e., it is a loosely-defined structure that at least serves as the starting point for 
inquiry and argument. It will be argued in Section 5.5 below that Meno’s definition is the 
result of an incomplete application of the three operations of collection and division that 
were defined in Chapter 2. 
 
5.4 The Euthyphro 
 
At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates, facing a charge by Meletus, 
encounters Euthyphro near the king-archon’s court (2a). Euthyphro explains that he is 
prosecuting his father for murder. His story is as follows: 
 
…ἐπεὶ ὅ γε ἀποθανὼν πελάτης 
τις ἦν ἐμός, καὶ ὡς ἐγεωργοῦμεν ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ, ἐθήτευεν 
ἐκεῖ παρ’ ἡμῖν. παροινήσας οὖν καὶ ὀργισθεὶς τῶν οἰκετῶν (5) 
τινι τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀποσφάττει αὐτόν. ὁ οὖν πατὴρ συνδή- 
σας τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, καταβαλὼν εἰς τάφρον 
τινά, πέμπει δεῦρο ἄνδρα πευσόμενον τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ ὅτι χρείη 
(d) ποιεῖν. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦ δεδεμένου ὠλιγώρει τε 
καὶ ἠμέλει ὡς ἀνδροφόνου καὶ οὐδὲν ὂν πρᾶγμα εἰ καὶ ἀπο- 
θάνοι, ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἔπαθεν· ὑπὸ γὰρ λιμοῦ καὶ ῥίγους καὶ  
τῶν δεσμῶν ἀποθνῄσκει πρὶν τὸν ἄγγελον παρὰ τοῦ ἐξηγη- 
τοῦ ἀφικέσθαι. (4c3-4d5) 
 
The victim was a dependent of mine, and when we were farming  
in Naxos he was a servant of ours. He killed one of our household slaves  
in drunken anger, so my father bound him hand and foot and threw him  
in a ditch, then sent a man here to inquire from the priest what should  
be done. During that time he gave no thought or care to the bound man,  
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as being a killer, and it was no matter if he died, which he did. Hunger  
and cold and his bonds caused his death before the messenger came back  
from the seer.126  
 
At Socrates’ prompting, Euthyphro provides a definition of piety: 
 
     ΣΩ. Λέγε δή, τί φῂς εἶναι τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τί τὸ ἀνόσιον; 
     ΕΥΘ. Λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅσιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νῦν 
ποιῶ, τῷ ἀδικοῦντι ἢ περὶ φόνους ἢ περὶ ἱερῶν κλοπὰς ἤ τι 
ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων ἐξαμαρτάνοντι ἐπεξιέναι, ἐάντε πατὴρ (10) 
(e) ὢν τυγχάνῃ ἐάντε μήτηρ ἐάντε ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν, τὸ δὲ μὴ 
ἐπεξιέναι ἀνόσιον· ἐπεί, ὦ Σώκρατες, θέασαι ὡς μέγα σοι ἐρῶ 
τεκμήριον τοῦ νόμου ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει—ὃ καὶ ἄλλοις ἤδη εἶπον, 
ὅτι ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη οὕτω γιγνόμενα—μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τῷ ἀσε- 
βοῦντι μηδ’ ἂν ὁστισοῦν τυγχάνῃ ὤν. αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι 
τυγχάνουσι νομίζοντες τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἄριστον καὶ δικαιότατον,   
6(a) καὶ τοῦτον ὁμολογοῦσι τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα δῆσαι ὅτι 
τοὺς ὑεῖς κατέπινεν οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ, κἀκεῖνόν γε αὖ τὸν αὑτοῦ 
πατέρα ἐκτεμεῖν δι’ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα. (5d7-6a3) 
 
     Socrates: Tell me then, what is the pious, and what the impious, do  
you say? 
     Euthyphro: I say that the pious is to do what I am doing now, to  
prosecute the wrongdoer, be it about murder or temple robbery or anything  
else, whether the wrongdoer is your father or your mother or anyone else;  
not to prosecute is impious. And observe, Socrates, that I can cite powerful  
evidence that the law is so. I have already said to others that such actions are  
right, not to favor the ungodly, whoever they are. These people themselves  
believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, yet they agree that  
he bound his father because he unjustly swallowed his sons, and that he  
in turn castrated his father for similar reasons.127  
 
Euthyphro also remarks that his father and other relatives are angry because they believe 
that it is impious for a son to prosecute his father for murder, especially in this case since 
the victim was himself a killer (4d). But Euthyphro claims that their ideas of the divine 
attitude to piety and impiety are mistaken: “For, they say, it is impious for a son to 
                                                 
126 Translated by G.M.A. Grube (Plato 4) 
 




prosecute his father for murder. But their ideas of the divine attitude to piety and impiety 
are wrong, Socrates.”128 (“ἀνόσιον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ὑὸν πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξιέναι—κακῶς 
εἰδότες, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ ὁσίου τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου.”; 4e). 
Below, Euthyphro’s definition of piety will serve as a representative example of 
non-deductive reasoning. This definition was chosen because Euthyphro, like Meno, is 
not a philosopher, nor is he a specialist in practicing collection and division as a specific 
procedure, as the Eleatic Stranger is in the Sophist and the Statesman. Rather, he 
formulates his definition in the midst of a conversation. As such, it is a suitable example 
for explaining how collection and division allow one “to speak and to think” (see Section 
1.6.3) without the application of a specific procedure. However, first it will be argued in 
Section 5.4.1 that Euthyphro’s definition is unrelated to collection and division. This will 
set the stage for the opposing argument presented in Section 5.4.2: Euthyphro’s definition 
of piety only appears to be far removed from collection and division, but on further 
consideration, it will be argued, this is not the case.  
 
5.4.1 Hypothesis: Euthyphro’s definition of piety does not derive from  
         collection and division 
 
At 5d-e Euthyphro is formulating a definition of piety, but for several reasons it is 
essentially different from collection and division. First, Euthyphro’s definition of piety 
emphasizes the particular over the general. The first part of his definition, “the pious is to 
do what I am doing now” (“τὸ μὲν ὅσιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νῦν ποιῶ”) shows that 
                                                 




Euthyphro defines piety in terms of his own actions – it is as if the general statement that 
follows (“to prosecute the wrongdoer”) was an afterthought. Thus, Euthyphro’s definition 
of piety indicates tunnel-vision: the particular details of his own situation, the here and 
now, limit and shape his understanding of the general concepts involved. Euthyphro did 
not set out to define piety and then state his definition; rather, he is answering a question 
posed by Socrates. This is a far cry from the elaborate step-by-step procedure carried out 
by the Eleatic Stranger in the Sophist and the Statesman. 
Furthermore, Euthyphro’s definition of piety is vague and unstructured. It leaves 
open the question of what wrongdoing is: there is no attempt to divide wrongdoing or 
piety into sub-kinds or species. We are left in the dark as to whether temple robbery and 
murder belong to the same species of wrongdoing, and we have no indication of the 
number of kinds of wrongdoing. What piety is, precisely – i.e., what particular kinds of 
wrongdoing it involves – is not specified. Thus, the “parts” of piety and wrongdoing 
remain unstated, and so it appears that Euthyphro’s brief remark on piety is not a logical 
framework.  
In short, Euthyphro’s definition of piety has very little, if anything, to do with 
collection and division. None of the familiar steps of collection take place: instead we are 
led from a very specific case – the details of his father’s crime and Euthyphro’s decision 
to prosecute – to a generalized claim supported only by authority, in this case the 
examples of Zeus and Cronus. Nor is there any division into kinds or aspects: instead of 
the names and number of kinds or aspects of piety, we are given a story about a particular 
crime. No logical structure is formulated or investigated; instead, Euthyphro simply 
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relates his observations on his own experience, going no further than drawing a parallel 
with the gods.  
 
5.4.2 Hypothesis: Euthyphro’s definition of piety derives from collection  
          and division 
 
Like Meno’s definition of virtue, Euthyphro’s initial statement concerning piety – 
“the pious is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer” – is general enough 
to serve as a definition in the sense that it indicates the scope of piety. More specifically, 
Euthyphro’s statement is not restricted to his particular actions – it is a claim about piety 
in general. In addition, Euthyphro distinguishes piety from the impious (5e). Whether 
true or false, Euthyphro’s definition expresses a division between two contraries, and 
both are defined in terms of their relations to two other concepts, prosecution and 
wrongdoing.  
Commentators have expressed differing interpretations as to whether Euthyphro’s 
statement amounts to a definition. Taylor remarks that “Like so many of the interlocutors 
in these early dialogues of Plato, Euthyphro at first confuses definition with the 
enumeration of examples. ‘Religious duty’ is to proceed against the party guilty of an 
offence against religion, whether it be a homicide or a sacrilegious theft, or any other 
such crime ...” (149). Even if this were the case, Geach argues that examples can be more 
informative than formal definitions: “We know heaps of things without being able to 
define the terms in which we express our knowledge. Formal definitions are only one 
way of elucidating terms; a set of examples may in a given case be more useful than a 
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formal definition” (371). But regardless of whether examples can be more useful than a 
formal definition, others have a different point of view: Euthyphro is not only providing 
examples of piety, he is also defining it. Thus, Hoerber argues that “by defining piety as 
prosecuting the guilty, [Euthyphro] does not mean merely ‘do what I am doing’ (although 
Socrates interprets the definition thus at 6d), but his intent is rather ‘follow the law’ 
(5e3) ... Euthyphro, by prosecuting his father, is following the law, the highest human 
authority” (101). Under this interpretation, Euthyphro is not only enumerating examples 
but making a general claim about piety. Moreover, some commentators argue that 
Euthyphro is defining a class; Gomperz states that “In reply to the question – What is 
pious, and what impious? Euthyphro at first merely refers to the class of instances to 
which his own action belongs. It is pious, he says, to accuse evil-doers, and, in so doing, 
to spare neither father nor mother nor any one else” (359).  
On the other hand, as argued in the previous section, under some interpretations 
Euthyphro’s definition of piety can be dismissed as a simple appeal to authority; i.e., 
instead of reasoning his way to a definition through an understanding of the nature of 
piety, Euthyphro conjures religious figures to justify his actions. But behind Euthyphro’s 
seemingly simplistic reasoning is a set of parallels that serve to illustrate his definition: 
the relation between Cronus and his father Uranus parallels the relation between Zeus and 
his father Cronus; and these in turn, according to Euthyphro, parallel the relation between 
Euthyphro and his father. The common thread that runs through each father-son relation 
according to this argument is the prosecution of wrongdoing; in each case the image of a 
son prosecuting his guilty father serves as a representation of piety, according to 
Euthyphro. Just as figurative exemplars such as the householder and the architect are 
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used to illustrate the reasoning behind a division in the Statesman (Section 5.3.2, pg. 250), 
here Euthyphro is reasoning along the same lines: individual gods and humans serve as 
examples to clarify a general idea and to distinguish it from other concepts.  
The parallel between the divine and the human is also seen when collection and 
division are introduced in the Phaedrus: the human is the “left-hand” of madness, the 
divine is the “right hand” (266a). At Phaedrus 265b, Socrates’ summary of the results of 
collection and division is as follows: 
 
     ΣΩ. Τῆς δὲ θείας τεττάρων θεῶν τέτταρα μέρη διελόμενοι, 
μαντικὴν μὲν ἐπίπνοιαν Ἀπόλλωνος θέντες, Διονύσου δὲ 
τελεστικήν, Μουσῶν δ’ αὖ ποιητικήν, τετάρτην δὲ Ἀφροδίτης 
καὶ Ἔρωτος, ἐρωτικὴν μανίαν ἐφήσαμέν τε ἀρίστην εἶναι, (5) 
καὶ οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπῃ τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθος ἀπεικάζοντες, ἴσως 
μὲν ἀληθοῦς τινος ἐφαπτόμενοι, τάχα δ’ ἂν καὶ ἄλλοσε 
παραφερόμενοι… (265b2-8) 
 
     Socrates: We also distinguished four parts within the divine kind and  
ascribed them to four gods. Having attributed the inspiration of the  
prophet to Apollo, of the mystic to Dionysus, of the poet to the Muses,  
and the fourth part of madness to Aphrodite and to Love, we said that the  
madness of love is the best. We expressed the passion of love figuratively;  
perhaps it had a measure of truth in it, though it may also have led us  
astray.129 
 
Thus, Socrates admits that some truth was expressed by collection and division – the 
definition of love is partial, yet, just as in Euthyphro’s case, it presents at least a general 
picture or image of what is being defined. Here, the Greek word for “figuratively” is 
‘ἀπεικάζοντες,’ the participle form of ‘ἀπεικάζω,’ which means “liken, compare with” or 
“to form from a model”130 (Liddell and Scott 182). Socrates likens divine madness to the 
                                                 
129 Translated after A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff (Plato 542), with modifications. 
 
130 Ast lists ‘assimilo’ and ‘comparo’ as the meanings of this word (215), and cites its occurrence 
throughout the dialogues, including passages in which the word is used to compare parts of a whole that is 
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four gods, and Euthyphro reasons similarly when he likens his actions to those of Zeus 
and Cronus. While on the one hand Socrates emphasizes the differences between human 
and divine madness, and on the other Euthyphro emphasizes the similarities between 
human and divine piety, the general form of reasoning is the same: one concept is 
illustrated with human and divine analogues. More generally, the concepts of divine and 
human overlap both piety and madness. 
As discussed in Section 3.2.2 (pg. 162), commentators such as Moravcsik argue 
that Plato did not consider division to produce a definition in the usual sense of the word. 
Instead of specifying a singular statement of essential properties, the method yields one 
of many possible “characterizations” that individuate the concept being defined. Both 
Socrates’ division of madness in the Phaedrus and Euthyphro’s definition of piety can be 
understood as characterizations in this sense. This is not to say that either characterization 
is correct, only that the reasoning that is used to arrive at a characterization, even a 
tentative one, is driven at least implicitly by collection and division. In Euthyphro’s case, 
Socrates has good reason for criticizing Euthyphro’s definition of piety.131 However, the 
key point is that Socrates at least has something to argue against: by using the analogies 
of Zeus and Cronus to illustrate the concept of piety, Euthyphro presents a background 
picture of human and divine families that specifies the conceptual relations between piety, 
prosecution, and wrongdoing. This is not to say that the picture is fully coherent or 
consistent, nor is it a complete division with each part fully articulated; rather, in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
divided (e.g. at Statesman 267a). 
 
131 Even this is questionable, however: Geach argues that Socrates’ criticism amounts to an ad hominem 
argument and an appeal to class prejudices (375). 
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background of his reasoning is a basic logical structure that presupposes a rudimentary 
form of collection and division. 
More specifically, each of the two families described by Euthyphro – the divine 
lineage of Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus on the one hand, and the human lineage comprising 
Euthyphro and his father on the other – can be understood as a whole of parts. Under one 
sense of the word, each lineage is a “γένος” – a collection of individuals that forms a 
unity.  
This sense of the term ‘γένος’ – i.e., ‘γένος’ as lineage – is recognized by 
Aristotle as well as Plato. In his observations on Metaphysics Δ.28, Pierre Pellegrin 
summarizes two senses of the term as follows: 
 
In the catalogue of the different senses of genos given in Metaphysics Δ.28, the first 
to be mentioned makes of genos ‘the uninterrupted generation (genesis) of beings 
having the same eidos’, which is to say that the genos is the locus of conservation of 
this eidos in time through the course of generations ... the second sense given to genos 
by this passage [is] that of a collection of individuals descended from the same 
progenitor, i.e. the same male ... The genos is thus fundamentally a patri-lineage, a 
‘genetic space’ of transmission of a kinship as well as a collection of individuals 
bound together by participation in the eidos of an ancestral male founder... (319) 
 
Thus, under this reading, the individual of a collection (i.e., each member of a lineage) 
participates in the eidos (εἶδος) not of a universal, but that of an individual, the ancestral 
male founder. Reasoning about individuals and reasoning about universals both involve 
reasoning about structures of wholes and parts. Collection and division are essentially 
about defining wholes and parts, no matter what kind of whole is being considered – thus, 
a lineage can be divided into individuals, or a kind can be divided into sub-kinds. 
In Plato, ‘γένος’ is used to refer to tribes, families and lineages as well as to kinds. 
The latter sense is often seen in the midst of a series of divisions; e.g. at 260d, 260e, and 
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263c in the Statesman. The former use is seen throughout the dialogues; e.g. Phaedrus 
246d refers to “τῶν θεῶν γένος” (“the race of the gods”) while other dialogues refer to 
races and lineages of men (e.g. Cratylus 397e, Critias 109d, Republic 368a).132 The 
following passage from the Cratylus is especially relevant since it makes the distinction 
between the two senses of the word in relation to the concept of piety: 
 
     ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν, οἳ ἂν ἐν τέρατος εἴδει (5) 
γένωνται; οἷον ὅταν ἐξ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ θεοσεβοῦς 
ἀσεβὴς γένηται, ἆρ’ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, κἂν 
ἵππος βοὸς ἔκγονον τέκῃ, οὐ τοῦ τεκόντος δήπου ἔδει τὴν 
ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γένους οὗ εἴη; 
     ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε. (10)  
(e)   ΣΩ. Καὶ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ εὐσεβοῦς ἄρα γενομένῳ ἀσεβεῖ τὸ 
τοῦ γένους ὄνομα ἀποδοτέον. (394d5-394e2) 
 
    Socrates: What about the ones that are born contrary to nature, those  
that are some form of monster? For instance, when a good and pious man  
has an impious son, the latter shouldn’t have his father’s name but that  
of the kind to which he belongs, just as in our earlier example of a horse  
having a calf as offspring? 
    Hermogenes: Yes 
    Socrates: Therefore the impious son of a pious father should be given  
the name of the kind to which he belongs.133 
 
Here, Socrates argues that “the name of the kind” (“τὸ τοῦ γένους ὄνομα”) ought 
to reflect not the parent’s name, but whether the son falls within the γένος of the pious or 
the impious. Euthyphro’s argument reflects this distinction, and his analogy between his 
actions and those of Zeus and Cronus works on two levels. First, there is the division 
between individuals – i.e., between father and son, a division which is paralleled in both 
the human and the divine families. Second, there is the conceptual division between the 
                                                 
132 Ast lists a variety of meanings for ‘γένος’; in addition to genus, in the dialogues it also means sexus, 
gens, stirps, and progenies (381-82). 
 
133 Translated by G.M.A. Grube (Plato 113) 
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pious and the impious that is characterized by Euthyphro’s definition of piety as 
prosecuting the guilty, and failing to do so as impiety. In both the Cratylus and the 
Euthyphro, the conceptual division between piety and impiety is contrasted with the 
relation between father and son – i.e., ‘γένος’ as a division of kinds is contrasted with 
‘γένος’ as a patriarchal lineage in which members of the lineage are not sub-kinds but 
individuals.  
In short, there are two undercurrents that shape Euthyphro’s reasoning, both of 
which are based on whole-part relations. In one respect, Euthyphro reasons about 
individuals: Uranus, Cronus, Zeus, his own father and his own self. He also reasons about 
individual families or lineages: the lineage of Uranus on the one hand, and that of his 
father (or his ancestor) on the other. Second, Euthyphro also reasons in more general 
terms, i.e., in terms of concepts such as prosecution, wrong-doing, and piety. Thus, 
whole-part reasoning and collection and division apply not only to universals, but also to 
individuals. This claim reinforces the argument made in Section 1.6.3, that collection and 
division are wide in scope, and it also supports the argument that they are not restricted to 
defining genus-species trees (see Section 3.2.5). The relation between both forms of 
reasoning to structures of wholes and parts will be discussed in more detail below. 
 First, the divine and human lineages described by Euthyphro can be paralleled 
and compared with each other because they share in the same kind of whole-part relation, 
here treating each individual of a lineage as part of a whole; i.e., the parts of a whole in 
this case are not kinds, species, or aspects, but individuals: humans in one case, gods in 
another, but individuals nonetheless. Because the lineage of Uranus-Cronus-Zeus shares 
the same basic relational structure as the lineage of Euthyphro’s father and Euthyphro, 
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Euthyphro can use the former as a model – i.e., as a representative image with which to 
compare his own actions. Thus, relations between individuals, not kinds or species, are 
used to understand and compare two wholes. Moreover, in Euthyphro’s reasoning each 
family or lineage is an individual. In one case, the individual family is that of which 
Uranus is the patriarch, in the other, the individual family is that of which Euthyphro’s 
father (or one of his ancestors) is the patriarch. Euthyphro’s reasoning incorporates 
individual fathers and sons and families as well as the more general concepts father, son, 
prosecution, etc.  
Second, Euthyphro reasons in a more general way as well: he defines piety as a 
kind of prosecution. But even in this case, although he does not use whole-part 
terminology, he reasons in terms of wholes and parts. More specifically, since (according 
to his definition) piety is a kind of prosecution, piety is a part of prosecution. The 
difference here is that instead of reasoning about individual humans, gods, and families, 
he is reasoning about universals: Forms or concepts. Nonetheless, he reasons in terms of 
wholes and parts in both cases. In the first case – i.e., in the respect in which he reasons 
about individuals – he reasons about two families, one a collection of gods, one a 
collection of humans, but both are divided in terms of individual fathers and sons. In the 
second case – i.e., in the respect in which Euthyphro reasons about kinds or aspects – he 
divides prosecution into two kinds, the kind that is pious (i.e., the prosecution of wrong-
doers) and the kind that is not. Thus, both senses of the term ‘γένος’ are operative in the 
background of Euthyphro’s reasoning and in both cases, the notion of a whole divided 
into parts underlies Euthyphro’s reasoning. 
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Collection and division that involve reasoning about both individuals and kinds is 
also seen in the Phaedrus, where Socrates divides madness in terms of individual gods on 
the one hand, and kinds of madness on the other (265b2-8, quoted above on pg. 260). 
Here, each individual god is associated with a specific kind. Moreover, the three 
operations of collection and division – seeing, naming, placing – apply to both 
individuals and kinds in Socrates’ definition of love. On the one hand, the parts of divine 
madness are seen as individual gods and goddesses, they are given the names of 
individuals such as Aphrodite and Dionysus, and they are clearly placed in the same 
family on the right-hand side of madness. On the other hand, the parts of madness are 
also seen as kinds: the prophetic, the mystic, the poetic, and the erotic, each of them 
placed under the divine kind of madness. A similar form of reasoning is seen in 
Euthyphro’s case: he sees that Zeus, for example, is not only an individual but also an 
individual who exhibits a kind of behavior, the prosecution of wrong-doing, the latter of 




The Meno and the Euthyphro are both interesting cases that shed light on what 
counts as a framework – i.e., what counts as a product of collection and division. 
According to one interpretation, collection and division produce elaborate logical 
structures. Moreover, a certain definite ordering and structure must be present. Under this 
reading, a simple statement like ‘piety is a kind of prosecution’ is not a product of 
collection and division. In addition, under this reading Meno’s definition of virtue is not a 
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framework either, because it is too incoherent, too scattered and disorganized, to count as 
a logical structure. I argue that, on the contrary, collection and division are involved in 
both cases. 
  Meno’s definition can be understood as an incomplete application of collection 
and division: parts of virtue – i.e., kinds and instances of virtue – are collected together, 
and they are unified by the concept of the human. In this sense, Meno brings together into 
a whole the “scattered many” (cf. Section 1.2.1) instances and kinds of virtue. But the 
whole is not clearly defined because only a fraction of the parts of virtue are enumerated 
and named (e.g., the virtue of man and woman), while most of its parts are only alluded 
to: the virtues for every age and individual remain nameless. These latter parts of virtue 
are not structured; i.e., they are not placed in a logical structure as, say, different kinds of 
madness are placed under divine or human kinds in the Phaedrus. So, while Meno can 
“see” that virtue has parts – i.e., there are different kinds and instances of virtue – he 
names only some of them, and their interrelations, if any, are unstated. In this respect, 
Meno’s definition expresses only a partial application of the three operations of collection 
and division, seeing, naming, and placing. Thus, while there is a tenuous and unstated 
relation between Meno’s reasoning on virtue and collection and division, there is a 
relation nonetheless: at least some parts are discerned and named, bringing Meno one 
step closer to a coherent definition. 
The Euthyphro shows how whole-part reasoning applies to both universals and to 
individuals and collections thereof. On the one hand, a family can be seen as a structure 
which can be compared with another family of the same or a different kind. In 
Euthyphro’s case, a human family is compared with a divine family, and a similarity is 
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found because each family exhibits pious behavior. On the other hand, families can also 
be seen as wholes that are divided into individual fathers, sons, mothers, daughters, etc. 
The latter form of reasoning, however, falls outside of the scope of the syllogistic: the 
genealogical relations of lineages are not transitive.134 Thus, collection and division 
encompass and integrate reasoning about individuals and reasoning about universals, 
and they underlie forms of reasoning that are not encompassed by the syllogistic.  
The purpose of arguing that Meno’s definition of virtue and Euthyphro’s 
definition of piety call out for logical frameworks is twofold: first, it adds support to the 
argument presented in Section 2.4, where it was argued that collection and division are 
not necessarily a skill-based procedure. Even Meno’s and Euthyphro’s formulations of 
piety and virtue involve collection and division despite the absence of a procedure as seen 
in the Statesman and the Sophist. Second, this chapter supports the argument that 
collection and division underlie non-deductive reasoning. Neither Meno nor Euthyphro 
were defining hierarchical logical structures, yet they were formulating conceptual 
frameworks nonetheless. These frameworks could have been developed much further – 
e.g., the concept of prosecution could be mapped out, much as production is mapped out 
in the Sophist. Also, each of the kinds of virtue that Meno describes (e.g., the virtue of 
man, the virtue of woman, etc.) can be explored and then tested through the method of 
elenchus or through some other means. But while these definitions serve as minimal or 
partial frameworks, they are frameworks nonetheless. In short, they are products of 
collection and division – they are the endpoints of reasoning about wholes and parts that, 
in turn, serve as starting-points for other lines of reasoning.  
 
                                                 




Conclusion: summary and avenues for future research 
 
6.1 Introduction    
 
  The preceding chapters have raised some unanswered questions that, while not 
crucial to defending the thesis, point the way to possible future projects. A brief 
discussion of these questions will at least bring additional aspects of collection and 
division to light as well as indicate avenues for future research. The purpose of this 
chapter is twofold. First, it will summarize the key points and arguments of the preceding 
chapters. Second, it will discuss three interrelated questions that indicate possible future 
projects relevant to collection and division. While drawing on material introduced in the 
preceding chapters, these questions also bring into play aspects of Plato’s thought that are 
just as much relevant to epistemology and metaphysics as they are to logic. The purpose 
of discussing these questions is not to present fully-developed arguments in favor of a 
particular point of view, but only to introduce problems that I believe are interesting and 
relevant to contemporary Platonic studies. These questions show how some of the 
conclusions of the preceding chapters can be used as starting points for future work. An 
outline of each section of this chapter is provided below.  
Section 6.2 reiterates the central thesis introduced in Chapter 1 and summarizes 
the main arguments that were presented in the preceding chapters. Section 6.3.1 raises the 
question of how to evaluate the correctness of images. Since an image may or may not 
represent its object accurately, criteria are needed to determine whether an image is 
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truthful. A passage in the Laws does provide such criteria, but, as will be explained 
below, it raises the problem of Meno’s paradox. In Section 6.3.2, a related problem will 
be presented: in the dialogues, belief and knowledge are sometimes represented as 
collections of individuals. According to one interpretation of the unlimited (ἄπειρον), not 
only organisms, but beliefs are subject to countless variations, making them subject to the 
same idiosyncrasies as organisms in a state of flux. Section 6.3.3 will further discuss 
material introduced in Section 2.2.1.3 (pg. 110), where the possibility of a further 
analysis of the operation of seeing was introduced. A passage in the Parmenides states 
that “the instant” (τὸ ἐξαίφνης) lies between the one and the many and the many and the 
one. One avenue for future inquiry is to consider the instant as a boundary between two 
steps of reasoning, and this approach may point the way to further analysis of the three 
operations of collection and division. 
 
6.2 Summary  
 
Collection and division define logical frameworks that underlie both deductive 
and non-deductive reasoning. As explained in Chapter 1, collection and division can be 
understood as ways of reasoning (Section 1.6.3, pg. 88). Moreover, the reasoning is 
logical in the sense that it is a stepwise process oriented toward a true conclusion (Section 
1.5.3, pg. 74). This interpretation agrees with the image of collection and division as a 
road (ὁδός) and a method (μεθόδος).  
Collection is reasoning about a scattered many – whether sensible or not – and 
“seeing” or “bringing together” the many into a unified, coherent whole (Section 2.2.1.2, 
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pg. 105). Division is the reverse of collection: instead of bringing many into one, it 
separates one into many. Division may or may not involve empirical observations, and it 
may or may not involve dividing into kinds. More specifically, a whole can comprise 
parts that are not species or sub-kinds of the whole. For example, Menn points out that 
mutes are not sub-kinds of sound (φωνή), although they are still “in” sound (295). In 
short, “Theuth is depicted, not as dividing speech into its kinds, but as discovering the 
ἀρχαί out of which speech is constituted” (Menn 294; see Section 1.5.3, pg. 74). 
Similarly, the high and low, fast and slow mentioned at Philebus 26a are not kinds or 
sub-kinds of sound, but aspects of sound that apply to multiple kinds of φωνή. 
A logical framework is defined by means of collection and division through three 
operations: seeing, naming, and placing. Through seeing, one discerns similarities and 
differences between the parts of a conceptual whole. Naming articulates the scope of the 
parts that have been discerned. Placing defines interrelations between the parts, giving 
order and structure to the whole. These operations are not explicitly defined by Socrates 
and the Eleatic Stranger, instead, their use is illustrated, and this is precisely the point of 
naming the three operations: it makes evident a pattern that underlies collection and 
division as they are portrayed in the dialogues. 
Each of the three operations can be understood as a part of an ordered process: (1) 
the parts of a whole are seen, (2) each part is named, and (3) the target is placed into a 
part, and the process is repeated. This is not the only reading of the three operations as an 
ordered process. As explained in Section 2.2.4 (pg. 129), other readings are viable. 
Arguably, each step of reasoning begins and ends with a name, i.e. the intervals of 
reasoning are demarcated by names that articulate wholes and parts. Even in this case, 
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however, seeing and placing play a role: at some point, parts must be discerned, and in 
some cases, nameless parts must be discovered. This is seen in the Philebus, where the 
letters of the alphabet were revealed by Theuth through collection and division. In 
addition, parts must be ordered into a whole; a mere list of named parts does not define a 
structure (Section 5.2, pg. 242). 
Collection and division produce logical frameworks – i.e., structures defined 
through whole-part relations. A framework can serve as the basis of other forms of 
reasoning. For example, by defining hierarchical relations between the parts of a whole, a 
framework can serve as the basis of a syllogism. The syllogistic is based on proper-part 
relations, which are asymmetric and transitive. This is evident in Barbara, for example 
(see Section 4.4.3.3, pg. 219). However, collection and division can also define structures 
of non-hierarchical overlapping parts, as is often seen in dialogues such as the Sophist 
and the Statesman (see Section 4.4.3.4, pg. 225). But regardless of whether hierarchical 
or non-hierarchical structures are defined, a logical framework produced by collection 
and division can serve as the starting point for other lines of reasoning. A framework can 
be the target of elenchus, the subject of a myth, or serve as an image or representation to 
be revised or discarded (Section 2.2.4, pg. 129). As stated in Section 1.6 (pg. 83), 
collection and division can be a means by which one may inquire, discover, and learn.  
When collection and division are successful, the resulting framework is a coherent 
picture that is more or less true of its subject – i.e., the parts of a whole and their relations 
are displayed accurately. As argued in Section 2.3 (pg. 134), when the method is 
employed to clarify and explain, it often aims to produce an image that represents the 
target being defined. This raises the question as to which criteria are to be used when 
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judging whether the result of collection and division is accurate. In Section 6.3.1 below, it 
will be argued that Plato provides three criteria for evaluating the truthfulness of an 
image. However, as will be explained below, even with these criteria Meno’s paradox 
holds: i.e., it would seem that the object of a search needs to be known before the search 
is completed. 
 
6.3 Avenues for future research 
6.3.1 Criteria for evaluating images 
 
In Section 2.3.3, it was argued that like definitions, images are depictions that 
may or may not be truthful representations of the object being described. The danger of 
producing a misleading definition or image through collection and division is made 
evident as early as the Phaedrus: Socrates admits that his portrayal of madness may have 
led him astray (Section 2.2, pg. 98). As explained in Section 2.3.3 (pg. 141), Plato makes 
a distinction between two kinds of image, a likeness which is truthful and an appearance 
which is misleading. But how can we tell the two apart? For example, how do we know 
that the final definition of the Sophist is not an appearance as opposed to a likeness – i.e., 
how do we rule out the possibility that the final definition merely seems to be conclusive 
and truthful, but in reality is just another appearance? In short, how does one determine if 
an image or representation is accurate?  
The dialogues provide criteria for determining the correctness of images. More 
specifically, a passage in the Laws states the following: 
 
     ΑΘ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις. ἆρ’ οὖν οὐ περὶ ἑκάστην εἰκόνα, 
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καὶ ἐν γραφικῇ καὶ ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ πάντῃ, τὸν μέλλοντα 
ἔμφρονα κριτὴν ἔσεσθαι δεῖ ταῦτα τρία ἔχειν, ὅ τέ ἐστι 
(b) πρῶτον γιγνώσκειν, ἔπειτα ὡς ὀρθῶς, ἔπειθ’ ὡς εὖ, τὸ 
τρίτον, εἴργασται τῶν εἰκόνων ἡτισοῦν ῥήμασί τε καὶ μέλεσι 
καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς (669a7-669b3);  
 
     Athenian: You have hit the nail on the head. So anyone who is going  
to be a sensible judge of any image – in painting and music and  
every other field – should be able to assess three points: he must know,  
first, what has been represented; second, how correctly it has been copied;  
and then, third, the moral value of this or that representation produced by  
language, tunes and rhythms.135 
 
While this passage gives us a general idea of how to proceed given a representation or 
image (εἰκών) of an original, the problem becomes circular: if knowledge of what is 
being represented is required, and the method of collection and division is designed to 
give us knowledge of the original through a representation, how can one judge a 
representation until knowledge is achieved? It would seem that one must already know 
the original before one can successfully search for it using a representative image. This 
problem echoes Meno’s paradox: 
 
     ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὃ (5) 
μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν ὅτι ἐστίν; ποῖον γὰρ ὧν οὐκ οἶσθα 
προθέμενος ζητήσεις; ἢ εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ, 
πῶς εἴσῃ ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ σὺ οὐκ ᾔδησθα (80d5-8); 
 
     Meno: How will you look for it, Socrates, when you do not know at all  
what it is? How will you aim to search for something you do not know  
at all? If you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing  
that you did not know?136 
 
Similarly, it would seem impossible to apply the criteria specified in the Laws unless one 
has already found what one is searching for: knowledge of the original above and beyond 
                                                 
135 Translated after Trevor J. Saunders (Plato 1359-60), with modifications. 
 
136 Translated by G.M.A. Grube (Plato 880) 
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knowledge of its representation. This problem is related to that posed in the following 
section: if knowledge of the target being defined is not available during the search, it 
would seem that a definition can be revised without limit. This problem will be explained 
more fully below. 
 
6.3.2 Belief, knowledge, and individuals 
 
In the Symposium, the contents of the soul, including belief and knowledge, are 
described as if they generate and decay in the same manner as organisms. After 
describing the continuous changes that accompany the body from childhood to old age, 
Diotima describes a similar process of change in the soul of an individual: 
 
…καὶ μὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ τρόποι, τὰ ἤθη, δόξαι, ἐπιθυ- 
μίαι, ἡδοναί, λῦπαι, φόβοι, τούτων ἕκαστα οὐδέποτε τὰ 
αὐτὰ πάρεστιν ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀπόλ- 
λυται. πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἀτοπώτερον ἔτι, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι (5) 
208 (a) μὴ ὅτι αἱ μὲν γίγνονται, αἱ δὲ ἀπόλλυνται ἡμῖν, καὶ οὐδέ- 
ποτε οἱ αὐτοί ἐσμεν οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
μία ἑκάστη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ταὐτὸν πάσχει. ὃ γὰρ καλεῖται 
μελετᾶν, ὡς ἐξιούσης ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· λήθη γὰρ 
ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος, μελέτη δὲ πάλιν καινὴν ἐμποιοῦσα ἀντὶ (5) 
τῆς ἀπιούσης μνήμην σῴζει τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥστε τὴν 
αὐτὴν δοκεῖν εἶναι. (207e1-208a7) 
 
…And it’s not just in his body, but in his soul, too, for  
none of his manners, customs, beliefs, desires, pleasures, pains, or fears  
ever remains the same, but some are coming to be in him while others  
are passing away. And what is still far stranger than that is that not only 
does one branch of knowledge come to be in us while another passes away 
and that we are never the same even in respect of our knowledge, but 
that each single piece of knowledge has the same fate. For what we call 
studying exists because knowledge is leaving us, because forgetting is the 
departure of knowledge, while studying puts back a fresh memory in place 
of what went away, thereby preserving a piece of knowledge, so that it  
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seems to be the same…137  
 
The Symposium paints the picture of beliefs (δόξα) and items of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη)138 
in flux. Just like physical organisms, belief and knowledge come to be and pass away in 
the individual.139  
The Sophist in particular can be read as a dialogue in which individual 
appearances (i.e., definitions of the sophist) follow one after the other, each appearance 
bringing something new to light after a revision. Definitions of the sophist can be 
understood as images that take on different shapes and forms – more generally, different 
parts or aspects of the same object may be depicted during collection and division. This 
was expressed by Sonja Tanner in her essay on the Sophist: 
 
The Sophist begins with the image of the sophist as a wild beast to be 
hunted. As the dialogue unfolds, changes are made to this image, resulting in 
a different one altogether: that of the sophist as a man-made creation, a tapestry. 
The hypothesis is reformulated and revised. The image falls apart, but is 
replaced by another. Although impermanent and in flux, this replacement of 
the old by the new is productive (117). 
 
This is an intriguing way of looking at the matter, and Tanner’s description of the 
changing appearances of the sophist resembles the succession of beliefs and items of 
knowledge that is described in the Symposium. Both images of the sophist and the 
thoughts and feelings of the soul in the Symposium are in flux.  
                                                 
137 Translated after A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff (Plato 490-91), with modifications. 
 
138 It is noteworthy that not just opinion is in a state of flux, but knowledge as well. For example, even if 
(hypothetically) the last definition of the sophist is a truthful one, it is not necessarily a stable definition – 
i.e., it could be forgotten and then revived in a form that seems to be the same (“…τὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν εἶναι”).     
 
139 In the dialogues as a whole, reasoning is often seen as a process involving a collection of objects and 
individuals: beliefs and branches of knowledge in the case of the Symposium; imprints on the wax block 
and birds in the aviary in the Theaetetus; portraits of the Statesman; and appearances of the Sophist. 
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An interpretation of the unlimited (ἄπειρον) as the variable characteristics of 
individuals was presented in Section 2.5. In the Symposium, beliefs and items of 
knowledge are likened to individual organisms in flux (207e1-208a7 above). Gosling’s 
example of a Persian cat serves as a useful parallel: we may know the general outline of 
such a creature, but each particular Persian cat that is encountered will have its own 
idiosyncrasies – i.e., there are countless variations (Section 2.5, pg. 152). Arguably, a 
similar observation may be made about the appearances of the Sophist and the Statesman: 
there are countless ways in which a single definition may fluctuate, thereby generating 
another definition. This is indicated by the division of sound in the Philebus: Theuth had 
discovered new kinds of sound (Section 1.2.4). Knowledge of music and the alphabet has 
not remained static over the centuries. Similarly, why would we not expect to discover 
new kinds of art, production, or imitation, thereby altering our definition of the sophist 
and the statesman? This is not to say that in reality there are countless Forms, only that 
from the standpoint of the inquirer, there are countless possible paths to choose from 
when revising or searching for a definition.    
Thus, according to the Symposium the individual belief or item of knowledge is in 
flux and eventually dies and may come back again after studying (207e1-208a7, pg. 275 
above), or it may be altered by argument: it has many incarnations. What the next 
definition of the sophist, or love or the statesman, might be, is indeterminate – there are 
unlimited possible definitions given that not all kinds have been discovered. In short, 
there does not seem to be a limit to the amount of revisions that can be made to a 
definition. The following section will present the argument that a better understanding of 
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the first operation, seeing, may shed light on the issue. 
 
6.3.3 Further analysis of the three operations 
 
 
In Section 2.2.1.3 (pg. 110) it was explained that there is a critical turning point in 
which the parts of a whole are suddenly discerned. The purpose of this section is to point 
the way to an analysis of this turning point by drawing on material in the Parmenides and 
the Symposium.  
The following passage in the Parmenides describes a moment of change (e.g., 
between rest and motion, or vice versa) as follows: 
   
(d)     Ἆρ’ οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο,  
ἐν ᾧ τότ’ ἂν εἴη, ὅτε μεταβάλλει; — Τὸ ποῖον δή; — Τὸ 
ἐξαίφνης. τὸ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης τοιόνδε τι ἔοικε σημαίνειν, ὡς 
ἐξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑκάτερον. οὐ γὰρ ἔκ γε τοῦ 
ἑστάναι ἑστῶτος ἔτι μεταβάλλει, οὐδ’ ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως (5) 
κινουμένης ἔτι μεταβάλλει· ἀλλὰ ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις 
ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεώς τε καὶ στάσεως, 
(e) ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὖσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε 
κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἑστάναι καὶ τὸ ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ 
κινεῖσθαι. (156d1-156e3) 
 
     “Is there, then, this strange thing in which [the one] might be, just when it  
changes? – “What strange thing?” – “The instant. The instant seems to sig- 
nify something such that changing occurs from it to each of two states. 
For a thing doesn’t change from rest while rest continues, or from motion  
while motion continues. Rather, this strange creature, the instant, lurks  
between motion and rest – being in no time at all – and to it and from it  
the moving thing changes to resting and the resting thing changes to moving…”140 
 
At the moment of change, the one is neither in motion nor at rest – it is rather in “the 
instant” (“Τὸ ἐξαίφνης”) which is between motion and rest (156e7). Parmenides 
                                                 
140 Translated by Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan (Plato 388), with modifications. 
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emphasizes that this observation applies not only to changes involving motion and rest, 
but to other changes, including the change from one to many, and from like to unlike, and 
vice versa: 
 
…Κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς 
ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἰὸν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐφ’ ἓν οὔτε ἕν ἐστιν οὔτε (5) 
πολλά, οὔτε διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται. καὶ ἐξ ὁμοίου 
ἐπὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίου ἐπὶ ὅμοιον ἰὸν οὔτε ὅμοιον 
οὔτε ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε ὁμοιούμενον οὔτε ἀνομοιούμενον (157a4-8) 
 
“…Indeed, according to the same argument, when it goes from one 
to many and from many to one, it is neither one nor many, and neither  
separates nor combines. And when it goes from like to unlike and from  
unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, nor is it being made like or unlike.”141  
 
This is very curious, and it raises the following question: what happens in the instant 
between seeing a whole and discerning its parts? In other words, what happens when 
reasoning moves from one to many, as is the case where a “seam” appears in belief-
mimicry (δοξομιμητική), where the latter is described as if it were a piece of iron that 
appears sound one moment, but not the next (see Section 2.2.4, pg. 129)? One can ask the 
same question with any of the three operations: what happens in the step between 
discerning a part and naming it? What happens when one part is placed beside another? 
It remains to be determined how the instant bridges the gap between discerning 
the many in the one and the one in the many, and this raises the following question: can a 
finer-grained analysis of collection and division and the three operations be achieved 
through a better understanding of the instant and its role as a transition point between 
steps of reasoning? It may be the case that there is a single moment that occurs during 
collection in which the “seeing together” of the scattered many yields a single idea, and 
                                                 




conversely a single moment that occurs during division in which the parts of a whole 
come to light.142  
It is worth noting that in the Symposium, the final step that occurs between 
contemplating the sea of beauty and recognition of the Form itself occurs in an instant. 
Diotima describes the final step in which the lover catches sight of knowledge of Beauty: 
 
(e)…πειρῶ δέ μοι, ἔφη, τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν ὡς οἷόν 
τε μάλιστα. ὃς γὰρ ἂν μέχρι ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτικὰ 
παιδαγωγηθῇ, θεώμενος ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς τὰ καλά, πρὸς 
τέλος ἤδη ἰὼν τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί τι θαυ- 
μαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗ δὴ (5) 
ἕνεκεν καὶ οἱ ἔμπροσθεν πάντες πόνοι ἦσαν… (210e1-6) 
 
“Try to pay attention to me,” she said, “as best you can. You see, the 
man who has been thus far guided in matters of Love, who has beheld 
beautiful things in the right order and correctly, is coming now to the goal 
of Loving: all of a sudden he will catch sight of something wonderfully 
beautiful in its nature; that, Socrates, is the reason for all his earlier labors…”143 
 
The step that occurs in an instant not only crosses the boundary from many to one – i.e., 
from a sea of beauty to the Form of beauty, it results in the completion (τέλος) of 
reasoning. This passage indicates that the final endpoint of reasoning – i.e., the limit of 
reasoning – is the sudden seeing (“ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί”) of a Form. Perhaps this step is 
the transition from image or representation to the thing itself, and in this sense the instant 
that leads to an experience of a Form may be the final step that brings the reasoner to the 
conclusion of reasoning.  
 
                                                 
142 It was argued in Section 4.4.1 that a ‘ὅρος’ (a musical note in the Philebus, a term in the Analytics) acts 
as a boundary or limit. Similarly, it may be that the instant serves as a boundary between the one and the 
many and vice versa. This moment or “instant” may be analogous to a term or limit as described in the 
Philebus: as a note divides intervals of sound, an instant divides intervals of reasoning. 
 





Sections 6.3.1-6.3.3 indicate avenues for future research. To reiterate the point 
made in Section 6.1, the purpose of these sections was to introduce questions and 
problems that, while not directly related to the central thesis of this study, may reveal 
some important aspects of collection and division in light of the analysis made in the 
previous chapters. In Section 6.3.1, it was explained that while images play a crucial role 
in collection and division and in the dialogues in general, they are problematic: since 
images can misrepresent, how can it be determined whether an image is truthful? In 
Section 6.3.2, a related problem was presented: in the dialogues, belief and knowledge 
are often represented as collections of individuals. Not only individual organisms, but 
individual beliefs and definitions may be subject to countless variations. If this is the case, 
how can one reach an endpoint if there are limitless ways in which a belief or definition 
may be modified? Plato’s theory of Forms and related topics such as recollection may be 
helpful in answering these questions: if Forms and their interrelations can be recollected, 
for example, then knowledge derived from recollection can be used to evaluate the results 
of collection and division. This is but one possible avenue for future inquiry. Section 
6.3.3 presented the third and final avenue for future research: the concept of the instant as 
described in the Parmenides could serve as the basis of a more fine-grained analysis of 
the particular “steps” of collection and division and the three operations.  
In conclusion, the purpose of this study was to defend the thesis that collection 
and division define logical frameworks that underlie both deductive and non-deductive 
reasoning. In some cases, genus-species trees are defined, in other cases, a structure of 
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interwoven threads is articulated. These structures can serve as starting points for other 
lines of reasoning. Thus, collection and division are wide in scope. They are not restricted 
to the production of one kind of structure, nor are they limited to one domain of inquiry. 
As stated in Section 1.6, collection and division are the means by which all the 
discoveries of the arts are made and they can be used to both teach and inquire. In short, 
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APPENDIX A:  
 




1. 265b2:  
     ΣΩ. Τῆς δὲ θείας τεττάρων θεῶν τέτταρα μέρη διελόμενοι… (265b2) 
     Socrates: We also distinguished four parts within the divine kind and  
connected them to four gods… (pg. 542)146  
2. 271d3-5:  
                                                 
144  The Phaedrus, Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus are commonly held to be representative of collection 
and division. However, even within this particular set of dialogues, it is not always clear which passages 
concern collection and division and which do not. This appendix is based on Meinwald’s list of passages 
that include a key term of the method, διαίρεσις (“division”). Meinwald defines the list as follows: 
  
While there are many “ordinary” occurrences of forms of διαίρεσις in Plato, and many others of which 
one would be ill-advised to pronounce whether they are technical or not, the number of occurrences 
that clearly apply to the technical case is enormous: Phaedrus 273el, 265b2, 271d4, Sophist 225a4, 
235b8, 235c3, 221e2, 220bl0, 235d4, 253dl, 220bl4, 267d7, 265a5, 264c4, 219e7, 266a11, 223d2, 
220a9, 266a8, 265a11,229d6, 235c8, 226c3, 283d6, Statesman 261a5, 262d7, 264b7, 265dl0, 286d9, 
266a5, 262d1, 284e2, 258e4, 285a7, 291e3, 302d6, 265c2, 264a8, 276e7, 287c3, 260b4, 263e3, 276a5, 
262c8, 285a5, 265a3, 276a3, 279b8, 262dl [sic], 276d5, 260e5, 264e4, 260b5, 262a5, 262e4, 261c2, 
265c6, 282c9, 265b8, 266c2, 276a1, 262b4, 265b6, 263c5, 282d1, Philebus 18c3, 49b6, 48d6, 20c4, 
20a6, 49a7 (“One/Many Problems” 98).  
 
While Meinwald states that these passages employ the term διαίρεσις in a “technical” sense (i.e., under one 
interpretation, these are passages in which collection and division produce genus-species relations), no list 
as specific as this would find universal acceptance. For example, Trevaskis argues that the illustrations 
given in Philebus 17a – 18d “are not recognizable illustrations of Collection and Division” (“Classification 
in the Philebus” 42). In addition, Meinwald’s list covers only one term, “διαίρεσις”, yet Plato uses other 
terms for division (e.g. ‘τέμνω’ (cut) is used at Sophist 264e2; see 1.3.3, pg. 45), and the list does not 
include passages on collection. As such, the list is incomplete, but it does indicate how frequently just one 
term is used, and it is useful for giving a general idea of the scope and purpose of division.  
 
145 Translations by A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff (cited under Plato in Works Cited), with modifications.  
 
146 Page numbers after English translations refer to Plato in Works Cited. 
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     ΣΩ. … τούτων δὲ δὴ 
οὕτω διῃρημένων, λόγων αὖ τόσα καὶ τόσα ἔστιν εἴδη, τοιόνδε 
ἕκαστον. (271d3-5) 
     Socrates: …Those distinctions established, there are, in turn, so-and-so many 
 kinds of speech, each of such-and-such a sort. (pg. 548) 
 
3. 273d8-273e4:  
 
ΣΩ. …ὡς ἐὰν μή τις τῶν τε ἀκουσο- 
(e) μένων τὰς φύσεις διαριθμήσηται, καὶ κατ’ εἴδη τε διαιρεῖσθαι 
τὰ ὄντα καὶ μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ δυνατὸς ᾖ καθ’ ἓν ἕκαστον περιλαμ- 
βάνειν, οὔ ποτ’ ἔσται τεχνικὸς λόγων πέρι καθ’ ὅσον  
δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ. (273d8-273e4) 
     Socrates: … No one will ever possess the art of speaking, to the extent that  
any human being can, unless he acquires the ability to enumerate the sorts of  
characters to be found in any audience, to divide everything according to  




4. 219e7:  
     ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἀψύχου γένους διελομένους, τὸ δ’ ἐμψύχου. (219e7) 
                                                 
147 Translations by Nicholas P. White (cited under Plato in Works Cited), with modifications. 
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     Stranger: We divide it [hunting] into the hunting of living things and the hunting  
of lifeless things. (pg. 240) 
5. 220a7-10:   
     ΞΕ. Ζῳοθηρικῆς δὲ ἆρ’ οὐ διπλοῦν εἶδος ἂν λέγοιτο ἐν  
δίκῃ, τὸ μὲν πεζοῦ γένους, πολλοῖς εἴδεσι καὶ ὀνόμασι  
διῃρημένον, πεζοθηρικόν, τὸ δ’ ἕτερον νευστικοῦ ζῴου πᾶν 
ἐνυγροθηρικόν; (10) (220a7-10) 
     Stranger: And isn’t it right to say that animal-hunting has two types? One  
is land-hunting, the hunting of things with feet, which is divided into  
many types with many names. The other is aquatic hunting, which hunts  
animals that swim. (pg. 240) 
6. 220bl0-14: 
     ΞΕ. Τί δέ; ταύτην αὖ τὴν θήραν ἆρ’ οὐκ ἂν κατὰ μέγιστα μέρη δύο διέλοιμεν; (10) 
     ΘΕΑΙ. Κατὰ ποῖα; 
     ΞΕ. Καθ’ ἃ τὸ μὲν ἕρκεσιν αὐτόθεν ποιεῖται τὴν θήραν, 
τὸ δὲ πληγῇ. 
     ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις, καὶ πῇ διαιρούμενος ἑκάτερον; (220b10-14) 
 
     Stranger: Well then, this kind of hunting might be divided into two  
main parts. 
     Theaetetus: What are they? 
     Stranger: One of them does its hunting with stationary nets and the other  
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one does it by striking. 
     Theaetetus: What do you mean? How are you dividing them? (pg. 240) 
7. 221e2-3:  
     ΞΕ. Δίχα που νυνδὴ διείλομεν τὴν ἄγραν πᾶσαν, νευστικοῦ  
μέρους, τὸ δὲ πεζοῦ τέμνοντες. (221e2-3) 
     Stranger: We divided all hunting into two parts, one for land animals  
and one for swimming animals. (pg. 242) 
 
8. 223d2-3:  
     ΞΕ. Τὴν μὲν τῶν αὐτουργῶν αὐτοπωλικὴν διαιρουμένην,  
τὴν δὲ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἔργα μεταβαλλομένην μεταβλητικήν. (223d2-3) 
     Stranger: One part is the sale of things that the seller himself makes. The 
other is purveying, that is, the purveying of things other people make. (pg. 244)  
9. 225a4:  
     ΞΕ. Οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου τοίνυν ἐστὶ διαιρεῖν αὐτὴν δίχα. (225a4) 
     Stranger: And it makes sense to divide it [combat] in two. (pg. 245)  
10. 226c3:  
     ΞΕ. Διαιρετικά που τὰ λεχθέντα εἴρηται σύμπαντα. (226c3) 
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     Stranger: All the things I’ve mentioned are kinds of dividing (pg. 247). 
 
11. 229d5-6:  
     ΞΕ. …ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι καὶ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ἆρ’ ἄτομον ἤδη ἐστὶ (5) 
πᾶν ἤ τινα ἔχον διαίρεσιν ἀξίαν ἐπωνυμίας.(229d5-6) 
     Stranger: …But we still  
have to think about whether education is indivisible or has divisions that  
are worth mentioning. (pg. 250) 
12. 235b8-235c4:  
     ΞΕ. Δέδοκται τοίνυν ὅτι τάχιστα διαιρεῖν τὴν εἰδωλο- 
ποιικὴν τέχνην, καὶ καταβάντας εἰς αὐτήν, ἐὰν μὲν ἡμᾶς εὐθὺς 
ὁ σοφιστὴς ὑπομείνῃ, συλλαβεῖν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὰ ἐπεσταλμένα (10) 
(c) ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ λόγου, κἀκείνῳ παραδόντας ἀποφῆναι  
τὴν ἄγραν· ἐὰν δ’ ἄρα κατὰ μέρη τῆς μιμητικῆς δύηταί πῃ, 
συνακολουθεῖν αὐτῷ διαιροῦντας ἀεὶ τὴν ὑποδεχομένην αὐτὸν  
μοῖραν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ληφθῇ. (235b8-235c4) 
     Stranger: So it’s settled. We’ll divide the craft of copy-making as quickly 
as we can and we’ll go down into it. Then if the sophist gives up right  
away we’ll obey the royal command and we’ll capture him and hand our  
catch over to the king. But if the sophist slips down somewhere into the  
parts of the craft of imitation, we’ll follow along with him and we’ll divide  
each of the parts that contain him until we catch him. (pp. 255-56) 
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13. 235c8-235d5:   
     ΞΕ. Κατὰ δὴ τὸν παρεληλυθότα τρόπον τῆς διαιρέσεως  
(d) ἔγωγέ μοι καὶ νῦν φαίνομαι δύο καθορᾶν εἴδη τῆς μιμητικῆς· 
τὴν δὲ ζητουμένην ἰδέαν, ἐν ὁποτέρῳ ποθ’ ἡμῖν οὖσα τυγχάνει, 
καταμαθεῖν οὐδέπω μοι δοκῶ νῦν δυνατὸς εἶναι.  
     ΘΕΑΙ. Σὺ δ’ ἀλλ’ εἰπὲ πρῶτον καὶ δίελε ἡμῖν τίνε τὼ 
δύο λέγεις.(5) (235c8-235d5) 
     Stranger: Going by the method of division that we’ve used so far, I think  
I see two types of imitation here too. But I don’t think I can clearly tell  
yet which one the type or form we’re looking for is in. 
     Theaetetus: Well, first tell us what distinction you mean. (pg. 256) 
14. 264c4-5:  
     ΞΕ. Διειλόμεθα τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς εἴδη δύο, τὴν μὲν  
εἰκαστικήν, τὴν δὲ φανταστικήν. (5) (264c4-5) 
     Stranger: We divided copy-making into two types, likeness-making and  
appearance-making. (pg. 288) 
15. 265a4-5:  
     ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν τότε μὲν ἠρχόμεθα ποιητικὴν καὶ κτητικὴν 
τέχνην διαιρούμενοι; (265a4-5) 





     ΞΕ. Νῦν δέ γ’ ἐπειδὴ μιμητικὴ περιείληφεν αὐτὸν τέχνη, (10) 
δῆλον ὡς αὐτὴν τὴν ποιητικὴν δίχα διαιρετέον πρώτην.  
(b) ἡ γάρ που μίμησις ποίησίς τίς ἐστιν, εἰδώλων μέντοι, 
φαμέν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων· ἦ γάρ; (265a10-265b2) 
     Stranger: But now, since he’s included among experts in imitation, first 
we obviously have to divide productive expertise in two. We say imitation 
is a sort of production, but of copies and not of the things themselves. Is 
that right? (pg. 289) 
17. 266a8-11:  
     ΞΕ. Τὰ δέ γ’ ὡς ἑτέρως αὖ διῃρημένα, μέρος μὲν ἓν 
ἀφ’ ἑκατέρας τῆς μερίδος αὐτοποιητικόν, τὼ δ’ ὑπολοίπω 
σχεδὸν μάλιστ’ ἂν λεγοίσθην εἰδωλοποιικώ· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα (10) 
δὴ πάλιν ἡ ποιητικὴ διχῇ διαιρεῖται. (266a8-11) 
     Stranger: Then if we take the division we made the first way, one part  
of each of those parts is the production of originals. Just about the best  
thing to call the two parts that are left might be “copy-making.” That way,  
production is divided in two again. (pg. 290) 
18. 267d4-7:  
     ΞΕ. Πόθεν οὖν ὄνομα ἑκατέρῳ τις αὐτῶν λήψεται 
πρέπον; ἢ δῆλον δὴ χαλεπὸν ὄν, διότι τῆς τῶν γενῶν κατ’ (5) 
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εἴδη διαιρέσεως παλαιά τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀργία τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν  
καὶ ἀσύννους παρῆν, ὥστε μηδ’ ἐπιχειρεῖν μηδένα διαιρεῖσθαι· (267d4-7) 
     Stranger: Where would you get a suitable name for each of them? Isn’t  
it obviously hard to do, just because the people who came before us were  
thoughtless and lazy about dividing kinds into types, and so they never  




19. 258e4-5:  
     ΞΕ. Ταύτῃ τοίνυν συμπάσας ἐπιστήμας διαίρει, τὴν μὲν  
πρακτικὴν προσειπών, τὴν δὲ μόνον γνωστικήν. (5) (258e4-5) 
     Stranger: Well, divide all cases of knowledge in this way, calling the one  
sort practical knowledge, the other purely theoretical. (pg. 297) 
20. 260b3-5:  
     ΞΕ. Ἆρ’ οὖν συμπάσης τῆς γνωστικῆς εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπι- 
τακτικὸν μέρος, τὸ δὲ κριτικὸν διαιρούμενοι προσείποιμεν, 
ἐμμελῶς ἂν φαῖμεν διῃρῆσθαι; (5) (260b3-5) 
                                                 
148 Translations by C.J. Rowe (cited under Plato in Works Cited), with modifications. 
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     Stranger: So if we divided off two parts of theoretical knowledge as a  
whole, referring to one as directive and the other as making judgments,  
would we say that it had been divided suitably? (pg. 299) 
21. 260d11-261a9:  
Note: surrounding text is included to provide context for discussion 
 
     ΞΕ. Τί οὖν; εἰς ταὐτὸν μείξομεν βασιλικὴν ἑρμηνευτικῇ,  
(e) κελευστικῇ, μαντικῇ, κηρυκικῇ, καὶ πολλαῖς ἑτέραις τούτων 
τέχναις συγγενέσιν, αἳ σύμπασαι τό γ’ ἐπιτάττειν ἔχουσιν;  
ἢ βούλει, καθάπερ ᾐκάζομεν νυνδή, καὶ τοὔνομα παρεικάσω- 
μεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνώνυμον ὂν τυγχάνει τὸ τῶν αὐτ-  
επιτακτῶν γένος, καὶ ταύτῃ ταῦτα διελώμεθα, τὸ μὲν τῶν (5) 
βασιλέων γένος εἰς τὴν αὐτεπιτακτικὴν θέντες, τοῦ δὲ ἄλλου  
παντὸς ἀμελήσαντες, ὄνομα ἕτερον αὐτοῖς παραχωρήσαντες 
θέσθαι τινά; τοῦ γὰρ ἄρχοντος ἕνεκα ἡμῖν ἡ μέθοδος ἦν  
261 (a) ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου.  
     ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.  
     ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μετρίως ἀφέστηκεν ἀπ’ ἐκείνων,  
ἀλλοτριότητι διορισθὲν πρὸς οἰκειότητα, τοῦτο αὐτὸ πάλιν αὖ  
διαιρεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, εἴ τινα τομὴν ἔτι ἔχομεν ὑπείκουσαν ἐν (5) 
τούτῳ;  
     ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε.  





     Stranger: So – shall we mix together the expertise of the king with that  
of the interpreter, the person who gives the time to the rowers, the seer,  
the herald, and many other sorts of expertise related to these, just because  
they all have the features of issuing directions? Or do you want us to make  
up a name in line with the analogy we were using just now, since in fact  
the class of ‘self-directors’ happens pretty much to be without a name of  
its own? Should we divide these things this way, locating the class of kings  
as belonging to the ‘self-directing’ sort of expertise, and taking no notice  
of all the rest, leaving someone else to propose another name for them?  
For we set up our investigation in order to find the person who rules, not  
his opposite. 
     Young Socrates: Absolutely. 
     Stranger: Well then, since this149 is at a certain distance from those others,  
distinguished by difference in relation to kinship, we must in turn divide  
it too, if we still find some cut yielding to us in it? 
     Young Socrates: Certainly. 
     Stranger: And what’s more, we seem to have one: follow on and make  
the cut with me. (pg. 300) 
22. 261b13-261c2: 
                                                 
149 the “self-directing” kind of expertise 
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     ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ἀψύχων γενέσεσιν αὐτοῦ τάτ-  
(c) τοντες, τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ <ταῖς> τῶν ἐμψύχων· καὶ πᾶν οὕτως ἤδη 
διαιρήσεται δίχα. (261b13-261c2) 
     Stranger: By assigning part of it to the production of inanimate things, 
part to that of animate things; and in this way it will all immediately be 
divided into two. (pg. 301) 
23. 262a5-6:  
     ΞΕ. Παντάπασί γε προθυμότατα καὶ ἀνδρειότατα δι- (5) 
ῄρησαι· μὴ μέντοι τοῦτό γε εἰς αὖθις κατὰ δύναμιν πάσχωμεν. (262a5-6)       
     Stranger: Yes, absolutely, you’ve made a very keen and courageous division!  
But let’s try to avoid this happening again. (pg. 302) 
24. 262b2-5:  
     ΞΕ. … κάλλιστον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων εὐθὺς διαχωρίζειν  
τὸ ζητούμενον, ἂν ὀρθῶς ἔχῃ, καθάπερ ὀλίγον σὺ πρότερον  
οἰηθεὶς ἔχειν τὴν διαίρεσιν ἐπέσπευσας τὸν λόγον, ἰδὼν ἐπ’  
ἀνθρώπους πορευόμενον· (262b2-5) 
     Stranger: … It’s a really fine thing to separate off immediately what  
one is searching for from the rest, if one gets it right – as you thought you  
had the right division, just before, and hurried the argument on, seeing it  




Note: surrounding text is included to provide context for discussion  
     ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ποῖον οὖν δὴ φράζεις διαιρουμένους ἡμᾶς οὐκ 
ὀρθῶς ἄρτι δρᾶν;  
     ΞΕ. Τοιόνδε, οἷον εἴ τις τἀνθρώπινον ἐπιχειρήσας δίχα (10) 
(d) διελέσθαι γένος διαιροῖ καθάπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε δια- 
νέμουσι, τὸ μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν ὡς ἓν ἀπὸ πάντων ἀφαιροῦντες 
χωρίς, σύμπασι δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις γένεσιν, ἀπείροις οὖσι καὶ  
ἀμείκτοις καὶ ἀσυμφώνοις πρὸς ἄλληλα, βάρβαρον μιᾷ κλήσει  
προσειπόντες αὐτὸ διὰ ταύτην τὴν μίαν κλῆσιν καὶ γένος (5) 
ἓν αὐτὸ εἶναι προσδοκῶσιν· ἢ τὸν ἀριθμόν τις αὖ νομίζοι 
κατ’ εἴδη δύο διαιρεῖν μυριάδα ἀποτεμνόμενος ἀπὸ πάντων, 
(e) ὡς ἓν εἶδος ἀποχωρίζων, καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ δὴ παντὶ θέμενος ἓν  
ὄνομα διὰ τὴν κλῆσιν αὖ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἀξιοῖ γένος ἐκείνου χωρὶς 
ἕτερον ἓν γίγνεσθαι. κάλλιον δέ που καὶ μᾶλλον κατ’ εἴδη  
καὶ δίχα διαιροῖτ’ ἄν, εἰ τὸν μὲν ἀριθμὸν ἀρτίῳ καὶ περιττῷ  
τις τέμνοι, τὸ δὲ αὖ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ἄρρενι καὶ θήλει, (5) 
Λυδοὺς δὲ ἢ Φρύγας ἤ τινας ἑτέρους πρὸς ἅπαντας τάττων  
ἀποσχίζοι τότε, ἡνίκα ἀποροῖ γένος ἅμα καὶ μέρος εὑρίσκειν 
263 (a) ἑκάτερον τῶν σχισθέντων. (262c8-263a1) 
 
     Young Socrates: Well then, what sort of thing are you saying we weren’t  
doing right just now in our divisions?  
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     Stranger: This sort of thing: it’s as if someone tried to divide the human  
race into two and made the cut in the way that most people here carve  
things up, taking the Greek race away as one, separate from all the rest,  
and to all the other races together, which are unlimited in number, which  
don’t mix with one another, and don’t share the same language – calling  
this collection by the single appellation ‘barbarian.’ Because of this single  
appellation, they expect it to be a single family or class too. Another  
example would be if someone thought that he was dividing number into  
two real classes by cutting off the number ten-thousand from all the rest,  
separating it off as a single class, and in positing a single name for all the  
rest supposed here too that through getting the name this class too came  
into existence, a second single one apart from the other. But I imagine the  
division would be done better, more by real classes and more into two, if  
one cut number by means of even and odd, and the human race in its  
turn by means of male and female, and only split off Lydians or Phrygians  
or anyone else and ranged them against all the rest when one was at a  
loss as to how to split in such a way that each of the halves split off was  
simultaneously a real class and a part. (pg. 302) 
 
26. 263c4-7:  
     ΞΕ. … οἶμαι μὲν γὰρ μάλιστα, ὅθεν ἐρωτηθεὶς σὺ τὴν ἀγελαιοτρο- 
φίαν ὅπῃ διαιρετέον εἶπες μάλα προθύμως δύ’ εἶναι ζῴων (5) 
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γένη, τὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπινον, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων συμπάντων 
θηρίων ἕν. (263c4-7) 
     Stranger: …I think it was pretty much the point at which you were asked  
how to divide herd-rearing, and you said with great keenness that there  
were two classes of living creatures, one human, and a second single one  
consisting of all the rest – the animals – together. (pg. 303) 
27. 263e3-4:  
     ΞΕ. Μὴ πᾶν τὸ τῶν ζῴων γένος διαιρούμενοι, ἵνα ἧττον 
αὐτὰ πάσχωμεν. (263e3-4) 
     Stranger: By not dividing the class of living creatures as a whole, in order  
to lessen the risk of its happening to us. (pg. 303) 
28. 264a8-264b1:  
     ΞΕ. Μὴ τοίνυν διαιρώμεθα ὥσπερ τότε πρὸς ἅπαντα 
ἀποβλέψαντες, μηδὲ σπεύσαντες, ἵνα δὴ ταχὺ γενώμεθα 
(b) πρὸς τῇ πολιτικῇ. (264a8-264b1) 
     Stranger: Well then, let’s not divide in the way we did then, looking at  
everything, or in a hurry, just in order to get quickly to statesmanship. (pg. 304) 
29. 264b6-7:  
     ΞΕ. …πάλιν δ’ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὴν κοινο- 
τροφικὴν πειρώμεθα διαιρεῖν· (264b6-7) 
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     Stranger: ... In any case, let’s go back and try again from the 
beginning to divide collective rearing;  (pg. 304). 
30. 264e3-4:  
     ΞΕ. Πᾶς μὲν δὴ τό γε ξηροτροφικὸν τῆς ἀγελαιοτροφίας 
διέλοιτ’ ἂν φῦλον. (264e3-4) 
     Stranger: Everybody would divide the dry-land rearing sort of herd- 
rearing (pg. 305). 
31. 265a1-5:  
(a)      ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἐφ’ ὅ γε μέρος ὥρμηκεν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, ἐπ’  
ἐκεῖνο δύο τινὲ καθορᾶν ὁδὼ τεταμένα φαίνεται, τὴν μὲν  
θάττω, πρὸς μέγα μέρος σμικρὸν διαιρουμένην, τὴν δέ, ὅπερ  
ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ μεσοτομεῖν ὡς μάλιστα, τοῦτ’ 
ἔχουσαν μᾶλλον, μακροτέραν γε μήν. (5) (265a1-5) 
 
     Stranger: Now it seems that there are two routes to be seen stretching  
out in the direction of the part towards which our argument has hurried,  
one of them quicker, dividing a small part off against a large one, while  
the other more closely observes the principle we were talking about earlier,  
that one should cut in the middle as much as possible, but is longer. (pg. 305). 
32. 265b5-9:  
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     ΞΕ. …τὴν (5) 
δὲ δὴ διαίρεσιν ὅρα.  
     ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Λέγε. 
     ΞΕ. Τὰ πεζὰ ἡμῖν τῶν ἡμέρων, ὅσαπερ ἀγελαῖα, διῃρημένα  
ἐστὶ φύσει δίχα. (265b5-9) 
     Stranger: …Observe the division. 
     Young Socrates: Tell me what it is. 
     Stranger: Of tame things that live in herds, we find those that go on foot  
naturally divided into two. (pg. 305) 
33. 265c2-8:  
     ΞΕ. Τὴν δὴ πεζονομικὴν διελὼν ἀπόδος ἑκατέρῳ τῷ μέρει  
λόγῳ χρώμενος. ἂν γὰρ ὀνομάζειν αὐτὰ βουληθῇς, ἔσται σοι 
περιπεπλεγμένον μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος.  
     ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν χρὴ λέγειν; (5) 
     ΞΕ. Ὧδε· τῆς πεζονομικῆς ἐπιστήμης δίχα διαιρεθείσης 
τὸ μόριον θάτερον ἐπὶ τῷ κερασφόρῳ μέρει τῷ τῆς ἀγέλης  
ἐπιτετάχθαι, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἐπὶ τῷ τῆς ἀκεράτου. (265c2-8) 
     Stranger: Well then, divide the management of creatures that go on foot  
by assigning it to each of these two parts, using a descriptive phrase for  
the results of the division. For if you want to give them names, it will be 
more complicated than necessary. 
     Young Socrates: How then should it be put? 
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     Stranger: Like this: by saying that when the knowledge that has to do 
with the management of creatures that go by foot is divided into two, one 
part is allocated to the horned part of the herd, the other to the hornless part. 
(pg. 305-6) 
34. 265d9-11:  
     ΞΕ. Πότερον οὖν βούλει τῷ σχιστῷ τε καὶ τῷ καλουμένῳ  
μώνυχι διαιρεῖν αὐτὴν ἢ τῇ κοινογονίᾳ τε καὶ ἰδιογονίᾳ; (10) 
μανθάνεις γάρ που. (265d9-11) 
     Stranger: Well, do you want to divide it150 by the split-hooved and the so- 
called ‘single-hooved,’ or by interbreeding and non-interbreeding? I think  
you grasp the point. (pg. 306)  
35. 266a5:  
     ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἀλλὰ τίνι δὴ τὼ δύο διαιροῦμεν; (5) (266a5) 
     Young Socrates: No indeed. But what are we to use to divide the  
two classes? (pg. 306) 
36. 266b10 -266c2:  
     ΞΕ. Πρὸς δὴ τούτοις ἕτερον αὖ τι τῶν πρὸς γέλωτα (10) 
(c) εὐδοκιμησάντων ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἆρα καθορῶμεν ἡμῖν γεγονὸς  
ἐν τοῖς διῃρημένοις; (266b10 - 266c2) 
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     Stranger: And there’s more – do we see, Socrates, that there’s something  
else resulting in our divisions that would itself have done well as a  
comic turn? (pg. 307) 
 
37. 276a1-7:  
 
(a)     ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς. ἀλλ’ ἡ μετὰ τοῦτο διαίρεσις αὖ τίνα 
τρόπον ἐγίγνετ’ ἄν; 
     ΞΕ. Κατὰ ταὐτὰ καθ’ ἅπερ ἔμπροσθεν διῃρούμεθα τὴν  
ἀγελαιοτροφικὴν πεζοῖς τε καὶ ἀπτῆσι, καὶ ἀμείκτοις τε καὶ  
ἀκεράτοις, τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἄν που τούτοις διαιρούμενοι καὶ τὴν (5) 
ἀγελαιοκομικὴν τήν τε νῦν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ Κρόνου βασιλείαν  
περιειληφότες ἂν ἦμεν ὁμοίως ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. (276a1-7) 
     Young Socrates: Correct. But in what way would the division following  
this be made? 
     Stranger: In the same way as we previously divided herd-rearing by  
footed and wingless, and non-interbreeding and hornless – by dividing  
herd-keeping too by these same things, I think, we would have included  
in our account to the same degree both the present sort of kingship and  
that in the time of Cronus. (pg. 318) 
 
38. 276d5-6:  
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     ΞΕ. Ἧι τε τὸν θεῖον ἄν που διειλόμεθα νομέα χωρὶς καὶ (5) 
τὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐπιμελητήν. (276d5-6) 
     Stranger: I imagine, where we would have divided off the divine herdsman,  
on one side, and the human carer on the other. (pg. 318) 
39. 276e6-8:  
 
     ΞΕ. Νῦν δέ γε πάλιν ἐπανορθούμενοι, καθάπερ εἶπον, 
τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμελητικὴν δίχα διαιρώμεθα, τῷ βιαίῳ τε  
καὶ ἑκουσίῳ; (276e6-8) 
 
     Stranger: But now should we set things to rights again, and, as I said,  
should we divide the expertise of the human carer into two, by using the  
categories of the enforced and the voluntary? (pg. 319) 
 
40. 279b7-279c3:  
 
     ΞΕ. Τί δῆτα οὐ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθε τέμνοντες  
μέρη μερῶν ἕκαστον διῃρούμεθα, καὶ νῦν περὶ ὑφαντικὴν 
(c) ταὐτὸν τοῦτ’ ἐδράσαμεν, καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα διὰ  
βραχέων ταχὺ πάντ’ ἐπελθόντες πάλιν ἤλθομεν ἐπὶ τὸ νῦν 
χρήσιμον; (279b7-279c3) 
 
     Stranger: Why then don’t we now do the very same thing with weaving  
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that we did in what preceded, dividing each thing by cutting it into parts,  
and then cutting them? We’ll get back to what is useful in the present  
context after covering everything as briefly and quickly as we can. (pg. 321) 
41. 282c5-8:  
     ΞΕ. Αὖθις δὴ πάλιν συγκριτικῆς μόριον ἅμα καὶ ταλα- (5) 
σιουργίας ἐν αὐτῇ γιγνόμενον λάβωμεν· ὅσα δὲ τῆς διακρι-  
τικῆς ἦν αὐτόθι, μεθιῶμεν σύμπαντα, δίχα τέμνοντες τὴν 
ταλασιουργίαν διακριτικῷ τε καὶ συγκριτικῷ τμήματι. (282c5-8) 
     Stranger: Then again, by contrast, let’s take a part that is simultaneously  
a part of combination and of wool-working and takes place in the latter;  
and whatever parts of separation there were here, let’s let all of them go,  
cutting wool-working into two by means of the cut between separation  
and combination. (pg. 324)  
42. 282c10-282d2:                  
     ΞΕ. Τὸ συγκριτικὸν τοίνυν αὖ σοι καὶ ταλασιουργικὸν (10) 
(d) ἅμα μόριον, ὦ Σώκρατες, διαιρετέον, εἴπερ ἱκανῶς μέλλομεν 
τὴν προρρηθεῖσαν ὑφαντικὴν αἱρήσειν. (282c10-282d2) 
     Stranger: Then in its turn, Socrates, you should divide the part that is 
simultaneously combination and wool-working, if indeed we are going to 
capture the aforesaid art of weaving. (pg. 325) 
43. 284e2-8:  
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     ΞΕ. Δῆλον ὅτι διαιροῖμεν ἂν τὴν μετρητικήν, καθάπερ 
ἐρρήθη, ταύτῃ δίχα τέμνοντες, ἓν μὲν τιθέντες αὐτῆς μόριον  
συμπάσας τέχνας ὁπόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ μήκη καὶ βάθη  
καὶ πλάτη καὶ ταχυτῆτας πρὸς τοὐναντίον μετροῦσιν, τὸ δὲ (5) 
ἕτερον, ὁπόσαι πρὸς τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸν καιρὸν 
καὶ τὸ δέον καὶ πάνθ’ ὁπόσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀπῳκίσθη τῶν  
ἐσχάτων. (284e2-8) 
     Stranger: It’s clear that we would divide the art of measurement, cutting  
it in two in just the way we said, positing as one part of it all those sorts  
of expertise that measure the number, lengths, depths, breadths and speeds  
of things in relation to what is opposed to them, and as the other, all those  
that measure in relation to what is in due measure, what is fitting, the  
right moment, what is as it ought to be – everything that removes itself  
from the extremes of the middle (pg. 328). 
44. 285a4-285b6: 
     ΞΕ. …διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ κατ’ εἴδη συνειθίσθαι 
σκοπεῖν διαιρουμένους ταῦτά τε τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα συμ- (5) 
βάλλουσιν εὐθὺς εἰς ταὐτὸν ὅμοια νομίσαντες, καὶ τοὐναντίον  
αὖ τούτου δρῶσιν ἕτερα οὐ κατὰ μέρη διαιροῦντες, δέον, ὅταν 
(b) μὲν τὴν τῶν πολλῶν τις πρότερον αἴσθηται κοινωνίαν, μὴ  
προαφίστασθαι πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐτῇ τὰς διαφορὰς ἴδῃ πάσας 
ὁπόσαιπερ ἐν εἴδεσι κεῖνται, τὰς δὲ αὖ παντοδαπὰς ἀνομοιό-  
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τητας, ὅταν ἐν πλήθεσιν ὀφθῶσιν, μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι δυσωπού-  
μενον παύεσθαι πρὶν ἂν σύμπαντα τὰ οἰκεῖα ἐντὸς μιᾶς (5) 
ὁμοιότητος ἕρξας γένους τινὸς οὐσίᾳ περιβάληται. (285a4-285b6) 
     Stranger: … But because of their151 not being accustomed  
to carrying on their investigations by dividing according to real classes,  
the people in question throw these things together at once, despite the  
degree of difference between them, thinking them alike – and then again  
they also do the opposite of this by dividing other things not according  
to parts, when the rule is that when one perceives first the community  
between the members of a group of many things, one should not desist  
until one sees in it all those differences that are located in classes, and  
conversely, with the various unlikenesses, when they are seen in  
multitudes, one should be incapable of pulling a face and stopping before  
one has penned all the related things within one likeness and actually  
surrounded them in some real class. 
 
45. 286d6-9:  
     ΞΕ. …τό τε αὖ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ προβληθέντος ζήτησιν, 
ὡς ἂν ῥᾷστα καὶ τάχιστα εὕροιμεν, δεύτερον ἀλλ’ οὐ πρῶτον  
ὁ λόγος ἀγαπᾶν παραγγέλλει, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτον 
τὴν μέθοδον αὐτὴν τιμᾶν τοῦ κατ’ εἴδη δυνατὸν εἶναι διαιρεῖν… (286d6-9)  
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     Stranger: … And again, as for  
what contributes towards the inquiry into the subject set before us, what  
we have said commits us to making a second and not a first priority of  
the question how we might find it most easily and quickly, and to give  
by far the greatest and primary value to the pursuit itself of the ability to  
divide by classes. (pg. 329) 
46. 287c3-5:  
     ΞΕ. Κατὰ μέλη τοίνυν αὐτὰς οἷον ἱερεῖον διαιρώμεθα, 
ἐπειδὴ δίχα ἀδυνατοῦμεν. δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἐγγύτατα ὅτι 
μάλιστα τέμνειν ἀριθμὸν ἀεί. (5) (287c3-5) 
     Stranger: Then let’s divide them limb by limb, like a sacrificial animal,  
since we can’t do it into two. For we must always cut into the nearest  
number so far as we can. (pg. 330). 
 
47. 291e1-5:  
(e)      ΞΕ. Πρὸς τὸ βίαιόν που καὶ ἑκούσιον ἀποσκοποῦντες 
νῦν καὶ πενίαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ νόμον καὶ ἀνομίαν ἐν αὐταῖς  
γιγνόμενα διπλῆν ἑκατέραν τοῖν δυοῖν διαιροῦντες μοναρχίαν 
μὲν προσαγορεύουσιν ὡς δύο παρεχομένην εἴδη δυοῖν ὀνόμασι, 
τυραννίδι, τὸ δὲ βασιλικῇ. (5) (291e1-5) 
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     Stranger: I think that as things are people refer to the aspects of force  
and consent, poverty and wealth, and law and lawlessness as they occur  
in them, and use these to divide each of the first two types into two. So  
they call monarchy by two names, on the grounds that it exhibits two  
forms, the one ‘tyrannical,’ the other ‘kingly’ monarchy. (pg. 335)  
 
48. 302d6:  
     ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς δή; καὶ τίνι διαιροῦντες ταύτην; (302d6) 





Note: surrounding text has been included to provide context for discussion  
    ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ φωνὴν ἄπειρον κατενόησεν εἴτε τις θεὸς 
εἴτε καὶ θεῖος ἄνθρωπος—ὡς λόγος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Θεῦθ τινα  
τοῦτον γενέσθαι λέγων, ὃς πρῶτος τὰ φωνήεντα ἐν τῷ  
ἀπείρῳ κατενόησεν οὐχ ἓν ὄντα ἀλλὰ πλείω, καὶ πάλιν  
(c) ἕτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὔ, φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντά τινος, ἀριθμὸν  
δέ τινα καὶ τούτων εἶναι, τρίτον δὲ εἶδος γραμμάτων διε- 
στήσατο τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν· τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διῄρει  
τά τε ἄφθογγα καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, καὶ τὰ φωνή- 
                                                 
152 Translations by Dorothea Frede (cited under Plato in Works Cited), with modifications. 
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εντα καὶ τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἕως ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν (5) 
λαβὼν ἑνί τε ἑκάστῳ καὶ σύμπασι στοιχεῖον ἐπωνόμασε·  
καθορῶν δὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδ’ ἂν ἓν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἄνευ 
πάντων αὐτῶν μάθοι, τοῦτον τὸν δεσμὸν αὖ λογισάμενος ὡς 
(d) ὄντα ἕνα καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἕν πως ποιοῦντα μίαν ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς 
ὡς οὖσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθέγξατο προσειπών. (18b5-18d2) 
 
    Socrates: The way some god or god-inspired man discovered that vocal 
sound is unlimited, as tradition in Egypt claims for a certain deity called 
Theuth. He was the first to discover that the vowels in that unlimited 
variety are not one but several, and again that there are others that are 
not voiced, but make some kind of noise, and that they, too, have a number. 
As a third kind of letters he established the ones we now call mute. After  
this he further subdivided the ones without sound or mutes down to every  
single unit. In the same fashion he also dealt with the vowels and the  
intermediates, until he had found out the number for each one of them, 
and then he gave all of them together the name “letter.” And as he realized 
that none of us could gain any knowledge of a single one of them, taken 
by itself without understanding them all, he considered that the one link 
that somehow unifies them all and called it the art of literacy. (pg. 406) 
 
50. 20a5-8:  
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     ΠΡΩ. … βουλεύου δὴ πρὸς ταῦτα αὐτὸς πότερον ἡδονῆς (5) 
εἴδη σοι καὶ ἐπιστήμης διαιρετέον ἢ καὶ ἐατέον, εἴ πῃ καθ’ 
ἕτερόν τινα τρόπον οἷός τ’ εἶ καὶ βούλει δηλῶσαί πως ἄλλως  
τὰ νῦν ἀμφισβητούμενα παρ’ ἡμῖν. (20a5-8) 
Protarchus: …It is up to you to decide whether for this purpose you need to  
divide off different kinds of pleasure and knowledge or can leave that out, if you  
are able and willing to show some other way to settle the issues of our  
controversy. (pg. 407)  
 
51. 20c4-6:  
     ΣΩ. Τῶν δέ γε εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἰδῶν ἡδονῆς οὐδὲν ἔτι  
προσδεησόμεθα κατ’ ἐμὴν δόξαν. προϊὸν δ’ ἔτι σαφέστερον (5) 
δείξει. (20c4-6) 
     Socrates: So we will not have to worry any longer, I think, about the  
division of the kinds of pleasure. But further progress will show this 
more clearly. (pg. 408) 
 
52. 48d6:  
 








     ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔτι διαιρετέον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, δίχα, εἰ 
μέλλομεν τὸν παιδικὸν ἰδόντες φθόνον ἄτοπον ἡδονῆς καὶ  
λύπης ὄψεσθαι μεῖξιν. (49a7-9) 
 
     Socrates: So we must continue with our division of ignorance, Protarchus,  
if we want to find out what a strange mixture of pleasure and pain  
this comic malice is. (pg. 438) 
 
54. 49b6-49c1:  
 
     ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ τοίνυν δίελε, καὶ ὅσοι μὲν αὐτῶν εἰσι μετ’  
ἀσθενείας τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καταγελώμενοι τιμωρεῖσθαι, 
γελοίους τούτους φάσκων εἶναι τἀληθῆ φθέγξῃ· τοὺς δὲ  
δυνατοὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰσχυροὺς φοβεροὺς καὶ ἐχθροὺς  
(c) προσαγορεύων ὀρθότατον τούτων σαυτῷ λόγον ἀποδώσεις. (49b6-49c1) 
 
     Socrates: So make this the point of division. All those who combine  
                                                 
153 i.e., the division of the disposition of not knowing oneself 
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this delusion with weakness and are unable to avenge themselves when  
they are laughed at, you are justified in calling ridiculous. But as for those 
who do have the power and strength to take revenge, if you call them 
dangerous and hateful, you are getting exactly the right conception about 




APPENDIX B:  




Definition of love: 
 
1. 265a6-7: 
     ΣΩ. … μανίαν γάρ τινα ἐφήσαμεν εἶναι  
τὸν ἔρωτα. (265a6-7) 




Definition of the angler: 
 
2. 221b2-221c3: 
     ΞΕ. ... συμπάσης γὰρ τέχνης  
τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ μέρος κτητικὸν ἦν, κτητικοῦ δὲ χειρωτικόν, 
                                                 
154 Translation by A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff (cited under Plato in Works Cited), with modifications. 
 
155 Translations by Nicholas P. White (cited under Plato in Works Cited), with modifications. 
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χειρωτικοῦ δὲ θηρευτικόν, τοῦ δὲ θηρευτικοῦ ζῳοθηρικόν,  
ζῳοθηρικοῦ δὲ ἐνυγροθηρικόν, ἐνυγροθηρικοῦ δὲ τὸ κάτωθεν (5) 
τμῆμα ὅλον ἁλιευτικόν, ἁλιευτικῆς δὲ πληκτικόν, πληκ- 
τικῆς δὲ ἀγκιστρευτικόν· τούτου δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν κάτωθεν 
(c) ἄνω πληγὴν ἀνασπωμένην, ἀπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς πράξεως ἀφομοιωθὲν  
τοὔνομα, ἡ νῦν ἀσπαλιευτικὴ ζητηθεῖσα ἐπίκλην  
γέγονεν. (221b2-221c3) 
 
     Stranger: … For of art as a whole one half was acquisitive; half of the acquisitive  
was coercive; half of the coercive was hunting; half of hunting was animal-hunting;  
half of animal-hunting was aquatic hunting; all of the lower portion of aquatic  
hunting was fishing; half of fishing was hunting by striking; and half of  
striking was hooking. And the part of hooking that involves a blow drawing  
a thing upward from underneath is called by a name that’s derived by its  
similarity to the action itself, that is, it’s called draw-fishing or angling  –  which  
is what we’re searching for. (pg. 241) 
 
Definitions of the sophist: 
 
3. Definition 1 (223b1-7): 
 
(b)     ΞΕ. Κατὰ δὴ τὸν νῦν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, λόγον, ὡς ἔοικεν, 
ἡ τέχνης οἰκειωτικῆς, <χειρωτικῆς>, [κτητικῆς,] θηρευτικῆς, 
Pasqualoni 323 
 
ζῳοθηρίας, [πεζοθηρίας,] χερσαίας, [ἡμεροθηρικῆς,] ἀνθρω- 
ποθηρίας, <πιθανοθηρίας>, ἰδιοθηρίας, [μισθαρνικῆς,] νομισ- 
ματοπωλικῆς, δοξοπαιδευτικῆς, νέων πλουσίων καὶ ἐνδόξων (5) 
γιγνομένη θήρα προσρητέον, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος ἡμῖν συμβαίνει,  
σοφιστική.  (223b1-7) 
 
     Stranger: So according to our account now, Theaetetus, it seems that this  
sort of expertise belongs to appropriation, taking possession, hunting,  
animal-hunting, hunting on land, human hunting, hunting by persuasion,  
hunting privately, and money-earning. It’s the hunting of rich, prominent  
young men. And according to the way our account has turned out, it’s  
what should be called the expertise of the sophist (pg. 243). 
 
4. Definition 2 (224c9-224d2):  
 
     ΞΕ. ... ἴθι δὴ νῦν συναγάγωμεν αὐτὸ λέ-  
γοντες ὡς τὸ τῆς κτητικῆς, μεταβλητικῆς, ἀγοραστικῆς, (10) 
(d) ἐμπορικῆς, ψυχεμπορικῆς περὶ λόγους καὶ μαθήματα ἀρετῆς 
πωλητικὸν δεύτερον ἀνεφάνη σοφιστική. (224c9-224d2) 
     Stranger: …Come on now and let’s collect it all together. We’ll say  
that the expertise of the part of acquisition, exchange, selling,  
wholesaling, and soul-wholesaling, dealing in words and learning  
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that have to do with virtue – that’s sophistry in its second appearance (pg. 245).  
 
5. Definition 3 (224d4-7): 
 
     ΞΕ. Τρίτον δέ γ’ οἶμαί σε, κἂν εἴ τις αὐτοῦ καθιδρυμένος 
ἐν πόλει, τὰ μὲν ὠνούμενος, τὰ δὲ καὶ τεκταινόμενος αὐτὸς (5) 
μαθήματα περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πωλῶν, ἐκ τούτου τὸ ζῆν  
προυτάξατο, καλεῖν οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν ὅπερ νυνδή. (224d4-7) 
 
     Stranger: In the third place I think you’d call somebody just the same  
thing if he settled here in the city and undertook to make his living selling 
those same things, both ones that he’d bought and ones that he’d made 
himself. (pg. 245) 
 
6. Definition 4 (224e1-4):  
 
(e)     ΞΕ. Καὶ τὸ κτητικῆς ἄρα μεταβλητικόν, ἀγοραστικόν, 
καπηλικὸν εἴτε αὐτοπωλικόν, ἀμφοτέρως, ὅτιπερ ἂν ᾖ περὶ 
τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθηματοπωλικὸν γένος, ἀεὶ σὺ προσερεῖς, ὡς  
φαίνῃ, σοφιστικόν. (224e1-4) 
 
     Stranger: So apparently you’ll still say that sophistry falls under acquisi- 
tion, exchange, and selling, either by retailing things that others make or  
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by selling things that he makes himself. It’s the retail sale of any learning  
that has to do with the sorts of things we mentioned. (pg. 245) 
 
7. Definition 5 (226a1-4):  
 
(a)      ΞΕ. Οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ χρηματιστικὸν γένος, ὡς ἔοικεν, 
ἐριστικῆς ὂν τέχνης, τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς, τῆς ἀμφισβητητικῆς, 
τῆς μαχητικῆς, τῆς ἀγωνιστικῆς, τῆς κτητικῆς ἔστιν, ὡς 
ὁ λόγος αὖ μεμήνυκε νῦν, ὁ σοφιστής. (226a1-4) 
 
     Stranger: It seems his type is precisely the money-making branch of exper- 
tise in debating, disputation, controversy, fighting, combat, and acquisition.  
According to what our account shows us now, that’s the sophist. (pg. 246) 
 
8. Definition 6 (231b3-231b8):  
 
     ΞΕ. Ἔστω δὴ διακριτικῆς τέχνης καθαρτική, καθαρτικῆς  
δὲ τὸ περὶ ψυχὴν μέρος ἀφωρίσθω, τούτου δὲ διδασκαλική,  
διδασκαλικῆς δὲ παιδευτική· τῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς ὁ περὶ τὴν (5) 
μάταιον δοξοσοφίαν γιγνόμενος ἔλεγχος ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ  
παραφανέντι μηδὲν ἄλλ’ ἡμῖν εἶναι λεγέσθω πλὴν ἡ γένει 




     Stranger: So let it be the cleansing part of the expertise of discriminating  
things; and let it be marked off as the part of that which concerns souls;  
and within that it’s teaching; and within teaching it’s education. And let’s  
say that within education, according to the way the discussion has turned  
now, the refutation of the empty belief in one’s own wisdom is nothing  
other than our noble sophistry. (pg. 251) 
 
9. Definition 7 (268c8-268d4):  
 
     ΞΕ. Τὸ δὴ τῆς ἐναντιοποιολογικῆς εἰρωνικοῦ μέρους 
τῆς δοξαστικῆς μιμητικόν, τοῦ φανταστικοῦ γένους ἀπὸ τῆς 
(d) εἰδωλοποιικῆς οὐ θεῖον ἀλλ’ ἀνθρωπικὸν τῆς ποιήσεως 
ἀφωρισμένον ἐν λόγοις τὸ θαυματοποιικὸν μόριον, “ταύτης 
τῆς γενεᾶς τε καὶ αἵματος” ὃς ἂν φῇ τὸν ὄντως σοφιστὴν 
εἶναι, τἀληθέστατα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐρεῖ. (268c8-268d4) 
 
     Stranger: Imitation of the contrary-speech-producing, insincere and un- 
knowing sort, of the appearance-making kind of copy-making, the word- 
juggling part of production that’s marked off as human and not divine.  
Anyone who says the sophist is of this “blood and family” will be saying, 






10. Definition 1 (267a8-267c3): 
 
     ΞΕ. Τῆς γνωστικῆς τοίνυν ἐπιστήμης ἡμῖν ἦν κατ’ ἀρχὰς 
μέρος ἐπιτακτικόν· τούτου δὲ ἀπεικασθὲν τὸ μόριον αὐτεπι-  
(b) τακτικὸν ἐρρήθη. ζῳοτροφικὴ δὲ πάλιν αὐτεπιτακτικῆς οὐ τὸ 
σμικρότατον τῶν γενῶν ἀπεσχίζετο· καὶ ζῳοτροφικῆς εἶδος  
ἀγελαιοτροφικόν, ἀγελαιοτροφικοῦ δ’ αὖ πεζονομικόν· τοῦ δὲ  
πεζονομικοῦ μάλιστα ἀπετέμνετο τέχνη τῆς ἀκεράτου φύσεως  
θρεπτική. ταύτης δ’ αὖ τὸ μέρος οὐκ ἔλαττον τριπλοῦν (5) 
συμπλέκειν ἀναγκαῖον, ἂν εἰς ἕν τις αὐτὸ ὄνομα συναγαγεῖν 
βουληθῇ, γενέσεως ἀμείκτου νομευτικὴν ἐπιστήμην προσ-  
(c) αγορεύων. τὸ δ’ ἀπὸ τούτου τμῆμα, ἐπὶ ποίμνῃ δίποδι μέρος  
ἀνθρωπονομικὸν ἔτι λειφθὲν μόνον, τοῦτ’ αὐτό ἐστιν ἤδη τὸ 
ζητηθέν, ἅμα βασιλικὸν ταὐτὸν κληθὲν καὶ πολιτικόν. 
(267a8-267c3) 
     Stranger: Well then: of theoretical knowledge, we had at the beginning  
a directive part; and of this, the section we wanted was by analogy said  
to be ‘self-directing.’ Then again, rearing of living creatures, not the smallest  
of the classes of self-directing knowledge, was split off from it; then a  
herd-rearing form from rearing of living creatures, and from that, in turn,  
                                                 
156 Translations by C.J. Rowe (cited under Plato in Works Cited), with modifications. 
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rearing of what goes on foot; and from that, as the relevant part, was cut  
off the expertise of rearing the hornless sort. Of this in turn the part must  
be woven together as not less than triple, if one wants to bring it together  
into a single name, calling it knowledge of rearing of non-interbreeding  
creatures. The segment from this, a part relating to a two-footed flock,  
concerned with rearing of human beings, still left on its own – this very  
part is now what we were looking for, the same thing we call both kingly 
and statesmanlike. (pg. 308) 
 
11. Definition 2 (311b7-311c6): 
 
     ΞΕ. Τοῦτο δὴ τέλος ὑφάσματος εὐθυπλοκίᾳ συμπλακὲν 
γίγνεσθαι φῶμεν πολιτικῆς πράξεως τὸ τῶν ἀνδρείων καὶ 
σωφρόνων ἀνθρώπων ἦθος, ὁπόταν ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ φιλίᾳ κοινὸν  
(c) συναγαγοῦσα αὐτῶν τὸν βίον ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη, πάντων 
μεγαλοπρεπέστατον ὑφασμάτων καὶ ἄριστον ἀποτελέσασα  
[ὥστ’ εἶναι κοινόν] τούς τ’ ἄλλους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πάντας 
δούλους καὶ ἐλευθέρους ἀμπίσχουσα, συνέχῃ τούτῳ τῷ πλέ- 
γματι, καὶ καθ’ ὅσον εὐδαίμονι προσήκει γίγνεσθαι πόλει (5) 




     Stranger: Then let us say that this marks the completion of the fabric  
which is the product of the art of statesmanship: the weaving together,  
with regular intertwining, of the dispositions of brave and moderate  
people – when the expertise belonging to the king brings their life together 
in agreement and friendship and makes it common between them, completing  
the most magnificent and best of all fabrics and covering with it all the  
other inhabitants of cities, both slave and free; and holds them together  
with this twining and rules and directs without, so far as it belongs to a  
city to be happy, falling short of that in any respect. (pg. 358) 
 
